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ABSTRACT 
PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 
This thesis supports the view that mathematics teachers should be 
aware of differing views of the nature of mathematics and of a range of 
teaching perspectives. The first part of the thesis discusses differing 
ways in which the subject 'mathematics' can be identified, by relying on 
existing philosophy of mathematics. The thesis describes three tradition- 
ally recognised philosophies of mathematics: logicism, formalism and 
intuitionism. A fourth philosophy is constructed, the hypothetical, bring- 
ing together the ideas of Peirce and of Lakatos, in particular. 
The second part of the thesis introduces differing ways of teaching 
mathematics, and identifies the logical and sometimes contingent connections 
that exist between the philosophies of mathematics discussed in part 1, and 
the philosophies of mathematics teaching that arise in part 2. Four teach- 
ing perspectives are outlined: the teaching of mathematics as aesthetically- 
orientated, the teaching of mathematics as a game, the teaching of mathematics 
as a member of the natural sciences, and the teaching of mathematics as 
technology-orientated. It is argued that a possible fifth perspective, 
the teaching of mathematics as a language, is not a distinctive approach. 
A further approach, the Inter-disciplinary perspective, is recognised as 
a valid alternative within previously identified philosophical constraints. 
Thus parts 1 and 2 clarify the range of interpretations found in both 
the philosophy of mathematics and of mathematics teaching and show that 
they present realistic choices for the mathematics teacher. The founda- 
tions are thereby laid for the arguments generated in part 3, that any 
mathematics teacher ought to appreciate the full range of teaching 
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perspectives which may be chosen and how these link to views of the nature 
of mathematics. This would hopefully reverse 'the trend at the moment... 
towards excessively narrow interpretation of the subject' as reported by 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate (Aspects of Secondary Education in England, 
7.6.20, H. M. S. O., 1979). 
While the thesis does not contain infallible prescriptions it is 
concluded that the technology-orientated perspective supported by the 
hypothetical philosophy of mathematics facilitates the aims of those 
educators who show concern for the recognition of mathematics in the 
curriculum, both for its intrinsic and extrinsic value. But the main 
thrust of the thesis is that the training of future mathematics educators 
must include opportunities for gaining awareness of the diversity of 
teaching perspectives and the influence on them of philosophies of 
mathematics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the last twenty-five years there have been radical changes in 
the mathematics taught in primary and secondary schools, and in universities 
and other institutions of higher education. If one had been studying for a 
first degree in mathematics just ten years ago, one's first acquaintance 
with the term 'set', would probably have come in the first or even the 
second year of that degree. To-day, a five or six year-old may be intro- 
duced to terms like 'set' and 'intersection' in his first year of primary 
education. This is indicative of the kind of change that has occurred in 
the last two decades. It is likely that twenty-five years ago the only 
people acquainted with the language of set theory as students, were those 
that chose such or related areas of specialisation at higher degree level. 
Mathematics education has been a growing focus for debate in the last decade 
particularly, but while practising teachers and several schools of psychology, 
like those following Piaget, Dienes and more recently Skemp, have written 
extensively on the subject of mathematics education, philosophers have 
generally chosen to remain silent on the subject. 
Philosophers may have believed that they have nothing useful to say 
on the subject of mathematics education. If this is the case, than this 
thesis attempts to prove them wrong. The intention is to break the silence 
and to lay out for mathematics educators, at whatever level they may teach, 
the diverse nature of both mathematics and mathematics teaching, as 
philosophical analysis identifies it. By clarifying existing distinctions 
and by introducing some new ones, the intention of this thesis is to show 
that philosophy can usefully contribute to the ongoing debate on mathematics 
education. Not all the distinctions are new, but by showing their relevance 
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to mathematics education, it is hoped that many people involved in 
mathematics who were previously oblivious to the distinctions will come 
to recognise their relevance to them. Some of these distinctions have 
previously been hidden in philosophy of mathematics courses, and others 
have only arisen since many practising mathematics teachers were trained. 
Furthermore, even those that have experienced much of the contemporary 
debate will have also felt the influence of various writers on the curri- 
culum, most notably of whom has been Professor Hirst. Hirst argues that 
there are 'distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge' and in particular, 
that 'mathematics depends on deductive demonstrations from certain sets 
of axioms' ('Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge' in Philosophical 
Analysis and Education, pages 113 to 138), and that this tidily packages 
away mathematics so that one can go on to discuss other disciplines, with 
greater ambiguity. That the packaging of mathematics is not so tidy was 
a major stimulus to the writing of this thesis, and it is to be hoped that 
the thesis at least succeeds in showing that it is worthwhile looking in 
depth at just one of those 'forms of knowledge', through a philosophical 
microscope. It is not that the thesis attempts to challenge the work of 
Hirst or any other writer in this area, but simply tries to demonstrate 
the value of putting just one discipline under the microscope. By narrow- 
ing down the area of attention in this way, it has been possible to look 
at not only the nature of mathematics, but the teaching of mathematics, 
and the training of teachers of mathematics. 
The thesis is divided into three parts corresponding to the three 
factors just mentioned. The first part considers the nature of mathematics; 
the second identifies differing approaches to mathematics teaching; and the 
third part moves from a consideration of the aims of mathematics education 
to suggesting prerequisites for being a mathematics educator, in so far as 
philosophical analysis can identify such features. Because of personal 
experience, the examples used in the thesis are generally from secondary 
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schools, but much of what is written here could apply to teaching either 
younger or older students. 
The overall coherence of the thesis is demonstrated by the continual 
interplay that is found between views given in one part of the thesis and 
arguments developed in another. While part 2 of the thesis is predomin- 
antly concerned with identifying differing approaches to mathematics 
teaching, logical and sometimes contingent links are shown to exist 
between particular approaches and the philosophies of mathematics, intro- 
duced in part 1. Inevitably, the discussion of mathematics teaching in 
part 2, leads to comments being made on differing notions of mathematics 
education that may seem to underpin particular approaches. In this way, 
part 2 may give a prior glimpse of many of the problems more fully 
developed in the final part of the thesis. It is also the intention of 
this final part, part 3, to show in particular that a philosophical 
critique like this can identify pointers that can be realistically con- 
sidered by practising teachers, and teachers of teachers. Overall it 
is hoped that anyone reading this thesis will recognise the importance 
to mathematics education, of: 
a) different views about the nature of mathematics; 
b) genuine alternatives in the approaches to teaching mathematics; 
c) interconnections between the nature of mathematics and the ways 
it is taught; and 
d) the pro-requisites of teaching mathematics that philosophical 
analysis can identify, given that there are limits to what 
philosophy can appropriately comment on. 
The thesis begins with an historical review of those authors that 
seem most clearly to foreshadow the philosophical movements in mathematics, 
that have developed in the last hundred years. These philosophical 
predecessors stretch back to Plato and forward to the work of Kant. As 
with any selection from more than 2000 years of writings, one could be 
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criticised for leaving out or preferring one philosophy to another. It 
is hoped that the coherence of the thesis will demonstrate that the 
initial choice was correct, although other thinkers, like Mill and Locke 
are mentioned in the main body of the thesis, as they are seen to reflect 
or develop the views of the four philosophers given special attention in 
chapter 1 of the thesis, Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant. The argument 
in favour of this selection and also of the selection of the philosophies 
of mathematics discussed in the proceeding chapters, has been the influence 
that each can be shown to have had, not always directly, on mathematics 
education during the last twenty-five years. Other schools of thought 
and even other branches within the movements selected can be identified, 
but they have been excluded if there did not seem to be clear evidence 
that they were presently influencing mathematics education. While this 
is a contingent matter, it is to be hoped that the rightness of the 
selection does not play a critical part in the validity of the overall 
argument of the thesis. 
While each movement is discussed separately, it is argued that due 
to its complexity and significance across the philosophies of mathematics, 
mathematical truth is not treated within each philosophy but as a separate 
topic in a final chapter to part 1. However, the implications of points 
made in that chapter, stretch throughout the thesis, and are not found 
just in the first part. Although part 1 includes the argument that there 
are various views of the nature of mathematics, it could not be claimed 
that what is provided there is a comprehensive introduction to the 
philosophy of mathematics. Parts 1 and 2 are completed by Conclusions 
which attempt to set the scene for the next part, and to review briefly 
the argument of that part. It is to be hoped that these few comments 
have set the scene not only for part 1 of this thesis, but also for the thesis 
as a whole. 
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PART 1: PHILOSOPHIES OF MATHEMATICS 
CHAPTER1 
WHAT IS MATHEMATICS? 
While the concentration of this first part of the thesis will be on 
the philosophies of mathematics developed since Frege, these philosophies 
were influenced by earlier presentations of related and sometimes identical 
questions. Two such questions are taken as central to the discussions 
that occur in this and the next three chapters. These two questions are: 
1) Are there eternal objects of mathematics? 
2) Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 'empirical sciences'? 
The responses to these two questions as they occur in the works of Plato, 
Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant1 will provide the body of this chapter, but 
connections will be noted between these responses and those of contemporary 
philosophers of mathematics. By putting the focus on a third question, the 
ideas of the first four chapters are brought together in the final chapter 
of this part of the thesis. This third question is: 
3) What is identified by the phrase 'mathematical truth' and 
how is 'mathematical truth' demonstrated? 
1. Four philosophers are chosen to represent ideas produced over 2000 
years. Plato and Aristotle are chosen because they set up the funda- 
mental alternatives to which all later philosophers of mathematics 
have returned. Leibniz is chosen because he influences the founda- 
tion of contemporary positions and incorporates views on both Plato 
and Aristotle and also on significant contemporaries like Descartes, 
Hobbes and Newton. Kant is similar to Leibniz as he lays future 
foundations and enounces the views of contemporaries, particularly 
Hume. Other philosophers are noted where their influence on later 
thinkers is explicit (see, mention of Locke's influence on Peirce 
in Chapter 4, and of Mill's attempt to reduce Mathematics to an 
empirical science and how it contrasts with the views of Popper and 
Lakatos). 
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Through the responses to these three questions, a set of possible models 
of mathematics will be built up and it will be the objective of the second 
part of the thesis to see how each model influences the teaching of 
mathematics. For example, if one argues that mathematics is highly 
abstract and to be mathematically educated one must have first-hand 
appreciation of its abstract nature then this will have implications for 
the teaching of mathematics. There is an obvious correspondence between 
these three questions and the criteria given by Paul Hirst of a 'Form of 
Knowledge'. 1 Hirst is concerned to identify 'categorial concepts', 
'unity formed by "relationships with particular social patterns"', and 
'truth criteria'. 
2 Like the questions given above, the result is to 
outline: 
1) The ontological status of ultimate concepts - in this 
case, the foundations of mathematics. 
2) The discreteness or otherwise of the discipline which 
may or may not lead one to give it major importance in 
establishing a curriculum - in this case, reasons will 
be developed for the position of mathematics in the 
curriculum. 
3) The epistemological nature of the discipline - in this 
case, how one can demonstrate the truth of a mathematical 
proposition. 
1. See P. H. Hirst, 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge', in 
Philosophical Analysis and Education, edited by R. D. Archambault. 
On the question of discreteness, it is not assumed that 'logic and 
mathematics' are to be taken as one, with regard to question 2). The 
relationship between 'mathematics' and 'logic' is discussed where 
appropriate. 
2. In a letter, published in the Journal of Further and Higher Education, 
4(1), Spring 1980, Hirst spells out the main points of his theory of 
knowledge and that it rests in 'humanly created social "forms of life"' 
and not a transcendental reality. Furthermore, 'It is not the search 
for complex family resemblances that helps to demarcate the forms of 
knowledge. It is by the drawing of lines in terms of mutually 
irreducible truth criteria that we can make progress, I think. It is 
primarily by looking at differences that we can distinguish the different 
families, not by looking for subtle and often elusive resemblances. ' (pp. 122-3). 
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The separation of the epistemological question for treatment in a separate 
chapter, and related appendix, is justified by the complexities of 
responses, very few of which can be understood in isolation from earlier 
developments, and the inappropriateness of identifying 'camps' on this 
issue. For example, Quine and Lakatos both reject 'analytic truth', but 
Lakatos is as strongly against Quine's logic-based version of Pragmatism 
as he is, against any metamathematics. Furthermore, truth has been a 
central issue again, in the last two or three decades, rather than at 
the time of those who founded the movements to be discussed in Chapters 
2,3 and 4. This is not to exclude some discussion of epistemological 
questions in these chapters. 
1 This separation may be justified from 
another direction. There is a need to present a set of clear responses 
to the ontological question first, because several philosophers rest their 
explanations of the epistemological problem, logically, on their ontological 
positions. Plato's 'realism' supports his 'correspondence theory of truth' 
and two thousand years later, Hilbert's 'realism' supports his 'coherent 
theory of proof'. 
Before one attempts to discuss possible responses to the three 
questions identified on the previous page, it is important to clarify the 
ways in which certain terms will be used in this thesis, in order to reduce 
ambiguity. 
Realism and Idealism: The words 'realism' and 'idealism' may be preceded 
either by the adjective 'ontological' or 'epistemological'. Furthermore, 
someone may hold differing views according to the context being considered, 
and so it should be assumed throughout this thesis, unless explicit mention 
1. Dummett argues in his article, 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuition- 
istic Logic' that an answer to the ontological question is necessarily 
incomplete, prior to considering an answer to the epistemological 
question (Truth and other Enigmas, p. 230). Thus the conclusion to 
Chapter 5 has the function of drawing together the arguments of 
earlier chapters, as well as the epistemological points made in 
Chapter 5 itself. 
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is made to the contrary, that the context considered is the mathematical 
one. Thus, 
Ontological Realism is to be taken as any theory that asserts the independent 
existence of objects (i. e. in no sense man-made), which man can experience 
directly, either through his senses or through his reason. 
Epistemological Realism is to be taken as any theory that asserts some 
truths hold independently of any particular mind. 
Ontological Idealism and epistemological Idealism are to be taken as 
theories where dependence, rather than independence is asserted, in each 
of the previous definitions. 
QJESTION ONE: Are there eternal obiects of mathematics? 
Plato has one reply for most of his life, and a modified position 
towards the and of his life. As Plato explains in the Republic and in 
the Phaedo, experience of reality occurs when the mind apprehends the 
Forms. Mathematical objects are Forms. That is to say that there is a 
form 'one-ness', 'two-ness', and so on. These entities are precise, 
timeless and independent but limited in number. It is this last considera- 
tion that leads Plato to indicate the possibility of changes in his theory, 
in the Timaeus, the Lawsl and the Philebus. In a simple mathematical 
proposition like '1 +1=2, both l's refer to the same 'oneness' and so 
it is difficult to conceive of the independent existence of the reality 
to which the mathematical proposition corresponds. In other words, the 
Platonic heaven has only one '1'. The solution chosen by Plato is to 
posit an intermediary world between 'sensible world' and the 'reality 
of the Forms' where there are mathematical objects in abundance. Multi- 
tudes of l's and so on, exist as 'intermediate mathematical objects'. 
2 
1. Compare Plato's view of Mathematics in Phaedo 101A-102B with his 
later view in Ph 1 bu 16C-18D. See discussion of this change in 
Gulley, pp. 172-86. 
2. This phrase is referred to by Gulley as used by Aristotle in 
the Metaphysics to explain Plato's change of view. 
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Leibniz discusses this same problem, but provides his own response. 
When two and two are said to make four, the latter two 
must be different from the former. If they were the same, 
nothing new would result; it would be just as if, for a joke, 
I wanted to make six eggs out of three by first counting 
three eggs, then taking away one and counting the remaining 
two, and finally taking one away again and counting the 
remaining one. But in the calculus of numbers and magnitudes, 
A, B or other signs do not stand for a certain thing, but for 
any thing of the same number of congruent parts. For any two 
feet are signified by 2, if a foot is the unit or measure, 
whence 2+2 makes something new, 4, and 3 by 3 makes some- 
thing new, 9; for it is presupposed that what are used are 
always different (though of the same magnitude). 
(Leibniz : Logical PaiDers, p. 143 (from Gerhardt, vii, 246). 
This seems to me to encapsulate Leibniz's rejection of 'Platonic Forms' 
and its corresponding 'realm of mathematical objects'. Truths of reason 
which include those of mathematics are 'intensional propositions' rather 
than 'extensional propositions', truths of fact. 'Extensional propositions' 
employ concepts that are defined by man, but do not necessarily identify 
an object, and so one must look to the external world for an answer. 
' 
In this extract from Leibniz's works one has the critical clues to 
his Ontological Idealism. '2 +2= 4' means: 
1) The concept of 4 INCLUDES the concept of 2+2. 
2) Reference is to concepts and not to objects: these 
concepts are mental constructs: so, '2 +2 makes 
something new, 4'. 
Here there is the possibility of complete analysis (1) and complete 
synthesis (2). In the case of 'two feet of material bought to-day and 
1. Leibniz was particularly concerned to distinguish 'extension' from 
'intension'. In his view, mathematical concepts are intensional, and 
like any 'truth of reason' can be completely defined by man. That is, 
given any 'new property', a man can know whether or not it is included 
within that complete definition of the concept, e. g. Is '6' a factor 
of '36'?: the answer is necessarily, 'yea', for 36 =6x6,4 x 9, and 
so on, as defined within arithmetic. On the other hand, if one is 
asked 'Does Joe eat cabbages? ', then there is no way one can 
automatically search through the definition of 'Joe' to find the 
property, 'eats cabbages', for it is a matter of fact. In Physics 
one may posit 'pulse' and employ the concept in propositions. The 
truth of the propositions remains empirical. 
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two feet bought later', the total making 'four feet' is not a truth of 
reason, for no man has the complete conception of material, that would 
be the case in 'intensional' examples. Here one must refer to a world 
independent of man and not just to 'ideas'. There is a modification of 
'truths of fact' in Leibniz's later work, where he suggests that they be 
treated as 'hypothetical propositions' (Leibniz: Logical Papers, p. 121) 
on the basis that if certain conditions are known to God and assumed by 
man, then the truth follows necessarily. Thus, if material does subdivide 
or join together, 'two feet of material bought to-day and two feet bought 
later will make four feet'. Leibniz rejects the Platonic 'reality' but 
retains the 'analytic a priority' of mathematical propositions. 
1 
Leibniz 
was aware of certain difficulties in the reference of true propositions 
well before Frege was to stumble because of them. 
2 
Leibniz uses the 
example, 'Every perfectly good man is happy' to indicate an analytic 
proposition whose truth is independent of the existence of the subject, 
'good man'. It is this 'ideal' feature that makes the proposition not 
just analytic, but analytic a Priori. 
3 
Similarly, 1,000,000 + 2,000,000 = 
3,000,000 is true whether or not 3,000,000 of things exist anywhere. 
If one were looking at Leibniz's total ontology then further parallels 
with Plato could be drawn, but Leibniz's monads identify individual sub- 
stances, while Forms are universals. However, their agreement on the 
existence of a transcendental reality is not to contradict their disagree- 
ment as to whether or not mathematical objects belong to that reality. A 
similar partial agreement and disagreement occurs between Aristotle and 
Plato. 
Aristotle discusses, much more fully than Plato had done himself, 
1. The implications for mathematical truth of these comments will be 
fully discussed in Chapter 5. 
2. See Chapter 2 for details of Frege's position and criticisms of it. 
Some indications were given on p. 15 above. 
3. 'Analytic a Driori' may be taken as synonymous with 'truth of reason'. 
17 
Plato's later modifications of his view of mathematics. Aristotle sees 
these modifications as a partial admission that the earlier view of the 
Formst was inadequate. For Aristotle, the example, '1,000,000 + 2,000,000 = 
3,000,000' is a proposition which belongs to 'Universal Mathematics' whose 
ontological status is ideal. '1,000,000' has no ontological reality apart 
from '1,000,000 Welshmen' say, but one may pretend such a separation can 
be made. One posits an independent existence for the number. However 
this idealism is not to be confused with the epistemological realism 
inherent in the question, 'what is 1,000,000 + 2,000,000? '. The 
answer '3,000,000' is universally and eternally true, but there is no need 
to match eternal forms to demonstrate this. What are comparable to 
Platonic Forms in Aristotle's theory are his 'categories'. Among these 
categories is that of 'measure' or 'quantity'. This category is exemplified 
when one asks, 'what is the measure of that cat? ', and one replies, 'it is 
two feet long'. The point about a category is that if it makes sense to 
ask of some term in ordinary language, 'what is that? ', then it is always 
possible to answer, by making linkings with each of the categories. Thus 
the cat is not just measurable, but has 'quality', in being a 'black' cat. 
While Aristotle's theory of categories involves assertion of epistemological 
realism, it does not entail any ontological commitments. Thus the categorial 
analysis is as appropriate for a 'Cheshire cat' as 'the cat at No. 3', 
without one believing that 'Cheshire cat' has more than fictional reality. 
2 
1. Reference is again being made to reports of Plato's later work as 
represented by Aristotle in his MetaDhvsics, and discussed by writers 
on Plato, like Gulley. 
2. What arises is the choice between empiricist interpretations of 
Aristotle and more Platonic ones. As A. E. Taylor says (Aristotle, p. 54), 
'he seems to be an empiricist or a Platonist according as you choose 
to remember one-half of his statement or the other. ' (The Empiricist 
interpretations of Aristotle echo strongly Locke's distinction between 
'idea' and 'quality', which leads Locke to the idealism, one finds in 
Essas Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 8, 'ideas are 
the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves. 
But-the quality produced hath commonl no resemblance with anything 
in the thing producing it... ' (pp. 72-3)). Aristotle may be seen as 
placing each concept under various categories, in order to define the 
term, i. e. answer the question, 'what is that? '. 
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While some interpret Aristotle's theory of universal mathematics 
as based upon 'abstraction from sense experience', others like Koerner, 
prefer, 'A variant of this interpretation (which) would be to say that 
the empirical apple is one, in the sense that it is a member of the class 
of mathematical units, just as it is red in the sense that it is a member 
of the class of red things. ' (p. 19). 
On all interpretations it is agreed that Aristotle rejects the 
independent existence of 'forms' and explains the non-existence of 
mathematical objects in terms of 'abstraction' or 'idealization'. 
1 
Aristotle describes a system of mathematics as that created and appre- 
hended by the reasoning of mathematicians according to the rules of logic. 
2 
Like Plato's and Leibniz's, this system would consist of analytic a priori 
propositions. Aristotle may be seen therefore as merely modifying Plato's 
ontological position along lines that Aristotle seems to suggest Plato had 
himself tentatively considered. 
Kant has a partial agreement with Plato. However, Kant distinguishes 
'space and time' as parts of the categorial framework by which all 
1. Koerner prefers 'idealizing abstraction' but Miss Anscombe seems to 
suggest that what Aristotle indicates are 'definitions'. Thus, what 
is common to all examples of '24' is the definition by which '24' is 
identified, and the definition has no 'per se existence' but in its 
successful identification 'in substance'. Given Miss Anscombe's 
unhappiness at Russell not recognising similarities between his work 
in the area of 'definite descriptions' and Aristotle's Categories she 
may be suggesting that Aristotle is leaning towards 'Nominalism', as 
Plato set the way to 'Realism'. For 'Nominalism' the word 'unicorn' 
is a sign of something meaningful in a mind but in no way indicates 
an existent 'reference' (Miss Anscombe's contribution on 'Aristotle' 
in 3 Philosophers). 
2. In answering the second question it will be seen that Aristotle makes 
it clear that all science, including mathematics is a deductive system, 
but only mathematics and its propositions are produced by 'idealizing 
abstraction' and established by 'intellectual intuition' 
(O'Connor's 
phrase) independently of qualities of substances; i. e. 'thought' alone 
(see 
pp. 21-2 below). Signs of Aristotle laying the path to Kant's 
synthetic a priori notion are indicated particularly in the De anima, 
where for example, one finds, 'when we think of mathematical objects 
we conceive them, though not in fact separate from matter, as though 
they were separate'. 
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knowledge and understanding is made possible, from mathematics as 'pure 
natural science'. This distinction resembles Aristotle's distinction 
between 'measure' as a category and 'universal mathematics'. As was 
mentioned above, it is left to Aristotle to make claims that Plato had 
also recognised this type of distinction. Certainly, mathematics has a 
central role in Plato's epistemology, throughout his works. Whether or 
not mathematics is identified with the forms or in a world, just below 
them, does not alter Plato's identification of mathematical knowledge as 
a prerequisite of understanding sensible experiences. This resembles at 
least, Kant's view that experience of the physical world depends logically 
upon the categorising framework, of which 'space and time' are critical 
constituents, for it to be comprehended. Now, for Plato, 'astronomy' 
depends upon mathematics, just as for Kant, 'Newtonian mechanics' was 
to be seen as depending upon mathematics. However, mathematics is to be 
taken here, in the sense of 'pure natural science', by which one can 
explain particular empirical situations, rather than as a fundamental 
category. 
1 
That there is this similarity between Plato and Kant ought not to 
give the impression that the closeness covers all their views of mathematics. 
Kant follows Aristotle in denying that mathematical objects have ontological 
reality. One can recognise that Kant's immediate answer to the question, 
'Are there eternal objects of mathematics? ' will be that mathematics 
consists of the 'conceivable' and not the 'perceivable'. The 'perceivable' 
is dependent upon the world, and the 'conceivable' upon man's nature. 
While Kant believed that Euclidean geometry was the only way to make sense 
1. Compare for example, Plato, Laws, Book VII, pp. 818ff., with Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, I, First Division, Chapter II, Section 3. 
Kant distinguishes 'pure natural science', which depends logically 
upon synthetic a priori principles, from other areas like chemistry, 
which are totally synthetic a posteriori, in their foundations. 
This striving for absolutes indicates the extent to which Kant remains 
tied to Rationalist predecessors, rather than to any relativism that 
evolved in the two centuries after his death. 
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of space as man experiences it, he did not deny the logical possibility 
of other geometries, any more than he would deny the conceivability of 
'actual infinity'. Kant limited this, to the belief that, 'we can neither 
perceive nor construct an actually infinite aggregate' 
(Koerner quotes 
Kant, p. 30). However, Kant suggests a slightly tighter notion of the 
limits of mathematics, by requiring that the entities are not to be just 
'conceivable', but 'constructible' in the mind, according to the rules of 
mathematics. It is this linking of the objects of mathematics to what 
can be constructed that indicates the justifiable claim that Kant is the 
father of Intuitionism. 
1 
In such a theory one must ask two questions, 
'Is it conceivable? ' and then, 'Is it constructible? '. In this context, 
'actual infinity' is conceivable but not constructible. Kant criticises 
Aristotle for not recognising that proof that 'actual infinity' is not 
constructible is not to make the phrase meaningless, nor establish that 
God could not construct it. It is worth repeating that 'constructible 
in the mind' is the sign of 'ideas produced' rather than the uncovering 
of objects in a physical or transcendental reality. 
The kinds of responses that Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant would 
make to the first question, 'Are there eternal mathematical objects? ' have 
been considered, and further understanding may be facilitated by consider- 
ing their likely responses to two secondary questions. 
Firstly, they would all reply positively to the question, 'Is there 
mathematics? ', and would also respond positively to the question, 'Is 
there eternal mathematics? ' where the interpretation is that changes in 
empirical states of affairs will not alter mathematics Per as. However 
the responses to the initial question are split on ontological grounds. 
Plato responds without reservations that there are 'eternal mathematical 
1. See the detailed discussion of 'intuitionism' in Chapter 3. 
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objects'. The others refrain from the connotations of 'objects' as 
'extensional' and 'concrete'. Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant all reject 
the strong form of 'Platonic realism', but their alternatives will not 
become fully clear until the epistemological question, 'what is identi- 
fied by the phrase "mathematical truth"? ' is considered at length, in 
Chapter 5. What has been resolved is that 'ontological realism' is 
one distinct position and that there are others like Idealism and 
Nominalism as well as less extreme types of realism, to be seen in more 
developed forms later. 
QUESTION TWO: 'Is "mathematics" logically distinct from the "empirical 
sciences"? ' 
The united reply on this occasion is, 'Yes', BUT with qualifications, 
particularly by Aristotle. This means that a consensus position cannot 
be presented but again each philosopher will be considered separately. 
Aristotle draws upon the special distinction between 'existing 
potentially' and 'existing in actuality'. All 'things that exist poten- 
tially are discovered by being brought to actuality' (Metaphvsics, Book IX, 
Chapter 9). This 'existing potentially' is found in man's thinking. Thus 
one sees a system of 'hypothesis' and 'deductive proof' applicable to all 
science. Whether the hypothesis is, 
'three angles of a triangle add up to two right angles' 
or 'these bulbs planted in this soil will produce tulips', 
does not indicate a difference, nor would the deductive proof based upon 
definitions indicate a difference ('intuitively' established in O'Connor's 
view, but this is open to interpretation as has been indicated earlier). 
However, there is a logical difference in the construction 'in actuality'. 
The 'actuality' of a mathematical example may rest at construction in 
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'thinking' which is itself actuality. 
1 The 'actuality' of a scientific 
example is so, not only in 'thinking' but also necessarily in the construc- 
tion of 'substances', in this case, 'tulips'. However, the fact that the 
'tulips' grow is not the proof of the hypothesis for that is verified, 
like the mathematical one, through the internal coherence of the particular 
scientific system (this will be returned to in Chapter 5). To make this 
last point clearer, the failure of the tulips to grow would not be counted 
as disproof, for given the coherent proof, they 'ought' to grow. 
Thus for Aristotle mathematics is separable logically both from all 
other sciences and from formal logic. Formal logic provides 'the principles 
which are common to all sciences' (Koerner, p. 20), but is not sufficient 
to establish all mathematics for which its own special principles and 
definitions are necessary. Mathematics is separable from all other sciences 
because of the underlying ontological position that tulips exist and it is 
necessarily the case that 'five' and 'seven' do not. 
Like Aristotle, Kant asserts the logical discreteness of mathematics 
from both formal logic and the empirical sciences. The most ready way in 
which one remembers this discreteness claim is in Kant's introduction of 
'synthetic a Priori' for propositions describing universal particulars, 
as mathematical propositions do. Formal logic is analytic a priori' and 
empirical sciences consist of 'synthetic a posteriori' propositions, 
consequent upon synthetic a priori principles. Aristotle may be inter- 
preted as coming towards such a distinction, because he refuses to 
identify mathematics with logic (as Leibniz does), or assert an 'absolute 
1. In The Concept of Mind (pp. 143-7) and in the article, 'Teaching and 
Training' (pp. 109-10, in The Concept of Education), Ryle indicates 
his debt to Aristotle for the classification of 'achievement' verbs 
as distinct from other verbs of activity or process. Furthermore, 
cognitive verbs like 'thinking' and 'deducing' are identified by Ryle 
as resembling 'achievement verbs' but not being members of that class. 
This is directly supportive of Aristotle's separation of them, as 
'actuality verbs'. Another verb of this kind would seem to be 
'teaching' for it too can be used with an in-built success condition, ('You taught only if he learned'). 
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reality' of mathematical objects (as Plato does). As will be noted below, 
Leibniz and Plato have no reason to separate mathematics from logic, but 
Kant is concerned to assert the special relationship between mathematics 
and science, that is, to see the framework of all science as mathematics, 
and the framework of all thinking, including mathematical, and hence 
scientific, as logic. Pure mathematics provides the means by which man 
orders his physical world, according to the constraints of the dimensions 
of 'space' and 'time'. 
1 
This ordered experience of the world is not to 
be confused with the specific study of this world, which is called 'science'. 
Mathematics is not an empirical science for it is a pre-condition of 
empirical science itself. Nor is it just a set of analytic propositions 
(tautologies)2 because mathematical propositions themselves act as 
participant elements in the description of man's physical experiences. 
Mathematics is recognisably distinct therefore. 
For Leibniz, the separation of mathematics from the empirical sciences 
is based largely upon the distinction between 'Truths of Reason' and 'Truths 
of Fact'. 
3 
For Leibniz, anyone who understands the definition of '5' and 
'7' must be contradicting himself necessarily if he denies, '5 +7= 12'. 
The same man is not contradicting himself necessarily if he asserts, 
'5 apples and 7 apples do not make a dozen' or 'salt is not always soluble 
in water'. It is logically possible that what is generally accepted as a 
1. 'Space' itself is describable only because there is a Euclidean 
geometry to provide the vocabulary and 'time' depends upon the 
sequences of arithmetic for its description. However the absoluteness 
of the description of 'space' and 'time' is not evidence, it is to be 
remembered, of the absoluteness of Euclidean geometry (See the earlier 
comment made on p. 19 above). 
2. To be just a set of 'analytic' propositions would make mathematics, 
logic. Analytic propositions are true because the meaning of one 
part of the proposition is included within the meaning of the other 
part. 'All bachelors are unmarried men' or 'all men are bipeds'. 
3. 'Truths of Fact' cannot be unpacked simply by considering the 
definitions of 'the subject' and 'predicate' that constitute all 
Leibniz's propositions. For example, 'every judge is over fifty' 
or 'my friend, John is asleep' are propositions that require 
consideration of empirical evidence for their demonstration. 
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'truth of fact', even in applied mathematics, could be shown to have some 
other answer. As strongly as Leibniz separates mathematics from empirical 
science, he brings mathematics into a unity with logic. He believed that 
there must be one formal system in which all truths of logic and of 
mathematics would be decided. In such a system, any rational man, given 
the right rules and method, would be able to establish the truth of any 
logical or mathematical proposition. The programme is precisely that 
taken up by the Logicists, and the method of arithmetisation was that 
which Goedel was to use to demonstrate the impossibility of the programme. 
l 
As with the logicists, the distinctive terms 'logic' and 'mathematics' 
would cease to exist - 'logic and mathematics' is one form of knowledge. 
While Leibniz saw the unification of science with 'logic and 
mathematics' as possible for God alone - only God can apprehend scientific 
1. From the age of 20, if not earlier, Leibniz uses numbers to indicate 
words and in particular, the terms of geometry. Rather like someone 
coming across Descartes' algebraic representation of Euclidean 
geometry and attempting to simplify it further, he reduces the 
theorems to arithmetic relationships that a machine could carry out. 
In 1679, at the age of 33, Leibniz wrote a paper entitled, 'Rules 
from which a decision can be made, by means of numbers, about the 
validity of inferences and about the forms and moods of categorical 
syllogisms' (Leibniz: Logical Papers, p. 25). Goedel provides a 
proof in 1934 by using the arithmetisation of Z (whose elements are 
the non-negative integers) that there is a statement such that 
neither the statement nor its negation is provable within Z. The 
point of relevance to the present discussion is not Goedel's theorem 
but his method which is to employ the possibility of arithmetising 
formal systems to prove something about statements within the system 
itself. Put very crudely, the idea common to Leibniz and to Goedel 
is that one might link concepts to numbers and by manipulating the 
numbers discover the 'truth or falsity' of the proposition which the 
concepts constitute. Thus Leibniz builds up an arithmetisation of 
geometric terms as in the following example (ibid., pp. 6-7): If 
'Space' is 2; 'Between' is 3; 'Whole' is 10; then 'Interval' is 
2.3.10. An 'interval' is the whole space between (ibid., p. 7). 
Similarly, 'Any term of any proposition,... is to be written as two 
numbers.. . 
For example, let the proposition be "Every wise man is 
pious", and the number corresponding to "pious", + 10 - 3... the two 
numbers of the same term must not have a common divisor.. .A 
true 
universal affirmative proposition, for example 
Every wise man is pious 
+70 -33 +10 -3 
... is one in which any symbolic number of the subject 
(e. g. +70 -33) 
can be divided exactly-by the symbolic number of the same sign 
belonging to the predicate. ' (ibid., p. 26). 
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definitions that involve an infinite number of components - Plato seems 
to have greater faith in 'educated man'. In the Republic, 'dialectics' 
and 'mathematics' are equally dependent upon the reasoned experience of 
their absolute reality, 'the Forms'. That Plato did not extend this 
theory explicitly to astronomy until later works like the Laws, is due 
more to the predominant position of mathematics in Plato's time, than to 
any personal indifference for astronomy. 
1 
For Plato there is no logical 
separation of 'knowledge' for it all exists in the Forms, whether science, 
mathematics, logic or even morals. The earthly world approximates to the 
transcendental reality and the question to be asked in a problem about the 
earthly world is, 'To which principle in the Forms does this problem 
approximate? ' For example, two apples and two apples' approximates to 
'2 + 2' which make '4', and so, 'two apples and two apples make four 
apples'. Thus for Plato, there is absolute knowledge in 'Pure Mathematics' 
and 'Pure Science' as a unified area, to which correspond the approximate 
systems of 'Applied Mathematics' and 'Applied Science'. 
The answers to the second question seem to fit into two kinds. On 
one side, Aristotle and Kant assert the separation of Mathematics from 
both Logic and Science, and on the other side, Plato and Leibniz assert 
the ideal situation in which Logic, Mathematics and Science are unified, 
but Leibniz admits that necessarily given that man is limited, Science 
is separate from the unified system of 'Logic and Mathematics'. 
CONCLUSION: In this chapter the bases of various philosophies of 
mathmatics are laid down. Plato and Leibniz point one unquestionably to 
Logicism, while the concern of Aristotle and Kant for 'constructibility' 
1. See the support given to this in A. E. Taylor's Plato, pp. 292ff. 
and pp. 497ff. For example, p. 293 'the "reduction of all pure 
mathematics to logic" is only a part, and not the most important 
part, of what the Republic understands by "dialectic". Such a 
unification of the sciences as the Republic contemplates would 
require a combination of the reduction of mathematics to logic 
with the Cartesian reduction of the natural sciences to geometry. ' 
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shows the path to Intuitionism. In considering these philosophies and 
others, in greater detail, it will be further indicated how such 
dependence arises. 
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CHAPTER2 
LOGICISM AND FORMALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
With the work of Frege, philosophical interests in the late nine- 
teenth century returned to questions of logic rather than to epistem- 
ology. Aristotle had been the focus of philosophical debate throughout 
the middle ages, until Descartes and others put Aristotle's logic to one 
side and argued that epistemological questions were more fundamental. 
Descartes had been firstly concerned to decide what, if anything, one 
'knows', and then concerned with the logical nature of arguments by 
which one demonstrates that what one 'knows' is true. With the possible 
exception of Leibniz, no philosopher attempted to provide a replacement 
for Aristotelian logic for another two hundred years, until followers of 
Kant, e. g. Fichte and Hegel rejected it, in favour of a dialectical 
approach. The nature of their rejection need not bother us here, as it 
had no immediate consequences for the philosophy of mathematics, and 
does not seem to have made the climate any more receptive to Frege's 
modifications of Aristotelian logic. The stimulus for Frege to produce 
a richer logic did not come from philosophy, but from the range of 
advances just achieved in mathematics. Frege introduced a logic with 
universal quantifiers, the propositional logic, 
1 
which would be a 
1. By 'propositional logic' Frege attempts the symbolic representation 
of propositions not covered by the syllogism-dominated logic of the 
Aristotelians. This logic had been almost exclusively concerned with 
propositions that could be rewritten as one subject with one predicate. 
A typical proposition of this elementary predicate calculus would be, 
'Socrates is bald'. For Frege a necessary part of any useful logic 
would be that predication can occur over several variables - 'Socrates 
is balder than Plato' or 'x ; y'. In this feature Frege returned to 
[Contd. overleaf 
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sufficiently powerful tool to give rigour to the work of Cantor and 
others (for example, in the study of transfinite numbers). So it was, 
that Frege attempted to provide what he believed would be the strongest 
possible support for arithmetic and numerical analysis, 
1 its reduction 
to Logic. This is the essential feature of Logicism. 
Twenty-five years later, Hilbert was able to reflect upon the work 
of Frege and upon challenges to it by Kronecker and Cantor. Thus he 
could set out to produce a theory, free from the paradoxes of set theory. 
2 
In his lecture, 'Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic', he says, 
Arithmetic is often considered to be a part of logic, and 
the traditional fundamental logical notions are usually 
presupposed when it is a question of establishing a founda- 
tion for arithmetic. If we observe attentively, however, 
we realize that in the traditional exposition of the laws 
of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already 
used, for example, the notion of set and, to some extent, 
also that of number. Thus we find ourselves turning in a 
circle, and that is why a partly simultaneous development 
of the laws of logic and of arithmetic is required if 
paradoxes are to be avoided. (Heijenoort, p. 131). 
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developments already indicated in Leibniz's work. However, Frege 
distinguishes the content of a proposition from the judgment or 
assertion about the proposition, i. e. distinguishing '-p' from 
'I-p', 'the meaning of "Socrates is bald"' distinguished from 'the 
assertion that Socrates is bald'. Previously, the two senses had 
been conflated and it was assumed that each proposition was asserted, 
while in the following argument given in Frege's revised calculus, p 
is only asserted in the conclusion: ' E -(not m), -(m or p), ergo 1-p'. 
For Frege, each assertion has a reference, and so the assertion sign 
reduces the unnecessary multiplication of objects. It also separates 
the description of the pieces in the calculus-game from action within 
the game, i. e. 'm' is the description of a piece like 'pawn' in chess, 
while ' f-m' is like a move in chess, say 'pawn to K4'. Previous 
attempts to unseat Aristotle include the works of Occam and BoBthius 
but not until the nineteenth century was there widespread dis- 
satisfaction. 
1. Frege accepted Kant's view of 'geometry' as synthetic a priori and 
not reducible to logic. Whitehead intended to attempt the reduction 
but never did. Hilbert completed an axiomatisation of geometry which 
was sufficient for the Formalist programme, as there was no wish to 
reduce this to logic, but Hilbert later argued that the formal system 
of geometry must be totally subsumable within an axiomatisation of 
arithmetic. 
2. The most famous paradox of set theory is that found by Russell, 'Let 
w be the predicate: to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of 
itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each answer its op osite 
follows. ' (From 'Russell's Letter to Frege', Heijenoort, p. 125). 
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Here Hilbert is establishing the distinctive programme of Formalism, 
as against that of Logicism, as 'the conceptions and means of investiga- 
tion prevalent in logic,..., do not measure up to the rigorous demands 
that set theory imposes'. Hilbert asserts the separate axiomatisation 
of logic and of mathematics, because logic is not in itself sufficiently 
rigorous to be formally decidable and could not encompass mathematics in 
any case without the primary insertions of basic arithmetic terms, i. e. 
these terms are not definable in the terms of logic. alone. Formalism 
attempts the demonstration that mathematics can be seen as a complete 
and consistent1 system of interrelated formulae. Similarly logic would 
be another such system and so on. 
By the first decade of the twentieth century two rival movements 
had been established. It is the replies that they would give to the 
two questions discussed in Chapter 1 that will provide the core to the 
remainder of this chapter. 
QUESTION ONE: Are there eternal Objects of Mathematics? 
Frege asserts unequivocably that the proper explanation of the 
ontology of mathematics is to be platonic. The objects of mathematics 
are not empirical, nor mental, but eternal. Furthermore, no asserted 
proposition may leave any ambiguity as to which object reference is 
being made. Thus, \/4= 
±2 is logically unacceptable as an asserted 
statement, for one does not know if the reference is +2 or -2. Similarly 
one must never fail to make restrictions as to division by zero. 
2 
Thus 
1. By 'complete' one means that every statement within the system is 
either provable or disprovable within the system. By 'consistent' 
one means that there are no pair of statements in the system which 
are both provable and contradict each other. 
2. Frege bases his analysis of logic and the logic of language upon the 
kinds of relationships found in mathematics. Central to mathematics 
is the relation, 'function' and 'argument'. A function, 'y =x+ 3' 
only identifies particular numbers, the 'objects', when an argument, 
a value of x, is put into the function. Frege believed that the 
logic of language, and the logic of mathematics, could be formalised 
by the use of a similar relation, that of the 'concept'. Thus the 
[Contd. overleaf 
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the logicist follower of Frege would posit an arbitrary value for the result 
of dividing by 'x - y' when 'x = y'. 
1 
Furthermore, all symbols must be for- 
mally introduced into the system, so that ambiguity is eliminated. Compare, 
1) x+3=7; 2)ý +3=7; 3)Q+3=7. 
In 1) x is an indefinite placeholder for a numeral and defined as such 
within the logic. In 2)') is an indefinite placeholder for anything 
including numerical signs, but ýf in 3) has no meaning at all within the 
logic. Technically it requires formal definition, before the resulting 
activity that may occur in a Primary School, say, can be judged mathematics. 
Thus the pupils' attention must be brought at some point to this require- 
ment if they are to be initiated into mathematics, as described by Frege. 
Hilbert accepted that within finite arithmetic there are real objects 
to be employed in mathematics. These would be empirical strokes, not 
platonic forms. However, mathematics is not just a science of finite 
numbers and no one can see the strokes of an actual infinity. Thus one 
must add 'ideal entities' to make up the system. These entities would 
be essentially signs defined within the system, intuitively grasped, and 
without any kind of reference, neither earthly or eternal. In fact, 
there are no eternal objects of mathematics at all for it is synthetic 
a Posteriori, just like any science. Its components are no more eternal 
than the electrons and cabbages that other scientists study. Hilbert 
was not concerned about the ontological question, provided he produced 
Fn. 2,29. contd. 
'open concept': 'players on a field for one team', only becomes closed 
when one replaces 'players' by 'cricketers'. Furthermore, it has the 
numerical reference, '11'. Thus the specific concept has an object 
reference, as must any properly satisfied concept, and the object has 
ontological status whether it is a house, a number or a unicorn. 
Furthermore, any talk of 'knowing an object' depends logically upon 
being able to give an appropriate concept to which it applies, e. g. 
'I know that this is Keels because it is the village in which I live'. 
1. For example, the function 'y =32z' is defined everywhere but at 
a point of discontinuity, 'x = 3'. Following Frege one ought to give 
this some arbitrary value, say 'y = 0', for it is axiomatic for him, 
that if there is no formal rule to exclude the particular value of 
'x', then 'y', the function, must have a value. 
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an internally consistent axiomatisation. Hilbert adds all the notions 
of Cantor' to his system of mathematics, so long as they are not identi- 
fiable as the source of internal contradictions. If this programme of 
Hilbert's had been successful, then one would have known by mechanical2 
means whether or not a particular proposition is true or false. Thus 
for Hilbert, Formalism was to be seen as meaningful in so far as it 
provided proper foundations for mathematics. Hilbert was not concerned 
with formal systems in general, but with that formal, internally consis- 
tent system, which could be given an interpretation picking out the whole 
of mathematics. Cantor's paradise is only a paradise as against a modi- 
fication of a given formal system, if one has given it a particular 
interpretation. In other words, one might invent some system in which 
'zn' is generated by 'Kzj' and there is no way of deciding if 'j =n+ 1', 
but only that 'zj precedes zn', and this allows considerable manipulative 
moves, without any ontological consequences. The ontological consequences 
arise if one interprets 'za' as /j'O' and 'zb' as 'x\ 1', 
for then one 
wants to know if there is some transfinite number that lies between the 
transfinite number identifiable with all rational numbers, and the 
1. Cantor produced a theory of transfinite numbers,,. ', - 
'Cantor's paradise'. Hilbert saw this as just one 
more enrichment 
of the game - as someone else might see the addition of a third 
dimension to chess. As long as one can keep playing and one can find 
additional satisfaction, then there may be no reason for not having 
the extra dimension as an optional extra. This had been Leibniz's 
reaction to actual infinity two hundred years earlier, that it is a 
fiction, but being a serviceable fiction it may be included. 
2. 'Mechanical' is a term used by all Formalists and is commented upon 
by Wittgenstein in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
most interestingly. He makes the point that the analogy is rather 
an odd one, for mathematics is in fact claimed to have a level of 
certainty better than any known machine. Machines are liable to go 
wrong, but the Formalists see their systems as being those with the 
least imaginable risk of error. The danger that Wittgenstein is 
highlighting for the Formalist is that implicitly he seems to assume 
that the systems are 'error-free', analogous to 'ideal machines', 
while for logical consistency the Formalist only claims, as a matter 
of fact, a small possibility of error. To make any stronger claim 
would be to turn 'the manipulation of strokes' into an ideal state, 
certainly contrary to Strict Formalism (see Klenk, Wittgenstein's 
Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 32 for a fuller explanation). 
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and the transfinite number identifiable with all real numbers, it 
according to the axiomatisation, that does not appear in transfinite 
arithmetic itself: Cantor's paradise. Hilbert's followers were to take 
up a stricter notion of Formalism. Their notion was not tied to 
particular interpretations of already produced, symbolic systems. Curry 
and others who followed Hilbert saw 'the science of formal systems' as 
providing axiomatisation of any formal system, whether consistent or not, 
but including 'mathematics'. To these strict formalists Cantor's paradise 
was not seen as a problem, for people like them studied formal systems 
independently of particular interpretations. However there was a problem 
for someone who wanted to make use of the system, and found inconsistencies 
arising in the actual application. Thus, on the one hand Hilbert had had a 
priority: the axiomatisation of a mathematics with the maximum richness and 
it was this desire that motivated his famous cry, 'No one shall drive us out 
of the paradise which Cantor has created for us. ' ('On the Infinite' in 
Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 141). On the other hand, the strict 
formalist would have far less fear of such an eviction, for this would 
come from a philosophical argument about the inadequacy of the given 
interpretation, and that should not arise in a non-interpretative science. 
Furthermore, they could argue that there is no logical reason to stop the 
study of a system that is shown to be inconsistent, for one cannot know 
a priori that only consistent systems will have interpretations that can 
be of use to another science. 
Hilbert was only interested in the axiomatisation of systems that 
already had some kind of 'meaning'. Interpretations are therefore a key 
feature of Hilbert's Formalist programme, while linking interpretations 
to formal systems has no part in the science that the strict Formalists 
identified. These Formalists would proliferate games, in order to study 
their behaviour. They agreed with Hilbert that these were not eternal 
objects, but exist in the same reality as everything else studied by 
scientists, the world of phenomena. 
1 
The formalist definitions of 
mathematics may be summarised in two phrases. Hilbert would require the 
notion, 'the science of formally consistent systems', while the later 
formalists would stop at 'the science of formal systems' and 'regard to 
consistency is thus no part of the formalist conception of mathematics' 
(Curry, 'Remarks on the Definition and Nature of Mathematics' in 
PhilosoDhv of Mathematics, pp. 155-6. 
Russell rejects both this corrigible view of mathematics and also 
Frege's platonic conception. He does accept Fregs's logicism in so far 
as it is a programme to attempt the reduction of mathematics to logic, 
but he can make no more sense of 'eternal objects' than did many contem- 
poraries of Plato, of his forms. Russell's logicism is one founded on 
'classes' rather than 'objects', that is, the definition of numbers2 
rather than any claims to the existence of numbers. One is reminded of 
the distinction drawn on p. 18 above between Aristotle's 'idealizing 
abstraction' and Platonic 'forms'. Russell takes the views of Plato and 
of Aristotle on a further stage. He is forced by the paradoxes of set 
theory to produce a hierarchy of types. Thus the predicate described in 
footnote 2, p. 28 (the self-predicating predicate) is admissible but the 
negative answer to the question is stipulative or is simply not admissible, 
by stipulation. The point being that a rule is introduced which is not to 
be found in classical logic and is defined so that a predicate cannot be 
predicated of another of the sane 'type'. The other 'artificial' rule 
introduced by Russell was the 'axiom of reducibility' which brings back 
1. 'Phenomena' is taken here in the sense of 'sense-data' as used by 
Russell and Positivists. 
2. Russell also highlights the distinction between numerals and numbers. 
Numerals are the names given to numbers and can be used outside 
mathematics, e. g. 'Is "2 +2- 4" a true mathematical proposition? ' 
may be asked of a mathematician to open up a social conversation 
without any intention on either part for the resultant conversation 
to be mathematical. However, if one is asked to consider 'the factors 
of 12' then what one studies is not a numeral but a number, and this 
could only occur within a mathematical context. 
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down the number of predicates proliferated by the theory of types. 
I The 
result for Russell is a world of discerning terms without the guarantee 
that the terms refer to any existent objects; rather as the phrase 'present 
king of France' may have no existent reference, but a possibility of usage 
in language. One may use predicates successfully to convey meaning, with- 
out attaching them to the real world - novelists do this all the time. 
Such are the predicates of logic and mathematics. They never identify 
objects in the world. For Russell, a question about the ontology of 
mathematics indicates ignorance of what mathematics is. Whenever one 
identifies something that seems to be an object of mathematics, like 'the 
first prime number after 2' then either it is a contextual definition or 
is reducible to such. In other words, nothing 'out there'2 is ever dis- 
cussed within logic or mathematics - just as 'Mr. Silly' has no meaning 
outside of 'Mr. Men Books', its only possible context. 
Russell took this position because he recognised it as the most 
consistent, if one accepts that logic has no particular objects. Logic 
is a framework for, and not a description of any reality. Thus, if 
mathematics is reducible to logic, then, something cannot come out of 
1. The theory of types may be exemplified as follows: 
Let us imagine a system in which Football Teams are 'individuals' 
of 'Type 0', and predicates of the form 'beaten by/drew with/beat 
x on date y' are of 'Type 1', and predicates of the form 'coming 
nth. in year k in division p' are of 'Type 2'. The theory of types 
dictates that predicates of type 2 cover predicates of type 1 and 
so on, and cannot themselves involve other predicates of type 2. 
In this example, to fill out a type 2 predicate so that it is a 
proposition will involve links with a not of type 1 predicates - 
the football results for a given season. Using this example, the 
axiom of reducibility may be seen as follows: Take 'Bristol Rovers' 
as a Type 0- individual and 'beaten by West Ham on 17th March' as a 
'Type it predicate, then both have the same reference and so may be 
treated as indiscernible, given the axiom of reducibility - only one 'nomen'. 
2. Wittgenstein came to argue that replacing a description by a name 
allows one to 'create' new things, and so the name is not just a 
substitution as Russell thought, but facilitates development, and 
in that sense it comes to have a life of its own, e. g. 27 can always be rewritten as 2x2x2x2x x2x2 but o ce one's notation includes 
2g x 2b = 2a + b, then x 2i9 = 22b is 'perspicuous' but not 2x2x2x2x2x2x2 x 219 = 226. See Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, pp. 65-90. 
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nothing, there can be no mathematical objects either. This view of 
Russell's is called 'nominalistic logicism', and Frege's answer to posit 
objects for logic too, is called 'realistic logicism'. 
While there are many contemporary views, strongly influenced by 
Logicism, they accept the Logicist thesis to differing extents. While 
Carnap retains the idea that arithmetic is reducible to logic in his 
'constructional system', Quine only accepts that there is a model of 
'arithmetic' identifiable in 'set theory', and that consequently one can 
'get by without numbers' (Compare Carnap's article, 'The Logicist Founda- 
tions of Mathematics' with Quine's articles, 'On What There is' and 'Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism'; reprinted together in Philosophy of Mathematics, 
pp. 31-41; 183-96; and 346-65). Quine's is a logically weaker programme 
than that of Frege and Russell, for Quine accepts links with direct 
experience on Pragmatic grounds (in particular, on the grounds of Occam's 
razor, not to have more entities than is absolutely necessary). He argues 
that if sets can do everything that numbers can do, then one does not need 
to consider whether numbers exist or not. Quine has two principles at the 
centre of his thinking for all 'science, mathematical and natural and 
human' ('Two Dogmas of Empiricism') and one of these is Occam's razor. 
' 
By Occam's razor Quine argues that a set theoretic foundation is prefer- 
able to an arithmetic one, for the whole of mathematics, because the laws 
of set theory cover all those of arithmetic. Therefore, choosing set 
theory as the foundation reduces the total number of necessary laws in 
the universe. Put another way, mathematics has to have some ontological 
foundations, but one has a free choice between 'arithmetic' and 'set theory' 
except that the latter provides ontological foundations for other systems 
1. The other principle is that all theories 'must be kept squared with 
experience' ('Two Dogmas of Empiricism'), and is consistent with 
Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, discussed 
in Chapter 5 below. It also indicates the pragmatist viewpoint that 
everything must 'square with experience'. 
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besides mathematics. Thus one can see that Quine's pragmatic view leaves 
the line far less clear between Formalists and Logicists. 
To sum up the replies to question one: the Formalists all reject 
'eternal mathematical objects' but Hilbert considered some mathematical 
objects to be 'ideal entities'. The strict Formalist treats all mathe- 
matical objects as empirical constructs, 'strokes on the page'. The 
Logicista on the other hand, are fundamentally divided between a 'platonic 
reality' and 'nominalism'. The platonists like Frege believed in eternal 
'entities in a realm accessible only for thought' (Complementarity in 
Mathematics, p. 106), while the nominalists like Russell believe that 
the entities have no independent status, but have meaning within proposi- 
tions within a system. 
' 
The division between realism and nominalism is 
not altered by the weakening of the Logicist programme in the way Quine 
does - 'sets' can be still either 'eternal objects' or 'verbal descriptions' - 
and this seems to remain unresolved. 
QUESTION TWO: Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 'empirical sciences'? 
The Logicists, Frege and Russell, would assert that 'mathematics' is 
logically distinct from the 'empirical sciences', for it is logically 
reducible to 'logic'. 'Logic' consists of analytic a priori propositions 
while the 'empirical sciences' consist of synthetic a posteriori proposi- 
tions. Thus there is no logical possibility of overlap. Frege refers to 
the distinction drawn by Leibniz between 'Truths of Reason' and 'Truths 
of Fact' (see p. 23 above), rather than to Kant's analytic/synthetic dis- 
tinction. The point of the argument is the same whatever the terminology. 
A third kind of dichotomy, besides 'Reason and Fact' or 'analytic and 
1. Frege and Russell differ more in degrees than in quality. Frege also 
recognised that a concept only has meaning in a proposition but 
asserts that the concept and the proposition necessarily have refer- 
ences in objects of a platonic reality. It is the necessity of the 
connection that Russell questions, for Russell rejects the argument 
that every concept and every proposition must carry existential importance. 
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synthetic' is provided by Quine in his work (see for example in 'Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism' and in Word and Object). Quine rejects the idea 
that one can find a reference for the phrase 'analytic proposition'. He 
argues that there are no 'purely' analytic propositions, for all proposi- 
tions, even if only by inference, are open to modification because of 
sense experiences. 
1 
There does seem to evolve in Quine's theory a 
dichotomy between 'peripheral sentences' that are directly open to con- 
firmation by sense experience, and 'non-peripheral sentences' that are 
only open to revision by inference. Thus Quine separates 'logic and 
mathematics' from 'empirical sciences', because the latter alone include 
'peripheral sentences'. In other words, one corrects 'logic and mathe- 
matics' when the framework it provides for the 'empirical sciences' is 
inferred as leading to false assertions about peripheral sentences, but 
'logic and mathematics' make no direct assertions about the peripheral 
sentences. 
The result is that even Quine's form of Logicism leads to the 
assertion that mathematics is separable from the empirical sciences but 
Quine might hesitate in calling the separation 'logically distinct'. 
2 
The Formalists would be united in rejecting a logical distinction 
between mathematics and the empirical sciences. They both consist of 
1. The sense in which one might use the word 'analytic' of 'there are 
7 days in a week' is that of a learned stimulus-response rather in 
a Humean fashion. Thus one responds immediately to the question, 
'how many days in a week? '. There is a psychological tie and great 
confusion would result from its denial, but conventions of this kind 
could alter. The implications of this position for notions of 'truth' 
will be explained in Chapter 5 below, but it may be worth noting here 
that the axioms of net theory are also examples of 'analytic' sentences. 
2. Quine's uncomfortable feeling would be based on his recognition of 
the fundamentally social use of language, under which the boundaries 
of mathematics could be otherwise than as they are. Quine is most 
appropriately seen as following in the Pragmatist tradition of James 
and Dewey, rather than as many writers in the philosophy of mathe- 
matics describe him, as a pragmatic logicist. Quine himself keeps 
clear of identification with logicism, which can be taken to indicate the extent to which Quine has abandoned the original programmes of Frege and Russell. 
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synthetic a posteriori propositions, and to use Quine's expression, of 
'peripheral sentences'. The strokes manipulated in mathematics are as 
open to sense experience as the chemicals analysed in a laboratory. 
Hilbert saw the mathematician as an investigatory scientist who investi- 
gates the relationships among numerals, etc. Every science consists of 
the objective study of some delimited range of entities and for mathe- 
matics this range is 'complete and consistent systems'. Hilbert's 
orientation reminds one of Locke's reference to mathematics as the 
handmaiden of science. Unlike his later followers, Hilbert selected the 
systems for axiomatisation on the basis of their known service to other 
sciences. The strict formalists like Curry make no such division, and 
Goedel's theorems' demonstrated that Hilbert's talk of completely 
axiomatising arithmetic was hopeless. Curry and others have carried on, 
citing the belief that even inconsistent formal systems may have useful 
applications. The result is a Formalism committed to the science of all 
formal systems. 
Wittgenstein argued (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, IV, 
1-12) that this Formalism makes mathematics indistinguishable from all 
games, that 'the science' presented is asserted as having no meaning and 
no interpretation, which seems to contradict one's basic conceptions of 
1. Reference was made to one of Goedel's theorems in footnote 1, p. 24 
above. The theorem referred to there, demonstrated that Hilbert 
would never be able to axiomatise arithmetic so that every statement 
can be decided within the formal system. Goedel showed that there 
will be always at least one statement not refutable within the system. 
In other words, Hilbert's programme could not include 'complete 
decidability' - proofs could not be produced in toto 'mechanically'. 
The further consequence of Goedel's theorems is that the paradoxes 
noted by Russell and others cannot be guaranteed elimination by any 
particular rule(s), as Russell had hoped to achieve by the Theory 
of Types. Essentially, the further interpretation of Goedel's work 
is that paradoxes arise, if one attempts to define 'truth' in a 
formal system FOR that same system - this massive 'self-predication', 
as must occur in ordinary language, generates paradoxes. The Logicist 
is thereby left hanging on the horns of a dilemma - either modify the 
programme or accept piecemeal isolation of paradoxes. This area will 
be developed in the light of Taraki's work in Chapter 5 below. 
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a science. It is more like a game of patience whose successful completion 
has no implication for the world, rather than like the successful isolation 
of a rare virus - more readily typifying science. The Formalists seem to 
accept Wittgenstein's analogy and would broaden 'science' to include 
'games and the study of them'. For the Formalists the successful proof 
of a theorem of set theory is much more like a game than any scientific 
study, which is specifically orientated to solve a problem in the real 
world. However, they may still argue that that is only one branch of 
science, and that there are others in which no interpretations are made. 
l 
Here one devises and studies 'games' for their own sake, while not dis- 
missing the right of others to give them interpretations. There is still 
some ambiguity as to the use of the term 'mathematics' in the work of the 
strict Formalists. What seems to happen is that where mathematics once 
stood, one puts the phrase 'science of formal systems'. This was not a 
problem initially, for Hilbert seemed to consider the set of Formal 
Systems and Logic and Mathematics to be coincident. For the strict 
formalist, 'old mathematics' with consistent systems only, is a subset 
of 'new mathematical consisting of all formal systems, and so they have 
a wider notion of mathematics. Also, Hilbert was concerned about inter- 
pretation and mathematics, as mentioned already on p. 33, and this is 
ruthlessly removed from the contemporary Formalist programme. 
Formalists do seem to have stretched the notion of 'science', for 
ordinary language users do expect a science to be predictive of states 
of affairs in the real world, and the uninterpreted formal systems do 
not do this necessarily. Mathematics as a formal system may be empirical 
and may be investigatory, but its detachment from scientific prediction 
1. In part 2, Chapters 6 and 7, and in part 3 there is further discussion 
of the consequences of shying from 'meaning'. Crudely one could argue from a notion of 'meaning is use': that 'meaning' necessarily exists 
within a game or any formal system. 
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leaves it a 'peculiar science'. For the Formalists, as was indicated in 
the previous paragraph, it is essentially an extrinsic matter whether or 
not a formal sentence like, '1 +1= 2' is ever interpreted in say, the 
gathering of apples. This formal system will be used because it works, 
and only as long as it is seen to work. 
1 
The answers to the second question divide in line with the views of 
the two differing movements. The Logicists, reminiscent of Leibniz, 
assert a unification of Logic and Mathematics, but leave Science logically 
distinct. The Formalists assert a position that did not arise in Chapter 1. 
They see Mathematics as one of the sciences where all sciences are 
a posteriori. Mathematics is discrete, not because of a peculiar method, 
but because the object of study is 'formal systems' rather than 'physical 
bodies' or 'cultures' or what-have-you. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter two movements have been identified and their pro- 
grammes outlined in the light of the ontological and discreteness questions. 
It has been noted that the founding fathers of each movement were severely 
unsettled by discoveries occurring while they attempted to implement their 
programmes. The result of these difficulties has been the reformulation 
of the programmes by followers, at the cost of some of the original 
intentions of the founding fathers. Thus Quine's 'pragmatic logicism' 
is a programme of 'replacing' numbers by sets, rather than one of 
'reducing' numbers to sets, and Curry's 'strict formalism' is a science 
of 'all' formal systems and not just consistent ones. Frege and Russell, 
one might suppose, would have come to accept that mathematics cannot be 
derived from logic alone and similarly, Hilbert would have come to accept 
1. This is not a satisfactory answer and will be discussed further in 
part 2, Chapter 8. The implications of a Game-orientation for the 
teaching of mathematics may be seen as restrictive of the study of 
mathematics in application, and will be contrasted in part 2 with 
other positions that link 'interpretation' to the very nature of 
'mathematics'. 
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that mathematics cannot be completely axiomatised so that the 'truth' 
of any proposition can be proved 'mechanically'. 
Still there remains opposition between contemporary Logicists and 
Formalists, both on the nature of mathematical objects and on the 
relationship of mathematics to other subjects. The leaning on one side 
to 'Truths of Fact', has not been eradicated, for all the changes of the 
past fifty years. However, during this time, Kant's synthesis of this 
dichotomy has been taken up by a movement known as either 'Constructivists' 
or more generally, as 'Intuitionists'. In focusing on this movement in 
the next chapter, particular attention will be paid to the contrasting 
ontology presented there, as against those found in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER3 
INTUITIONISM 
INTRODUCTION 
A French contemporary of Frege, Poincare was influenced by Kant 
just as much as Frege was influenced by Leibniz. The result was that 
Poincare opposed the Logicist programme from its very inception. He 
argued that mathematics could not be reduced to logic because the 
potentially infinite has no basis in syllogistic reasoning. In other 
words, he believed that Frege's propositional calculus (see p. 27 
above) was a corruption of classical logic. Poincare was claiming that 
this programme, involving the inclusion of universal quantifiers and 
mathematical induction, would founder on circularity. 
1 
1. The thread of Poincare's argument (Science and Method, pp. 143-96; 
Science and Hypothesis, pp. 1-16) can be explained as follows: 
'the proposition, 'all jam tarts are delicious' can be demonstrated 
as true, only if one assumes an equivalence between this proposition 
and, 'this jam tart is delicious and this jam tart is delicious and... ' 
where the truth of a finite number of particular propositions is taken 
as sufficient proof of the truth of a universal proposition. The 
model for this regularity, so Poincare argues, is mathematical induc- 
tion where proving a formula true for n=1 and n=n+1 
(assuming 
it true for n) is taken as proof that it will be true for any n. 
In so far as classical logic is strictly finitist, one could check 
in principle the truth of any proposition, but mathematics requires 
consideration of at least, the potentially infinite, and so the 
logicist reduction is fundamentally absurd. This reaction can only 
begin, if one implicitly assumes the principle described by mathe- 
matical induction, as a logical axiom. It cannot then be claimed 
that mathematical induction is produced out of the logic. Hilbert, 
the founder of Formalism, recognises in his Foundations of Mathematics, 
1928, that Poincare's arguments are directed at Formalism as well as 
at Logicism. The modified argument is that mathematical induction 
cannot be justified within a formal system, for a pair of propositions 
may each be demonstrated by mathematical induction and yet contradict 
each other. There is no further means to indicate the resolution of 
the contradiction. Thus a system that includes mathematical induction 
cannot be shown to be consistent. Poincare believed that mathematical 
[Contd. overleaf 
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No movement grew up around Poincare who was much more concerned 
with practising mathematics than founding a philosophy of mathematics, 
but in the two decades following his renouncing of Logicism a man did 
attempt to provide and implement a contrasting programme to that of the 
Logicists and Formalists. This man was Brouwer and twenty years after 
Hilbert's formalist foundations for arithmetic came Brouwer's intuitionist 
foundations (roughly during the period 1904-1926). Brouwer presented a 
more radical programme than any considered by Poincare. Brouwer rejected 
both Frege's calculus and the classical logic of which it is an extension, 
in so far as these logics are presented as adequate modes for describing 
reasoning involving infinite species. 
1 
Brouwer was influenced by Kant as well as Poincare but unlike either 
of them, claimed that intuitionist mathematics is 'an essentially language- 
less activity of the mind, having its origin in the perceptive of a move 
of time'. Kant had placed mathematics firmly in the mind but had linked 
it to the 'perceptive' of space as well as time. 
2 
Brouwer retains the 
link with 'time' alone. He argues that mathematical activity must not 
be confused with the linguistic description of the activity. This 
description has rules, those of classical logic or an extension of it, 
but mathematics in itself is autonomous, independent of any given logic. 
Mathematics shapes its own logic as it is produced. 
Fn. 1. D. 42 contd. 
induction was a synthetic a priori principle rather than analytic (Logicism) or empirical (Formalism), for it 'is necessarily imposed 
on us, because it is only the affirmation of a property of the mind 
itself'. (Quoted by Kuyk, Complementarity in Mathematics, p. 112) 
1. 'The set' has no direct equivalent within intuitionism. 'Sets' are 
passive collections in classical mathematics, while 'species' are 
open collections picked out by the assignment of a single character- 
istic property. Compare 'the set of square numbers' with 'the 
species of numbers picked out/constructed by forming squares of 
integers'. The latter gives no sense of a pre-determined totality. 
2. See discussion on pp. 18 & 22 above and footnote 2 on p. 45 below. 
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And Brouwer claims that 'neither the ordinary language nor any 
symbolic language can have any other role than that of serving as a 
non-mathematical auxiliary... '. The reason for this, according to 
Heyting, is 'the fundamental ambiguousness of language. As the meaning 
of a word can never be fixed precisely enough to exclude every possibility 
of misunderstanding, we can never be mathematically sure that the formal 
system expresses correctly our mathematical thoughts. '... Thus the 
mathematical language is always to be mistrusted, and the only thing 
that really counts in mathematics is the inner state, the mental mathe- 
matical construction. ' (Klenk, p. 19, with quotations from Brouwer and 
Heyting). 
The strength of Brouwer's programme rests on the acceptance that 
the mental mathematical construction' requires no formal justification 
but is a self-validating procedure. Once accepted, natural numbers and 
fractions arise as mental constructs without the intrusion of antinomies. 
Logicists may criticise this method of mental conatructibility as unbear- 
ably complex, but Brouwer claimed that this was due to their lack of 
familiarity with the system. This movement has its attraction in not 
attempting to provide a complete answer to 'mathematics', but to accept 
that man will be left at any time with incomplete knowledge of propositions. 
Language will be always an imperfect vehicle for communicating results 
constructed in the mind. 
One further principle of Brouwer's programme that requires exposition 
before one considers the two questions taken as central to each of the 
first four chapters, 
1 
is the rejection of the Law of Excluded Middle as 
being of unrestricted application. In other words, Brouwer claims that 
one may not be able to construct a proof of a proposition p's truth nor 
1. The two questions are, 'Are there eternal objects of mathematics? ' and 
'Is "mathematics" logically distinct from the "empirical sciences"? '. 
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construct a proof of the impossibility of P's truth. There is a distinction 
to be remembered between the semantic principle: 'every statement is either 
true or false', which Brouwer rejects, and the logical law 'p v- p' 
which Brouwer accepts. Thus Brouwer is rejecting the principle that in 
mathematics every problem is solvable. 
1 He argued that all previous 
mathematicians had taken this to be a working assumption and in so doing, 
were Platonists by default, at least. That is, they were assuming that 
in some eternity all of mathematics already existed, waiting to be uncovered. 
This realisation alone showed the quality of Brouwer's insight. 
QUESTION ONE: Are there eternal Objects of Mathematics? 
All intuitionists including Brouwer accept the idealism that Kant 
characterised as being the ontological foundation of mathematics. For 
Kant, the mathematical entities are concepts constructed a Priori in 
intuition, and this notion of constructible entities of the mind is central 
to all intuitionism. 
2 
Thus the objects of mathematics are mentally con- 
structed series of abstract entities, produced in the on-going expansion 
of the system as constructed at any instant. The totality of mathematics 
is always in 'flux'. Classical mathematics is the passive uncovering of 
a priori or empirically existent sets while intuitionist mathematics is 
1. It is this position of complete decidability that Hilbert was so 
strongly committed to, and which Goedel proved was a hopeless dream. 
That is, there are mathematical problems which are not solvable in 
an absolute sense. Heyting argues that accepting some proposition 
of mathematics as insoluble, is to reject the Law of Excluded Middle, 
for there is then a 'p' which is neither true nor false 
(see Heyting's 
Intuitionism, p. 2). 
2. Kant's position on this point was outlined in pp. 18 to 20 above. 
Thus 'mathematical knowledge' describes 'space and time' which are 
particular universal categories of human experience. These are 
'particular' for they are divisible as an apple or an orange is 
divisible. Similarly, their parts are describable mathematically. 
A part of space is described by three co-ordinates say, and a part 
of an apple by a fraction. Each part has a mathematical description. (See Kant's elaborate discussion of this in Critioue of Pure Reason, 
Method of Transcendentalism, Chapter 1). 
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the active generation of more species. 
' 
The clearly critical problem for Intuitionism is the prevention of 
a solipsistic reduction. Entities constructed in the mind are not open 
to public view and so one seems to be discussing a number of privately 
produced mathematical words whose status is open to the attacks of 
Wittgenstein's 'private language argument'. 
2 
The only basis of objec- 
tivity for the Intuitionist is the belief that everybody is capable of 
having the same self-evident experience. It is pleasing but not part 
of mathematics when reports of such mental activity, by several different 
people, coincide. 
Dummett provides a lucid picture of the alternative to transcen- 
dental and empirical realities of mathematics, 'If we think that mathe- 
matical results are in some sense imposed on us from without, we could 
have instead the picture of a mathematical reality not already in 
existence but as it were coming into being as we probe' 
(see Dummett, 
p. 18). This contrasts the passive view of mathematics with the active, 
which is supported both by Intuitionists and by Wittgenstein. The 
difference of interpretation between Intuitionists and Wittgenstein is 
that the entities are constructed in the mind for the former, and in a 
public language for the latter. Wittgenstein may be seen as rejecting 
1. A contrast is easily drawn between a 'creative approach' in mathe- 
matics and a 'discovery approach', and this will be developed in 
part 2 of the thesis. The point indicated here is the susceptibility 
of Intuitionism to a description of 'mathematical constructibility' 
as 'creating' or possibly, 'inventing'. 
2. In the Philosophical Investigations, pp. 53ff. one finds Wittgenstein's 
specific rejection of total reliance upon 'mental knowledge', and he 
employs there examples from mathematics. The point that Wittgenstein 
drives home, is that I cannot be sure that what I intuitively claim 
to know is not a figment of my imagination, without public confirma- 
tion. Heyting would agree, that there is no guarantee that what is 
publicly confirmed is an accurate representation of the mental con- 
struction, but the mental construction is essential to all Intuitionists. 
Wittgenstein argues that it must be inessential, for objectivity to be 
preserved (See Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, V, 6). This 
brings the argument up to the question of 'truth' which will be tackled 
in Chapter 5 below. 
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the philosophy of mathematics presented by the Intuitionists, while 
accepting the reports of the mental constructions as being mathematics 
itself. This might be called 'Intuitionist Formalism'l (see Koerner, 
p. 139) - 'Formalism with a Human Face'. To agree that there are no 
'real' mathematical entities may matter far less for the education of 
children than agreement or disagreement as to the purpose of mathematics 
itself. It is this point that will be further resolved, as one considers 
the Intuitionist response to the second question. 
QUESTION TWO: Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 
'empirical sciences'? 
Brouwer's response to this question was indicated by the comment on 
p. 43 above, that 'mathematics in itself is autonomous'. Brouwer indicates 
a logically necessary connection between mathematics and the category of 
'time', but no such connection with either empirical sciences or logic. 
Brouwer is not thereby prescribing an answer to the question which he 
would consider far less important, though a natural consequence of 
Intuitionism, 'Is "the reporting of mathematics" logically distinct from 
the 'empirical sciences"? ' This chapter will consider answers to both2 
1. It might be more fully presented as 'normative Intuitionist Formalism', 
for Wittgenstein denies that mathematics consists either of 'real 
entities' or of 'ideal entities', rather it is essentially a language 
in use. That this is not a reduction to Logicism or Formalism is made 
clear by Wittgenstein's warning that one is not discussing 'facts' in 
mathematics but the use of rules. Thus the law of excluded middle is 
just one more rule which one chooses to include, but one may choose 
also, as a community to add further rules to limit its use. Nothing 
is pre-existent in mathematics, not even a logical principle like the 
law of excluded middle (see RFM, IV). It has been argued above, p. 31, 
footnote 2, that neither is this to equate Wittgenstein's position 
with that of the Strict Formalists, for he is intensely concerned to 
preserve the human element -a proof holds only if men are convinced 
by it and not simply if and when a computer produces it. Nor is 
Wittgenstein's position a form of Russell's nominalism, for Wittgenstein's 
overall commitment is to the consideration of propositions rather than 
to abstractions from reality (see footnote 1, p. 18. Compare Anscombe's 
interpretation of Aristotle, with Wittgenstein's position in RFM, IV, 
particularly pp. 139-43). 
2. These questions are distinct for one refers to the status of mathe- 
matics itself and the other to the status of the reporting of 
mathematics. The one may be independent of empirical sciences without 
both being so. 
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questions and explain how someone heavily in Brouwer's intellectual debt, 
like Wittgenstein reunites the two questions. 
Brouwer's most immediate follower, Heyting argues that 'for every 
logical theorem: it is but a mathematical theorem of extreme generality; 
that is to say, logic is a part of mathematics, and can by no means serve 
as a foundation for it' (Heyting, p. 6). The logic of mathematics arises 
as inductive generalisations about those mental, mathematical constructions 
already achieved. This logic is called 'intuitionistic logic'. Commu- 
tativity is first demonstrated for integers (2 +3=3+2,4 +7=7+4... ) 
and then for real numbers say, and so on. Heyting is explaining that in 
the same way as there are no pre-existent mathematical entities, there are 
no pre-existent laws of intuitionistic logic, for constructing entities. 
This is to be contrasted with the reporting of the mental constructions 
which 'express purely empirical results... a mathematical theorem expresses 
a purely empirical fact, namely the success of a certain construction. 
"2 +2=3+ 1" must be read as an abbreviation for the statement: "I 
have effected the mental constructions indicated by "2 + 2" and by "3 + 1" 
and I have found that they lead to the same result. ' (Heyting, p. 8). 
This report is logically equivalent to the report of an experiment in any 
science. The logic of ordinary language underlines any reporting, includ- 
ing mathematical. Such reporting can only be contingently related to 
whatever is reported. Thus reporting mathematical events and reporting 
scientific discoveries are not logically distinct kinds of reporting. 
To summarise Heyting's responses to the two forms of the second question, 
a) Mathematics is logically distinct from the empirical sciences 
and from logic (i. e. the logic underlying everyday discourse - 
as against 'thought'). 
b) Mathematics reporting is logically coincident with the reporting 
of all empirical sciences and is itself an empirical activity. 
It amounts to 'a scientific examination of intuitionistic 
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mathematics', a description of mathematics but not mathematics 
itself. This description will obey the logic underlying every- 
day discourse, for it is given in an extension of such a 
discourse. 
Heyting asks the question in his book, Intuitionism, what is the 
point of 'intuitionism' in itself. The reports may be employable in the 
real world but the autonomous mental mathematical constructions are 
isolated from the world and as such, can hardly be useful to it. Heyting 
responds that Intuitionism in itself may not be valuable to the empirical 
sciences but yet may facilitate the developments in 'philosophy, history 
and the social sciences' for 'mathematics. . . 
is a study of certain functions 
of the human mind' (Heyting, p. 10). Heyting is wishing to stress overall 
the intrinsic value of intuitionistic mathematics, as one might stress 
that of art. This has clear implications for the attitude with which one 
may teach mathematics to others, and this will be a major concern in 
part 2 of the thesis. 
On the other hand, if one treats the mental constructions as 
inessential rather than intrinsically valuable, then a strikingly differ- 
ent conception of mathematical value will arise. Such a position is that 
held by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein seems to return to Kant of whom the 
Intuitionists lose sight, when they discuss the value of mathematics. 
Kant had argued that mathematics is logically necessary for 'pure natural 
science' (Newtonian mechanics in particular), which provides the only 
correct description of the world. Wittgenstein is not supporting the 
uniqueness claim, but is arguing that mathematics provides the forms in 
which the world is describable. 
1 
This is the paramount reason for valuing 
1. Koerner gives Weyl as an alternative to the Intuitionists' view of 
the value of mathematics (Koerner, pp. 144ff. ) and that Weyl attempts 
a modification of Kant's position in the light of nearly two hundred 
years of scientific advancement. Weyl was initially an Intuitionist 
who came to have increasing sympathy with modifications of Formalism (see Hermann WeýY 1, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, 
Princeton, 1949)" 
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mathematics, as it opens up for man dimensions to life that would be 
non-existent otherwise. For example, the British would have a far less 
rich 'language-game' of discussing the weather if isobars, thermometers, 
etc. could not be measured. As Klenk concludes in her support of this 
position of Wittgenstein's, 'Mathematics... provides us with a conceptual 
framework into which we can fit our empirical experience' (Klenk, pp. 66-70). 
From a teaching point of view, Wittgenstein leaves one in no doubt that 
mathematics can be a vital activity which enables the enrichment of one's 
empirical experiences. He is stimulating a concern for 'using mathematics' 
in stark contrast to the isolationism of Brouwer. 
However, Wittgenstein accepts the Intuitionist view that mathematics 
is synthetic a priori, 
1 
and as such is logically distinct from both the 
empirical sciences and the logic underlying all discourse. While Heyting 
and Brouwer distinguish 'mathematics' and 'reporting of mathematics', 
Wittgenstein considers the mental constructibility to be a possible, but 
not an essential feature of the total mathematical activity. The written 
or spoken features of the activity are not a report of an inner experience 
but the essential feature of mathematics itself. In addition, an essential 
feature of mathematical proof is human understanding of the written or 
spoken activity, sufficient for any person actually to be convinced by 
the proof (this is the key sentence for an explanation of Wittgenstein's 
theory of truth and will be focused upon in Chapter 5 below. Thus 
Wittgenstein collapses the notions of 'mathematics' and 'mathematics 
reporting' as one activity with two senses. Writing out '5 x3= 15' 
is both a calculation and the assertion (or reporting) of a rule for 
1. 'The distribution of primes would be an ideal example of what could 
be called synthetic a priori, for one can say that it is at any rate 
not discoverable by an analysis of the concept of a prime number' (RFM, III, 42). 
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others to follow. 
1 The result for Wittgenstein is that the second question 
has the one answer, 'Mathematics is logically distinct from the empirical 
sciences. ' 
CONCLUSION 
It would be reasonable to ask how Wittgenstein has come to play an 
important part in this chapter when he denies the central condition of 
Intuitionism, its special identity of 'mental constructions' and mathe- 
matics. 
2 
What is suggested here is that a natural sequence occurs from 
the work of Kant, through the work of Brouwer to the work of Wittgenstein. 
3 
Both Brouwer and his followers and Wittgenstein came to accept Kant's 
belief in the synthetic a priori nature of mathematical propositions. 
They both accept Kant's identification of mathematics as an activity of 
construction rather than uncovering. Wittgenstein may be seen as develop- 
ing away from Intuitionism in so far as he argues that 'mental construc- 
tions' lead to unanswerable questions of objectivity, unless seen as 
1. The underlining of 'rule' is to emphasise that 'mathematical proposi- 
tions are instruments taken up into the language once for all... ' 
(ibid., II, 29) and are not descriptive of an empirical world. The 
propositions 'show' a man how to do things, rather than 'say' any 
truth about things. Educationally it is important to note that 
Wittgenstein is not designating 'repetition of a rule' as sufficient 
for one to be said to understand it. One must be able to act 'on 
the rule' as well as in 'accordance with' it. One must appreciate 
its relevance, 'But does the proof only bring us to the point of 
going by this rule (accepting it , or does it also shew us HOW we 
are to go by it? (ibid., II, 28 ... every proof, each individual 
calculation makes new connexions: ' (ibid., II, 47). To understand 
a mathematical proposition is, according to Wittgenstein, to appreciate 
its function in a range of contexts. Wittgenstein is making the 
important suggestion that every proof adds to knowledge and does not 
merely confirm what was already known. While this point excites, it 
also removes the traditional grounds for accepting proofs as compel- 
ling, i. e. before Wittgenstein, a proof would be seen generally as 
saying the same thing as was already known but in a new way. 
Wittgenstein suggests that a proof shows new things and so confirmation 
cannot be the basis of compulsion. 
2. Wittgenstein goes so far as to say, 'Intuitionism is all bosh - 
entirely. ' (Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 237) 
3. The discussion of Wittgenstein in this chapter is to be viewed as an 
independent development of, and only partial agreement with the views 
expressed by V. H. Klenk in her, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of 
Mathematics and M. E. Tiles in her, as yet unpublished, article, 
'Self-Reference, Saying and Showing'. 
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inessential features of mathematical reasoning. He admits the possibility 
of such mental activity but does not rest all his case upon it. Similarly, 
he warns mathematicians about the unrestricted use of the law of excluded 
middle, rather than renouncing it. 
1 
Wittgenstein tries to give mathematics 
'meaning', rather than attempting to establish a new mathematics to stand 
beside classical mathematics, or even replace it as the Intuitionists 
desire to do. Ontologically some agreement among Kant, the Intuitionists 
and Wittgenstein is retained, for they all reject the existence of an 
independent realm of mathematical entities. This is sufficient unanimity 
for them all to answer, 'No' to question 1. Similarly, there is suffi- 
cient agreement for them all to answer 'Yes' to question 2 (at least, in 
a form that does not explicitly mention the reporting of mathematics). 
Educationally, the critical point is that mathematics is presented as 
'doing' rather than 'seeing' or 'repeating what already is'. In the 
language of Intuitionism, no one else can 'do' my mental construction 
which enables me to know that something is right. 
2 
Finally, it is to be noted that the first three chapters have brought 
forth the development of three philosophies of mathematics and the next 
chapter will attempt to consider less clearly identified movements in 
philosophy of mathematics arising in the past hundred years. There has 
been no attempt made to consider movements based on other grounds than 
philosophical ones, although politics or an intrinsic love of subject 
1. The importance of cautious treatment of the principle of bivalence 
was elucidated on p. 45 above. 
2. This use of 'right' indicates that the argument will remain incomplete 
until the discussion of the views of 'truth' presented by Kant, 
Wittgenstein and the Intuitionists. The use of the term 'synthetic 
a Priori' may be seen as temporarily begging the question, but hope- 
fully one can be forgiven for asking 'suspension of disbelief' until 
Chapter 5. 
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may be seen as having produced other movements. 
1 
Once outlines of the 
various movements have been completed then the material thus gathered 
can be focused on the question that has been emerging already, 'what is 
mathematical truth? '. 
1. The only other movement to be mentioned in the thesis is that of the 
Bourbakists for they have had an influence on the nature of some 
Modern Mathematics text books in the last twenty years. Bourbaki is 
the name taken by a group of practising mathematicians who have 
attempted a formalisation of all mathematics. These mathematicians 
have made no attempt to assert a particular philosophical standpoint, 
but the nature of their project implies an implicit rejection of 
Intuitionism. They prefer to appeal to 'the common sense of the 
mathematician'. Their formalisation is based upon the Theory of 
Sets which is assumed consistent, but it is allowed that any contra- 
diction would result in a modification of this theory rather than in 
mathematics. For all the formalisation there is a certain sympathy 
with Intuitionism, as the Bourbaki group believe mathematics provides 
insight into the way people think and thereby uncover 'the most funda- 
mental faculties of the human mind' (quoted by Koerner, of Heyting, 
p. 121). 
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CHAPTER4 
MATHEMATICS AS HYPOTHETICAL 
INTRODUCTION 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that Aristotle built up the concept of 
'deductive science'. In the last hundred years this has been given a 
further twist, and most contemporary philosophers talk of 'hypothetico- 
deductive sciences'. The fundamental theme of this chapter is the 
identification by certain movements of what they claim 'scientists really 
do', and how mathematics acts as a key feature of scientific advancement. 
These movements are brought together here in the form of one broad school, 
just like those identified in the previous two chapters, except that this 
school is the author's own creation. The central linkage of this new 
school is to be found in the fundamental connection made between mathe- 
matics and its application. In this sense, Wittgenstein has provided a 
natural entry point to this chapter, for he centred his explanations on 
'mathematics in use' and sought to retain the human element in what other- 
wise could be seen as a 'formalised deductive science'. 
' 
Wittgenstein 
highlights the rejection of mathematics as something that can be uncovered 
or discovered, just as much as the Hypothesisors will be seen to do. 
2 
Wittgenstein sees new areas of mathematics invented in just the way that 
one imagines rugby was invented by the changing of some rules and the 
1. Tarski's term for mathematics in 'About some fundamental concepts of 
metamathematica' (Login. s) and mentioned by 
Lakatos, p. 3 (Proofs and Refutations). 
2. On pp. 67 and 68 below the ontological standpoints of Ormell and Lakatos are identified, and on pp. 46-49 above, there is a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein's own standpoint and his rejection of Intuitionist idealism. 
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addition of some other rules and concepts. Wittgenstein identifies 
mathematics with inventions in a language-game and not with the study 
of any kind of objects that Logicists and Formalists might present. 
The Intuitionists reject these alternative ontologies too, but retain 
a mental ontology that Wittgenstein considers inessential. There is a 
further link with the previous chapter, for like the Intuitionists the 
movements presented in this chapter, all accept the incompleteness of 
mathematical knowledge. 
The model for these 'Hypothetical movements' as described thus far 
might be thought to be present in some form of Empiricism, but all these 
movements are united in their rejection of Empiricism, particularly as 
envisaged by J. S. Mill. Within decades of Mill writing a System of 
Logic (1843), the founder of Pragmatism, the oldest movement discussed 
in this chapter, was presenting a vehement refutation of Mill's thesis. 
1 
This founder was C. S. Peirce. 
The initial section of this chapter is given over to a discussion 
of the intellectual framework in the midst of which Peirce developed his 
view of mathematics, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and 
how his view is reflected in the contemporary view of Ormell. The view 
of another anti-orthodox thinker, Lakatos, is then outlined and shown to 
have important features in common with Peirce and Ormell. As Frege and 
Russell have been seen to agree on a basic programme to reduce mathematics 
1. See for example Peirce's comments on Mill in 'Lessons from the History 
of Science' as reprinted in Essaus in the Philosouhv of Science, p. 207 
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1957). This adversity between Peirce and Mill may 
surprise those who wrongly identify 'usefulness' as a common element 
in Pragmatism and Utilitarianism. Peirce has much more in common with 
Wittgenstein for both saw 'meaning' in terms of 'use'. They define a 
concept by defining its role. Pragmatism centres on 'use' not 
utility. 
2. C. P. Ormell has been Director of the Schools Council Sixth Form 
Mathematics Project from 1969-1979 and in that time has provided a 
clear philosophy of mathematics and of mathematics education, particu- 
larly in his article, 'Mathematics, science of possibility', Int. J. 
Math. Educ. Sci. Technol. 3,329-41 (1972). 
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to logic, and thereby both may be called Logicists, even though they 
diverge considerably in the way each sets about implementing the programme, 
Lakatos and Ormell can be linked within one movement although they have 
identifiable characteristics of their own. They are united in the 
presentation of mathematics as a hypothetical and a human science, and 
not simply a 'formalised deductive science', but diverge in the stress 
they each put on human contexts outside mathematics itself. Ormell sees 
himself following Wittgenstein in as far as arguing that, 'meaning of any 
form of words (or symbols) stems ultimately from its use in human contexts' 
('The Crisis of Meaning in Mathematics' in Mathematics Teacher (India), 
11A, 1976, pp. 23-6). While Ormell is keen to look broadly at the human 
contexts in which mathematics occurs, Lakatos sticks to the internal 
activities of mathematicians or moves just outside such boundaries to 
interaction1 with theoretical physicists and chemists. Finally responses 
to the two questions2given in Chapter 1 above, are outlined and an overall 
conclusion is drawn. 
PEIRCE and ORMELL 
Peirce's view of mathematics is dependent upon extensive interaction 
with his father who was Professor of Mathematics at Harvard. Peirce 
rejects the full-blooded idealism of his father for a temperant realism. 
Peirce was well versed in Kant, and his realism stems from an interpretation 
of the Critique of Pure Reason (2nd Edition), as suggesting the possibility 
of the direct experience of noumena. This may be seen as a rejection of 
Mill's view that there are known limits to what man can know. Peirce views 
science as the struggle for the truths of science. Although these 'general 
1. Ormell's greater concern for interaction across all human contexts, 
and not just with those at the traditionally considered boundaries 
of mathematics will be discussed further in part 2, particularly 
Chapter 10. 
2. The questions: 1) Are there eternal objects of mathematics? 
2) Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 
empirical sciences? 
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principles are really operative in nature' 
(quoted in Feibleman, p. 59 
from C. P. 5.101*), at any time one can never know whether one's present 
propositions are conclusively true. Hence the conclusiveness of all 
scientific proposals remains uncertain. Peirce talks of such propositions 
remaining 'fallible'. 
Consequent upon the scientific revolution that had begun with Darwin, 
Peirce wished particularly to clarify the epistemological foundations of 
science, and in so doing he laid the foundations of Pragmatism. Peirce 
was most concerned with the relation of sciences to logic and to mathe- 
matics, because of his own work as a logician and his father's, as a 
mathematician. Thus Peirce came to ask the fundamental question, 'What 
is the methodology of science? '. It is the similarity in the consequent 
answers to the sub-question, 'What is the methodology of mathematics? ' 
that explains why Ormell is joined with Peirce in this chapter. While 
Peirce says, 'the necessary reasoning of mathematics is performed by means 
of observation and exDeriment' (Feibleman, p. 138, quoted from C. P. 3.560), 
Ormell says 'One might describe mathematics as the investigation of the 
1 
properties of possibilities by means of the manipulation of zq-apparatus. ' 
('Mathematics, Science of Possibility, p. 339). 
Peirce indicates that the Pragmatists accept as a key definition for 
their philosophy that 'belief' is 'that upon which a man is prepared to 
act. From this definition pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary. ' 
This is the view of belief originated by the Scottish philosopher, 
* All references 'C. P. ' refer to Hartshorne and Weiss, Collected Pavers 
of Charles Sanders Peirce - thus C. P. 5.101 is 'Volume 5 para. 101'. 
1. By 'zero-quasi apparatus' Ormell is reminding one implicitly of 
Wittgenstein's comment that 'In mathematics process and result are 
equivalent' (RPM, I, 82). That is, the apparatus manipulated is also 'the end of the process' itself. Ormell would seem to be reinforcing 
the distinction that it was noted Aristotle draws, between mathematics 
and science, 'in actuality' (See p. 21 above). Ormell is identifying 
the fact that the apparatus of mathematics has no real existence (except 'zero-quasi' existence), unlike the test tubes and glass prisms 
of the natural sciences. 
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Alexander Bain, to whom Mill refers with great respect in his autobiography. 
This concern to see things achieved was common to Bain, Mill and the 
Pragmatists, including Peirce. However Peirce was no anti-intellectualist, 
for he argued that knowledge is off-course if its 'purpose is not the 
solution of great problems, but merely the fitting of a selection of 
young men to earn more money than their fellow citizens... ' and to emphasise 
this point one may quote a consequent remark that, 'True science is distinc- 
tively the study of useless things' (Ess&vs, p. 210). 
1 
Peirce was not satisfied with the uncovering of a methodology but 
was asking the further question, 'what is the purpose of this branch of 
knowledge? '. It is this question that draws Peirce close to Wittgenstein, 
rather than to the Logicists and Formalists discussed in Chapter 2. The 
relationship may be clarified if one first considers further Peirce's 
realist position. As a realist Peirce has answers to both ontological 
and epistemological questions and he moves from 'general solutions' to 
specific ones about mathematics. A similar route will be taken here. 
On p. 57, it was noted that Peirce asserted that 'general principles 
are really operative in nature' and are not simply imposed by man on 
nature. Peirce does not claim originality for this view but says, 'That 
is the view of scholastic realism. ' In rejecting what he saw as Mill's 
nominalism, Peirce saw himself as reiterating Duns Scotus' defence of 
realism against the attacks of Occam's nominalism. In contemporary terms, 
2 
1. These points indicate features of the discussion of intrinsic/extrinsic 
values to be found below, in part 3 of this thesis. Clearly 'fitting 
men to earn money' is extrinsic, and 'studying something useless' is 
likely to indicate intrinsic value, but of particular interest, in 
view of later discussion, is the kind of value placed on studies done 
for 'problem-solving potential'. 
2. 'The problem of universal laws and their truth; that is, the problem 
of regularities' (Popper, Unended Quest, p. 19). It was noted in 
footnote 2, p. 17 and footnote 1, p. 18 above, how similarities may 
be drawn among Aristotle, Locke and Russell. Each of them has been 
identified by some critics as 'nominalist'. Each man attempts the 
presentation of a thesis free of 'platonic entities' but accepts the 
idea that universals (numbers are abstractions from experience) are 
[Contd. overleaf 
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Peirce's realism is based on the argument that regularity in nature is 
there in itself, and is not just a psychological need that man imposes. 
The nominalists however claim that the only kinds of things existing 
extra-mentally are individuals. Furthermore, they argue, the only meaning- 
ful alternative position is that of Platonic realism. Peirce follows the 
Platonic realists (like Frege) in rejecting psychologism1 but stops short 
of asserting the existence of 'forms,. 
2 However, later Pragmatists, from 
William James on, were to accept psychologism. Thus it is no surprise to 
find Dewey writing, 'the status of mathematics is as empirical as that of 
metallurgy. Men began with counting and measuring things just as they 
began with pounding and burning them' (Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 137), 
for his pragmatism is at one with Mill's Utilitarianism3 on this point. 
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logical fictions. The alternative argument is that there are meaning- 
ful propositions that neither refer to nor are logically detached from 
experience. This is the position presented most clearly by Wittgenstein 
and discussed on p. 47 above. Like Wittgenstein, Peirce sees these 
universal propositions as 'laws' in the sense that 
(Wittgenstein calls 
them 'rules') they 'show a man how to do things rather than 'say' 
anything. Peirce identifies a 'say'/'show' distinction between logic 
and mathematics. 'The one studies the science of drawing conclusions, 
the other the science which draws necessary conclusions' 
(Essays, 
p. 266). Logic 'says' what mathematics 'shows'. 'Logic' is identi- 
fied in Kantian terms for Peirce. It is a narrower view than the 
Fregean perspective taken by Wittgenstein, by which logic covers all 
human reasoning. This distinction has educational implications. In 
Kantian terms, being 'logical' entails being able to 'show timid say' 
one's reasons, while Wittgenstein can be satisfied by 'showing' alone. 
Tighter and looser conceptions of 'understanding' may follow, and this 
will be returned to in some depth in part 3 of the thesis. 
1. 'Psychologism' is taken here as the view that some words necessarily 
arouse mental images relevant to their meaning. Its rejection is 
taken as the denial of any necessary connection between rules of 
meaning and principles about thought. 
2. See Haack, S., PhilosoDhv of Logics, p. 55, for a similar interpreta- 
tion of Peirce, on this point. 
3. Dewey is clearly sympathetic to Mill and writes on p. 183 of this 
book, 'The idea of a fixed and single end lying beyond the diversity 
of human needs and acts rendered utilitarianism incapable of being 
an adequate representative of the modern spirit. ' In other words, 
Mill was going in the right direction but stops short of Dewey's 
view of pragmatism, in which 'The hypothesis that works is the true 
one... ' Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 156). 
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Once one recognises Peirce's belief that there is truth for which a man 
of science searches, one is not surprised to read, that on the basis of 
'few observations of a given matter, and those rough ones, a law is made 
out which, when the observations come to be increased in number and made 
more accurate, is found not to hold exactly' (Essays in the Philosophy 
of Science, p. 219). Peirce stresses 'observations' but not just for the 
physical sciences, for 'the necessary reasoning of mathematics is per- 
formed by observation and experiment' (C_P. 3.560). (Underlinings are 
not in original texts. ) This approach could be equated with Mill's, in 
which induction is the central method of all science including mathematics, 
but Peirce admits induction as only one method among many, for 'The best 
hypothesis, in the sense of the one most recommending itself to the 
enquirer, is the one which can be the most readily refuted if it is 
false. This far outweighs the trifling merit of being likely-which 
falls in with our preconceived ideas' and may involve 'strategems for 
cutting off inquiry' (Essays, p. 22). Peirce gives a broad description 
of scientific method including the pro's and con's of verifiability and 
fallibilism. 
1 
The picture of science that results is that of an activity 
with built-in self-correction by which means it is directed to the truth, 
but could never know it has reached it. 
2 
It is with this immense concern for 'testability' that Peirce con- 
siders mathematics. He sees it differing strikingly from all other 
sciences because it is, 'Cut off from all inquiry into existential 
1. While attacking Comte and Poincare as strict verificationists, Peirce 
expects any scientific result to 'be of such a nature that it could 
not occur without being detected' (Essays, p. 255). In Peirce's 
works one finds indications of positivism but there are stronger 
signs of the ideas of Popper and Lakatos, except in their rejection 
of induction. Peirce seems to follow a middle course between strict 
verifioationism and falsificationism. 
2. Compare Popper who writes, 'Explanation is always incomplete... the 
new why-question may lead to a new theory which not only 'explains' 
the old theory, but corrects it. This is why the evolution of 
physics is likely to be an endless process of correction and better 
approximation... ' (Unended Quest, pp. 130-1). 
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reality-mathematics is only busied about Purely hypothetical questions' 
(Feibleman, p. 353 quoting from C. P. 1.53). All sciences including logic, 
are to be recognised as having a mathematical branch. This reiterates 
the distinction between Peirce's Kantian view of logic and Wittgenstein's 
Pregean view. Peirce views logic as one science among many while mathe- 
matics is the 'showing' feature of all sciences. Wittgenstein presents 
logic as all-embracing for human reasoning and mathematics is depicted 
as only one corner of this. 
Peirce sees the sciences as locating the facts of sensible experience 
in the world of ideas while mathematics consists of 'mental experiments', 
'ideal experimentation' and 'abstractive observation'1 in an 'arbitrarily 
hypothetical universe', and could be seen as 'an advanced theory of graphs 
which... treat(s) of the whole universe of logical possibility'. 
(See 
Feibleman, pp. 138-40). To summarise, 'Mathematics is the study of what 
is true of hypothetical states of things. That is its essence and 
definition. ' (C_P. 4.233). 
It is to be hoped that Peirce's view of mathematics as hypothetical 
has been drawn sufficiently clearly for connections to be brought out now, 
between Peirce's work and the contemporary views of Ormell. Ormell2 is 
writing some fifty years after Peirce's death in 1914, and after Logicism, 
Formalism and Intuitionism have grown up and presented programmes. In 
addition, Peirce's programme Pragmatism, has taken on new directions and 
there have been numerous reactions to these and all the other programmes. 
The result is that one may be surprised to find any contemporary views 
remaining independent of the main movements covered in Chapters 2 and 3 
above. 
1. By 'abstractive observation', Peirce might be seen as accepting 
'nominalism'. However, what is abstracted is not the name of some- 
thing, but the law by which constructions occur. 
2. For a detailed analysis of Ormell's position, see my article, 
'Mathematics, Science of Possibility -A Critical Review', Int. J. 
Math. Educ. Sci. Technol., 4,413-20 (1973). 
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Ormell follows Peirce in being particularly concerned to identify 
mathematics as the practising mathematician sees it, rather than as 
philosophers view it. Ormell accepts that one has the option of taking 
mathematics as a nominalist system - the manipulation of symbols without 
references. He sees this position as compatible with Formalism1 as dis- 
cussed in Chapter 2 above. However, Ormell prefers to talk about 
'interpreted mathematics' rather as Hilbert had sought to aaiomatise only 
those formal systems that had some mathematical interpretation. Ormell 
sees the Formalistic metamathematicians of Chapter 2, as blind to half 
of what mathematics is to most mathematicians, and certainly what it 
ought to be viewed as, by most ordinary citizens. 
For Ormell the objects of mathematics are 'kits' packed with 
undiscovered potential. Ormell talks in terms of 'potential model 
expressions' which may be applied either to another branch of mathematics 
(algebra to geometry for example) or to an outside area (as in designing 
a bridge, say). Thus Ormell sees the key stimulus for mathematical 
development in the question, 'what are the possible applications of a 
given model? ', rather than 'what new formulae does this formal system 
allow one to generate? ', as the strict Formalists would be expected to 
see things. Like Peirce, Ormell centres his view of mathematics on its 
hypothetical nature, believing that this allows any element of mathematics 
to have a potential usefulness, as part of 'the science of possibility'. 
LAKATOS and THE HYPOTHETICAL SCHOOL. Lakatos provides an equally contem- 
porary, but much more strikingly independent view of mathematics than 
Ormell. In the same way that Popper remained outside the most readily 
accepted circle of Philosophy of Science, as it came from Vienna to 
England and to America, so in the same way Lakatos remained aloof from 
1. A specific discussion of Formalism and this standpoint is found in 
my article, 'Mathematics, Science of Possibility -A Critical Review', 
PP. 414-16. 
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any kind of formalism, standing out for 'informalism'. 
1 
Lakatos contrasts 
'the monotonous increase of truth' that occurs in a mechanically decidable 
formal system, with the enlightenment that occurs when one finds that a 
connection holds for a more limited domain than one previously believed. 
Imagine the spectrum that opens for the person who discovers that 'p/q' 
(where p and q are integers) is not sufficient to describe all numbers, 
for there are irrationale like , 
/-2-. Getting things right is seen by 
Lakatos as a poor description of a mathematician's task. 
One sense in which Lakatos may be identified as an Hypothesisor 
follows naturally from his abhorrence of an over-emphasis upon 'getting 
things right'. His view is not one of absolute certainty, but of truth 
accepted relative to a logic which is at present admitted. This is the 
essential nature of deductive proof based upon the hypothesis that this 
logic will do. 'Certainty is never achieved'2 (Proofs and Refutations, 
p. 56). Another form of proof is that in which a proposition has at 
present no counter-example and none is foreseeable. The hypothesis in 
this latter case is that no counter-examples will occur. The first form 
of hypothesis is exemplified in proving Pythagoras' theorem for Euclidean 
geometry, and the latter form is exemplified in accepting 'all bachelors 
are unmarried'. 
3 
Lakatos puts 'problems' at the centre of informal 
mathematics. Mathematicians invest systems or parts of systems in order 
to deal with a problem. 
Having given brief outlines of the views of Peirce, Ormell and 
Lakatos, certain features can be picked out as common to all three. 
1. 'An investigation of informal mathematics will yield a rich situational 
logic for working mathematicians, a situational logic which is neither 
mechanical nor irrational, but which cannot be recognised and still 
less, stimulated, by the formalist philosophy. ' (Proofs and 
Refutations, p. 4). 
2. Popper and Peirce agree, see p. 60 above, that certainty is never 
known in science, and Lakatos extends this lack of certainty to 
mathematics. 
3. That this is an acceptable example for Lakatos is indicative of his 
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, about which comment 
is made in the next chapter. 
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'Hypothesising' is seen as the key activity for mathematics, rather than 
'concrete experimentation' as is found in other sciences. Hypothesising 
indicates the illuminative power that Lakatos and Ormell see in mathematics. 
Mathematics is developed by the production of hypothetical structures. 
Ormell sees them as acts of 'disciplined imagination', and Lakatos calls 
them 'thought-experiments'; and they provide clarity where it is lacking 
and can even make advancements where physical experimentation is practi- 
cally impossible. By hypothesising, one gets to know more about continuity 
in algebraic functions, 
1 
or the feasibility of inflatable bumps for improv- 
ing road safety. 
2 
If someone fears a difficulty in their work or has a 
practical problem to resolve, through the use of some part of mathematics 
in fresh pastures, then there is the possibility of further illumination 
and the development of mathematics. Thus, it can also be said that all 
three thinkers, Peirce, Lakatos and Ormell, tie mathematics closely to 
the purpose of solving problems. 
3 
'Hypothesising' is indicative of the 
ontological framework that unifies this school. A universe of mathematical 
entities is identified which consists neither of 'solid' objects nor of 
'mental' ones. Popper presents such a world and calls it 'World 3'. 
World 3 is neither an 'idealist' nor a 'Platonic' reality but 'the 
world of statements in themselves', distinguished from 'thoughts in the 
1. The 'principle of continuity' comes in for lengthy discussion in 
Proofs and Refutations (pp. 127-131), to exemplify the method of 
proofs and refutations. By the hypothesising instrument of numerical 
analysis, much 'graph-commonsense' was disturbed. 
2. Teaching Mathematics Applicable. Introductory Guide (p. 21). This 
example is most interestin because it has been discussed seriously, 
even in parliament, since 
(although 
not because of) 1974 when it was 
put in a specimen examination paper. 
3. Ormell admittedly holds some value in the 'game-side' of mathematics, 
and so is willing to accept that mathematics can also advance through 
formal derivation, followed by hypothesising. Yet formal development 
cannot occur totally without direction, for mathematics is not compar- 
able to absent-minded or spontaneous doodling. Lakatos concurs on 
this latter point when he rejects the idea that mathematics advances 
through either 'the rationalism of a machine' or 'the irrationalism 
of blind guessing' (Proofs and Refutations, p. 4). 
b5 
sense of thought processes' (which seems to be the place of Intuitionist 
mathematics). Popper distinguishes three worlds in his book, Unended Quest 
(pp. 183ff. ), and uses the example of a book to clarify his position. In 
World 1, one finds the physical object that is called a book. In World 2, 
the thoughts that are stimulated by the words in the book, and in World 3, 
one finds the content of the book itself. 
1 
Both Ormell and Lakatos give clear signs that they would fit mathe- 
matical entities into this world 3. Popper describes this world as 'the 
world of all that man may think up', and this seems to fit particularly well 
with Ormell's hypothesising imagery as characterised in the phrase 'discip- 
lined imagination'. Through 'disciplined imagination' a mathematician 
creates models that await application, but they are not simply figments 
of the imagination for they are open to public scrutiny. The propositions 
of mathematics represent a world of 'possibilities' which Ormell can surely 
only claim to be 'reifiable', as he does in his article, 'Mathematics, 
Science of Possibility', in just that sense identified by world 3. 
Lakatos has similar concern for the publicity of the 'thought 
experiments', which he sees as inventions stimulated to solve given 
problems. He has no intention of falling foul of the privacy problems 
of Intuitionism (Lakatos' argument on p. 52 of Proofs and Refutations 
makes this clear). Lakatos' position may seem at first sight to be 
asserting ideal, mental constructs, but like Wittgenstein and more 
particularly like Popper, he unifies what one thinks with the language 
one speaks. Mathematical proofs do consist of 'thought experiments', 
but their public language-form must be analysed for counter-examples, 
'refutations', before it makes sense to talk of there being a new 
1. Peirce distinguishes the 'universe of logical possibility-the 
ideal world' from the 'real world' (C_P. 3.527), just as Popper 
distinguishes World 3 from World 1. Quinton draws parallels between 
Popper and Peirce along similar lines, in his lecture printed in 
R. S. Peters (ed. ) John Dewev Reconsidered, p. 2. 
66 
mathematical proof. It is by this unifying of 'proof' with 'refutation' 
that Lakatos clearly separates himself from the world 2 of Intuitionism, 
and stands more comfortably in world 3, with Ormell. 
The Purpose of Mathematics. Common to Peirce, Ormell and Lakatos 
is a belief that mathematics has a potential usefulness, at least. This 
usefulness can apply either from one part of mathematics to another or 
from mathematics to the outside world. However Lakatos is to be con- 
trasted with Ormell in particular, on the generating of mathematics. 
Lakatos seems to follow a line found in Popperl that mathematics develops 
in order to solve problems, while Ormell argues that the mathematics 
developed has the potential to solve problems. In this sense, the gap 
between Lakatos and the Logicists and Formalists presented in Chapter 2, 
is far greater than that between Ormell and Logicists and Formalists. 
Ormell does not reject the possibility of generating new mathematics2 
without any problem being in sight. Lakatos argues that there are always 
steps, even in mathematics, which are chosen because of the problem that 
one is considering, even if the problem is not consciously visible. 
Given that one now has a picture of a broadly linked school of 
thought centred on the hypothetical nature of mathematics, and its 
concern with the solution of problems, it is possible to consider the 
two questions identified in Chapter 1. 
1. Popper's falsificationism leads him to write, 'Explanation is always 
incomplete... the new why-question may lead to a new theory which not 
only "explains" the old theory, but corrects it. ' (Unended Quest, 
p. 130). On p. 60 above, it was noted that this leads Popper to a 
perpetual view of scientific evolution, and it would seem this model 
fits for Lakatos as perpetual mathematical evolution, through 
'proof-analysis'. 
2. Ormell and Lakatos will be seen closer on this point when the nature 
of proof is discussed in the next chapter. For both of them a proof 
cannot be adequate unless it has a demonstrable application, very 
much in line with the Pragmatist linking 'proof' to 'successful 
action' (Essays, pp. 252-4). 
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QUESTION ONE: Are there eternal objects of mathematics? 
One might suggest that the ontology for mathematics common to Peirce, 
Orwell and Lakatos is one that identifies mathematical entities as 'real 
possibilities'. This phrase picks out the point that the entities are 
both 'hypothetical' and 'publicly identifiable'. While these entities 
depend upon man's drawing up hypothetical states of affairs for their 
existence, the mathematician has not complete control of them. As Peirce 
says, 'His hypotheses are creatures of his own imagination, but he 
discovers in them relations which surprise him sometimes' (C_P. 5.567). 
To answer the question, one is certainly directed to a denial of Platonic 
realism for mathematical entities have neither eternal nor matter of fact 
existence, but only the existence provided by man's 'imagination'. 
1 
Ormell admits in his article, 'Mathematics, Science of Possibility' 
that he has had a difficult struggle to find an alternative to Platonic 
reality, but believes that the 'possibilities' which are the constructs 
of 'disciplined imagination' are distinguishable from eternal forms, 
precisely because no such eternal claims are being made. However, Orwell 
accepts that nominalism is a valid interpretation of the ontology of 
mathematics, along the lines presented by Wittgenstein (and discussed 
in Chapter 3 above). That is, one could take the view that there are no 
objects of mathematics, for mathematics is not a system of objects, but 
a system of rules employable in the empirical world. Thus Ormell rejects 
the idea that mathematical objects are eternal, but rather sees them as 
'potential model expressions' existing in 'the world of all that man may 
think up'. 
Lakatos' view of this ontological question is very much in line with 
those of Peirce and Ormell, in so far as the only possible kind of universe 
in which they could exist, would be one describable as 'World 3'. Although 
1. Peirce stresses 'imagination's' place in proof on pp. 252-54 
(ibid. ). 
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Lakatos accepts that man makes mathematical proofs, and also may discover 
through them 'relations which surprise him sometimes' 
(Peirce, as quoted 
on p. 67 above), for Lakatos these proofs and any other mathematical 
entities have no long-term guarantee of survival. Lakatos argues that 
one must 'give up the idea that our deductive, inferential intuition is 
infallible' (Proofs and Refutations, p. 1381). In other words, Lakatos 
is arguing that any element of mathematics could be removed through some 
subsequent reorganisation of what is called mathematics. Thus, in terms 
of the specific question, 'Are there eternal objects of mathematics? ' 
Ormell and Peirce argue that there are no objects existing in a Platonic 
universe, but if man invents 'equilateral triangles' say, then demonstrated 
truths2 about them are guaranteed eternally. Lakatos takes the extreme 
position that even if today 'our' mathematical universe includes what 
are called 'equilateral triangles', then this gives no guarantees for 
the future. 
For all their differences, Peirce, Ormell and Lakatos agree that the 
ontology of mathematics lies between the totally theoretical and the 
actual empirical worlds, with clear paths to both. Educationally, one 
1. The paragraph in which this occurs has the following editors' footnote 
added, 'This passage seems to us mistaken and we have no doubt that 
Lakatos, who came to have the highest regard for formal deductive 
logic, would himself have changed it. First order logic has arrived 
at a characterisation of the validity of an inference which 
(relative 
to a characterisation of the "logical" terms of a language) does make 
valid inference essentially infallible. Thus one need make only the 
first of the two admissions mentioned by Lakatos. By a sufficiently 
ood "proof analysis" all the doubt can be thrown onto the axioms 
or antecedents of the theorem) leaving none on the proof itself. 
The method of proofs and refutations is by no means invalidated (as 
is suggested in the text) by refusing to make the second of these 
admissions: indeed it may be by this method that proofs are improved 
so that all the assumptions that have to be made in order that the 
proof be valid, are made explicit. ' (ibid., footnote 4, p. 138). 
Essentially the two admissions are that there are no infallible 
propositions and secondly, that there are no infallible proofs - the 
editors accept the first only. 
2. A full discussion of this point can only occur once the views on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and that on the overall conception of 
truth have been clarified, and this will occur in the next chapter. 
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is shown signs of mathematics as both intellectually rigorous, and 
relevant to man's inter-action with the empirical world. In this 'science 
of possibility', no possibilities are cut-off. 
QUESTION TWO: Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 
'empirical sciences'? 
Given that much stress has been put on the links inherent in the 
Hypothetical movements with the 'empirical sciences', one may well be 
surprised to find a positive answer to this second question. With these 
movements an appreciation of the ontology of science itself may be neces- 
sary, for an accurate reply to be stated. In this way Peirce's broader 
philosophy was discussed and not just his philosophy of mathematics. 
Thus one finds that 'problem-solving' is a thread running through the 
methodology of mathematics as well as that of the natural and social 
sciences. Lakatos and Ormell concur in their acceptance of this view 
of Peirce's. 
What is given to Peirce directly, and to others implicitly, by Kant 
is the view that mathematics involves both 'invention' and 'discovery'. 
The literary analogy would be that someone 'creates' a spy thriller and 
critics 'discover' a political analysis within it. 'Creating' and 
'inventing' may occur in science, but there are no 'given' entities in 
mathematics. In this way, mathematics is identifiably separated from 
the empirical sciences. Yet the invention in either sphere may have 
consequences recognised only through later 'discovery', as is found in 
the technological advancements of nuclear energy that provide peaceful 
applications, or with the side-effects of a drug, like Thalidomide. 
In the works of Peirce one finds a more complex view of empirical 
sciences than that assumed by followers of most other movements. The 
Logicists, Formalists and Intuitionists seem content with a passive view 
of science, fully identified in 'verification' and 'classification'. 
Lakatos' criticism of these movements in the area of mathematics is 
equally appropriate to science. These movements describe methods of 
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proof rather than the way scientists or mathematicians work. The prelim- 
inary informal activities are ignored as logically irrelevant to the 
logical strength of the resulting proofs. Lakatos' argument is that 
the consequence of ignoring such informal procedures must be incomplete 
proof 8.1 The foundations are never more than 'conjectures' - 
'hypothetical', but the 'proofs' themselves are empty without them. 
In the completion of this argument Lakatos certainly parts company 
with Peirce and Ormell. Lakatos' argument comes to a biting conclusion 
in a footnote on p. 143 (the argument has began on p. 138), he writes, 
Now while Popper showed that those who claim that induction 
is the logic of scientific discovery are wrong, these essays 
intend to show that those who claim that deduction is the 
logic of mathematical discovery are wrong. While Popper 
criticised inductivist style, these essays try to criticise 
deductivist style. (Underlining not in the text) 
As was noted on pp. 58 and 59 above, Peirce's criticism of inductivism 
is much more limited than Popper's, but Peirce and Popper agree on the 
essentially infallibilist status of mathematics, and that there is no 
one logic of scientific discovery. They disagree however on the total 
eradication of 'induction'. Lakatos accepts Popper's view of scientific 
discovery but argues similarly in mathematics. 
Lakatos holds an 'heuristic' view of both scientific and mathematical 
discovery; that is the means and methods of problem-solving as related to 
scientific and mathematical problems. Lakatos says, 'both are character- 
ised by conjectures, proofs, and refutations' (Proofs and Refutations, 
p. 74). Lakatos' point is that there is nothing identifiable as the logic 
underlying the conjectures, proofs and refutations of mathematics, any 
more than Popper believes there to be of scientific explanations, for 
1. A contrasting but not unsympathetic picture is that drawn by the 
American philosopher, Israel Scheffler through his notion of 
programmatic definitions. Thereby, he provides a framework for 
'science with doubt' (see his book, the Language of Education, 
Chapter 1). Lakatos is arguing that programmatic definitions occur 
even in mathematics, but one only knows the definitions one requires, 
because of informal mathematics. 
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ultimately 'guessing' has a central place and there is no uniquely 
identifiable logic of 'guessing'. 
1 
'Guessing' precedes 'thought experiments' 
in Lakatos' view, but Ormell seems either to conflate the two activities 
in the phrase 'disciplined imagination', or more likely, to reject the 
notion of mathematical activity free of obedience to formalised manipula- 
tions, as is suggested by the word, 'guessing'. Ormell may put problem- 
solving at the centre of mathematics as Lakatos does, but Ormell refuses 
to accept that the underlying deductive procedures of mathematics could 
be fallible; that is, beyond the fallibility of axioms or a given theory- 
2 
In the works of Peirce, Popper and Ormell one finds support for the 
view that mathematics is separable from the empirical sciences, because 
it alone has the possibility of infallible proofs. Lakatos, in his 
actual writings, holds the stronger position that even mathematical 
proofs are not guaranteed infallibility. The difference may be explained 
1. A fascinating suggestion would be that an attempt could be made to 
link Locke's work on the logic of scientific discovery, as found in 
Book IV of an Essay concerning Human Understanding with the contem- 
porary views of Popper and Lakatos. See for example, Locke's dis- 
tinction between the logic of proofs (syllogism) and that of 
'intuitive knowledge', Book IV, Chapter 17. As early as Locke, 
there seems to have been the suggestion that 'human reasoning' has 
no single identifiable system of logic underlying it. The views 
of extreme Rationalists and Empiricists may in one sense be charac- 
terised as holding the opposite position to Locke. Their mutual 
difference lies in the type of logic they identify as the underlying 
logic, and not whether or not there is one at all. On one side 
Aristotle had identified 'deductive logic' and Mill, on the other, 
identified 'inductive logic'. 
2. One may doubt the presuppositions but not the procedures for estab- 
lishing new axioms from old; that is, deductive proof. Underlying 
this rigidity is the belief that there is one system of logic that 
describes all human reasoning as Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein 
believed. This is to be contrasted with the Kantian notion of a 
transcendental logic covering synthetic a priori propositions, in 
addition to the logic among judgements which underlies analytic 
a priori and synthetic a posteriori propositions. In a similar 
vein, the Intuitionists have been seen to hold to more than one 
logic too. Intuitionist logic is the logic of thought-experiments 
generated independently of the logic underlying public discourse. 
What Lakatos' editors seem to fear is any position that claims 'extra' 
logics, whether one more or on to total relativism, although the 
unifying or reductionist force only began with Frege's logiciam. 
Such a reductionist view existed before Frege, but only since has 
it generated the power of self-evidence. 
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by a model originally employed by Koerner1 and amended by Orwell, that 
scientific proofs have a limited repeatability, while mathematical proofs 
have unlimited repeatability. Koerner sees the distinction as a logical 
gap, while Lakatos leaves it as possibly one of degree. 
Thus largely, the Hypothetical movement shows a close similarity 
with the methodology proposed for science, but not an identification 
with the nature of its proof. The movement distinguishes between logic, 
as uninterpreted symbolic manipulation and mathematics, as necessarily 
a system with interpretative potential. To reiterate Peirce, (Logic) 
'studies the science of drawing conclusions, the other (mathematics) the 
science which draws necessary conclusions' (Essays, p. 266), and that 
mathematics is separable from empirical sciences for it 'is only busied 
about purely hv-Dothetical questions' (Feibleman, p. 353, quoted from 
C. P. 1.53), while the empirical sciences are concerned with actual 
questions, solved by actual experiments. 
2 
CONCLUSION 
From a concise outline of Peirce's, it has been seen that his view 
of mathematics is of a hypothetical science. Contemporary support for 
this standpoint is found in the work of Ormell and of Lakatos. Both 
stress the informal nature of mathematics as a domain of hypothetical 
reasoning, in contrast to the tightly restrictive views given particularly 
1. Koerner employs the phrases 'infinitely repeatable experiments' and 
'infinite repeatability' in outlining his argument that theoretical 
discourse, at the heart of which is mathematics, is an idealisation 
of empirical discourse and logically disconnected from it. One 
reason for this is that infinite repeatability can only occur in 
theoretical discourse (see Experience and Theory). Ormell amends 
this in 'Mathematics, Science of Possibility'. 
2. As was already noted on p. 57, footnote 1 above, the nature of 
experimentation in mathematics as against the natural and social 
sciences may be identified as different, through the type of apparatus 
employed. Ormell distinguishes the 'zq-apparatus' of mathematics from 
the concrete materials of other sciences. In mathematics, there is no 
separation of the apparatus used in the experiment from the record 
kept of the experiment, for 'there is nothing in addition to the 
record' ('Mathematics, Science of Possibility', p. 338). 
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in Chapter 2 above. However, they do not present a picture of unlimited 
freedom, but show mathematics constrained by the requirements of publicity 
for demonstrating proofs and refutations, and also by the fundamental 
linking of mathematics to the solution of problems. By combining these 
constraints with hypothetical reasoning in which mathematics is generated, 
one can see marked out a unified movement, distinct from any identified 
in the preceding two chapters. 
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CHAPTER5 
MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 
INTRODUCTION 
The object of this chapter is to investigate the place of truth in 
the movements discussed in the previous chapters. In order to do this, 
it is necessary to describe not only certain theories of truth, but also 
differing views on the analytic/synthetic distinction. This distinction 
is often critical to theories that recognise more than one kind of true 
proposition. The most obvious of these distinctions would be one between 
tautologies and all other true propositions. 
Russell suggested that in discussing theories of truth one must 
bear in mind the distinction between definitions of the concept and 
criteria for its correct application. One could imagine a child ignorant 
of the definition of 'thank you', being told that it is what one says 
whenever an elder gives you something, and not to be said when giving 
someone else something. All such situations are thereby divided into 
sets according to a criterion, without knowing a definition. Similarly, 
it may be hoped that anyone could be given a criterion of truth, so that 
all propositions1 may be divided into true or false ones, independently 
of whether or not one has a definition of truth. The first person tradi- 
tionally taken to have provided a definition of truth is Aristotle, who 
wrote, 'To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false 
and to say that what is is, or what is not is not is true; ... 
(Metaphvsics, 
1. The use of 'propositions' should not be taken as prejudging any issues 
about distinctions among 'propositions', 'statements' and 'sentences'. 
Russell draws the definition/criteria distinction in terms of 'the 
nature of truth and a criterion of truth' ('On the Nature of Truth' 
in Philosophical Essays, p. 149). 
75 
Book IV, Sect. 7, p. 71 in Bambrough edition). This may be a help if 
someone makes an assertion like 'the cat is on the mat' and one can ask 
the question, 'is it? ' of oneself, but it does not help one to put 
assertions together for oneself. It is this latter problem that so 
concerned Leibniz' who imagined the possibility of a computing machine 
producing such assertions. He soon realised that some propositions 
could be produced in this way, 'truths of reasoning', but not others, 
'truths of fact'. The latter group would involve a non-denumerable 
number of conditions in the argument, and so no machine could be sure 
to assert them. In contemporary philosophy one is more used to the 
distinction highlighted by Kant, between analytic and synthetic proposi- 
tions, and this is the distinction that is generally used in the thesis. 
As the rest of the discussion of mathematical truth2 will be held 
up without some clarification of this distinction, this will be tackled 
briefly first. In the following section, each movement will be taken in 
turn and it will be argued that certain views of truth come through more 
strongly in some movements rather than in others. The chapter concludes 
with the attempt to provide a model of a true mathematical proposition 
for each movement, in the light of the first part of the thesis as a whole. 
It is finally indicated that the ontological positions of each movement 
will emerge as central characteristics of teaching approaches, discussed 
in the second part of the thesis. 
THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION 
Before one identifies differing notions of analyticity, it is 
important to make clear that the analytic/synthetic relationship is not 
1. One hopes that the reader will recognise the obvious reason for 
picking out Leibniz, given his connection with Logicism. He identifies 
'two kinds of truth' in the Monadology, p. 9 (Everyman Edition). 
2, In the Appendix, pp. 273-283 four theories of truth are described. 
This does not cover all the theories that exist but, hopefully, all 
those that have a bearing on the mathematical movements identified 
in the body of the thesis. 
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synonymous with the 
,a 
priori a posteriori one, which concerns the way 
one comes to know something, rather than whether or not what one claims 
to know, is true or false. 
Thus an a priori proposition requires no empirical investigations 
for one to know which truth value holds for it. It only concerns terms 
within languages (taking 'languages' as broadly as Wittgenstein could 
possibly have done). The paradigm example is 'a bachelor is an unmarried 
man', which one can construct correctly if one has a dictionary and some 
rules for English language construction. This is not the case with 
'Essex beat Surrey last Saturday'. This a Posteriori proposition requires 
information beyond that attached to language construction, for it to be 
produced with meaning. However, being told that the first proposition 
holds a Priori, and the second a Posteriori, may not be sufficient 
information for one to know how to set about finding out whether or not 
either is true. One must further consider whether or not being told that 
the first is analytic and the second is synthetic will enable one to do 
this. 
Four views of necessary truths will be seen to ground the discussion 
of mathematical truth in the main body of this chapter. These four views 
may be summarised as, 
(1) A truth of reason is true because its denial would be self- 
contradictory, and this is either self-evident or the proposition 
can be reformulated by identities to be self-evident (Leibniz). 
(2) An analytic proposition is true because the concept of the predicate 
is included in the concept of the subject. These are not the only 
necessary propositions, for the principles of the pre-conditions 
of all human experience are synthetic a priori propositions 
(Kant). 
(3) An analytic proposition is either a logical truth or is deducible 
from logical truths (Frege). 
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(4) An analytic proposition is not a clearly identifiable notion and 
even if the purported distinction were clarified it would remain 
empty (Quine). 
VIEWS OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 
In this chapter links will be considered between views of analyticity 
and the four mathematical movements described in chapters 2 to 4 in order 
to clarify the differing view of truth, to which they most readily relate. 
In chapters 2 to 4, it was made clear that certain ontological positions 
were compatible with a given movement and others were not. The other 
question tackled indicated the relationship of the movements to other 
areas of knowledge, and this may be seen as a first attempt to indicate 
a theory of meaning1 associated with each movement. Thus one could 
interpret Frege's logicism as indicating that appreciation of the meaning 
of mathematical propositions, includes the understanding of logical propo- 
sitions, but it does not assure one, that he will understand physics. 
Furthermore, the entities of Frege's logicism have been identified as 
'real', in the sense of being independent of the mind, but not real in 
the physical sense. One's picture of each movement is being clarified, 
and it is now possible to move each a bit more into focus. 
1) Lo¢icism 
Both Frege and Russell considered arithmetic as a system of logical 
truths. 
1. Much has already been made of the realist/anti-realist dichotomy and 
it may be sufficient here to indicate two approaches to a theory of 
mathematical meaning roughly corresponding to these two sides. Thus, 
I know the meaning of p if 1) I can recognise a proof of p when given, 
and meaning must be linked to 'doing'; or 2) I know what has to be 
the case, for it to be true, but I do not actually have a proof here 
and now. Thus meaning is tied to truth conditions. A general point: 
meaning in mathematics does not generate the same set of problems as 
ordinary language, for it only has assertions. 
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a) Definition1 of Mathematical Truth. With Platonic realism under- 
pinning his view, Frege sees 'truth' and 'falsity' rather as abstract 
objects to which true and false propositions refer. 
2 
Thus, there is the 
reference of all mathematical propositions to truth or falsity, and the 
correspondence of arithmetic propositions to abstract reality. From 
Russell's standpoint there is an ultimate correspondence between mathe- 
matical propositions as abstractions and empirical reality. Given the 
attachment of both men to 'realism' (in the sense identified in Appendix, 
p. 278) one can recognise mathematical truth as defined in terms of some- 
thing external to what any person may think or write. 
Clearly, as the work of Goedel and Tarski has been produced after 
that of Frege and Russell, they might now have tried to employ a Semantic 
Theory of Truth with modifications to allow for the difficulties of 
consistency within their formalised system. 
b) Criterion of Mathematical Truth. In order to see how Frege revised 
Leibniz's 'truths of reasoning' while retaining great sympathy for his 
overall programme, it is necessary to give some account of their differ- 
ing views on 'truths of reasoning'. 
For Leibniz, that a proposition was a 'truth of reasoning' rather 
than one of fact meant that the proposition could be rewritten through 
logical steps until it was glaringly3 obvious that the two expressions 
'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' either are or are not identical, or that 
the one expression is totally contained in the other. Thus in the case 
of 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' this becomes 'an unmarried man is an 
1. Where possible the discussion of mathematical truth is separated 
under the features noted from Russell, p. 74 above; those of 
a)'definition', and b) 'criterion'. 
2. For Frege there are sentences which are neither true nor false and 
their reference is what they state. 
3. The reduction is to 'identical propositions whose opposite contains 
an express contradiction' (Monadology, para. 35). One might suggest 
that by 'express' is meant 'glaringly obvious'. 
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unmarried man'. In Leibniz's theory the following would be also truths 
of reasoning: 'Sulphuric acid contains Hydrogen' because in the language 
of chemistry it becomes by logical steps, 'H2SO4 contains H'. Similarly 
in the language of arithmetic '2 +2=1+ 3' becomes '4 - 4'. Where 
there is not this possibility of rewriting the proposition by logical 
steps, the proposition would be treated as a 'truth of fact' and one 
would look to the world to show that it is true. Thus in the case of 
'Essex beat Surrey last Saturday' one would require empirical evidence, 
for it is not as a result of the language of cricket that one could derive 
the identity, 'Essex is the side that beat Surrey last Saturday' and so 
reach, 'The side that beat Surrey last Saturday beat Surrey last Saturday'. 
However such rules do exist for God, according to Leibniz, for God's 
definition of Essex includes everything that they will ever do, including 
beating Surrey last Saturday. A truth of reason is thus one that cannot 
ever be shown to have had an error, while a truth of fact may be shown to 
possess such an error. 
Fri reiterates Leibniz's position on the analytic a Driori status 
of arithmetic, but provides a further modification to the meaning of 
'analytic'. Frege asserts that an 'analytic proposition' is either 
deduced from definitions according to principles of logic or is such a 
principle. Thus, 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' becomes 'p -4 p and 
'sulphuric acid contains hydrogen' becomes 'p ^q /\r -4 p' and 
'2 +2=1+ 3' becomes 
2=1+1 and 3= (1 + 1) +1 (Peano definition No. 101) 
(1+1)+ (1+1) _ (l+1)+l+l 
1+1+1+1= 1+ 1+ 1+ 1 
4=4 
This is a logically tight view of what can be 'analytic', and it fits 
1. Peano's system is employed here because it is more straightforward 
than Frege's original form. To see both in action, From Freme to 
Goedel, pp. 30-97. 
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well with Frege's rejection of the idea that geometry could be seen as 
analytic. He treats geometric propositions as 'synthetic a Priori', 
but hardly in Kant's sense, for while the foundation of their deductive 
systems is not logic, it is not the preconditions of human experience 
either. Frege is working after it had been shown that Euclidean geometry 
was not the only possible geometry, and so knew that not all the axioms 
could be derived from logical truths alone. He therefore holds the 
position that once the axioms of a geometric system are given, all else 
follows logically and in that sense is then independent of reality, 
a priori. 
Thus arithmetic propositions are taken as 'analytic a priori' and 
so the conception of their truth is closely linked to this status. That 
is to say that a criterion of truth, 'being deduced from logical principles 
and definitions according to rules of logical inference is applicable to 
these propositions. 
2) Formalism 
a) Definition of Mathematical Truth. It is not easy to find Formalist 
definitions of truth, for the focus of this movement is to be found in 
the on-going work of pure mathematicians, contented with the success of 
their formal systems, rather than with philosophers to whom a definition 
might seem essential. However, Curry does clearly give the Correspondence 
Theory as the only option open to Formalists. As Curry says, mathematics 
is 'a body of propositions dealing with a certain subject matter; and 
these propositions are true insofar as they correspond with the facts. ' 
('Remarks on the Definition and Nature of Mathematics' in Philosovhv of 
Mathematics, p. 153). 
b) Criterion of Mathematical Truth. Fundamentally, Formalists wish to 
have a guarantee that their manipulations within a formal system are free 
from error. Thus Hilbert saw the deriving of a new proposition in a 
finite number of steps, from the basic axioms of the formal system, just 
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in this light. Prior to Goedel, the Formalists believed that this formal 
derivability was the criterion of mathematical truth, and in no other way 
would mathematical truths occur. Once Goedel had shown that it was not 
an adequate criterion of mathematical truth, in the sense that some 
inconsistency may arise in any non-finite system, then one must accept 
the kind of modification that one finds in Putnam. 
1 
Putnam argues that 
one can still keep close to Hilbert's original programme, except that one 
must take the point of view that one treats 'mathematical axiom sets as 
"presumably consistent"' ('Mathematics without Foundations' in Mathematics, 
Matter and Method, p. 42). Thus Putnam links the criterion of derivability 
to the attitude that 'in general, and in the long run, true ideas are the 
ones that succeed'. ('The "Corroboration" of Theories', op. cit., p. 269). 
Thus 'derivability within a formal system' remains the criterion of mathe- 
matical truth for the Formalists, in practice. 
3) Intuitionism 
The Intuitionist view of mathematical truth is heavily grounded in 
Kant's introduction of the notion of synthetic a Driori propositions. 
Some explanation of how such a category arose will have to be given before 
one can clarify the more contemporary position of Intuitionism. 
Kant largely accepts Leibniz's characterisation of distinguishing 
truths of reason from truths of fact, but it will be seen that Kant does 
modify the original position. He divides all propositions into three 
groups and not two as Leibniz had done. In addition to 'analytic a Priori' 
propositions like 'a bachelor is an unmarried man', and 'synthetic 
1. There is an alternative direction possible as a response to Goedel, 
and this path has been chosen by Carnap who has become more and more 
openly committed to Platonic realism. In this way one can argue that 
the only mathematical truths are those that correspond to this reality, 
even if the reality is no more than a further language form at a 
higher level of universality. (Compare Carnap's article, 'The 
Logicist Foundations of Mathematical, given in 1931, reprinted in 
Philosophy of Mathematics, pp. 31-41, with his article, 'Empiricism, 
Semantics, and Ontology' in Meaning and Necessity, 1955 
(2nd Edition)). 
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a posteriori' propositions like 'Essex beat Surrey last Saturday' there 
are 'synthetic a priori' propositions like '2 +2=1+ 3' which Leibniz 
had included in 'truths of reasoning'. 
Kant argues that there are two types of 'synthetic a priori' 
propositions. 
a) Those related to the spatio-temporal framework that makes any 
experience of the phenomenal world possible, e. g. 'What is here 
cannot also be there. ' 
b) Those related to the categorial principles, not just of mathe- 
matics, but also of the natural sciences and metaphysics, which 
make knowledge of the phenomenal world possible, e. g. 'Every 
event has a cause. ' 
Kant argues that Leibniz has not recognised that there are these 
propositions that do not merely include linguistic constructs that could 
be turned out by a 'characteristica universalis'1 but if they are mathe- 
matical for example, they are the constructs of space and time. One 
must go beyond linguistic constructs to intuitions corresponding to the 
individual elements in space and time. Yet if they are so closely tied 
to the real world, then one may ask why knowledge of them does not come 
a posteriori. Kant's argument is that such knowledge relates to changes 
in the material objects of the world, and what he is identifying is 
precisely that knowledge about the features of the phenomenal world, 
which are imposed by any knowing subject upon his experiences. 
The conclusion seems to be that Kant has not just introduced the 
notion of 'synthetic', but modified those of 'a priori' and 'a Posteriori' 
also. Thus a Priori knowledge makes no requirement on one to make 
1. Leibniz's argument is that mathematics is indistinguishable from 
logic, for both can be reduced to this mechanical system 
(see p. 24 
above). While Leibniz is committed to mathematics being true in 
all possible worlds, Kant is not forced by the logic of his position 
to propose that mathematics as existent was the mathematics, but 
only that it is the mathematics for this world. 
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empirical investigations to understand it, not because it is necessarily 
disconnected from the world, but only because it is necessarily disconnected 
from changes in the world. Similarly, a posteriori knowledge makes require- 
ments about changes in the world for it to be understood, or at least what 
is logically possible to be changing. A 'synthetic a priori proposition' 
is thereby one that identifies constructs constitutive of invariant 
features of the real world and whose truth depends ultimately upon 
'constructibility' rather than 'definitions'. This is the clear starting 
point of Intuitionism. 
For the Intuitionists there is no external or eternal reality to 
which mathematical propositions can correspond and in fact mathematics 
is for ever under construction and reinterpretation. This activity occurs 
in people's minds and as such is difficult to identify with any of the 
criteria of mathematical truth already discussed. 
1 
a) Definition of Mathematical Truth for Intuitionistic Logic can be 
shown compatible with an appropriately modified Semantic Theory of Truth. 
Both Dummett ('The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic' in 
Dummett) and Beth (The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 442-62) have 
shown that provided the notion of 'proof' is construed intuitionistically, 
then 'It is true that 'p' iff p' can be employed as the definition of 
truth. Thus for mathematical truth 'p' represents an intuitionist 
computation. In other words, there is the room for a compromise position 
in the philosophy of mathematics across the realist/anti-realist gulf. 
Signs of such a bridge are to be found in Wittgenstein, 
2 for he did 
question the absoluteness of bivalence, and does look for a third position 
1. Intuitionism is not readily linked in this respect with any of the 
theories of truth outlined in the Appendix, either. 
2. It was argued in Chapter 3 above that Wittgenstein fits most readily 
as a bridge between the Intuitionist and Hypothetical movements, but 
with a leaning towards the former. Particularly, Wittgenstein 
emphasises 'constructibility' within mathematics, as the Intuitionists 
do. Thus he sees mathematics as the construction of rules in a 
language where 'constructed sentences' and 'construction rules' are 
one. 
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distinct from platonic reality and mental constructs for the conception 
of mathematical truth. Wittgenstein supported the public form of 
constructibility as one might interpret Intuitionistic logic on one side, 
but also the playing of language-games on the other. Although the 
Wittgenstein of the Remarks renounces the Correspondence Theory of Truth 
for a Redundancy Theory, the gap between this latter theory and Tarski's, 
for formal languages, is very narrow. Ramsey's notion of 'It is true 
that 'p' iff p' being reduced to 'p' iff p is very close to the foundation 
stone of Tarski's theory. The closeness can be encapsulated in a simple 
example. If one asks, 'is 3+4=7? ' then what one needs to know is 
whether or not the rule '3 +4= 7' holds for mathematics, i. e. 'p' iff p. 
Thus Wittgenstein came to argue that mathematical truth can only be 
presented according to a correspondence theory, in a peculiar sense of 
that theory, for '3 +4= 7' is both the true proposition and the rule 
to which it is thought to correspond. There is neither a separated 
reality nor the need for a hierarchical structure in mathematics, for 
empirical reality enters for the use of proven mathematics and not before. 
Similarly, one is left with the realisation that at the very centre 
of Intuitionism is actual construction, and any definition of mathematical 
truth must involve this. This is not identifiable in definitions that 
rely upon existent, abstract or empirical objects, as any theory, 
employing correspondence for its definition of truth, does. 
b) Criterion of Mathematical Truth. Some clue to such a criterion may 
be given by some initial notions found in Kant's Introduction to Logic 
(Pp. 13-14). Having identified knowledge from principles as a Priori, 
Kant goes on, 
Mathematics... is Rational knowledge from the construction of 
concepts. We construct concepts when we present them in 
intuition a priori... In mathematics we use Reason in concrete; 
the intuition, however is not empirical, but we make something 
a priori the object of the intuition. [Underlinings occur as 
italics in the translation] 
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'Construction' is thereby the means for demonstrating both what is and 
what is not and simultaneously what is true and what is false. However, 
there is the linguistic representation of mathematics to be found through 
Intuitionistic logic, and any proposition of this logic only comes into 
existence because there is a corresponding mathematical construction. 
The mathematics justifies the logic rather than the logic justifying the 
mathematics as in Logicism. In both the thinking and its linguistic 
representation, the truth of propositions is related to successful produc- 
tion. In the former, truth is a construction completed, and in the 
latter, a newly derived formula. The important metaphysical point is 
the argument that something is true or false only if it is shown to be 
so. This separates Intuitionism quite strictly from Formalism and 
Logicism. Dummett has argued that there is no logical reason why one 
should not take this principle into languages, where it had not been 
previously accepted, unless the language includes a metaphysical commit- 
ment to all propositions being either true or false. That is, to hold 
some form of 'realism'. One would be holding that in some sense all true 
propositions are already identified. (See Dummett, o cit., pp. xxxix, 
xl, xli and the article 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic'). 
4) The Hypothetical 
In the area of mathematical truth, there would seem to be a short 
step from the work of Curry and of Wittgenstein to that of Lakatos. All 
three see 'proof' as a more central term than 'truth' in mathematics. 
However Curry has reached there less willingly than Wittgenstein and 
certainly Lakatos. To Lakatos mathematical proofs are open to refutation 
just as proofs in any other science. 
Lakatos argues that one never defines a concept as tightly as one 
hopes. For example, 'All quadrilaterals have four angles' seems self- 
evidently analytic but Lakatos would question whether the meaning of 
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quadrilateral necessarily rules out figures with three angles or six 
angles, as in b) and c) below. 
AB 
ýý 
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The question that arises for Lakatos is when does this 'monster-barring' 
or 'concept-stretching' occur, and when is it valid. He argues that 
acceptance or rejection of such modifications is dependent upon agreement 
within the community using this language, for example mathematicians. 
Given Lakatos' position, 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' is true only 
if agreement has been reached about monsters. Quine identifies this as 
'socially stimulus analytic'. This becomes logically no different from 
certain rules being agreed, before one can say that 'Essex beat Surrey 
last Saturday', 'socially stimulus synthetic'. 
nine believes that even if an adequate distinction is provided, 
one will find that the two classes identified are in fact empty. This 
is the position that he first proposed in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. 
Quine argues that 'analytic' is defined in terms of 'synonymy', and even 
if one were not worried about 'the notion of "synonymy" 
(which) is no 
less in need of clarification than analyticity itself' ('Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View, p. 23), one could still 
never feel secure in a logical sense that two concepts were synonymous. 
In other words, just how certain one is that 'bachelor' is indistinguishable 
from 'unmarried man' is a psychological rather than a logical state. 
Even if one accepts uncertainty here, Quine argues that one could not 
know how many exceptions one would need to identify of the kind, 
U 
'Bachelor has less than ten letters', for surely if they were inter- 
changeable1 in Leibniz's sense, then 'unmarried man' ought to fit here 
too. There have been many defences of Quine's attacks, and typical of 
these is Cooper's in Philosophy and the Nature of Language. He argues 
that this particular attack of Quine's is invalid because the expressions 
are not being used semantically in this example. In other words, inter- 
changeability refers only to situations where meanings are involved. 
However Quine still has the argument that analytic propositions 
only carry weight, if one can identify that they are purely dependent 
upon linguistic as against factual considerations. Quine argues that 
this absence of factual considerations cannot be shown logically to be 
necessarily the case. Since this article2 Quine seems to have accepted 
a slightly weaker position, for in Word and Object for example, logical 
truths are for all intent and purposes identified as analytic 
(See Word 
and )bject, pp. 54-67). 
While, like Quine, Lakatos rejects the validity of the analytic 
synthetic distinction, there is no certainty that he 
3 
accepts, like Quine, 
that 'deductive, inferential intuition is infallible' (Lakatos, Proofs 
and Refutations, p. 138). Even if Lakatos accepted a special status for 
logical truths, he would want it recognised that these are a small 
minority of the principles that make up all reasoning, and are swamped 
by all the mathematical and heuristic procedures. 
1. Quine sees 'interchangeability' as having the same kinds of problems 
as synonymy. Leibniz appends the phrase 'salva veritate' to the 
notion of substitution, but if one considers this for the example 
given, it fails. Interchangeability does not occur without a change 
in the truth value of the given proposition. 
('Two Do s of 
Empiricism' in From a Logical Point of View, pp. 27-32 
2. 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. 
3. The question of how much of logical form Lakatos does wish to retain 
was discussed on p. 68 above. This unresolvable debate has no 
implications for Lakatos' clear acceptance that 'formal propositions', 
which have no meaning, are 'a priori' truths; that is, logical truths. 
These are not refutable. Quine's view of logical truths was discussed 
briefly on p. 37 above. 
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Lakatos holds an evolutionary view of all knowledge, including 
mathematical. A theorem taken as true/proven at any one time is so, 
relative to a particular system and any attack on the theorem may be 
of two kinds. Either one tries to refute the conjecture within the 
system, or one demonstrates the total inadequacy of the system and then 
provides the same or modified conjecture translated into a new system. 
To say that a proposition is true, is not to say that it has withstood 
'the method of science' as Peirce said, but 'the method of proofs and 
refutations'. Lakatos' position has a strong tinge of pragmatism in 
both this respect and in the evolutionary concern 
(see Appendix). 
Thus the links between the hypothetical movement and the pragmatists 
suggested in Chapter 4 are reinforced here. 
Like Lakatos, Ormell accepts that in some circumstances mathematics 
may be treated as Curry views it, an 'uninterpreted language/symbol game' 
('Mathematics, Science of Possibility', in Int. J. Math. Educ. Sci. Technol. 
1972), but this should be an ever-decreasing part of the picture. 
1 
That is 
to say, the main view should be of interpreted mathematics, the 'potential 
model expressions'. This is to put the emphasis of mathematics upon 
problem-solving as Lakatos and Dewey do. Ormell shows reservations 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein, and stresses the 'symbol game' side of 
mathematics as well as the hypothetical, but always linked to use. This 
seems to be indicative of a position combining Formalism and Pragmatism, 
rather as Peirce linked Kantian presuppositions to Pragmatic maxims. 
The result for Ormell is a view of mathematical propositions as synthetic 
a posteriori, where the verification occurs through all relevant 
1. There are some obvious similarities between Putnam's view of mathe- 
matics and Ormell's. Putnam discusses 'the use of quasi-empirical 
methods in mathematics' and Ormell of 'quasi-apparatus'. Similarly 
on the'final collapse of the a priori' Putnam believes that 'much 
of mathematics too is "empirical"'. However Putnam remains a hard 
realist who would not accept Wittgenstein's waverings. See 
Mathematics, Matter and Method, 'What is Mathematical Truth'. 
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participators being trained to carry out the manipulations in the same 
way. As Ormell says, 'In the end we know elementary arithmetic only 
because we, our contemporaries and ancestors have found it so. ' As with 
Wittgenstein this leaves truth somewhat redundant, for words like 
'warranted', 'correct procedure', 'proved' seem to cover the same ground, 
though not necessarily by themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
a) Definition of Mathematical Truth. Given the concern of the earlier 
chapters with the ontological positions of the movements introduced there, 
one is left wondering whether the ontological commitment dictates or 
simply identifies what form the definition of truth will have. Thus, 
if a movement asserts the external existence of mathematical objects, 
then one may immediately identify it as holding/going to hold some form 
of Correspondence Theory. Similarly the anti-realists may be thought to 
necessarily link their undetermined ontology with fully determined proofs, 
for that in a sense, is how their mathematics is born. For this reason 
and because of the rejection of bivalence in Intuitionism, one must be 
cautious in suggesting that all four movements have a sufficiently 
formalised part or total structure, that is able to meet Tarski's require- 
ments for a definition of truth for their 'language'. 
b) Criteria of Mathematical Truth. In this chapter a common feature 
of three movements has been the derivability of true propositions from 
some set of axioms. The exception is Intuitionism in which constructi- 
bility replaces derivability, and whatever set of axioms is identified 
as basic within some Intuitionistic logic, it represents a possible 
interpretation of mental activity and is not itself the foundation of 
mathematics. While all other movements presume a logic exists before 
mathematics develops, the Intuitionist argues that the logic comes into 
being only as a result of the development of mathematics. 
More disparity occurs when one looks for other criteria of truth, 
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rather than a definition. Then one sees that derivability is insufficient 
for Putnam, Lakatos and Ormell. Their unhappiness is combined with a more 
'empirical' view of mathematics. That is to identify one split between 
a priori and non-a priori movements - Logicists and Intuitionists, 
opposed to Formalists and Hypothesisors. In fact Lakatos and Ormell give 
every indication that they agree with Quine on the essential redundancy 
of the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
This conception may be put in slightly different terms, if one asks 
what account each movement would give of the objectivity of mathematics. 
Under what circumstances would each movement identify a proposition S 
as true? The Logicist would assert that the deductive proof of S from 
logical truths and by logical principles would show that it was 
true. 
The Formalist would look to a proof too but this would be based on axioms 
intuited from the world and not from logic, but obeying logical principles 
in the manipulation. The Hypothesisor rejects the strict Formalist's 
proof as only half a proof, for neither has it stood the public scrutiny 
of proof-analysis, nor has it been shown to be of applicative value 
either within or without mathematics, at least potentially. Finally, 
the Intuitionist may agree that this linguistic interpretation of some 
mental construction identified as S, may in this linguistic form be 
checked by a proof comparable to the Formalist one, but with respect 
to the principles of Intuitionistic logic, not Classical logic. The 
enlightened Intuitionist may go further and say that clearly by 
'objectivity' one means the proof of S, originally mentally constructed, 
being checked in Intuitionistic logic. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first part of this thesis four movements in the philosophy 
of mathematics have been outlined. Three of these movements have a 
tradition of being demarcated as such. These are Logicism, Formalism 
and Intuitionism. A fourth movement has been constructed by the author, 
bringing together nineteenth century Pragmatism, twentieth century 
Falsificationism and the contemporary views of a director of an existent 
Schools Council Mathematics Project. This movement is called 'the 
Hypothetical' and is unified particularly by the general agreement that 
mathematics is used in problem-solving through 'thought-experimentation', 
rather than through 'laboratory-experimentation'. It is in this sense, 
'hypothetical'. 
These movements have been selected because they have had direct 
or indirect impact on the ways mathematics has been and is being taught 
in secondary schools. In order to give a clear account of each of these 
movements, the thesis begins with a brief resume of the views on mathe- 
matics of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant, who are identified as fore- 
fathers of the movements central to this thesis. To ensure clarity of 
exposition and unity in this first part of the thesis, three questions 
have been identified and the body of the first part of the thesis 
consists in answering these questions: 
1) Are there eternal objects of mathematics? 
2) Is 'mathematics' logically distinct from the 'empirical sciences'? 
3) What is identified by the phrase 'mathematical truth' and 
how is 'mathematical truth' demonstrated? 
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QUESTION ONE is identifiably concerned with the ontology of mathematics. 
The first two movements discussed were Logicism and Formalism, 
1 
and are 
both committed to some form of ontological realism. That is, mathematics 
does not consist of mental entities, depending exclusively on man for 
their existence. However, it is only the Platonic realism of Plato him- 
self, and of Frege, that assuredly can be said to present the objects of 
mathematics as eternal. The other Logicists and Formalists link mathe- 
matical objects, not to man alone, but to man and the existence of some 
physical reality, a real world. In other words, only realistic logicism 
gives an unrestrained positive response to this first question. The term 
'eternal' bars all other philosophers. 
The Intuitionists take the rejection further. They see mathematics 
as a solely mental activity whose public form, as represented by 
intuitionistic logic, can only have a contingent relationship with 
mathematics as it is in itself. That is to say, the written form of 
mathematics presents a description of an ideal system. Consequently, 
there may be several attempts of differing kinds to represent mathematics 
publicly. 
2 
Finally, the Hypothesisors generally hold a view similar to 
that held by the Formalists that mathematical existence is a contingent 
state, dependent upon the public performances and communications of men. 
Clearly, the differing ontological standpoints can direct one's 
teaching in different directions, and this point is developed in part 2 
of the thesis. A teacher influenced by Platonism can argue that it makes 
sense to talk of 'uncovering' the eternal beauty of mathematics, but this 
can be no more than a stretched metaphor for a teacher influenced by 
Intuitionism. He is much more likely to stress the value of studying 
mathematics for developing the mind, for mathematics to him, as 'mental 
constructibility', is a way of reasoning. 
1. Chapter 2, pp. 27 to 36. 
2. Page 46 above. 
QUESTION TWO requires a clarification of the logical status of mathematics, 
in relation to other areas considered to be key features of education. 
This question is particularly appropriate at a time when there is so 
much public concern with the 'needs of society' and the production of 
scientifically aware youngsters. 
1 
This century began with Logicists claiming that mathematics was not 
just logically different from the empirical sciences, but reducible to 
logic. This position is contrasted in this first part of the thesis with 
the Intuitionist view, that mathematics is autonomous, and the view of 
Formalists and Hypothesisors that it is a science, but a special science. 
Formalists see mathematics as 'the science of formal systems' and the 
Hypothetical movement see it as 'the science of possibility'. In both 
these cases, mathematics stands logically apart from other sciences, 
because for Formalists it does not refer to any natural particulars in 
the real world, and for Hypothesisors it is seen as describing 'what can 
be', and not 'what is'. 
Thus every movement identifies some quality of mathematics, by which 
one could come to argue that its study gives a dimension to one's education 
that is not obtainable through the empirical sciences alone. The extent 
to which this can be combined with other factors to form a coherent policy 
for teaching mathematics will be considered in the following parts of the 
thesis. 
1. Aspects of Secondary Education in England. 'Problems demanding the 
everyday use of language were receiving insufficient attention; and 
computation was practised..., unrelated to practical questions in 
which it is necessary to subject the calculations to commonsense 
checks' (p. 141, ch. 7, para. 6.18). 'The ideas of the courses need 
to be shown in a broader setting,... Mathematics was too little 
related to the world outside and to other subjects in the school,... ' (P. 159, ch. 7, para. 10.14). Mathematics is being asked to go, 
where H. M. Inspectors believe language teaching now is. 
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QUESTION THREE. As the majority of movements follow the path of 
ontological realism, so they also follow the path of epistemological 
realism. Only in the work of Lakatos is there any explicit questioning 
of whether or not the truths of mathematics are held relative to social 
contexts. 
1 
The other Hypothesisors identified, Peirce and Ormell, seem 
to hold the view that the solutions to problems that are achieved by man, 
may be fallible, yet man can never know when he has achieved the right 
solution, although such solutions may be obtained. Thus Orwell in particu- 
lar comes close to accepting the redundancy of 'truth', in favour of terms 
like 'warranted assertion'. There are signs that Lakatos takes the next 
step and sees 'mathematical truth' as a relative concept. Such relativism 
has explicit proponents who are not discussed in this thesis. Their2 
omission is justified because they have as yet to make a significant 
mark on the mathematics education of England and Wales. Furthermore, 
the central argument of this thesis will be seen to be unaffected by 
the omission. It is sufficient for this argument that question three 
is shown to have a variety of answers, even if some more extreme responses 
are omitted. 
In part 2 of the thesis the variety of responses is seen reflected 
in the differing approaches presented for teaching mathematics. Thus, 
a teacher influenced by strict Formalism may consider a formally derived 
proof of (a - b) 
(a + b) = 
(a2 
- b2), as adequate evidence that a student 
has shown that a given mathematical proposition holds, while a teacher 
influenced by the Hypothetical movement may also require the student to 
1. This is found in the dispute identified on p. 87 above. 
2. In philosophy of science this standpoint is well developed in 
P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method. In mathematics education the 
main force in this direction is W. M. Brookes but he rarely publishes 
his views although the influence is there in statements like the 
following, 'The nature and content of mathematics is an element of 
the culture of a people and liable to change with time. Any defini- 
tion of mathematics is a personal statement fixed in time. ' 
(Notes on mathematics for children, A. T. M., p. 143). 
1 
-, ý. _ . __ 
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show some internal or external application for the expression, as occurs 
when asked to calculate 752 - 252. 
CONCLUSION 
At this point four movements have been identified through their 
distinct views of the nature of mathematics. In the second part of 
the thesis these distinctions will be drawn upon to discuss the differing 
approaches to mathematics teaching to be found in secondary schools, from 
the overriding concern for 'mathematical beauty and form' to the constant 
regard for 'practical pay-off'. 
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PART 2: MATHEMATICS TEACHING 
CHAPTER6 
SEARCH FOR A COMMON FRAMEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first part of the thesis four perspectives on mathematics are 
outlined but no attempt is made to show that one movement provides a more 
accurate description than another. Given that the central focus of this 
thesis is mathematics education it would be short-sighted to exclude one 
or more movements if they have an on-going influence in mathematics 
education. The main aim of this part of the thesis is to highlight the 
influences present in mathematics teaching, which are due to philosophy 
of mathematics, rather than to assert what ought to be present in 
mathematics teaching. 
1 
There is a great temptation to attach to each philosophical movement 
outlined in part 1, a distinct perspective upon mathematics teaching. 
Thus for example, one would expect a teacher who admits to a Formalist 
philosophy, believing like Curry that mathematics consists solely of the 
manipulation of symbols, to teach mathematics as a 'Game'. 
2 It is clear 
that such tight logical connections cannot be drawn when one discusses 
the complexities of successful teaching. The teacher may choose to do 
what will motivate his class rather than what will connect immediately 
to his long-term objective, of showing that mathematics rests on Formalist 
foundations. 
1. In part 3 of the thesis some prescriptions are made. 
2. The linking of 'mathematics' with 'games' is first discussed on 
pp- 
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Nevertheless it would seem worth identifying movements in Mathematics 
Teaching in order to provide a clear structure to this part of the thesis, 
as there was in the first part. In the final pages of part 1 it is made 
clear that for each philosophy of mathematics there is a distinctive view 
of how mathematics is enlarged as a publicly accepted body of knowledge. 
These views are: 
1) The Loaricist view considers the enlarging of mathematics as an 
exercise in uncovering what one knows to be tire-existent. 
2) The Formalist view considers this as an exercise in discovering 
new ways of combining what is independently given. 
3) The Intuitionist view considers this as an exercise in creating 
totally new things. 
4) The Hynothesisor view considers this as an exercise in inventing 
structures that have a potential usefulness. 
In this part of the thesis four teaching perspectives are identified and 
it will be argued that there are existent movements in mathematics 
education, corresponding to each of them. For example, Nuffield mathematics 
has a commitment to 'discovery methods' and sets the child out to uncover 
wonderful new ways to look at the world. 
1 
The four teaching perspectives 
are, 
1) The Teaching of Mathematics as Aesthetically-orientated. 
2) The Teaching of Mathematics as a Game 
(or Family of Games). 
3) The Teaching of Mathematics as a member of the Natural Sciences. 
4) The Teaching of Mathematics as Technologically-orientated. 
The order is seen predominantly as a 'Culture-continuum' rather than corres- 
ponding to the order of philosophical movements discussed in part I. It 
1. As the originator G. Matthews says of Nuffield Mathematics, its objec- 
tive is 'to help the children develop gradually... from discovery with 
things to eventual abstraction with pencil and paper' 
('Mathematics 
in the Middle Years', S. C. W. P. No. 22, p. 64). 
I 
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reflects a personal view of how many people see the curriculum, ranging 
from the least to the most 'useful'. However a fifth 'perspective' is 
presented as somewhat of a radical alternative. This is the view that 
as far as possible all teaching is best done in an interdisciplinary 
context. This part of the thesis ends with a discussion of the implica- 
tions of such a viewpoint. It is important to remember that the focus 
has moved from philosophical views of mathematics to that of mathematics 
educators generally aware of philosophy. The two foci are inter-related, 
because one's beliefs about the nature of mathematics will put constraints 
on the way one teaches. 
Over the last twenty years there have definitely been radical changes 
in all education and when one mentions a particular teaching approach it 
may well depend on one's age whether one imagines it going on in the 
Infant School or in a class for M. Sc. students. Anyone looking in S. M. P. 
Book 11 and then in the Schools Council Curriculum Bulletin No. 1 will 
notice that a topic, say tessellations, is linked much more to the 
language of experimentation in the latter, more recently revised book. 
It is doubtful if such clear divides would have happened when they did, 
if there had not been in the previous fifty years major divergences of 
opinion in mathematics, the natural and social sciences and in philosophical 
reflections upon them. The result is that in this thesis one has been 
able to identify four philosophies of mathematics all founded within the 
last hundred years and can now go on to consider a range of teaching 
perspectives, using examples all being employed in schools today. While 
a particular philosophy does not commit one irreconcilably to a particular 
perspective, some links seem more natural than others. 
1. S. M. P. is the School Mathematics Project. With the Midlands Mathe- 
matics Experiment it was the first of what have become known as 
'Modern Mathematics' texts but even in this area there has continued 
to be changes from 1962 when S. M. P. Book 1 was published to 1972 
when this Bulletin was revised. 
I 
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THE PERSPECTIVES 
The differing perspectives will be described as employed by a 
fictitious 'young teacher'. He is a mathematics graduate who was told 
at Primary School what fun it is to do 'sums', treating mathematics very 
much as a 'game'. This approach contrasted sharply with the more 
utilitarian perspective suggested as essential for someone hoping to 
enter a Grammar School. Once in the Grammar School the utilitarian 
viewpoint was reinforced by talk of Pure Mathematics being one '0' level 
that one had to get to take up a professional career, particularly in 
Accountancy, Economics and Law as well as being compulsory for studying 
science at a 'good university'. This 'young teacher' came to find 
intrinsic pleasure in learning mathematics, happy to study it for its 
own sake. Fortunately this was reinforced by his 'A' level Pure 
Mathematics teacher who saw 'mathematics as an art', an area of 'creative 
thinking'. 
1 
At the same time his physics teacher made it equally clear 
that mathematics was really no different from physics and the other 
sciences, except that it was far less exciting and considerably less 
useful. However the links with 'Art' and 'Games' were reinforced at 
university by Pure Mathematicians, but then connections to be drawn 
with the scientific method were refreshed by tutors on his Graduate 
Certificate Course. There the focus was on 'Discovery Teaching Methods'. 
These practical influences of teacher education came just as the young 
teacher had begun to think that he had acquired 'mathematical taste' as 
Zeeman identifies it. He seemed to recognise the subtle qualities of 
'elegance, intrinsic beauty, profundity, generality, simplicity, depth, 
subtlety and economy' in many parts of Mathematics. Thus in his attempt 
to satisfy this range of acceptable influences this 'young teacher' 
1. See support for this approach in Zeeman E. C., 'Mathematics and 
Creative Thinking' in Mathematics in School, 2,305 (1972). He 
defines 'elegance, intrinsic beauty, profundity... ' as found in 
all aesthetic appreciation. 
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comes to employ differing perspectives with different classes in his 
first teaching post, at an 11-18 Comprehensive. 
1) The Teaching of Mathematics as Aesthetically-orientated 
The young teacher has been given syllabuses and text books to guide 
him and he begins with preparation of his 'A' level teaching. He hopes 
that his students will come to value mathematics 'in all its beauty' as 
he has done. He is to introduce them to co-ordinate geometry, say. 
His first objective is that they should appreciate the elegance and 
rigour of the proofs in this area of mathematics. He may have lots of 
objectives so let one more be noted in order to make clearer the 
characteristics of this approach. The students will have the opportunity 
to 'create'1 proofs of their own and to compare them with other proofs, 
and to see which are 'better' than which with respect to parsimony, 
elegance, et al. In this way the students will recognise that aesthetic 
terminology can be meaningfully linked to works of mathematics, just as 
one would use them in critically appraising a painting, say. Thus the 
approach shows itself in two ways. Firstly, the students are encouraged 
to develop 'mathematical taste' and demonstrate their understanding in 
using critical language and even showing preferences among different 
proofs. 
2 
Secondly, the students are led through proofs and then left to 
their own devices to 'create' inverses and corollaries. 
3 
1. See the discussion of 'creativity' within educational objectives in 
Elliott, R. K. 'The Concept of Creativity', Proc. Phil. Educ. Soc. 
of Gt. Brit. V, 1,97-104 (1971) and 'Versions of Creativity', ibid., 
V, 2,139-52 (1971), Ormell, C. P. 'Bloom's taxonomy and the 
objectives of education', Educ. Res. 17,3-18, and in the next chapter. 
2. One student prefers to use trigonometric proofs rather than 
Euclidean 
ones wherever possible because of their brevity, but another student 
likes the subtlety of constructions in Euclidean proofs even 
if they 
are many times as long. 
3. Given Pythagoras theorem that 'In a right angled triangle the area 
of the square on the hypotenuse is equal 
to the areas on the other 
two sides' then the inverse is 'If the area of 
the hypotenuse is 
equal to... then the triangle is right-angled'. 
A corollary would 
be any proof following directly from the proof of 
Pythagoras, e. g. 
'The centre of a circle lies on the perpendicular 
bisector of any 
chord'. 
I 
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2) The Teaching of Mathematics as a Game 
The young teacher considers next his youngest pupils, eleven year-olds. 
He decides to start with 'co-ordinates' and to introduce this through 
'Battleships'1 which many of the class may know how to play. Battleships 
is a game, with rules covering every allowable activity within the game 
and also procedures for deciding when it has ended and who has won. The 
teacher is encouraging the pupils to view mathematics as a family of games. 
Each part of mathematics is to be seen as possessing definite rules for 
everything one is allowed to do and procedures by which one can recognise 
that one has completed some 'sub-game', e. g. proved a theorem. So for 
these pupils the concept of 'games-teaching' may be said to be gaining 
a new dimension. However these games are not intended to be competitive 
but are comparable to patience at cards or playing against the course, 
at golf. 'Winning' is the successful completion of a 'sub-game', like 
proving a theorem or doing ten sums, checking them and finding that they 
are correct. 
Even though the teacher chose this approach for this class, he may 
at the same time introduce the language of 'aesthetic appraisal' (not 
everything that is 'beautiful' is a work of art -a beautiful cover 
drive). He may want also to indicate that battleship lay-outs are most 
inventive sometimes or that one pupil has 'created' a particularly complex 
solid or intricate symmetrical pattern. He may not feel that 'create' as 
used here is synonymous with its use referring to Blake as 'that creative 
genius', but it is still in his mind to begin to indicate the possible 
association of 'art' and 'mathematics'. The teacher is happy also for 
1. Battleships is a game for two where each person has a grid, numbered 
1 to 8 horizontally and A to H vertically for example. On the grid 
he places ships, e. g. x submarines, y frigates and z destroyers where 
each type of ship covers a different number of s uares. By calling 
the names of different squares to your opponent 
(C4, 
say and opponent 
says, 'Hit' or 'Miss') one eventually covers a second grid with the 
whereabouts of your opponent's ships. 
I 
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a child to make a discovery. In class, the pupils having thought of a 
three digit number find someone who would like to try and work out what 
it is by guessing numbers in each of three places. There may be many 
other rules and most likely the work is in base 5 say, rather than base 
10.1 The point is that one or more children return the next day and say 
they have a game at home called 'Mastermind' and although it uses colours 
for numbers it really is the same game - that is a discovery. This 
perspective may be seen however as discouraging the pupils associating 
mathematics with real-life situations. The idea that mathematics is a 
game may facilitate transfer to the Darts board or Netball pitch rather 
than to the Science Laboratory or Home Economics base. There is certainly 
room for further discussion on this point in the coming chapters. 
3) The Teaching of Mathematics as a member of the Natural Sciences 
The young teacher's second years are an able group, an express band 
taking '0' level in four years. They are to start the year with a look 
at 'Euler's rule'2 and the young teacher, remembering a desire for 
'discovery methods', can see that it is very easy to present this as 
analogous to the discovery of a law in science. The students can look 
at pictures of polyhedra and make polyhedra and decide what constant 
features they have, like corners and so on. Then they try to make 
conjectures about these vertices (corners), faces and edges. If they are 
guided to produce a table of information then arriving at hypotheses may 
be facilitated. Hypotheses may be tested and modified until some form 
of Euler's rule appears and is generally accepted. 
One may accept that the scientific method has been the basis of 
1. Ten is called the base of our number system. Place-value is deter- 
mined by the base so we have 1's, 10's, 10 x 10's, ... If the base 
were five then there would be l's, 5's, 5x 5's, ... 34 base 10 is 3x 10 +4x1 but 34 base 5 is 3x5+4xI. 
2. 'Euler's rule' shows a relationship for polyhedra (regular solids 
like cubes) such that F+V=E+2. Faces - Vertices - Edges. 
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some mathematics learning and yet make it clear to the learner that 
mathematics is not generally thought to be inductivist. In Nuffield 
mathematics the child is encouraged to experiment and find the solution 
for concrete problems, but at the appropriate point of cognitive develop- 
ment he is encouraged to go on, to 'abstractions and generalisations'. 
The child is not brought finally to believe that scientific induction 
is the method of mathematics but that it has a part to play in mathematical 
exploration. In this way the approach does not violate hard-held philo- 
sophical positions that a teacher may have. The experimental method can 
be accepted as excellent for motivation, provided the pupil is not given 
a view of mathematics that is so radically empiricist that he comes into 
conflict with nearly all teachers involved with mathematics, and is left 
with an overriding sceptism of mathematical results in later life. It 
may be valuable to show that mathematics must relate to science but one 
must be careful in explaining in what sense it is science. 
4) The Teaching of Mathematics as Technolozically-orientated 
The young teacher found that the third year syllabus began with 'flow 
charts', 
2 
and he decided to begin with a few general knowledge-type prob- 
lems. For example, the crossing of a river by soldiers who have a boat 
1. This division between mathematical exploration and mathematics not 
being identical to the other natural sciences in its method comes out 
clearly in the writings of those concerned with this approach. The 
book, Mathematics Through School contains the views of fifteen such 
mathematics educationists. 
2. A flow chart indicates the possible sequence of procedures that could 
occur in a given situation, assuming that any question is answered 
'yes' or 'no'. They facilitate the analysis of a problem. Thus a 
flow chart could help the solution of the above problem in the 
following way: (See SMP Book F, pp. 1-3). 
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owned by two boys, that takes one adult or two boys at a time. The 
teacher intends to show diagrammatic solutions of this and other such 
problems. He will use flow charts. The flow chart is a model of a 
solution for problems of a particular kind, and given information about 
a particular problem, aids its solution. Once the class become aware of 
the nature of flow charts, further flow charts will be employed in the 
solution of linear and quadratic equations, for example. The pupils 
learn how to construct for themselves kits of tools that are sometimes 
used to deal with problems purely within mathematics, like a linear 
equation, and at other times a kit may be used to solve a problem that 
the pupils would identify totally with real-life rather than connected 
to mathematics. In this comprehensive there is genuine concern about 
where is the best position for a new vending machine, to minimise conges- 
tion. Vending machines are heavy to move about but mathematical modelst 
of the possibilities are not. Before the school makes a decision oppor- 
tunities are given for debate. Differing models are investigated by the 
model-builders. Modifications may result but eventually an agreed best 
solution becomes established. These 'mental models' may be seen as 
comparable to the physical models that an engineer uses or the computer 
models of a country's economic growth that the Chancellor may use. Models 
are found throughout the applied, natural and social sciences. From this 
perspective, mathematics is to be seen as heavily concerned with applicability. 
One expects a young teacher to want his pupils to learn as much about 
mathematics as their corresponding levels of conceptual development seem 
1. While the number bases defined in footnote 1, p. 102 may be seen as 
simply conventions to facilitate the procedures of mathematics, 'models' 
as identified here are manifestations of ideas at a level of abstrac- 
tion further from the concrete than the original, e. g. Chess models 
the original Chinese game with real people. A linear graph may be 
presented as a model of a motor car's acceleration performance. In 
Teaching Mathematics Applicable Introductory Guide (Heinemann, 1979) 
pp. 10-15 there is a brief but thoroughly exemplified account of 
'modelling' and further elaboration occurs in Chapter 10 below. 
to indicate is appropriate. This desire may be facilitated by the use 
of models. They can vary in levels of concreteness and complexity. 
Models are not able to illustrate all the features in the original and 
so the teacher may guide the pupil to a model at a level of interpretation 
at which he can work successfully. It is hoped also that the pupil will 
see in the model more than the means to solve one problem, namely the 
'potential' to model other situations. Within the objectives of this 
technologically-orientated approach is the commitment to show as far as 
possible the relevance of knowledge acquired, not only to real-life 
problems but also to problems in other parts of mathematics itself, in 
the way that co-ordinate geometry may be considered to model Euclidean. 
Inevitably the teacher sometimes stimulates the production of 'potential 
models' as a game, without identifying any particular applications at 
that time. 
A further perspective may well have been expected. There has been 
much talk of 'mathematics as a language'2 as a successful focus for mathe- 
matics teaching. Underlying this view is the analogy with the natural 
acquisition of a first language. It is assumed that a child could acquire 
'naturally' 
a first 'numerical' language too. Teachers may want to encour- 
age this view of mathematics as no more difficult to learn than one's 
mother tongue, but it does not seem to identify any one approach or view 
of what mathematics is. Mathematics can only be identified with a 
restricted use of 'language'. It is difficult to see how a set of symbols 
held under a tight syntactic structure and even capable of meeting the 
1. Ratios in Euclidean geometry for example, become algebraic expressions 
in co-ordinate geometry. Thus, AB: BC becomes x2 - xl: y3 - y2 for a 
given right-angled triangle. 
Cx=4 ý"'] (x y) 3,3 
A 
ýB 
x% -_. (x 1 Y1 2 y2 i-- _7 y=0 
2. See the works of F. W. Land, e. g. The Language of Mathematics, for 
support for such a view. 
restrictive demands, identified in Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth, 
could have the richness that one associates with ordinary language. Even 
accepting this difficulty, mathematicians have used the notion of 
'mathematics as a language' more as a means to defend themselves against 
outsiders than to offer a positive perspective. The argument has been 
that there is an essential 'fluency' to mathematical understanding, 
1 
comparable to that implied in knowledge of a foreign language. Until 
one is at the level of appreciating technical terms in this 'language' 
then one is hardly able to contribute to discussions either in it, or 
even about it. This leaves the learner somewhat unprotected from the 
overriding authority of the teacher, 
Certainly there are uses of the word 'language' which are specialised. 
One may talk of 'computer languages', 'the language of music' and in the 
previous chapter mention was made of 'formal languages' but none of these 
can be identified with the concept of an 'ordinary language'. Some 
features are to be found in common and one may take into these artificial 
languages other words from ordinary language and modify their usage. One 
thinks of the use of 'meaning' and 'grammar' for example. 
2 
To be told to 
teach mathematics as if it were a language does not seem to give very much 
of a guide to a young teacher. There is still the further question, in 
what context are the pupils to speak the language. In other words, one 
may still wonder whether or not the pupils are to speak this language 
when uncovering a perfect proof, or discovering a new relationship, or 
devising a new form of Battleships, or producing a model of the different 
effects of a set of chlorines in the school swimming pool. The differing 
approaches are not erased by the idea that 'mathematics is a language', 
unless one associates 'language' purely with 'symbolic systems' and 'games', 
1. The notions of 'fluency' and 'understanding' are discussed further in 
part 3. 
2. Points about 'language' and 'mathematics' recur in part 3. 
which is not the sense discussed here. Teachers do seem concerned with 
mathematics as more than the symbolic manipulation of strokes, although 
they may well teach mathematics according to this philosophical movement 
sometimes. 
It should be clear that the suggestion is that a particular perspec- 
tive may be used by different teachers for different reasons. Only some 
teachers will tend to be technologically orientated for philosophical 
reasons. Others will be so because material is thought by them to 
increase the chances of their students getting employment. The most that 
one could claim is that such a teacher is an 'implicit' pragmatist. 
Similarly the popularity in the last fifteen years, of viewing mathematics 
as a formal system or set of systems whose foundations must be made clear 
to the pupils, does not indicate that all teachers became Formalists. One 
might suggest that many simply thought all the examiners were Formalists. 
CONCLUSION 
Given this debate the young teacher is wondering whether there are 
any hard and fast rules to the teaching of mathematics. This chapter is 
an introduction to the area, and as such has attempted to isolate some 
questions that are considered in subsequent chapters of this part of the 
thesis. The young teacher has employed a range of approaches, due to the 
different influences on him, but without arriving at a coherent framework 
for his teaching of mathematics. Therefore it would be natural for him 
to want to have a systematic outline of the various approaches, which 
involves consideration of the following questions: 
1) What distinguishes perspective X from all the others? 
2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one perspec- 
tive before, as a pupil, one can appreciate some other 
perspective? 
3) Does one find a common logical sequence to what is taught, 
no matter through which approach it is taught? 
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These questions may not be fully answered by the end of this part 2 of 
the thesis, but they do provide a focus for what is to follow. The 
answers that are achieved provide the framework in which the knowledge 
and understanding to be expected of any teacher of mathematics in 
secondary schools today, can be identified. In the third part of the 
thesis, questions about the training of mathematics educators can then 
come to the fore. 
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CHAPTER7 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING - ART PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
When the young teacher, met in the previous chapter, considers 
mathematics teaching as analogous to art teaching, certain objectives 
come to mind. In his sixth form class (see p. 100 above) he expects 
his students to, 
1) 'value mathematics "in all its beauty" as he has done', as they 
learn to 
2a) 'appreciate the elegance and rigour of the proofs', 
b) "create" proofs of their own', and 
c) 'Compare ... proofs... to see which are "better" than which 
with respect to parsinomy, elegance, et al. '. 
He believes that the result of meeting objectives 2a) to 2c) is to 
progress to 1). It is hoped that in achieving 2) students will have 
the opportunity to appreciate the historical dimension in which certain 
proofs came to be written. E. T. Bell in his famous Men of Mathematics 
speaks of co-ordinate geometry as, 'of the highest order of excellence, 
marked by the sensuous simplicity of the half-dozen or so great contri- 
butions of all time to mathematics. Descartes remade geometry and made 
modern geometry possible. ' (Men of Mathematics, p. 71). 
The eloquence of Bell's book does not show that aesthetic language 
is simply transferable to a mathematical context. 'Words' by themselves 
do not tell one very much. One must look behind to the theory that 
underpins them. The language of aesthetics is found to rest on at least 
as many possible foundations as were considered for mathematics itself, 
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in part 1 of the thesis. To make progress some theoretical frameworks 
must be sketched in. This will be the objective of the next section of 
this chapter. With these drawn, the remaining sections will concentrate 
on the possible links between aesthetics1 and mathematics teaching. It 
will be shown that aesthetic theories and the mathematical movements of 
the first part of the thesis have some features in common. 
2 
This chapter 
will try to consider the validity of presenting mathematics to children 
as an area in which aesthetics is of singular importance. 
AESTHETIC THEORIES 
In the first part of the thesis Platonic realism was a recurrent 
phrase. Plato's view of art and aesthetic criticism is compatible with 
such a realism. The analysis will start with this theory and continue 
with those roughly parallel to the Formalist and Intuitionist movements 
of part 1. Mathematical Formalists and Aesthetic Formalists have a 
common focus on 'ordered structures'. Intuitionists and Expressionists 
have their common focus on man's inner states, his ways of reasoning and 
self-expression. 
1) Representational Theory 
While there have been developments of this theory over the last 
two thousand years, Plato's presentation of the theory adequately 
exemplifies the main characteristics of the theory as it comes into 
contact with mathematics, in this thesis. 
3 Plato's view of art echoes 
1. 'Aesthetics' is to be taken here to cover 'philosophy of art', 
'aesthetic experiences' and 'aesthetic criticism'. It should be 
noted also that an object may warrant aesthetic criticism, without 
its being a work of art. 
2. It was noted on p. 13 that one could hold a realist view of the world 
for example, but an anti-realist view of mathematics. Thus a realist 
view of art may be linked to an anti-realist view of mathematics when 
one considers the teaching of mathematics. 
3. Developments in this theory, as found particularly in Gombrich, 
indicate a loosening in the absolute nature of the representation, 
and an acceptance of the Kantian view that experiences have meaning 
only if filtered through some categorial framework. Thus, in con- 
temporary forms of Representationalism, the artist presents an 
interpretation of his experiences necessarily, and neither he nor 
any critic can have the 'pure view' that Plato suggests. 
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the beliefs of the Pythagoreans nearly two hundred years before. Plato 
had taken their commitment to the perfection of mathematics as a paradigm 
of 'knowledge'. The Pythagoreans had seen mathematical truths as the key 
to all knowledge, including questions about 'the beautiful' and 'the good'. 
In Plato's works, his Formst also draw together what is morally right, 
what is aesthetically beautiful and what is philosophically known. Just 
as the true proposition '2 +2= 4' corresponds to the form of 'truth' 
in a Platonic reality, the aesthetic claim that the Mona Lisa is beautiful 
must relate to the form of beauty. Furthermore, what is beautiful must be 
also morally good, for they correspond to one form. 
Thus Plato divides the Arts into those that are supportive of the 
moral values of the state, and those that show weaknesses in the state's 
heroes. The artist has a moral duty to represent what is morally good, 
and to omit the suggestion that those who are morally good can falter. 
Art is seen as part of this moral education. Thus art is bad, both 
ethically and aesthetically, if it inhibits this propagation. In such 
a theory of art, one does not rely on 'Intuition' or 'innate ideas' to 
make aesthetic criticisms, but the Guardians of the Republic 'know' what 
is 'good' and 'beautiful'. Just as 2+2 is equal to 4 because of some- 
thing external to man, according to Platonic realism aesthetic judgments 
hold as eternally, 
2 
through their relationship to something external. 
Thus representation provides the definition of what is 'true', 'good' or 
'beautiful', but the criterion by which such things are identified is the 
application of the highest kind of reasoning as possessed only by the 
1. 'The forms' are introduced on PP. 14-8 above. They exist in a trans- 
cendental reality. That is where an object in its true self is to 
be found. Thus 'real knowledge ... 
(is possessed by)... those who 
contemplate things as they are in themselves... and as they exist 
ever permanent and immutable... ' (The Republic, para. 479/480). 
2. An identification of the use to be given to 'a priori' in this 
thesis was made on p. 76 above. It is based on Kant's interpretation, 
that such knowledge is gained without empirical investigation. 
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Guardians. One deduces from given hypotheses that '2 +2= 4' and by 
dialectic reasoning that the Mona Lisa is beautiful. Furthermore, one 
may recognise that something is 'elegant' without knowing whether it is 
beautiful or not, just as one may recognise that all circles have some- 
thing in common besides their shape, without being able to prove a link 
between diameters and circumferences. In each of these cases, one recog- 
nises an intermediary form, without recognising the one ultimate form in 
which all knowledge shares. One can categorise things as 'elegant' or 
as 'circles' without knowing any 'true, beautiful' proofs about 'elegant 
circles'. 
1 
The logic of Plato's position is that nothing can be both 
true and have an inconsistency or beautiful and possess a negative 
aesthetic attribute, like inelegance, for the ultimate form is perfect. 
2) Formalist Theory 
This theory originated with Fry and Bellt was vigorously reformulated 
by Suzanne Langer, 3 over the past thirty years. These thinkers are drawn 
together in the belief that there is something unique which all aesthetic 
objects possess. Art does express things but not like a language. Art 
is not to be criticised for its representational or semantic structure, 
but for its 'form' alone. Bell's position claims a very strong autonomy 
for artistic expression. He argues an aesthetic experience is only to be 
had in considering an object as an end in itself, free from human interests. 
In such circumstances one becomes aware of the 'formal significance' of the 
object, and this is the experience of 'aesthetic emotion'. 
4 
1. This is the position explained by Plato in 'The Divided Line' and 
'The Cave' illustrations of Republic, vi and vii. 
2. Reliance here is generally on Bell alone, particularly his book Art. 
3. Langer's books include Feeling and Form and Philosophy in a New Key. 
In the latter book she refers to Kant's ideas being reflected in her 
work. 
4. See Art, pp. 6-7, where Bell introduces aesthetic emotion as 'the 
essential quality... that distinguishes works of art from all other 
classes of objects'. Towards the end of the book one reads this 
broader conception, that 'By form the vague, uneasy, and unearthly 
emotions are transmuted into something definite, logical, and above 
the earth. ' (ibid., p. 283). 
The outsider seems inevitably to find all versions of the Formalist 
theory essentially tautolo; *ical. There is no public way of coming to 
identify 'form', or aesthetic experience. Similarly one has no means of 
refuting the theory for any counter-example may be simply identified as 
not being a formal feature but one tainted by human interests. There 
are indications in Bell's writings of the kinds of features that he and 
others are most concerned to study. Bell concentrates on what he sees 
as the organising features of a work of art. He focuses on line, mass 
and colour and excludes consideration of the meaning of the work, or 
the artist's intention to communicate a message. Bell and other Formalists 
represent a group trying to defend the rise of abstract art forms in the 
first three decades of this century. Bell saw literature as so inherently 
concerned with 'meaning' that it is classified as 'impure art'. One might 
suggest that this recalls everyday distinctions used by scientists, 
mathematicians and educators to separate pure from applied science or 
mathematics. Certainly the strict formalist mathematicians seem to 
flee to a comparable separating of themselves from all questions of inter- 
pretation. Bell similarly insists that one cuts oneself off from 'the 
significance of life' in making aesthetic judgments. He goes on, 'For, 
to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of 
form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space. ' (Art, p. 25). 
Bell later stresses that an artist is someone who has seen 'objects as 
pure forms. We see them as ends in themselves, ... Who has not, once 
at least in his life, had a sudden vision of landscape as pure form? 
For once, instead of seeing it as fields and cottages, he has felt it as 
lines and colours. ' (ibid., p. 53). Furthermore, '... Be they artists or 
lovers of art, mystics or mathematicians, those who achieve ecstasy are 
those who have freed themselves from the arrogance of humanity. ' 
(ibid., p. 70). 
In modifying Formalism, writers like Langer have continued to accept 
the primacy of 'significant form' but have admitted that 'meaning' can 
play a part if the influence is recognised and controllable. This is 
similar to Hilbert's initial constraint of mathematical Formalism to 
'formally consistent systems'. 
1 Langer attempted to take the pure 
position into music but found herself having to give some 'formulation 
and representation of emotions, moods, mental tensions and resolutions - 
a "logical picture" of sentient, responsive life. ' 
(This is brought out 
particularly in her Philosophy in a New Key, chapter 8). She draws the 
key features of Formalism together with an acceptance that art is 
expressive in a sense that goes beyond the isolated state of art that 
satisfied Bell. Langer accepts that success in art includes conveying 
formal features that are common to the arts and to human feelings. In 
other words, there are features by which one identifies music as 'sad', 
because there is some association with what one senses in finding some 
person 'sad'. While Langer hooks art on to the world, she does not 
explain how the outsider comes to recognise the commonality between 
feelings in art and in life. At this point, one is again held at bay, 
as one is with Bell's original Formalism, by the sui generis nature of 
art and its symbolism. Appreciation of the correctness of the theory 
can only come once one has got inside aesthetic appreciation in the 
formal sense. The circularity may not be vicious, but it certainly 
seems to be protective. 
It was indicated above, in the quotation from p. 70 of Art, that 
Clive Bell draws connections between art and mathematics. He certainly 
considered the mathematician to have a similar sensibility to that felt 
by artists and their critics. He says on p. 25 of Art, 'The pure mathe- 
matician rapt in his studies knows a state of mind which I take to be 
similar, if not identical.... I wonder, sometimes, whether the appreciators 
1. On p. 32 above, it was noted that Hilbert, unlike the later Formalists, 
had a place for meaning in mathematics. 
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of art and of mathematical solutions are not even more closely allied. ' 
One may feel justified therefore, in saying that the two kinds of 
Formalism, one artistic and one mathematical, differ, as one 'is the 
study of significant form and the other is the study of formal systems'. 
1 
The Formalist theory of art reminds one very strongly of 'a secret society' 
and this feature of strict mathematical formalism is one that will be 
returned to, both at the end of this part of the thesis and throughout 
the next and final part. 
Certainly the Formalist requires aesthetic appreciation to occur 
without reference to other considerations, like ethical or social 
questions. Aesthetic significance may be noted whenever aesthetic emotion 
is provoked, no matter what provokes it. However, the applying of 
aesthetic terminology is to be done with detachment and the linguistic 
expression is to be recognised as meaningful only within the aesthetic 
domain. 
3) Expression Theory 
Croce2 and Collingwood3 present works of art as internal constructs, 
expressions of the self. The physical representation of art is necessary 
to make it possible for the viewer to get into the artist's feelings, 
whereby the work of art can be fully grasped. 
4 
This theory has strong 
1. Even if Hardy saw that 'beauty is the first test' for the mathematician 
as well as the artist, the link of mathematics and art could be con- 
sidered intimate but not inclusive. This limitation is well expressed 
in the article, 'Mathematics and Art', Graduate Training of Mathematics 
Teachers (pp. 23-30), where K. 0. Mays says, 'Patterns in either field 
may illustrate, explain or inspire work in the other' 
(p. 29), but he 
clearly stops short of claiming that mathematics and art can be one. 
2. The founder of the theory. 
3. The Principles of Art contains his theory of art. 
4. R. K. Elliott's article 'Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art' 
in Aesthetics, includes a broadened theory that includes 'arousal of 
emotion' as well as the sensing of emotion, as a feature of 'aesthetic 
significance'. Even within the distinction between arousal and sensing 
of emotions is the further distinction between emotional responses that 
clearly lie within the control of the artist and those that arise 
independently of the artist's intentions. Clearly, the latter position 
is that most commonly implied when commenting on mathematics 
aesthetically. 
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similarities to Intuitionism as described in part 1, Chapter 3 above. 
This is reinforced in Collingwood by comments like, 'The artistic activity 
does not "use" a "ready-made language", it "creates" language as it goes 
along. ' (Principles of Art, p. 275). 
Croce accepted two sides to the experience of a work of art. One 
does not only try to experience the work of art as an object, to be made 
part of one's own experiences 'from within', but one must recognise the 
value also in seeing the work of art as an external object, 'from without'. 
This is comparable to some Intuitionists in mathematics treating 
Intuitionistic logic as a valid part of mathematics, and not just the 
instrument by which one gets to mathematics itself. Croce was concerned 
throughout his philosophy to eliminate dualism1 and he saw that the view- 
ing of art as separately a 'within part' and a 'without part' as a dualism. 
To Croce, an artistic experience only commences if both features were 
present. 
The theory has a simple notion of aesthetic achievement by an artist. 
It is well expressed in this unspecified quotation from Coleridge in 
Collingwood: 'we know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us poets. 
We know that he is expressing his emotions by the fact that he is enabling 
us to express ours. ' (Principles of Art, p. 118). 
Underlying this theory is the egalitarian principle that has signi- 
ficant educational implications, that everyone has 'imagination' and 
through one's imagination anyone can come to express the emotions one 
possesses. Everyone has these ordinary, real life emotions, but only 
artists are able to put them into a form that others can sense. In so 
reacting, one then learns something new about oneself, further knowledge 
1. 'Dualism' can be taken here to refer to any theory that proposes that 
a single identifiable object consists of components belonging to more 
than one ontological realm. The usual thesis given is Descartes' 
view of man as both 'physical' and 'spiritual', to exemplify such a 
position. 
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about one's own emotions. This is not a theory of causal responses. 
The critic may well have to work hard to indicate his knowledge of a book, 
say, before others come to sense what it expresses. This reflects 
accurately the struggle interpreters of great mathematicians have in 
providing a public form of their achievements. 
1 
Thus Expressionism may help to clarify an approach to mathematics 
teaching most readily considered by Intuitionists. However, Expressionism 
cannot be directly applied to mathematics as identified by Intuitionists 
or any other philosophical movement discussed in this thesis, for mathe- 
matical objects are not connected Per se, with the evoking of human 
emotions. The validity of a pedagogic link is based on the idea that 
a pupil may the more readily appreciate what is involved in understanding 
a mathematical proof, if he compares this experience with getting to know 
a work of art. 
There is little to suggest that aesthetic terminology as conceived 
by Expressionism is readily transferable to mathematics, unless mathematics 
is seen to be connected with the expression of emotions. To the 
expressionist, 'elegance' is not Per se an aesthetic term but may be used 
within an aesthetic judgment, if the elegance of the leading lady's 
performance say, evoked awareness of deep respect. In contrast, the 
mathematician can judge one proof as more elegant than another, and 
therefore consider one superior to another, even though neither proof 
1. This is typified by Heyting's remark, 'As the meaning of a word can 
never be fixed precisely enough to exclude every possibility of mis- 
understanding, we can never be mathematically sure that 
(a) formal 
system expresses correctly our mathematical thoughts. ' 
(Quoted by 
Dummett, 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics' in Dummett, p. 184). 
Wittgenstein further clarifies this point in noting that the debate 
is not resolved by some psychological explanation but by mutual agree- 
ment (Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, p. 21). 
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evokes any obvious awareness1 of pleasure or of any other emotion. 
Thus each of the three theories discussed in this section have differ- 
ing notions of aesthetic criticism. The Platonic Representationalist 
relies on knowledge of universal aesthetic Forms which correct reasoning 
identifies. The Formalist focuses on the observation of formal features, 
detached from questions of content, and these features are seen to provoke 
aesthetic emotion to differing degrees, according to how they are combined. 
Finally, the Expressionist requires the critic, in his evaluation, to try 
to take cognisance of what the artist felt in creating the work being 
considered, in addition to the more immediate or 'outside' appreciation 
of the work. 
AESTHETIC THEORIES AND MATHEMATICS 
There are two possible foci for any philosophical account of art. 
There is the work of art itself, and there is the criticism of it. In 
this section, the possibilities and the limitations of aesthetic criticism 
as a meaningful part of mathematical study will be considered. In the 
next section, creativity and mathematics will be the centre of discussion. 
The simplest objective isolated on p. 109 was 2(c). 
2 It is easier 
to say whether one prefers strawberry or vanilla ice cream than to say 
in isolation, 'what is it that makes strawberry ice cream so delightful? ' 
The first is a concrete comparison while the second is a comparison with 
all abstract possibilities. Underlying such comparisons is the assump- 
tion that it makes sense to put mathematical proofs say, in an aesthetic 
order of merit. In the following discussion awareness will be shown of 
1. 'Awareness' is a better term than 'feelings' which might have been 
expected, for one could follow Expressionism without claiming that 
the aesthetic object makes me joyful, but only that it makes me aware 
that it conveys a sense of joy. The critical point for any Expressionist 
as he arises in the present discussion is that the object contemplated 
must logically convey emotion to warrant any aesthetic description. 
2.2(c) 'compare... proofs... to see which are "better" than which with 
res ect to parsinomy, elegance, et al. ' 
2(a) 'appreciate the elegance and rigour of the proofs'. 
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three questions that can be considered to have an increasing order of 
particularity: 
1) What is involved in valuing something aesthetically? 
2) What is involved in valuing one thing more than another, aesthetically? 
3) What is involved in valuing one part of mathematics more than another, 
on the basis of aesthetic criteria? 
These questions can be seen to reflect the concern of the young teacher, 
not simply in achieving objective 2(c), but also 2(a); and both in line 
with the overall objective, to 'value mathematics "in all its beauty" as 
he has done'. 
(i) Platonic Representationalism has a clear criterion for evaluating 
works of art. The works are as good as their imitation of the forms. 
According to Plato, one can be sure in one's judgment of the aesthetic 
merit of a work of art, as it succeeds in reflecting or not the form of 
'beauty'. At least in the Republic, Plato expresses a similar view of 
mathematical proofs. If they are correct then they will reflect the form 
of 'truth'. Given Plato's view that there is only a single ultimate form, 
whether it is called 'good', 'beauty' or 'truth', then there is a sense in 
which mathematical proofs and works of art, if approved, reflect one form. 
Even if one accepts that what is true is also beautiful, this does not 
provide criteria for one to go on and put those beautiful objects in 
sequence. One could not order parts of mathematics by means of this 
theory, but only divide the objects into two classes; those that represent 
the truth, and those that do not. 
Platonic Representationalism provides a set of classes with the 
choice of membership or non-membership, while the language of aesthetics 
as present in ordinary usage is semantically open. One object can be 
more 'elegant' than another, and so can one mathematical proof be. The 
term 'elegant' as normally used indicates a quality of which something 
can have a relatively greater or less a measure. Plato's model of 
L20 
representation omits the possibility of this more common usage, and in 
so doing makes the ordering of aesthetic objects logically impossible. 
1 
(ii) For the Formalist aesthetician, aesthetic appreciation occurs in a 
semantically open set of symbols, unlike that of mathematics which is 
closed. Any attempt to have semantic rules would be frustrated because 
they would be more honoured in the breach than in their observance. 
Bell provides no clear clues for progress but Langer identifies 'formal 
features', isolatable syntax. However, these too have no definite rules 
to govern them but one may expect their 'presence' in all works of art. 
This provides some basis for discussion, but it does not provide even a 
perfect being, with some infallible method to order a set of dances, say. 
The Formalist's concern for structure does not extend to public grading 
criteria. 
Formalism has an admitted dominance in mathematics, and one might 
look for a similar claim in aesthetics. However, such a search would 
take this thesis too far away from its central purposes. In mathematics, 
one proof relies on a considerable number of definitions, followed by 
short proofs, while another relies on just two handfuls of postulates 
but the proof itself is long and intricate (compare the trigonometric 
with the Euclidean proof of the converse of Pythagoras' theorem, that 
if c2 = a2 + b2 then the triangle is right-angled). The form of each 
proof may be quite distinct, both on immediate impression and even after 
careful study. The one proof is simple once begun, while in the other 
one meets a new construction or condition on every other line. It feels 
more like a conjuring trick than a mathematical proof but once completed, 
mystery is turned to clarity. In exactly the same way one may distinguish 
1. Logically impossible that is, if aesthetic qualities are taken to be 
of equal importance in participating in the ultimate Form of 'beauty'. 
While discussion of this point is possible, it is not critical to the 
overall argument of this thesis. 
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two novels. In one say, (Zola's Nana) all the characters are presented 
early, while in another (say, Uris' QBVII) characters are held back to 
give twists or landmines as one travels through it. 
Certainly the Formalist1 mathematician would seem to have the likeli- 
hood of a happier relationship with an aesthetic theory that concentrates 
on universal 'structures', rather than one that rests on a conventionally 
agreed language. Thus there is a strong force linking mathematical 
Formalism to aesthetic Formalism. Yet part of the force's strength may 
be seen to highlight a weakness in the aesthetic theory. While the 
aesthetic Formalists, like their mathematical counterparts, identify 
universal structures, the aestheticians have yet to agree on criteria 
by which to identify the structures. The struggle over 'undecidability' 
in mathematics is as nothing when compared with the disputes among 
aesthetic Formalists, particularly as the mathematical Formalists have 
wide agreement over the treatment of finite systems. The aesthetic 
Formalist may not aid his mathematical counterpart as yet to order his 
mathematics, but it can be noted that the two movements have similar 
underlying premises and could serve each other in the future. 
(iii) The fundamental problem for the Expressionists, as well as for 
the Formalists, is that in inheriting Kantian origins, they have inherited 
1. This is not to exclude the use of aesthetic Formalist criteria to 
show appreciation of mathematics, by people who are not themselves 
mathematical Formalists. The critical presumption is that parts of 
mathematics can provoke aesthetic emotion. Aesthetic emotion 'is 
more intense and focused than the ordinary emotion we experience 
in our daily lives. Mathematicians have said the same of their 
experience of pure mathematical relations. ' 
(J. Wechler's Introduc- 
tion to On Aesthetics in Science, p. 6). She certainly seems to 
assume that in some sense, these mathematicians could admit such an 
experience as being one of aesthetic emotion, and not just analogous 
to it. If aesthetic emotion provides a formal framework for all 
emotions then it is not unreasonable to find a formal subject like 
mathematics evoking this kind of emotion, even though mathematics 
per se does not evoke ordinary, real-life emotions. 
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'aesthetic intuition' without his 'aesthetic conceptualisation'. 
1 
Aesthetic judgments are precisely those that are not determined by know- 
ledge (covered in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason), and also those not 
covered by universalisability (Critique of Practical Reason). These 
judgments are ultimately subjective. Ordering is not ruled out but it 
cannot be finally objectified either. 
Elliott2 accepts this but tries to explain how an Expressionist 
could show preference. He indicates what it must involve. A particular 
work of art may have more power in drawing one into it, if it provides 
sufficient clues so that one can view it from within. Elliott sees this 
as magical; the magic needed to see clues clearly. This is not objective, 
for one person or many people may be blind to the clues. The fault may 
lie more with the viewer than the artist, but for the Expressionist these 
clues are the only route to aesthetic criticism. 
Scruton3 seems to make explicit one more feature of Expressionist 
criticism that is relevant to an educational discussion. In getting 
inside a work of art, the viewer is going to gain from the experience. 
The viewer gains in educational development. Scruton argues that a 
1. Langer accuses the Expressionists of conflating 'form' and 'intuition' 
and that the result is 'confusion' in their theory 
(Feeling and Form, 
PP. 375-6). Certainly both the Expressionists and the Formalists have 
taken on board Kantian ideas. In the Critique of Judgment Kant writes, 
'I need not know its material purposiveness (the purpose), but its 
mere form pleases by itself in the act of judging it without any 
knowledge of purpose. ' (Para. 48). Later, para. 59, 'The beautiful 
pleases immediately (but only in reflective intuition, not, like 
morality in its concept). ' The two theories have inheritances in 
'mere form' and 'reflective intuition' which is employed both in 
criticism and creation but there is room for developments in these 
theories as Kant had considered both these dimensions of 'sensibility' 
and their control under 'the laws of logic' even earlier in the 
Introduction to Logic, pp. 24ff. There is the basis of an argument 
that Wittgenstein, as well as Langer, considered Kant's fuller thesis 
seriously, but there is not room here to elaborate on this. However, 
signs are found in Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, particu- 
larly in Lecture IV, pp. 28-36, but also in Lecture I. 
2.0i. Cit., pp. 154ff. (Footnote 1, p. 115 above). 
3. Art and Imagination, pp. 246-9. 
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necessarily worthwhile experience like that achieved in the making of an 
aesthetic criticism, is only ultimately justified as such, in terms of 
moral values. Scruton's fuller thesis, which will not be discussed here, 
is not just that 'worthwhile' carries moral approval, but that aesthetic 
judgments and moral judgments are one. 'Ethics and aesthetics are one. '1 
This would seem to have been Plato's position too. The resultant criterion 
for ordering works of art is therefore their worthwhileness, as ethically 
evaluated. 
Intuitionism as a study of mathematics cannot be seen as synonymous 
with Expressionism as a study of art, but it can be seen to have parallel 
formal features. The Expressionist uses public features to guide someone 
into the human feelings that the work of art expresses. The intuitionist 
uses the public symbols of intuitionistic logic to guide someone into 
those features of human reasoning that are used to construct mathematics. 
Understanding mathematical proofs can be taken as analogous to appreciat- 
ing works of art. A pupil achieves the understanding through the 
re-establishing of a proof, that Descartes derived, or calculating a 
square-root, as Pythagoras once did. The pupil attempts to share in the 
experiences and thereby to come to have a feel for what were, at one time, 
leaps of knowledge. It would be surprising if one went on to claim that 
the mathematical proof could be seen to express human emotions. People 
may accept that what is recognised in a proof as 'the self-evidence of 
wholeness', 'richness of stature', 'amusing procedures' or 'chilling 
simplicity', 
2 
are aesthetic qualities, but not that these are necessarily 
open to redescription in terms of human emotions. 
1. Scruton's concluding remark on p. 249 of Art and Imagination, 
culminates his argument that public standards of critical and 
ethical judgment are interdependent. 
2. This would demand an extensive study of the philosophy of the emotions 
to justify, but what does seem to indicate itself is the possibility 
that formal features like 'simplicity' can be associated with human 
feelings in appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, the basis of such 
an association may well be 'imagination' as Scruton identifies it in 
Art and Imagination, chapter 9. 
1 Gy 
CONCLUSION 
An important feature of the discussion in the last paragraph has 
been that whatever one identifies as aesthetic or other qualities, the 
comments could not be made intelligently if one had not sufficient relevant 
understanding of the subject matter of mathematics. The critic must have 
sufficient understanding of mathematics to 're-establish the proof' and 
experience 'the self-evidence' or that 'the procedure employed at some 
point really takes one by surprise', or whatever. This is not highlight- 
ing a point relevant only to Expressionism, for the Formalists and 
Representationalists also require the critic to have some understanding 
of the area to be aesthetically appreciated. As a matter of fact, once 
this condition is satisfied, one may aesthetically evaluate any piece of 
mathematics without fear of contradiction, whatever one's philosophy of 
mathematics. However the kind of knowledge required1 for such criticism 
may differ according to the aesthetic theory: 
(i) The Platonist requires understanding of what conditions are 
identifiable pre-requisites for the proof, and then for actually completing 
the proof. 
(ii) The Formalist would be similarly concerned with the principles of 
manipulation required. 
(iii) The Expressionist requires an attachment to human emotions that 
is not generally recognised by mathematicians and so any link with 
Expressionism will be no more than in an analogy. As such, the 
Intuitionist would have most in common with Expressionism, for both these 
movements treat physical constructs as signs of a fuller reality. The 
Intuitionist mathematics teacher has a view of his subject as possessing 
1. It is not within the limits of this thesis to identify what is 
required to understand a given proof, but further points could be 
made as to whether this kind of analysis is really a branch of 
psychology or not, as seems to be the argument of R. R. Skemp 
The Psychology of Learning Mathematics) among others. 
an 'inner' and 'outer' component that parallels the Expressionist's view 
of art, and so any analogy of mathematics as aesthetic can be more readily 
drawn out of this connection, than between any other philosophical view of 
mathematics, that links 'inner' and 'outer' components contingently, and 
Expressionism. 
Thus Expressionism can provide a basis for the criticism of mathe- 
matical proofs aesthetically, only in a very limited sense. Platonic 
Representationalism provides the framework for such criticism but no 
basis for ordering the identified proofs further, in terms of what are 
commonly considered aesthetic criteria. Only aesthetic Formalism seems 
to give a framework that could be applied to mathematics, without 
excessive discomfort. This application might well be facilitated if the 
mathematician, through his philosophy of mathematics, is keen to pick out 
the formal features of mathematics as of greatest importance, as the 
mathematical Formalist would do. Naturally, aesthetic Formalism could 
cohere with other philosophies of mathematics, but not readily. The 
Logicist would have no logical reason for objecting to such an approach, 
but the Intuitionist could argue that aesthetic Formalism looks for 
universal structures in public objects and in so doing might fail to 
look at mathematics r se. It would be looking at the arbitrarily 
chosen frameworks that facilitate the publicity of mathematics, and not 
mathematics itself. The Hypothesisor's objection is the more general 
one that mathematics is not the kind of subject to which it is appropriate 
to claim that the subject itself will benefit by aesthetic analysis. The 
Hypothesisor rejects the idea that mathematicians can turn to aesthetics 
to order mathematical proofs for their 'applicability', and aesthetic 
Formalism is particularly inappropriate for it lays great emphasis on 
its lack of concern in criticism on interpretation. Aesthetic 
terminology' may be still appended to mathematical proofs as a matter of 
1. Wittgenstein argues that there is a problem of logical impenetrability 
in a discussion of art. One cannot translate art into ordinary 
language. The only really successful way of commenting on a painting 
is 'again to paint', for 'you can't at all transmit the impression by 
words' (Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, p. 39). Wittgenstein 
indicates the difficulties involved in moving from one identifiable 
'form of life' to another. Success in communication within and across 
the resulting language-games must be seen, according to Wittgenstein, 
ibid., pp. 37-40, in relation to a given culture. Implicit in the 
move away from Plato, is the dislike of both his epistemological and 
ontological realism, discussed in Chapter 1 above. The ontological 
realism provides a difficult problem that Wittgenstein solves in the 
area of mathematics, discussed on pp. 46 and 47 above, by treating 
mathematics as 'rules' and not 'objects' at all. Croce, in the area 
of art, claims that art belongs to neither a real nor an ideal world. 
This is part of the justification for his remaining free of the 
dualism, mentioned on p. 116 above, but Croce does not give any clearer 
solution to this ontological problem. One solution has been mentioned 
above, p. 65, that one turns like Popper to 'the world of all that 
man may think up'. This includes for Popper, both the aesthetic and 
the mathematical realms. The validity of the option cannot be fully 
discussed here, but that the problem has lifted its head again, is 
surely worth recording. Conventions have to play a part in both 
artistic production and also in any aesthetic criticism. The artist 
is constrained by the conventions of his medium and of his art-form, 
and the critic is constrained by his having to move from the thoughts 
of one language-game to those of another, and this can only occur, 
even ambiguously, if there are agreed conventions. This position is 
comparable to that felt by a physicist today, who wishes to describe 
his experiences in experimenting with 'x-ray scatter in treatment', 
for example. In x-raying patients different kinds of nozzles can be 
put on the machine, and the resulting link between exactness of x-ray 
and scatter of ray can be expressed mathematically. The only language 
that he can use is mathematics, and there is no translation into the 
language of medical science that could adequately convey the meaning, 
beyond 'doing it this way is more dangerous for the patient than that 
way is! '. If one accepts that art is sui generis then commenting 
upon art must consist of using conventionally accepted terms, that 
try to pick out as well as possible the features of the 'form of life'. 
The success of the resulting communication partly depends on those 
involved being aware of the constraints under which it occurs. Thus 
the enlarging of the language of aesthetic criticism to cover mathe- 
matics will involve further agreements to those presumably already 
acknowledged for the Arts, as previously identified. Thus, it may 
be agreed that 'parsimony' can be used to indicate the finesses of 
a trigonometric proof of Pythagoras' theorem, as well as Hamlet's 
'To be or not to be' soliloquy. Furthermore, any ordering on the 
basis of aesthetic criteria would also be a matter of convention. 
Mathematicians might agree that 'elegance' is to carry more weight 
than 'parsimony', for example, and so all pupils will continue to 
study Euclidean as well as trigonometric proofs. However, there is 
no point in pressing the idea that mathematics is itself an art-form, 
for no philosophy of mathematics discussed in this thesis presents 
[Contd. overleaf 
fact, but it would seem to be the mathematical Formalist who is most 
likely to see the linking of aesthetic criteria to mathematics, as 
potentially beneficial to the development of mathematics. 
BECOMING CREATIVE 
In the above discussion one objective was not met. 
l This may be 
reintroduced as a question, 'How will pupils create proofs of their own? ' 
'Creativity' in recent years has been given much importance in education. 
2 
Some points may be usefully identified now. It will be assumed that 
'creative' is a complex term and two concepts will be taken as identifiable. 
These concepts can be called 'hard creativity' and 'soft creativity'. 
3 
Hard creativity entails the bringing of something into being. The 
ultimate example of this is God's creation of the universe out of nothing, 
but poets and composers may claim similar successes, though from more 
concrete beginnings. In this sense, being creative indicates originality - 
the creator has extended the world -a work of art is creative by adding 
Fn. 1, n. 126, contd. 
the communication of aesthetic experiences as the core feature of 
mathematics, rather than the deriving of formal proofs. The major 
problem of identifying art with propositional form, and only 
Representationalism accepts such a link, is that one has no clear 
idea of what falsity is in such a structure. One possible response 
to someone like Pring who says, 'What conceivably could be the 
negation of the Mona Lisa? ' (Knowledge and Schooling, p. 45) is 
nothing forces one to use that kind of a logic with bivalence, in it. 
This reinforces the impossibility of strong connections with mathe- 
matics, for even Intuitionists have a clear idea of what falsity is 
in mathematics, and this is central to what one means by mathematics. 
Naturally, aesthetic terminology may still be employed in mathematical 
contexts and be seen as meaningful according to some agreed conventions, 
without mathematics being itself an art-form, provided there is some 
context where the terminology does apply to art-forms, like Shakespeare 
soliloquies. 
1.2(b) 'Students will be able to "create" proofs of their own. ' 
2. An article by the author, 'Creativity and Mathematical Thinking' 
is attached to the thesis. 
3. While the author used these terms in a lecture at Worcester College 
of Higher Education in January 1974, and Ormell uses the distinction 
in 'Bloom's Taxonomy and the Objectives of Education', Educ. Res., 17, 
3-18,1974, it rests upon R. K. Elliott's two types of creativity as 
enunciated in 'The Concept of Creativity', and 'Versions of Creativity' 
in succeeding volumes of Proc. Phil. Educ. Soc., 1971. 
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a new object to some reality. Furthermore, what is created is not a 
simple thing like a new sentence, but rather, what is created must have 
a structure that is partly peculiar to it: a form. The creative person 
produces a new structured object. 
1 Elliott argues further, 'Creativeness 
is part of the concept of an artist, but it is not part of the concept of 
a scholar or a scientist, and even resists2 being predicated of them. ' 
For example, Whittle invented the jet engine, but did not create it. He 
built on to what body of knowledge was already there. There is obviously 
a short contingent step between the claim that mathematicians are creative 
in this 'hard sense' and the further claim that mathematics is an art. 
Elliott has not argued however that only artists are capable of hard 
creativity, so it does not follow from having incidents of hard creativity 
within an area that that area is an art form. It only follows that mathe- 
maticians cannot claim simultaneously to be both necessarily scientists and 
necessarily creative in this hard sense. Generally mathematicians may be 
content with a soft sense of 'creative' and one may well take it that this 
is how 'create' is used by the young teacher met in Chapter 6, in the 
objective 2(b). 
Soft creativity covers any innovative act of ingenuity or of imagina- 
tion. This concept may be limited by requiring the act of innovation to 
be linked to the solution of a problem. Left unrestricted, the concept 
may be thought to have a 'soft under-belly', by which Einstein and any 
John Doe who is following a Nuffield 5-13 Science Course may be considered 
creative under the self-same heading. This may not be significant, for 
only Einstein could possibly be considered creative in the 'hard' sense, 
which is not simply a more demanding concept but nearer to the original 
1. 'Object' is taken broadly to cover the various kinds of ontological 
commitment met in part 1 of the thesis, including 'a new structured 
set of rules' as Wittgenstein would propose. 
2. 'Resists' is not to be taken as 'cannot logically be'. 
1 Ly 
use of the word. Einstein does not simply make a discovery for himself, 
but provides a theory that corrects and betters what has gone before, 
and furthermore, stimulates other new advancements - 'dynamic innovation'. 
Given these two concepts, mathematicians may be at times creative 
under both senses. One might argue that when Boole produced his algebra 
of sets, there was nothing of its like before and so it was 'hard 
creativity'; while Descartes may have invented co-ordinate geometry, 
for he brought together two existent systems, those of algebra and 
Euclidean geometry. However one draws lines, there may well have been 
confusion caused in education by worries about the relationship of 
objectives linked to 'creativity' and those linked to 'discovery'. 
Under the concept of 'hard' creativity such objectives are separated 
logically, while if one has a very soft notion of creativity, then 
'creativity' and 'discovery' objectives may be synonymous. 
The danger lies in both teacher and taught coming to think that 
what occurs through 'discovery teaching methods'' is 'hard' creativity, 
when this is generally incompatible with expectations based upon the 
scientific method. Either the scientific method is of secondary import- 
ance to aesthetic development in mathematics or it is accepted that only 
some quite exceptional person who has revolutionary vision can be called 
creative in the 'hard' sense. 
2 
While creativity in the 'hard' sense is linked to the artist and in 
schools one may talk generally of children who are writing or painting as 
being free to be creative in the 'soft' sense, nothing has yet been said 
1. This teaching method and the place of scientific methods in mathe- 
matics education is discussed much more fully in Chapter 9 below. 
2. This clears away part of the problem about mathematics being 
approached as an art. To demonstrate that mathematics is an art, 
one would have to decide upon which theory of art, it is an art. 
It may be easy to show that a Formalist notion of art links music 
and mathematics nicely together, but then one has the problem of 
separating them in order to preserve, if one wishes to, the status 
ouo in which mathematics has five compulsory periods on most school 
time-tables and music, no more than one. 
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to indicate that 'creativity' is itself an aesthetic quality. It may be 
often presumed that it stands alongside 'beauty', but this is surely a 
misplacement. When Einstein is considered creative in the 'hard' sense, 
he is still considered a scientist and there need not be any feature of 
his work which is beautiful or even aesthetically surprising. 'Creativity' 
may most commonly categorise aesthetic activities, but it does not 
categorise such activities exclusively. Thus, objective 2(b), that 
students "'create" proofs of their own' could be considered by any 
mathematics teacher without his ever considering the more general objec- 
tive 1), that students 'value mathematics "in all its beauty" as he has 
done', though not vice versa. 
Independent of aesthetic considerations, mathematics is presented 
by all philosophies of mathematics met in this thesis as an activity 
that involves consistent reasoning, and by this means, at least in part, 
mathematics is developed. No philosophy presents mathematics as develop- 
ing either spontaneously or accidentally. A child who wrote 'pi x r2' 
on a piece of paper would be considered as acting under hypnosis or some 
such state, rather than a mathematical genius, if it became clear that 
he could make no mathematical use of the symbolism. Similarly, the six 
year-old who writes '7 +E= 10' for '7 +3= 10' has not discovered 
algebra but has problems of laterality, for example. Only a child who 
understood what linear equations involved could be 'creatively' producing 
'7 +E= 10'. As was pointed out on p. 100 above, the young teacher will 
lead his sixth formers through proofs and then leave them to their own 
devices to 'create', he will not expect 'creativity' to gush spontaneously 
from ignorance. Nothing written in this chapter or elsewhere' should make 
one believe that the author considers that creativity could arise in such 
a fashion. 
1. In the article, 'Creativity and Mathematical Thinking' which is 
attached to this thesis, the author elaborates his view of creativity 
and education. 
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Practical Interlude. Before ending this chapter, an example of 'creative' 
work may clarify the discussion. A class of 11 year-olds are introduced 
to Modulo arithmetic via a discussion of the days of the week. That is, 
Sun., Mon., Tues., Wed., Thur., Fri., Sat. 
0123456 
Modulo 7 and the days of the week correspond. The class soon produce 
an addition table and recognise that the same structure underpins both, 
'How many days after Thursday is Tuesday? ' and '5 +_= 2'. One of the 
class is soon most competently dealing with all that the teacher presents. 
The child is fascinated by the notion of this as 'Clock arithmetic' and 
sets to work on 'Figure eight arithmetic'. The child is surprised to 
find that in his new system '+' is not commutative'. 'a +bXb+ a'. 
-0- COMPARE 0 While '2 +4= 0', 4+2= 3'. The child 
1 ,ºý, 21 
WITH feels that he has something fantastic here. 
42 
354 Nothing short of a 'creation'. 
All educators seem to agree that in teaching mathematics, 
We are concerned with the creative side of the child's 
learning and with minimizing the teacher's interference 
with this. Every time a teacher insists on his way of 
doing a piece of mathematics which do not seem to fit, 
he nibbles away at the pupils' ability to act mathematically. 
We believe in the value of the child's mathematics. 
(A. T. M. Mathematics in Primary Schools, pp. 4-5) 
CONCLUSION 
Though not succeeding in answering the questions laid out at the 
end of the previous chapter, except to a limited extent, nevertheless 
a compilation of evidence has been produced, together with some sugges- 
tions for the young teacher considering this approach. 
In this chapter three aesthetic theories have been considered: 
Platonic Representationalism, Expressionism and Formalism. It was found 
that this form of Representationalism provides a very limited view of 
aesthetic criticism which for the mathematician provides no equipment 
for choosing the more 'elegant' among proofs, other than the tools he 
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already possesses in order to understand what mathematics is and how 
proofs are derived. Expressionism has the potential equipment for order- 
ing objects aesthetically but it ties aesthetic criticism to the expression 
of human emotions, and one does not generally associate mathematics with 
such sensuous appeal. However, the concern with 'inner states' shown by 
Expressionists does seem to resemble the Intuitionist view of mathematics 
and may be the source of useful analogies for the mathematics teacher 
interested in both Expressionism and Intuitionism. Finally, aesthetic 
Formalism was found more readily to fit some views of mathematics rather 
than others. The concentration upon formal features, independent of 
interpretations, parallels well the view of mathematics that mathematical 
Formalists and Bourbakists1 would seem most likely to support. Thus the 
mathematics teacher who is concerned with the structural properties of 
mathematics may easily find aesthetic Formalism at least a source of 
motivating analogies through comparisons with music and abstract art, 
for example. Furthermore, the quality of 'significant form' may well be 
considered the obvious basis for selecting the more 'elegant' of two 
proofs, and so on. 
A number of points about creativity have also been clarified. It 
has been indicated that its connection with art is not as an aesthetic 
quality, but as a criterion of being an artist. This leaves the possible 
links with mathematics freer and more readily acceptable. However, it is 
to be remembered that whatever one means by creativity, and two senses 
are identified here, the teacher cannot characterise it as part of an 
objective that pupils will suddenly achieve independently of their 
previous knowledge. Particularly with mathematics one must recognise 
that while 'creativity' in the 'soft' sense need not be considered a 
1. Both movements seek the development of mathematics by formal procedures, 
wherever possible. Papert for example, argues that mathematicians can 
be guided by 'mathematical beauty' as a formal principle in their work ('The Mathematical Unconscious' in Wechsler, loc. cit., pp. 104-19). 
rarity it cannot be associated with unprepared spontaneity either. 
These conclusions and the evidence behind them will be available 
when, at the end of this part of the thesis, and in the next, comparisons 
are made among the different approaches. Even if the link of mathematics 
to the arts perspective is weakened, it will be seen in the next chapter 
on the Games perspective, that the hard creativity concept can still be 
usefully discussed, and certainly the general use of aesthetic termin- 
ology by pupils of mathematics will be retained. Pupils will continue 
to be expected to gain and talk about the excitementI that mathematics 
can give. 
1. As Papert admits in his article, even for those who believe in the 
aesthetic component in mathematics, there has to be the admission 
that the 'exhilarating power' consists of integrating the aesthetic, 
the functional and the hedonistic. ('The Mathematical Unconscious', 
loc. cit., pp. 112-14). Demonstrating that in mathematics at least, 
the aesthetic is separable from the hedonistic could well be the 
basis of extensive future study. It is presumed to be a realistic 
possibility in what is written in this thesis. 
-ii 
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CHAPTER8 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING - GAMES PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter would progress very little without some indication of 
the use to be given to the term 'game'. The use to be followed here is 
to be found in 'game of chess' or 'game of cards' rather than 'game of 
football', 'he's fair game' or 'love games'. 
' 
Football, tennis and 
other human rule-governed activities allow exponents an unlimited number 
of possible moves at any moment. Thus one cannot write a book on 'all 
football kick-offs' say, as one can find such books on, 'all two move 
openings' in chess or 'all leads' in bridge. 
2 The view of 'game' to be 
taken as central in this chapter is one that is tied to the stipulative 
belief that, as chess is a strictly formalised activity, so is mathematics. 
Human decisions within such formalised activities are not just in accordance 
to rules, like obedience to laws in everyday life, but are repeatable 
instants of what is decided. 
Compare 'a pass in football' with 'bishop to rook 6 in chess'. The 
former activity has been chosen from a non-denumerable set of possible 
actions, none of which could be exactly defined. The latter activity is 
chosen from a denumerably finite set of possible actions, each of which 
must therefore be exactly defined. Thus every move in a game of chess 
can be repeated, while 'repetition' is only possible in some internally 
prescribed sense for football. That is, the manager decides to repeat 
1. 'Love game' may be taken as either a tennis or sexual activity. 
2. In practice this would be restricted to 'all leads using system of 
type X', e. g. Acol. 
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that 'free kick move' in the next match, or the television producer 
provides a 'video-repeat' of the winning goal. In neither case is the 
replication exact as it is in chess. Replication is a crucial feature 
of mathematics in any public form, and so one would expect a connecting 
of mathematics to 'other' games where physical pieces are not essential. 
' 
The term 'game' certainly has a range of uses but precision of some kind 
is possible here because the game-context is quite tightly restricted to 
those people concerned with mathematics teaching who indicate views on 
one or more of the criteria to be given now. The criteria themselves 
are taken with some literary licence, from other sources. 
2 
1) There are rules of play. 
2) 'Play' is a non-serious activity - it has no extrinsic implications. 
In particular 'playing' does not involve the making of moral 
decisions in addition to decisions taken in accordance with the 
rules of the game. Decisions taken within the game are taken 
seriously. 
3 
3) There is at least one rule whose implementation is required to 
start the game, e. g. throwing a six in Snakes and Ladders. 
4) The terminology and, where appropriate the objects of play are 
contextually (internally) defined. 
5) There is a criterion/criteria by which the end of the game is 
decided, at least in principle. 
6) Participation is voluntary and so generally there is an expectation 
of enjoyment. 
1. Chess could be meaningfully exhibited by two people using paper or 
nothing at all. What is required are rules of procedure, not 
physical objects. This is precisely how some blind players play, 
never needing to touch anything or have a recapitulation. 
2. Stimulus for the criteria comes largely from, The Philosophy of 
Primary Education, R. F. Dearden, pp. 95ff. and 'Ethical Aspects 
of Sport and Games', D. Aspin, pp. 58-61, in Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Soc. of Gt. Brit., Vol. IX. 
3. Such decisions are taken according to logical reasoning generally 
and to maximise outcomes with regard to the allowable completion 
of the game. Thus one follows rules logically and consistently. 
As a matter of fact, knowledge of all the rules of the game is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for playing the game. 
A necessary condition for playing the game is knowledge of some of the 
rules. Someone may play chess adequately for many years before discover- 
ing the rule of 'en passant' (taking of a pawn, by an opposing pawn 
passing through the third rank to the fourth). Thus it is not necessary 
to know all the rules of chess even, in order to play it. Conversely 
one may know all the rules of netball but be disallowed from playing it, 
as one is a man. Thus a teacher may have taught someone successfully 
all the rules of a game, but that is not an indication that sufficient 
conditions have been satisfied for the person to play the game. 
l 
It would seem possible now to focus in on the matters to be con- 
sidered directly in this chapter. The central concern is with mathematics 
presented to pupils A& a game. The use of 'as' hides a number of possi- 
bilities which require explicit mention. One may be prepared to employ 
the occasional game, like Battleships to facilitate learning without 
wishing to encourage identification of mathematics with games. Even if 
one were prepared for such identification, there would be a difference 
between someone who believed that mathematics was one undifferentiatable 
system and someone who believed mathematics was logically separable 
between 'counting systems' and 'measuring systems'. 
2 
The former teaches 
mathematics as one game, while the other teaches it as two games related 
through their common use of numbers, say. While another teacher only 
treats games for motivation, a fourth may believe that some part of 
mathematics is identifiable with games, but not all of it. Four views 
seem to present themselves: 
1. There is the example of someone crippled who may umpire at tennis. 
2. One may divide mathematics into 'discrete elements' and 'continuous 
elements'. When one counts, each number is separate from the next 
but in measuring there is no separation of one length and the next. 
137 
a) Teaching mathematics as one game that has sub-games developed 
from it. It has clear criteria by which it is distinguishable 
from all other games. Thus, analogously one recognises 'Whist' 
as a game but there are other games developed from it, 'Solo', 
'Contract bridge', 'Auction bridge', et 1. 
b) Teaching mathematics as a family of games that are linked by the 
use of common pieces, numbers, signs for identity, and so on. This 
is similar to a view of all card games forming a 'family', or Ball 
Games, or Board Games. 
C) Teaching mathematics through games, but not identifying it with 
games. The approach is justified on psychological or general 
pedagogic criteria, but not upon philosophical links between 
the form of mathematics and that of games. 
d) Teaching mathematics in part, as identifiable with games. 
It is not the intention of the following discussion to find examples of 
educators claiming that the criteria for a game given on the previous 
page are sufficient to identify mathematics. The examples of teaching 
mathematics will be discussed in relation to these criteria. Yet the 
same or other criteria may make mathematics, not only different from 
other games, but identifiable within some other category as well, for 
example, as a component in a common curriculum. Furthermore, it will 
be argued that one's view of the nature of mathematics may itself restrict 
the relative emphasis of games' criteria. 
1 
Given an analysis of these four views it will be possible then to 
see if they connect logically to the philosophical movements of the 
first part of the thesis. The remainder of the chapter will consist of 
discussing the questions identified at the end of part 2, Chapter 6, and 
1. Criterion 2 which identifies a game as non-serious will be seen to 
conflict with the notion of mathematics as 'Hypothetical', presented 
in Chapter 4 above. 
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it will be seen that the 'games perspective' provides a clear indication 
of how mathematics and its teaching has been 'isolationist'. 
l 
MATHEMATICS AND GAMES - FOUR POINTS OF VIEW 
a) The 'one game' view 
This view is best characterised through the idea that 'Set Theory' 
provides a fundamental game in terms of which a number of sub-games may 
be identified. Once this has occurred the sub-games may seem to the 
outsider to be independent games at the same level as 'set theory' many 
of whose features they may have shed. This is the view of the Bourbakists, 
2 
who represent mathematics teaching in higher education, but one can find 
this view at the Secondary level also. Learning Mathematics 
(The Shrop- 
shire Mathematics Experiment) begins with an introduction to the language 
of sets. This language is found in every chapter thereafter, except those 
that might be called 'History of Mathematics' and 'Applied Mathematics'. 
3 
Before considering objections to this view, it seems reasonable to 
provide the basic framework of an argument to justify the idea that 
mathematics can be treated as one game. The one game selected is 'set 
theory'. The emphasis of the argument required is that set theory be 
shown to be identifiable as a game rather than to be shown that 'every 
sentence expressible in the notation of pure classical mathematics, 
whether in arithmetic or the calculus or elsewhere, can be paraphrased 
into this'. 
4 
It will be assumed that Quine for example, has good, if 
not conclusive, reasons for holding to the position just quoted. It is 
1. This is the position that seems to exist in mathematics education 
which claims a peculiar status for mathematics thinking that everyone 
requires but only mathematicians can identify. This argument and its 
rejection will be completed in part 3 of the thesis, after discussion 
in this chapter and in Chapter 11 below. 
2. See footnote 1, p. 53 for an introductory identification of Bourbaki. 
3. For example, Book 1, Section 19 involves historical discussion of 
Galileo and also the use of metric equivalents - 'history' and 
'practice' rather than 'pure'. 
4. See Quine's discussion in 'Foundations of Mathematics' in The Ways 
of Paradox. The quotation is from p. 32, ibid. 
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easy to see that the terminology of set theory is contextually defined 
for given the use of letters as 'variables' one requires just 
'( )', '-', 'e', 'A ' and '(x)' to provide all the language of set 
theory. Thus, Quine gives the example, 
(x) 
- 
(y) 
- 
(x ey^-ye x) as employing all the terms. 
Not synonymously but roughly, this may be read as, 
'For all x's, there is a y, such that x is a member of y 
and y is not a member of x'. 
The rules of the game are the criteria of deduction and the game begins 
when a criterion is applied to a fundamental axiom. The game ends when 
all possible combinations of the language are derived or shown not to 
be so derivable. In practice one only plays sub-games in which one 
attempts to derive a given statement in the language. 
For example, given -(A/\ -B) = df. 
A --ý B and 
-(-AA -B) = df. 
(A V B) and (A--)C) --ý 
((C v A) --ý 
(C 
./ B)) 
is an axiom. If A ---joB and B -- pC are theorems, then prove A ---a 
C 
is a theorem. 
(B --. C) --. ((A --ý B) --. 
(A 
--. C)) by substituting in the axiom, 
B, C and -A respectively. 
(A 
--p. B) -ý 
(A 
--ý C) by modus ponens 
(A --ý C) by modus ponens. 
This indicates the way in which set theory may be seen as a game. 
In an English lesson a teacher may employ an analogous activity of 
asking the class to change 'HILL' to 'BASE': HILL, BILL, BALL, BALE, BASE. 
2 
Some indication has now been given of the way in which mathematicians 
demonstrate the closed and relatively complete nature of mathematics, 
based on set theory. These mathematicians have no concern for mathematics 
1. This is based on Bourbaki, Theory of St, p. 29. The substitution 
misses out, (B --. C) --. > ((-A v B) --ý -A v C)) and A --ý B- -A v B. 
2. No implication is to be drawn that English teaching is ever anything 
more than taught through games. 
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beyond its internal formalisation. Their rejection of 'meaningful inter- 
pretation' of mathematics as falling within their area reinforces the 
line of argument given here, that mathematics is seen both as a game, 
and as an isolated area. 
It is now appropriate to consider objections to the above view. 
The objections considered have educational implications. They could be 
put against view b) set out on p. 137 above, too, and so their clarifica- 
tion now will facilitate the discussion of view b) that follows. Finally, 
in moving from the game to its being taught, one principle is assumed. 
This is the principle that as a matter of fact it is discernable by 
practising mathematics educators what a pupil requires in the way of 
knowledge under criteria 1) to 5) (p. 135 above) before he can be said 
to be ready to play a given sub-game. 
2 
Objection 1. Criticism of a game is possible without sufficient know- 
ledge to play it, but this is not possible for mathematics so mathematics 
cannot be a game. For example, the only condition of 'Fox-hunting' that 
one may know is that the game is completed when the fox is dead. This 
knowledge is not sufficient for anyone to play the game but may be held 
sufficient for one to criticise the game. No such possibility could 
occur in mathematics. It is not a game in that sense. 
1. It is important to remember that the Bourbaki programme is not a 
philosophical programme but simply a way of making 'men's hearts 
beat more easily', 'to provide a solid foundation for the whole 
body of modern mathematics' (Theory of Sets, p. v). It holds 
neither to the view that mathematics is one interpreted axiomatisa- 
tion as Russell and Hilbert believed, nor to the view that it is a 
collection of formal systems, some more and some less consistent, 
as Curry and his followers held. 
2. This is the condition already identified for aesthetic criticism 
in the artistic approach, on p. 124 above. N. B. 'Sub-game' has 
two uses. On the one hand one might call the whole of arithmetic, 
a sub-game of set theory and on the other, any sub-routine of either 
may itself be called a sub-game. 
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Reply 1. This may seem a trivial objection but the question of 'privacy'1 
is central to arguments about mathematics as a game. The matter will not 
be fully clarified here but will have to be returned to in part 3 of the 
thesis where the nettle will be squarely grasped. Two types of reply are 
possible, 
A) One may criticise mathematics without knowledge of more 
than one condition. Someone may learn that there are 
'right answers' (proofs) in mathematics and object that 
such a game is harmful to children who play it. The 
important point is that criticism by someone lacking in 
knowledge of the game in itself can only be about the 
status of the game as a whole. Should fox-hunting be banned 
OR Should mathematics be taught in school'? It cannot be 
criticism of rules within the game for the 'closed' nature 
of a game is such that modification to rules is done by 
participants only. Thus the outsider cannot recommend 
what is to be taught in mathematics in schools, if 
mathematics is held by the teachers to be strictly a game. 
If one assumes that what one teaches is non-serious then 
one may well feel no responsibility for how elements of 
it required in other school subjects, are acquired. Thus 
one can find schools in which the science teacher teaches 
all the mathematics his pupils will need. One may find 
Nuffield Science strictly adhered to in the laboratories 
and S. M. P. equally strictly adhered to in mathematics 
classrooms. The result is that the pupil meets weight 
1. By 'privacy' is meant the notion that the language of mathematics 
is not coincident with ordinary language but is technical. Thus 
one must be introduced into the technical language to be able to 
participate meaningfully. 
T 
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(density) in first year science, but only in the second year 
in mathematics. 
1 
B) The objection is misdirected for what is in fact argued is 
that fox-hunting is not a game for it is not simply under- 
pinned by morality, as is any human activity, but actually 
involves moral decisions within the game itself. Thus 
deciding when the fox 'has had enough' is a moral decision, 
and also an essential feature of fox-hunting. There would 
not seem to be a similar argument against mathematics 
for the 'serious' decisions are those made by teachers, 
parents and pupils about what is to be studied rather 
than within the studying. The only possible line is that 
the mathematician is morally obliged to show cognisance 
of the possible interpretations of his work in other fields, 
which may include the eventual production of weapons, say. 
This is again to argue that mathematics is not a game for 
it has interpretations, which is precisely what the 
Bourbakists say is the province of non-mathematicians. 
This is an impasse and will be set aside until there has 
been a discussion of the views of mathematicians who 
reject the Bourbakist standpoint. 
Obje, gtion 2. To teach mathematics as a game is to deny that mathematics 
is a form of knowledge in Hirst's sense, for games fall into a category 
identified explicitly by Hirst as not a form of knowledge. 
Regly 2. Again, two types of reply seem possible, 
A) It is agreed that mathematics is not a form of knowledge 
in Hirst's sense but this is not to say that one cannot 
1. See the article, 'Mathematics and science in the secondary school' 
by A. J. Malpas, in Developments in Mathematical Education, pp. 233-40, 
but particularly the diagram on p. 235. 
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accept alternative arguments for structuring the curriculum. 
One may accept, for example, the argument presented by 
Phenix in Realms of Meaning, that mathematics is part 
of 'symbolics'. All games are to be seen as 'a collection 
of arbitrary symbolic systems' and mathematics is one of 
these. Symbolics is to be part of a school curriculum 
and it is up to educators whether or not there are other 
good reasons for introducing symbolics through mathe- 
matics, rather than through chess, say. 
1 
B) It would seem that one might bring this objection because 
one believes that games clearly occur in other areas than 
mathematics and only exist by being parasitic upon these 
other forms of knowledge. Thus a history teacher may use 
the game, 'Stalingrad' to discuss the reasons for the 
Germans losing the Second World War. In principle, the 
whole history syllabus could be built around such games 
but at no point could one claim that history was identi- 
fiable with this set of games and continue to claim, if 
one does, that it is a form of knowledge. Thus the 
argument runs, is not mathematics just like this? 
Mathematics is presupposed in the establishing of the 
games. 
The reply to this is that 'games' do not occur in 
other forms of knowledge as they occur in mathematics. 
The games that occur in history or economics or whatever 
are 'simulation games' and the qualifying term is also a 
1. In Phenix's analysis no distinctions are drawn between systems which 
necessarily possess coding/decoding structures and those that do not. 
In this way, he fails to provide any appreciation of the Bourbaki 
standpoint for example. 
negating term. One plays a simulation game in order to 
learn about what it simulates, and so its raison d'etre 
is not intrinsic. This is precisely what is not being 
claimed of the game of mathematics. It is simulation or 
interpretation which is denounced as irrelevant. Thus 
mathematics is a game in just the non-serious sense 
covered by the criteria given on p. 135 above. 
Yet one may accept that Hirst is right to identify 
mathematics as a 'Form of knowledge', and still argue 
that the 'unifying label', 
' 
'game', in no way contradicts 
this. Hirst chooses to talk of the link between 'knowledge' 
and 'experiences' rather than 'reality', and in so doing 
cannot be requiring each form of knowledge to be logically 
necessary for 'reality'. In other words, mathematics 
may be contingently connected to the serious business of 
life, for Hirst does not assert that a form of knowledge 
is to have a logical connection with 'real life'. 
2 
Objection To teach mathematics as a game eliminates the possibility 
of teaching mathematics in many other interesting ways, like 'discovery 
teaching methods'. 
Reply 
, 
3. It is difficult to deal fully with this objection until the 
alternative movements, centring on other approaches, like 'discovery' 
are fully presented. So far the conception of 'freedom' that a pupil 
may be given has been shown to be relative to the objective to be achieved. 
That is, the pupil must have sufficient knowledge for the objective to be 
within his reach before he can be said to be 'free to discover it'. 
1. Hirst indicates by this phrase in 'Liberal Education and the Nature 
of Knowledge', Archambault, that 'game' lacks the criterion necessary 
for 'knowledge'. This point should be considered along with 
Criterion 2 on p. 135 above for 'game. 
2. It is reasonable to assume that the developed mind will include 
awareness of abstract as well as applied problem-solving. 
In this sense, 'discovery' is no less a possibility for this approach. 
In Learning Mathematics, Book 1, Section 4, there are many spacial games, 
including tanagrams and pentominoes. Once the pupil has the rules for 
combining five squares to form a pentomino he may be left to discover a 
number of the 2,339 possible combinations for producing a 10 by 6 
rectangle with them. 
1 
The fact that the teacher knows that there are 
that many possibilities and that the pupil cannot call a shape joined 
only at the corners, a pentomino, is restrictive but does not eliminate 
'discovery' in any usual sense. Similarly, the view of the Bourbakists 
may be that as a game, mathematics is just a matter of 'convention' but 
this does not necessarily remove the notion of 'discovery' unless one 
stipulates that it may be used only of what is 'pre-existent'. 
2 
Objection 4. 'Truth' is an essential concept within mathematics but it 
seems to be necessarily eliminated from the view of mathematics as a game. 
Re. Rly A. A philosophy of mathematics has been introduced already that 
eliminates 'truth'. That is the theory of the Strict Formalists. 
Furthermore, in the discussion of 'truth' in part 1 Chapter 5, the 
Redundancy Theory was presented which argues that no additional meaning 
is given by the concept, 'truth'. These strict Formalists argue that all 
mathematics can be adequately presented without any introduction of inter- 
pretations. 'Truth' is only necessary for 'interpreted' systems and not 
for the establishing of the systems in themselves. However 'true' and 
'false' are employed within the Bourbaki system to indicate relationships 
that are demonstrated within limits. In other words, 498 + 326 = 824 is 
a 'true relation' in the sense that 'I' have not gone back to the first 
1. Pentominoes are combinations of five squares joined at the sides. Thus, 
is acceptable, but not . There are 12 such 1 
combinations. 
2. This is the issue that will be developed in the next chapter on the 
Scientific approach. 
m 
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principles of Set Theory to work it out. Thus 'True'and 'False' are 
elements in the abbreviations of the game, but not of the game as 
demonstrable in principle. 
1 
A final comeback may be to challenge this position over the problem 
of paradoxes, but this is to misunderstand the view presented here. It 
is not a position that stands or falls on its complete consistency; it 
is not a philosophical argument. In other words, if paradoxes arise 
then one simply modifies the original set theory to eliminate it. This 
is precisely an example of Lakatos' monster-barring. 
2 
b) The 'family of games' view 
Traditionally someone taking School Certificate in Pure Mathematics 
in the nineteen-forties would have expected to answer questions in three 
discrete areas, 'Arithmetic', 'Algebra' and 'Geometry'. Twenty years 
later an undergraduate in Pure Mathematics would have found himself 
taking courses in 'Numerical Analysis', 'Algebra' and 'Topology'. 
According to both standpoints, it makes sense to subdivide Mathematics. 
The rationale for the latter subdivision has strong support in the works 
of the educationist, Piaget. While Piaget has great sympathy for Bourbaki 
he presents his own view as a natural development of such static formalisa- 
tions, consequent upon the stimulus of Goedel. Piaget is not happy to 
identify any system as a given foundation for anything else. Bourbaki 
presents a view of mathematics as a pyramid resting on its apex, 'set 
theory'. Thus, 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
Algebra Analysis Topology/ 
Set Theory 
jam' 
1. This is not to introduce a further notion of truth for this is still 
the Correspondence Theory as modified by Austin, and explained in the 
appendix, pp. 274-5 . It may be called a form of 'truth 
by convention' 
'True' just acts as a sign to show that only an abbreviated proof is 
being given here, although a full proof is known. 
2. See Proofs and Refutations, pp. 14-23, and part 1 Chapter 4 above. 
Piaget says that any layer is dependent for its relative security on its 
links with the layer above and the layer below. All layers are themselves 
developing and there is no end to the layers. This briefly is the pro- 
gramme of Piaget's Structuralism. Within this is the idea that there 
are three basic forms of 'parental structures', which may be roughly 
identified as 'algebraic', 'order' and 'topological'. 
' 
Thus mathematics may be viewed as a family of games consisting not 
only of algebra, numerical analysis and topology but further, of combina- 
tions of these into new games, like algebraic topology, et al. However, 
within the Secondary School sufficient games are identified by the parent 
structures themselves, together with the 'language' of their formalisation, 
'set theory', to cover all that is to be taught by sixteen. 
In practical terms, the result'has been the possibility of identify- 
ing these structures within a modern mathematics series presented distinctly 
throughout the series. S. M. P. is such a series. While it wishes 'mathe- 
matics to be seen as a unified subject and not as a collection of independent 
topics' (Preface to Book F) the 'parental structures' are not cross-linked. 
2 
This view is essentially one of diffidence. It is the view of those 
educators keen on formalisation in mathematics but unconvinced that 
mathematics is unifiable in just the sense identified by groups like the 
Bourbakists. 
c) The 'through games' view 
If one identifies mathematics with the natural sciences or technology 
in just the way the Hypothesisors do in part 1 Chapter 4, then it would be 
illogical to treat mathematics as non-serious: as a game. No part of 
science or technology is a game. This does not prevent a teacher with 
1. These are the terms Piaget uses in Structuralism, p. 26. Piaget 
provides a framework for learning which is adaptable to either the 
'Games' or the 'Science' approaches. 
2. For example, matrix multiplication is given three applications in 
Book F, to networks, relations and transformations, but they all 
lie in one structure, 'algebra'. 
148 
such a view teaching parts of mathematics as if it were a game, or using 
games within mathematics. 
Thus a book 'designed to build a firm foundation of understanding 
of the principles of arithmetic, to show how numbers are used to describe 
physical models, and to build a bridge between arithmetic and algebra' 
may end with a chapter entitled 'More mathematical mysteries' whose 
purpose is 'only for enjoyment. Explore them to your heart's content. 
You may even become sufficiently intrigued by them to make some additional 
discoveries of your own. ' This is the contrast between the preface on 
p. v, and the introduction to the concluding chapter on p. 356 of an 
American high school text, entitled, Foundations of Mathematics 
(Holt, 
Rinehart, Winston, 1962). The overall concentration of the book is on 
'physical settings' and 'physical meaning' but it is still possible to 
have the non-seriousness of a question entitled 'Jealous husbands'. It 
is essentially a reformulation of the example given on p. 103 above, 
using a flow-chart. However, in this example, the boat takes two adults 
and a wife is never to be left without her husband if another man is to 
be present. 
It should not be assumed that 'realism' and 'games' can only go 
together if the teacher takes the 'through games' point of view. A 
game may involve the objects of reality and may even have a contribution 
to make to a pupil's coping with reality but it is not the objective of 
views a) and b) that that is why the pupils should be taught to classify 
shapes as squares, triangles, etc. for example. View c) is distinct 
precisely because it indicates the primacy of application over 
'enjoyment'. Even in the example given of the jealous husbands the 
teacher hopes that the pupils will develop further their use of flow 
charts which tomorrow they could be using in Home Economics to organise 
their cooking practical. 
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d) The 'in parts' view 
While one teacher identifies mathematics with 'games', another may 
consider some mathematical activities as games, but not all. He accepts 
that not all games are mathematical and vice versa. Just as there are 
things that one does with cards which are not 'card games': one may build 
a card house or teach a child to count with them. Similarly a teacher 
may present some mathematics as pursuable as a family of games, but the 
rest as applicable in other areas inside and outside school. This is 
reminiscent of Frege's view that arithmetic was reducible to logic but 
geometry was synthetic a priori. The teacher might say that there is 
a theory of algebra totally derived from set theory which is a closed 
game. Contrasted with this is the application of mathematics to 'space' 
which is identifiable generally as 'topological theory'. 
The teacher identified above may have made a much clearer division 
than that found in practising teachers. This point of view may be 
exemplified in a kind of schizophrenia that one finds in some text books. 
The result is that chapters even become divided between 'games playing' 
and 'applicability'. That this is not indicative of view c) is made 
clear by the theoretical underpinning found in prefaces and introductions. 
For example, the series Mathematics through Experience has a title which 
sets one to expect a clear approach of the kind to be discussed in the 
next chapter. However the preface states: 'The language and notation 
of sets are used throughout to clarify and unify previously unrelated 
concepts. Emphasis is placed on pattern and structure. ' Yet the 
Introduction informs one that mathematics 'is an activity in which we 
learn to organise, systematise and predict from our own experiences. 
The result is that games like 'magic squares', 'chinese multiplication' 
and 'the theory of sets' are intermingled with 'slide rules', 'timetables' 
and 'reading the meter' all in the first chapter of book 1. 
If one has no theoretical commitments then it would seem possible 
to select from other views but it is also reasonable that when this is 
to be presented as a text book, the neutrality should be made explicit. 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING, GAMES AND PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS 
There is a danger that someone who is committed to the 'games 
approach'1 and is also committed to the complete axiomatisation of 
mathematics in either the sense derived from Russell's logicism or 
Hilbert's formalism, will believe that one must learn mathematics in 
its logical order. The danger is that a pupil is required to progress 
rapidly from the minimal abstractions necessary to establish set theory 
for example, to its completely abstract use in the game of set theory. 
If there is a philosophical error here then it is of the highly technical 
kind that is found in the work of Goedel et al. This would not be the 
basis of useful criticism in a thesis concerned with secondary education 
rather than higher education. The point is that 'understanding set 
theory' may mean communicating formally with mathematicians in set 
theoretical terminology alone, but it makes no practical sense to call 
this, 'understanding set theory for eleven year olds', for very few such 
eleven year olds will ever exist. In other words, if mathematical games 
playing must be more abstract than chess playing say, then the mathematics 
teaching must involve psychological considerations. There is a point at 
which formal requirements and common sense conflict. 
A concern for such dangers comes out most clearly in the work of 
Dienes. On the one hand Dienes believes, that 'most mathematical 
structures can be learned by playing skillfully contrived and excitingly 
motivating games of a mathematical nature', while on the other hand, he 
states that it 'makes more sense to start with the world as it appears, 
abstract from it, represent the abstraction, and then symbolize it, 
1. If this is taken in the sense explained in (c) above, as 'The "through 
games" view', this danger cannot occur. 
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than to start with the symbols. ' See 'Some Reflections on Learning 
Mathematics' in Learning and the Nature of Mathematics, pp. 49-67. The 
point is that mathematical progress cannot be isolated from conceptual 
development. 
1 
At a particular conceptual level a child may not be 
capable of even abstracting from concrete embodiments of a given relation- 
ship, let alone have the understanding of the abstraction presented 
formally. Two relevant points arise from this particular article, 
1) All 'understanding in mathematics' must be related to conceptual 
development. 
2) Even given Dienes' commitment to 'games', he combines this with 
the additional educational objective that learning to draw 
'abstractions' from concrete examples and make 'generalisations' 
from these abstractions is not just valuable to mathematical but 
to all thinking. This must be so because 'mathematics relates', 
2 
as Dienes puts it, on p. 52 of his article. 
Thus Dienes rejects views a) and b) for some form of d). The argument 
that arises is that even if mathematics is isomorphic with a set of games, 
an educator who is aware that mathematics has developed because of its 
usefulness in other areas, cannot pretend thereafter that there are no 
extrinsic reasons for teaching mathematics. 
3 
Now, Dienes' first point that all 'understanding in mathematics' is 
related to conceptual development can be best exemplified by indicating 
1. 'Conceptual development' is taken by Dienes to follow the lines 
presented by Piaget in for example, The Child's Conception of Number, 
(with A. Szeminska). 
2. Dienes sees the existence of mathematics in evolutionary terms. It 
exists as it is, in order that relationships in the universe can be 
identified, using scientific knowledge as it stands at a particular 
time. 
3. Dienes would go further and say that if one took away the extrinsic 
reasons then mathematics would lose its justification for 95% of the 
population could acquire all that they needed to know of mathematics 
elsewhere. See 'Learning Mathematics' in Mathematical Education, 
pp. 81-95. 
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how he sees the nature of 'understanding'. It involves 
1 
a) Generalisation -a child picks up some stones and counts them. 
He counts 8. 
the child lays them on the ground and counts 
them left to right and gets 8. 
the child counts right to left and gets 8 and 
also gets 8 when they are in a circle. 
the child tells his mother that 'counting is to 
do with what there is rather than where it is'. 
This child has begun to understand what one means by cardinal numbers. 
b) Abstraction - in a class the teacher asks one pupil to think of 
one or two operations that can be done to a number. 
Members of the class shout out numbers and are 
given answers until someone is able to say what 
the operations are. Thus 4/15; 6/35; 3/8 and a 
child then shouts out x/x2-1. 
This child understands how this series is related. 
c) Proof -a class is asked to prove that 2 odd numbers 
make an even number. One child writes, if k and 
1 are odd numbers then they may be rewritten as 
2K +1 and 2L +1 (not divisible by 2) adding 
them gives 2K + 2L +2= 2(K +L+ 1) which 
is divisible by 2 and is thus even. 
This child has begun to understand a deductive sequence. 
These do not show sufficient conditions for 'understanding' but may give 
some indications of its requirements. Other approaches may require a 
link between applicability and understanding and another may require 
that a pupil corrects his own errors and continues towards achieving 
a correct answer rather than waiting for teacher. These are perhaps 
elaborations on the principal conditions indicated above, although no 
1" Dienes gives lucid explanations of this term in 'Learning Mathematics', 
and also of 'abstraction'. 
conclusive claims are being made for those given. 
1 
However, if a philosophical movement is not prepared to consider 
as 'mathematical understanding' anything less than an appreciation of 
completed deductive sequences, then the phrase has little use in schools. 
The point would seem to be that strict formalism is only concerned with 
the formal manipulation of symbols according to conventionally prescribed 
rules and it should be clear now that what a secondary pupil may achieve 
in his five years, 11 to 16, may be no more than the beginnings of such 
abstract manipulations. The philosophical point is that the teacher 
committed to such a philosophy would have to admit that only a small 
proportion of his teaching can be with the intention of achieving 
'mathematical understanding' in this sense. Most teaching would be 
through concrete games, and so would be barely touching the abstract. 
2 
The Intuitionist would be even more3 disappointed for he requires that 
the pupils produce completed proofs before he can know that they have 
achieved any of the mental constructs that he calls mathematics. There 
is clearly a sense in which Intuitionism's concern for mental constructs 
conflicts with the fundamental nature of this approach which is with 
conventionally produced games. However there is some common sympathy, 
for Intuitionism claims an autonomy for mathematics which is echoed in 
some of the views discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Of the other philosophical positions it has been argued already 
that there is a natural compatibility of beliefs between this games 
1. The term 'mathematical understanding' is further discussed in 
part 3 of the thesis. 
2. Dienes certainly supports the formalised nature of mathematics as 
central, but argues that children can pick out 'general rules' for 
improving their chances in a game, before they are conceptually 
ready to accept the formalised language in which it would be put 
in mathematics. An interesting introduction to these points occurs 
in Let's Play Maths, pp. 13-28. 
3. One might express this as: the Strict Formalists are demanding in 
the area of mathematical rigour, but the Intuitionists are even 
more demanding. 
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approach and Logicism and Hilbertian Formalism, but a natural hostility 
for this approach from the Hypothesisors. However a position not tempered 
by Dienes' intervention would have the same difficulties as those just 
shown for the philosophical position of the Strict Formalists. Equally 
Dienes' own position has a feature strongly reminiscent of hypothesising 
when he identifies 'generalisation' with 'what will happen if? '. That 
is, a generalisation occurs when one generalises the results that one 
has at present. Dienes is willing to talk of a pupil 'doing mathematics', 
before there is any guarantee that he has grasped the idea of 'abstraction'. 
SYLLABUS ORDER 
Naturally if one were still to try to hold to views a) and b) then 
there would be critical determinants' of the syllabus based upon accept- 
ance of the logical development of mathematics as a whole 
(view a) or of 
algebra, analysis and topology (view b). However, logical order is not 
the only criterion to be considered. Another is the facilitating of the 
development of those ways of thinking so characteristic of mathematics. 
This is to move the focus of mathematics teaching further away from 
'mathematics' itself, and concentrate its effects on pupils. This is 
not an open cheque, for mathematics is still to be seen as a formal 
system and as such, 'understanding' is only a possibility if the step 
towards which the teacher aims at any time are all attained. That is 
to say that if one decides that 'Pythagoras' Theorem' is worth teaching 
then necessarily the pupils must learn at some time previously what an 
angle is, and so on. In this sense, the subject must necessarily retain 
a grip on the order of what is taught. 
1. For Logicists, Formalists and Formalisers like the Bourbaki, there is 
no logically possible entry to mathematics 
(or some sub-system) 
except through the foundations that are logical axioms, self-evident 
axioms or set theoretical axioms, according to one's standpoint. 
Understanding the foundations is a pre-requisite of having the right 
to claim that one has 'mathematical understanding'. 
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CONCLUSION 
The games perspective indicates at least one criterion that sets it 
apart1 from any other to be discussed. Through the concept of a game 
there is the concern to do mathematics Just for its own sake. While 
Dienes' limitations on this for the teacher's objectives may have to 
be taken into account, the pupils will be expected still to find mathe- 
matics 'fun'. The arts too may be fun, but the concentration there is 
upon achievement of an end product, but this is not what is emphasised 
here. The emphasis is upon the manipulating rather than on the estab- 
lishment of something at the end of the manipulation. 'Ends' are 
logically necessary but they come as a matter of course if the manipula- 
tions are correct. To focus on 'manipulation' as the basis of mathe- 
matical attainment, is to select as objectives, features of mathematics 
that are logically independent of success, achieved in other subjects. 
This provides a natural source of 'isolationism'. The pleasure that 
seems so important to this perspective must involve some kind of aesthetic 
response to the mathematical situation. This presupposes knowledge of 
some mathematics and some on-going use of the language of criticism. 
2 
It does not necessarily imply that this language was learned in the 
viewing of mathematics or any part of it, as works of art. Of course 
under view d) this would be a possibility, but it ought not to be taken 
as necessary. 
Finally, in considering the problem of syllabus order there has 
been the reiteration of the point made for the art perspective that 
1. This can be seen as the reply to question 1, given on p. 107 above, 
'What distinguishes the games perspective from all the others? ' 
2. For example, one learns 5+3=3+5,6 +7=7+6.... what happens 
if given 27 + 98, one recognises that 27 + 98 98 + 27. That is, 
one acts according to the general rule, a+b=b+a. The problem 
of 'knowledge without language' has been touched upon in the dis- 
cussion of prerequisites of aesthetic criticism on pp. 121-23 above. 
The issue is too large for handling here. 
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understanding some proposition in mathematics logically requires a 
knowledge of some previous propositions tied logically to the present 
objective. In that sense, if one can come to agree on endpoints across 
the perspectives, then there will necessarily be some overlap in the 
syllabuses as a whole. 
1 
1. This issue is central to Chapter 11 below. 
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CHAPTER9 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING - SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
No less has been written about science by philosophers in the last 
hundred years than about mathematics. For every mathematics movement 
that one might identify there would be at least one scientific movement. 
It is not the intention of this chapter to carry out a brief survey of 
all these views of science. The term 'science' can be used broadly to 
refer to any 'seeking after knowledge', whether it might be the 'science 
of crossword-solving' or 'science of cock fighting' at one end of the 
scale, or precisely to refer to 'seeking knowledge of the nature and 
behaviour of the physical and social world by the construction of con- 
ceptual frameworks whose propositions are amenable to empirical refutation', 
at the other end of the scale. An attempt to cover such a scale of usage 
would be both impractical and unnecessary. It is sufficient here to 
identify that there is this breadth of common usage, and that it may 
be necessary in the discussions that follow in this and the next chapter 
to refer to the dangers of ambiguity that can arise from the breadth of 
usage. Two epistemological standpoints will be employed extensively in 
this thesis, and so these will be looked at in some detail in this 
chapter. For want of better names, one may call one, 'the Newtonian 
view' and the other, 'the Evolutionary view'. That they are epistemo- 
logical views is explained by the fact that the Newtonian view is 
characterised by the belief that, 'man can know that he has discovered 
how the world really is', and the Evolutionary view, characterised by 
the belief that, 'man can know that a given description of the world 
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is better than a previous one'. 
l 
A mathematics teacher who is concerned with children acquiring a 
model method will be influenced by either of these views. 
2 
There will 
inevitably be some suggestion that a teacher who believes in the eternal 
truths of mathematics will feel more at home in the Newtonian view, 
while someone with a synthetic a posteriori characterisation of mathe- 
matics will choose the Evolutionary view. Of course, as has been 
mentioned before, philosophical considerations are not the only ones 
that determine how one teaches, and so philosophy of mathematics cannot 
be tied logically to how one will actually teach. 
It is being suggested that the perspective considered here is that 
which concentrates on the method of science and this should not be con- 
fused with the perspective that will be considered in the next chapter. 
In that chapter, the focus is upon teaching mathematics through its use. 
That is, it is science, if science is 'helping man to deal with his 
environment'. 
This chapter will attempt to clarify the above two scientific views 
through their exemplification in mathematics teaching and consider the 
three questions identified at the end of part 2 Chapter 6.3 
1. The word 'better' is certainly contentious but hopefully is clarified 
by the end of the chapter. 
2. It is not claimed that there are not other relevant views, notably a 
Revolutionary view found in the works of Kuhn and of Feyerabend who 
argue that theoretical changes are 'radical' rather than 'evolving'. 
There is also the Marxist-Leninist view attacked in Popper's works. 
Support for it is found in N. I. Styazhkin's History of Mathematical 
Logic from Leibniz to Peano. No doubt, both views have the 
individual support of mathematics teachers, but not in the form of 
a movement, yet. 
3. The questions were: 1) What distinguishes perspective X from all the 
others? 2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one perspective 
before, as a pupil, one can appreciate some other perspective? 
3) Does one find a common logical sequence to what is taught, no 
matter through which approach it is taught? 
TWO VIEWS OF SCIENCE 
From late in the sixteenth century to early in the twentieth century, 
science was given a status that had previously only been given to religion. 
However the monuments built by Galileo, Harvey, Newton and others were 
shattered by the work of Darwin, Maxwell, Einstein, and Born. Today 
monuments are built one second and shattered the next. The result has 
been that the confident presentation of theories is replaced now by the 
diffident presentation of models. 
1 
Thus, at least two methods of science 
have had time to infiltrate mathematics teaching. 
1) The Newtonian View 
Newton wrote, 'The main business of natural philosophy is to argue 
from phenomena. ' (Principia, preface). This indicates one feature of 
what came to be believed as the method of science, Induction. This is 
the making of a generalisation from a number of particular observations. 
However the inductive generalisation is only a scientific Law, once it 
indicates why the generalisation has been found. In other words, one 
might find that whatever an object's weight, it hits the ground at the 
same time. This is not a law for it does not explain why one saw all 
these objects hitting the ground at the same time. It only becomes a 
scientific explanation once one learns that 'weight' itself is to be 
explained in terms of a special force, 'gravity'. Given the explanation, 
other problems may be resolved by deduction alone. This is called the 
HHpothetico-deductive method. Newton used this method in the PrinciDia 
to explain the motions of all the bodies then observable in the universe. 
Finally, under what has been called here the Newtonian view, a theory 
that explains all related phenomena is taken to be true in an absolute 
1. See the distinction between 'theory' and 'model' given by J. C. Forge 
in 'A Role for Philosophy of Science in the Teaching of Science' in 
Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 13,1979. A model is taken 
as a useful but not a true description, while a theory is believed 
to be a true description. 
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sense. It is thought to provide propositions that would correspond 
eternally with reality. 
1 
As the view is found in both Leibniz and Kant, 
2 
the laws of nature could be other than they are. Yet they are not man- 
made but pre-existent. For example, Newton's fundamental laws of mechanics 
are a priori, in just the sense identified on p. 76 above, 'disconnected 
from changes in the world', and therefore not open to falsification by 
the phenomena, once the law is identified. 
2) The Evolutionary View 
It has already been noted in part 1 Chapter 4 that Peirce was 
committed to the 'Method of Science'. However he realised that the status 
of scientific laws as identified by man could not be known to be the laws 
of nature, even if one believed, as Peirce himself did, that there was 
that kind of order in reality. Thus a principle of Peirce's method is 
'fallibilism'. Any given theoretical position is liable to later modi- 
fication, but Peirce believed that a series of modifications leads 
inevitably closer to the 'truth'. One more important alteration that 
Peirce makes to the Newtonian method is that he sees 'induction' as a 
second stage in science. The first stage, he calls 'abduction'. This 
is the point where one has a few observations that one feels are connected 
under some relation but which one is not prepared at that time to assert 
as an hypothesis. In more contemporary language one might say that one 
makes 'conjectures'. Psychologically their status is important, in that 
one does not feel that their refutation or modification is a big blow to 
one's pride. Eventually the conjecture hardens and one tests it against 
1. See the definition of the Correspondence theory of truth given. 
2. The seal of God on man's knowledge of the laws of nature is argued 
for, by both. See P. P. Wiener's Leibniz Selections, pp. 65-70, 
152-6, and 539-47; and in Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
(A125-127 
for example). Kant sees mechanics as an example of 'pure natural 
science' which includes geometry and all areas based upon synthetic 
a priori principles, but excludes such sciences as chemistry and 
biology which Kant did not recognise as having such fundamental 
principles underlying them. 
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a number of particular instances. If the conjecture holds then one has 
a 'hypothesis' which has been achieved through 'induction'. Finally one 
resolves other problems by drawing deductive connections from the new 
hypothesis, and then testing these out against reality. This view of 
science is clearly much more elaborate and less secure than the Newtonian. 
It may be roughly identified as a five stage method: 
1) Conjecture 
2) Observation under the conjecture 
3) Induction 
4) Deduction 
5) Constant willingness to modify (fallibilism). 
VIEWS OF SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS TEACHING 
1) Taking the Newtonian View a teacher of mathematics may well feel 
that this 'old-fashioned' view of science is precisely the approach to 
mathematics that he wishes to encourage in his pupils. Furthermore, it 
seems to take cognisance of the problem noted on p. 150 above that children 
in secondary schools are unable in the main, to take in new abstract 
ideas. Dienes' 'abstraction' seems to have much in common with inductive 
processes in science. 
' Similarly his notion of 'generalisation' is well 
exemplified by the way Newton took Kepler's work on planetary revolutions, 
to produce a generalised theory for all bodies. 
2 
In this way one may 
identify a pairing of 'induction' and 'abstraction' and 'hypothetico- 
deduction' with 'generalisation'. 
A further attraction is the fact that a teacher can identify this 
scientific model as claiming a priori truths, which may be precisely what 
the teacher may want to see in mathematics. It provides a model 
reminiscent of Russell's, in which 'abstraction' is followed by 'deduction', 
1. This may be even nearer to Peirce's notion of 'abduction', but that 
does not exclude the possibility of this linkage too. 
2. See Hanson's discussion of this in Patterns of Discovery, pp. 72-85. 
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and which thereby confirmed Russell's essential empiricism. 
1 
One has a 
method that explains the progress from concrete beginnings to formal and 
eternal conclusions. 
Signs of this approach are to be found in secondary school text 
books written just after the war. Series like Mathematics for Modern 
Schools took on a more concrete approach rather than a 'formal' approach, 
but stopped short of allowing children to make their own abstractions. 
Thus in Book 1 of this series, p. 166, one finds the following example: 
the book is introducing corresponding angles and has already introduced 
parallels through railway lines. However it is indicated that it would 
be more sensible to focus on objects that one can have in the classroom, 
'if anyone has a train-set one section of straight track will do... ' 
Then one moves to the next level of abstraction and measures the angles 
of drawn lines. 'Using a protractor, measure the angles x and y which 
are in the 'corresponding angle' position. Shift the straight edge 
several times, and each time measure the angles in the corresponding 
angle position. You should find that the separate pairs are always equal 
to each other. 
By doing this you have checked the truth of this very important 
statement... ' The pupil is almost encouraged to follow the method of 
science and two pages later on p. 168 he will prove that alternate angles 
are equal - the hypothetico-deduction of the Newtonian Method. 
Twenty-five years later one finds in Mathematics in Primary Schools 
a total commitment to children making 'real discoveries' and the view 
that 'science and mathematics should be very closely associated' for 
they both involve 'a discovery of relationships' 
(see pp. 141-42 ). 
This is to identify mathematics with abstract relationships to which the 
concrete experience is only a preliminary, for facilitating understanding. 
1. See the discussion of Russell's views on pp. 33 to 36 above. 
What is interesting, given some recent comments on 'discovery in 
Nuffield science', 
1 
is that the older text is keen on concrete experi- 
ments, not on pupils ever thinking that what they are doing is anything 
more than 'rediscovery', rather than 'real discovery'. 
In actual practice a teacher may not hold one hundred percent to 
his pupils studying mathematics in this way. With the previous chapter 
in mind2 it would seem to be the case that four positions are identifiable. 
These are, 
a) Mathematics is a science and pupils are to be taught it as such. 
b) Mathematics is divisible logically, for example as Frege believed, 
and one part is to be taught as a science and the other part as a 
game, say. 
c) For pedagogic reasons, at least some parts of mathematics are to 
be taught through the method of science. 
d) For pedagogic reasons, all of mathematics is to be taught through 
the method of science. 
2) Taking- the Evolutionary view a teacher of mathematics may well feel 
that this provides a picture of the actual achievement of most secondary 
school children in mathematics. They do not ever reach a point when they 
would believe that one could hold what they are said to have learned as 
eternally true. This is not to indicate that they have doubts about 
'2 +2= 4', but they may have doubts about 
'x = -b + b2 -' 
2a as 
the general solution of the quadratic equation, 'ax2 + bx +c= 0'. 
1. Stevens argues that there are dangers in presenting 'teaching about 
science' as 'teaching to do science', when the discoveries are heavily 
guided into almost always being 'rediscoveries', which is not science 
at all. Stevens says that this may lead to disenchantment, once 
pupils realise that 'real discovery' is not wanted. See 'The Nuffield 
Philoso by of Science' in Jour 1 of Philosopbv of Education, Vol. 12, 
1978. 
(See 
particularly p. 103). An incidental point is that both 
these 'progressive' projects and Mathematics for Modern Schools use 
'we' to reinforce a partnership in exploration? 
2. See the four views given on p. 137 above. 
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In this somewhat negative justification, one tells the pupils that they 
should not worry about having doubts because great mathematicians have 
them too. This may be right but a further justification, or perhaps a 
rewording of this justification may be, that mathematics is not a dead 
corpse that is gradually uncovered but a living animal that grows bigger 
every day. This, in a sense, is to look at the evolutionary approach 
from a different aspect. 
This is the view that comes through in the work of Raymond Wilder. 
It is well congested in his article, 'The Nature of Modern Mathematics' 
in Learning and the Nature of Mathematics, pp. 35-48. Wilder argues that 
mathematics is a science and not just a formal game that began through 
abstractions. He sees abstractions as on-going in the continual feedback 
of information from the continual attempt to provide 'better' explanations 
of reality. 
... as mathematics evolved, a higher order of abstraction was 
achieved, in which concepts began to be applied to concepts. 
Mathematics gradually added concepts of its own to the world 
of reality, so that its domain of application included not 
only the physical environment, but the cultural... no matter 
how abstract and seemingly removed from physical reality 
mathematics may become, it works; it can be applied. . . Even 
though the dual nature of mathematics may seem to split it 
into one part that can be applied and one part that seems 
to be just something for professional mathematicians to play 
with, there is actually no separation. Both aspects of 
mathematics serve a scientific function,... (every mathe- 
matician) is a participant in the evolution of mathematics, 
whether he likes it or not. If he tries to exile himself 
and play mathematical games having no relation to the world 
of reality, he will not be heard. (Pp. 41-2). 
Wilder emphasises the idea that mathematics begins and ends in the real 
world. Between these points there is always the possibility of new 
methods and new concepts. That is, today one proves Pythagoras by one 
construction and tomorrow by another, and on the next day by Trigonometry, 
rather than Euclidean geometry. In this sense, there is a far more 
realistic possibility for 'real discovery' in mathematics than in the 
natural sciences and a teacher who insists that there is only one way, 
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is not just teaching badly but is ignorant of the nature of mathematics. 
This is the essence of Wilder's position. Philosophically, it rejects 
logicism for being 'dead', and intuitionism for being overprotective. 
It is rather similar to the Wittgensteinian position outlined in part 1 
Chapter 3 above that seeks a route between formal axiomatisation and 
constructivism. The Wilder position has reflections in actual text books. 
In the preface to the appropriately named Discovery Mathematics series, 
one reads 'Mathematics is not a static thing, it is progressive and plays 
a vital part in our lives and we should think of it in these terms when 
we are teaching. ' One finds that in this series pupils are left with 
open questions, rather than with the questions being left open for one 
or two lines only, as in the earlier Mathematics for Modern Schools. 
'Abstraction' and 'generalisation' have strong presence in the Discovery 
Mathematics series. Compare 'what makes a square square? ' on p. 7 with 
'what would happen if your books were odd shapes? ' on p. 9 of Book 1.1 
It is not easy to find examples of practising mathematics teachers 
who follow Wilder, for in recent years they have taken this evolutionary 
view on a stage, to a concentration on the applicative value of mathe- 
matics which is to be considered in the next chapter. However with this 
in mind, it may be worth considering the view of mathematics given by 
one of those leaders of practical progressivism in mathematics education, 
W. W. Sawyer. Sawyer identifies five stages in the discovery of a 
mathematical theorem. 
'(1) Someone has to suspect the truth of the theorem. (2) Someone 
has to discover why it is true, i. e. to discern the kind of argument 
by which it may be proved. (3) The argument has to be embodied in a 
1. It would be wrong to assume that the view presented here is that 
the series holds exclusively to this 'Dienes-like' approach, for 
in fact it also includes some traditional pedagogic techniques 
such as identifying 'Make "top heavy"... Turn divisor upside down 
and Multiply... ' (Book 1, p. 89). 
lob 
formal proof. (4) The theorem has to be remembered. (5) Fruitful 
applications of it have to be found. ' ('The Role of Intuition in 
Mathematics Teaching' in Graduate Training of Mathematics Teachers, 
Canadian Mathematical Congress, 1972, pp. 63-75). Certainly this is not 
too unlike the sequence of 'Conjecture, Observation, Induction, Deduction 
and Fallibilism' identified for the Evolutionary View of Science suggested 
on p. 161 above. One might argue that the Fallibilism stage must logically 
presuppose that the hypothesis is remembered, so that disconnection may 
be accounted for. Similarly the move from 'conjecture' to what Lakatos 
calls 'informal proof'1 is covered by Sawyer's rewording of 
(2) a few 
lines later, as 'casting around for means of proof'. This suggests at 
least that the movement from (1) to (2) is far from immediate, if it 
involves 'casting around' ('observation'? ). Another such analysis is 
provided by someone else who has influenced all levels of mathematics 
education, H. B. Griffiths. He presents a four stage progress to a 
mathematical theorem. His stages may be summarised as, 
(1) a guess; 
(2) 'insight' into 'some "right" kind of way'; (3) checks; (4) formu- 
lated proof (See 'The Structure of Pure Mathematics' in Mathematical 
Education, p. 18). This is surely again very reminiscent of Sawyer's 
first three stages, the first four stages given on p. 161 above and the 
whole ethos of the work of Peirce. Griffith makes the reassuring comment 
that although 'the Bourbaki members will all have been through those 
stages.. . only the last one shows. Thus we see what a false notion of 
1. Lakatos uses the terms 'informal mathematics' for what precedes 
axiomatisation, and also for what is generally called 'meta- 
mathematics'. He also uses the terms 'informal theorem' and 'growing 
theorem' interchangeably. Thus, 'The theorem does not always differ 
from the naive conjecture. We do not necessarily improve by proving. 
Proofs improve when the proof-idea discovers unexpected aspects of 
the naive conjecture which then appear in the theorem. But in 
mature theories this might not be the case. It is certainly the 
case in young, growing theories. This intertwining of discovery 
and justification, of improving and proving is primarily character- 
istic of the latter. ' (Proofs and Refutations, p. 42). It is to 
be hoped that this sounds largely as an echo of the main text. 
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mathematics is given to pupils in schools and universities, if syllabus- 
designers in their enthusiasm for Bourbaki's treatise are concerned only 
with the fourth stage of the mathematical activity... ' (ibid., p. 19). 
The argument presented here is not that one must logically hold 
that the activities identified by the above method are pieces of mathe- 
matics but that by presenting pupils with nothing but what Griffith calls, 
'a Tidy System', pupils falsely consider that theirs is the only 'Untidy 
Activity' that occurs in mathematics. If one does come to hold the 
philosophy of mathematics presented in part 1 Chapter 4, then it would 
seem odd to present only the driest parts of mathematics to pupils, but 
not self-contradictory. The argument only acquires such logical force 
if one accepts that someone teaching mathematics desires his pupils to 
gain 'knowledge and understanding'. One may then argue that 'mathematical 
understanding' entails 'abstraction' at least, and is just one of the 
stages wiped away by the total emphasis on one particular stage of 
'deduction'. 
PUPILS AS MINI-MATHEMATICIANS 
If this thesis were related to 'science' rather than to mathematics, 
one might reword things in the form of a question, 'can pupils make dis- 
coveries? '. The answer to this would probably be that it is logically 
possible, but remembering one of Sawyer's stages, one may doubt whether 
anybody would 'remember' that a discovery had been made. The point is 
that if no one is looking out for 'real discovery' then anything unusual 
will be treated as 'a monster' to be barred. 
1 
All that remains for the 
pupil is 'guided rediscovery' which is in no way existent in science 
itself. In science there is 'discovery' and there is 'replication' but 
1. This is the term Lakatos uses to indicate how 'old' theories are 
preserved. Possible counter-examples are treated as unacceptable 
to the given system, 'monsters'. Stevens provides a practical 
example of monster-barring by a teacher over a pupil (loc. cit., 
pp. 105-8). 
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no one seems to think that 'replication' would motivate science pupils. 
This seems particularly odd once one turns from science to mathe- 
matics. Surely 'replication' is like breathing in mathematics. Someone 
asks what is 17 squared, and one responds 289. One has a doubt and so 
'works it out again a different way'. This is 'replication when one doubts 
oneself', but there are times when one 'checks' what someone else has said 
or even what is in the book. Calculus is full of such situations. Pupils 
are asked to check from first principles that of x3 really is 3x2. 
Someone tells a friend that the differential of tan x is sec2x and not 
being able to imagine from where the square comes, he works it out for 
himself. Similarly one reads in a book, 'Given that sin2A/2 = 
4-(1 
- cos A) 
then... ' and one's reaction is that it cannot be right and one checks. 
'Replication' is never made to hurt in mathematics. One may even use 
it as an introduction to statistics, by getting one child after another 
to do the same addition sum quickly, and see how the answers form a 
Gaussian distribution (the normal curve). The point is that if 
'replication' is typical of scientific methodology, then it is certainly 
an activity, which pupils in mathematics can also undertake. 
The harder question remains, 'Can a pupil make mathematical discoveries? '. 
One way out here as with science is for the project organiser to say that 
by discovery he means that the pupil finds out something for himself. 
It is a discovery for that child. This has been dealt with already, in 
the footnote to p. 163 above. Up until now the discussion has been about 
theorems in mathematics and it has been indicated that new theorems may 
involve long gestation. Therefore, what could be produced in a double- 
period is likely to be no more than a conjecture. However, if one allows 
the object of discovery to be broader, or perhaps more accurately narrower 
than a theorem, then possibilities may genuinely arise. The puzzle on 
p. 145 above had 2339 solutions, and while this has probably had all of 
them produced many times, there may be other such which have not. 
At this point it may be useful to consider again, whether or not 
restrictions will be put on the use of the word 'discovery', by the 
philosophical movements discussed in part 1. For the Logicist or 
Formalist, it would be sufficient to have discovered how one would 
identify a false candidate for the pentomino problem. One would not 
need to write down all 2339 solutions. This in itself would not be 
mathematics. For the Intuitionist to be satisfied that a discovery had 
been achieved, one would have to show how in principle all 2339 solutions 
could be produced. Producing the solutions would be incidental to the 
real mathematics: the construction of a method for producing solutions 
(a recursive function). Finally the Hvpothesisors would find the whole 
problem artificial. Yet beyond this they would not require more detailed 
solutions than the other movements. However if any one or more of the 
solutions could be shown to have an applicative value inside or outside 
mathematics, then this would be both a genuine and a mathematical 
discovery. For example, one might find that the solution outlined a 
possible circuit diagram. 
According to the differing movements, mathematics is identified 
with logic or formal systems, or mental constructs, or possibilities, 
or even relationships, but not with the production of particular solutions. 
Identifying a particular 'x' as belonging to some class, or as exemplify- 
ing one member of some class is a stage of 'abstraction', and may be 
considered a part of mathematics at most, but cannot be sufficient to 
gain the title 'mathematical discovery'. 
The value of this discussion has been that it has identified what 
is required for someone to be able to say that they have made a discovery. 
Two forms of discovery are possible. There is the production of a well- 
formed theorem on the one side, and on the other, short of this, is the 
production of a new method of verification, falsification or production 
according to the philosophy of mathematics. 
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These points may be identified in a simple example, to return to 
pentominoes again. Consider the problem of producing squares from one 
pentomino of the following shape 
E1. 
Three people produce three 
different kinds of solutions to the problem. 
Solution A. A builds up shapes with the pentomino and eventually finds 
he has made among other shapes a 10 unit by 10 unit square. When 
questioned, A has no idea whether or not there are any smaller squares 
that he has missed. This is a paradigm 'particular solution'. 
Solution B. B builds up shapes and comes to the conclusion that the 
only rectangle that can be produced is 5 units by 2 units or a multiple 
of such. From this, he is able to produce a table of rectangles: 
10 unit rectangle, 20 unit rectangle, 30 unit rectangle, ... 
100 unit 
rectangle.... From this table he identifies the smallest square number 
as 100, a 10 by 10 square is thus constructible. B concludes that he 
has provided a method for producing the sequence of squares constructible 
from this particular pentomino. 
Solution C. C takes B's work through to a formal proof. 
The solution given by B may be realistic in terms of pupil possibilities 
but it falls short of the formal requirements of 'professional' mathe- 
maticians. It has the value of a generalisation but not that of an 
explanation, to reiterate the point made of the Newtonian view of science 
on p. 159 above. The method produces all the correct answers but B does 
not possess a formal explanation of its success. 
1 
Pupils may be expected, particularly at 'A' level, to understand 
the formal explanation provided by C, but this is significantly less than 
expecting such pupils and perhaps even younger ones, to produce alternative 
proofs. One does not expect an average pupil to be a 'mini-mathematician', 
1. See a similar three-fold distinction into 'Instrumental, Relational 
and Logical Understanding' by R. R. Skemp, 'Goals of Learning and 
Qualities of Understanding' in Mathematics Teaching, 88, September 
1979, pp. 44-9. 
but the teacher may expect the pupil to achieve 
a) an appropriate level of appreciation of mathematics, 
b) the ability to replicate1 proofs, and 
c) the ability to make naive conjectures. 
Unless it is made clear that c) is an essential part of mathematical 
progress, pupils may come to believe that in understanding formal proofs, 
one has grasped the whole of mathematics, and how it develops. Where 
teachers identify the method of mathematics with either the Newtonian 
or Evolutionary methods of science, as defined above, the pupils ought 
to become aware of the stages of development prior to rigorous formalisa- 
tion. This leaves open as a question of philosophy of mathematics, whether 
or not the informal stages are themselves parts of mathematics. Clearly, 
for the Logicist and Formalist they are not. While the Intuitionist 
would make a similar separation, the separation as a matter of fact may 
not occur in public. To the Intuitionist, a proof is analysed publicly 
through Intuitionistic logic, but is constructed in the mind where only 
the person himself knows where conjecture ends and formal construction 
begins. The Intuitionist teacher may well make a clear-cut division 
between objectives a) and b) above, by identifying a) with 'appreciation 
of mental constructs'2 and b) with public 'proof analysis'. For the 
Hypothesisors, the Newtonian method is not a satisfactory theory of 
mathematical method for it leads to claims of infallibility, in contra- 
diction to the philosophy of the Hypothetical. This does not prevent 
its use as a model for pedagogic reasons. For the Hypothesisors, the 
Evolutionary method is an adequate theory of mathematical method, 
provided it is remembered that in this philosophy, 'method' and 'purpose' 
are inseparable. 
1. By 'replicate' one includes the ability to check the proof and not 
just repeat it. 
2. On pp. 117-27 above, it was argued that the route to appreciation 
must be through the public proof analysis, for these are generally 
the only 'clues' existent, to the nature of the mental construct. 
To conclude this section, it will be necessary first to distinguish 
clearly, 'mathematics' from 'mathematical development'. For Logicists, 
Formalists and Intuitionists the Newtonian method is acceptable as 
identifying the method of mathematical development, but is viewed as a 
method that extends beyond mathematics itself. That is, mathematical 
development is all that is involved in a new mathematical theory, while 
mathematics only begins with the formal proof of the theory. On the 
other hand, the Evolutionary method of science is an acceptable identifi- 
cation of the method of mathematics, as described by the Hypothesisors. 
Under this philosophy of mathematics alone, is the method of mathematical 
development inseparable from mathematics itself. 
l 
In following this science-approach to mathematics teaching one's 
main objective is not the production of mini-mathematicians, but enabling 
a pupil to retrace the stages of mathematical development in so far as 
the pupil's particular level of conceptual development allows. Most 
pupils only achieve an understanding of the formal nature of mathematical 
proofs at the end of their secondary education, and so the personal 
production of such proofs must be a stage beyond this. 
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND MATHEMATICS AS A SCIENCE 
The intention here is to identify for each philosophical movement, 
the logical limitations of mathematics teaching with regard to a science 
perspective. In this way an organised picture of mathematics teaching in 
relation to the science perspective can emerge, before considering the 
questions posed at the end of part 2 Chapter 6 and reiterated on p. 158 
above. 
1. Mathematics itself begins with 'observed facts' and ends in 'practical 
effects'. This is the position presented throughout part 1 Chapter 4. 
However, mathematics does not include propositions that depend, for 
their verification, on the nature of individual, empirical objects, 
as the more precise type of definition of 'science' noted on p. 157 
above, would. 
1) Logicism as described by Russell may be seen as beginning in empirical 
abstractions and ending in eternal truths. This matches well with the 
Newtonian view of science, but is in clear conflict with the Evolutionary 
fallibilistic viewpoint. It implies that a teacher cannot be both a 
logicist and believe at the same time there are no a priori truths, apart 
from identity statements. Once one accepts that mathematics consists 
solely of a priori propositions then the critical point to be made clear 
to pupils is that they may identify mathematical propositions by abstrac- 
tion, but can only prove them by deduction. Such abstraction is consistent 
with logicism, for mathematics is true of all worlds including this. 
However mathematics is not an empirical science and cannot be taught as 
such. It might be taught as the science that underlies all reasoning, 
l 
but not as explanatory science, telling one why certain relationships 
occur in the world. 
2) Formalism is according to Curry, presenting the thesis that mathe- 
matics is 'an objective science... dealing with a certain subject matter; 
... 
(whose) propositions are true insofar as they correspond with the 
facts' (Remarks on the Definition and Nature of Mathematics' in 
Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 152). However the 'formal systems' that 
make up that subject matter are totally different from the subject matter 
of all other sciences, for those of mathematics are man-made from begin- 
ning to end. It is a science only in the sense that it consists of a 
system of synthetic a posteriori propositions; empirical ones. Given 
the discussion in the previous chapter, the argument would be that a 
science of internal conventions is more appropriately called a game. 
Yet even if mathematics is not a science in the terms of either the 
Newtonian view or the Evolutionary one, it may be still taught through 
such a method. That is, within the game one may employ such a method 
1. In the broad sense, noted on p. 157 above. 
to judge which move to make. Although pupils may feel themselves within 
the safety of a non-serious activity, they may be still encouraged to 
make conjectures, and so on. Furthermore, a pupil has to keep on 
learning new rules, and as a matter of fact these might first be learned 
outside the game. For example, small children learn tables as songs or 
learn about equality through weighing cake ingredients. To a Formalist 
teacher, this process would consist of informal learning by the scientific 
method outside mathematics, followed at an appropriate time by formal 
acquisition within mathematics. 
3) Intuitionism identifies mathematics as an autonomous activity of 
a person's mind with objects dependent upon the human imagination. Hence, 
if science refers to reality then mathematics is not a science. While 
mathematics need not employ a scientific method, it is not contradictory 
for it to be constructed, at least on occasions, according to such a 
method as that presented in the Newtonian View. Further, one might 
suggest that Intuitionistic logic could be consistent with the Evolutionary 
method, for the logic is fallible, even though the mental constructs are 
not. Admittedly, any 'observations' made in determining the accuracy of 
such a logic would be back to the mind, rather than out to the world. 
As 'concrete intuitionism' is self-contradictory, for what is 'concrete' 
is not the possession of one mind, then it is difficult to see the place 
of Intuitionist constructs in the secondary school. The pupil acquires 
knowledge of an empirical study, the public form of mathematics. There 
are no restrictions on how this is to be learned, provided it is not 
presented as a system of propositions, all of which are either provable 
or not. The Intuitionist teacher must wait for the conceptual develop- 
ment of his pupils for them to do mathematics, rather than study inter- 
pretations of past constructions. 
4) Hypothesisors claim, like the Empirical Formalists, that mathematics 
is a science. To Peirce and to Ormell, it is the 'science of possibilities' 
and to Lakatos, the science of 'Proofs and Refutations'. Following both 
Formalists and Intuitionists, mathematics is seen as a human activity 
but it generates much more than man initiates. 
1 
The mathematician is 
for ever finding new relations in a subject matter that he thought he had 
fully analysed. These are the 'discoveries' of mathematical science, but 
their subject matter is not that of an empirical, but that of a fictional 
world, Popper's 'World 3'. 
1 The method employed in this activity is well- 
defined by the Evolutionary View, but it does not imply an identifiable, 
infallible method for that would be a contradiction in itself, if there 
are no absolutes besides trivial logical truths. Thus one may teach 
mathematics as a science, according to this philosophical position, but 
as its followers are found in practising mathematics education, they 
generally demand more of mathematics than being 'a pure science'. As 
was noted of Sawyer on p. 166 above, 'Fruitful applications of it have 
to be found'. 
2 
THREE QUESTIONS 
1) What Distinguishes the Science Perspective from all the others? 
This chapter has been distinctive because of its concentration upon 
mathematical progress and discovery. This is indicative of the method of 
science as concerned with the search for 'new' true propositions, in this 
case, of mathematics. The concern with 'progress and discovery' contrasts 
with the focus in the Arts perspective on 'creating end-products/formal 
proofs' and in the Games perspective, on 'manipulative skills/deductive 
1. See p. 65 above for further clarification on these points. 
2. Sawyer is just one of the mathematics educators who have shown great 
concern for applicability. Griffiths and Wilder have been mentioned 
in this chapter and one finds this also, not only in Ormell's text 
books but also in P. F. Burns, Dail Life Mathematics (1952) and 
P. Kaner, Modern World Mathematics 1969 for just two further 
examples. This is the major concern of the next chapter. 
procedures'. To reiterate Sawyer's criteria, given on pp. 165-6 above, 
this perspective highlights how, 1) Someone comes to suspect the truth 
of the theorem, while the Games perspective highlights (2) the deductive 
procedures required to establish the proof, and the Arts perspective 
highlights (3) the embodiment in a formal proof. It is to be expected 
that the Technological-orientation will highlight (5) fruitful applications 
of the theorem. Sawyer notes that (5) only occurs if (4) the theorem is 
remembered. 
2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one perspective, 
as a pupil, before one can appreciate some other perspective? 
A pupil entering secondary school necessarily has a mathematical 
history. He does not have a tabula rasa with regard to mathematics. 
The secondary school teacher can know what the pupil has been taught 
in the Primary school but it is not practical for him to know by what 
method every pupil has been taught. This question asks one to consider 
whether or not it really matters that one does not know the primary 
school perspective(s). 
It should be clear from this chapter and the two previous ones that 
a teacher may suggest a perspective for mathematics or a part of it, that 
does conflict with that presented earlier by another teacher, even in the 
same area of work. One teacher may introduce 'angles' axiomatically as 
'rotations' (See SMP Book A, Ch. 3) within a games perspective, while 
another introduces them as 'facts' to be discovered through a science 
perspective (See Discovering Mathematics, Book 1, pp. 12ff. ). Yet 
another stresses the fruitful applications of 'angles' for carpenters, 
wheelwrights and designers (See Daily Life Mathematics, Book One, 
pp. 154-64). Such diversity of approaches presented to a single child 
may lead to confusions, and certainly teachers ought to be aware that 
this can arise. However, nothing has been found so far to suggest that 
one perspective has a logical priority over another. As a matter of 
fact a particular philosophical form of a given perspective may be 
excluded at one time, for the pupils lack a sufficiently advanced level 
of conceptual development. In that situation the teacher will have 
alternatives. The pupils are to learn without understanding; or, the 
teacher modifies his philosophical stance to retain the perspective; 
or, the teacher presents to the pupils what he considers preliminary 
knowledge of the topic, that will facilitate acquisition of mathematical 
knowledge when it becomes contingently possible. A teacher realises that 
his pupils are too young to appreciate the insight required to produce 
Pythagoras theorem and so gets them discovering the relationship through 
cutting up squares. He does not consider that this 'really' is mathe- 
matics but believes it will facilitate later learning. 
This kind of situation will be considered most critically when the 
aims of mathematics education and their implementation are focused on in 
part 3 of the thesis. It is indicative of the problems that arise, when 
a mathematics department sets about planning its course to C. S. E., for 
example. A model of the results of such a discussion was presented in 
the image of the young teacher, in part 2 Chapter 6. He goes from a 
Games perspective in Year One, to a Science Perspective in Year Two and 
so on (See pp. 101-07 above). The tendency in this thesis will be to 
discuss how the logic of such progress comes out in particular mathe- 
matics text books, but the analysis may apply to groups of teachers just 
as well. 
3) Does one find a Common Logical Sequence to what is taught, 
no matter through which approach it is taught? 
Before this question is answered, one must first consider whether 
or not any criteria have arisen in this perspective, as occurred in the 
earlier ones, that indicate that the achievement of a given mathematical 
objective logically presupposes knowledge of other elements of mathematics. 
The argument thus far has been that it would make no sense for a teacher 
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to ask his pupils to come to his class, until he had decided what is 
presupposed in learning to solve a linear equation, 'x +m= n', say. 
However, the answer so far given in earlier chapters is that there is 
something presupposed, and that this is agreed to by all perspectives. 
A more critical question is, 'Is the set of presuppositions for a given 
objective logically identical for all approaches? ' The answer to this 
would seem simply to be negative. One teacher may consider axioms and 
a definition sufficient background for teaching linear equations to a 
level at which the best pupils understand, 
x+m=n 
x+ m- m= n- m 
=n-m x+ 
(MM) 
x+0=n-m 
x =n-m. 
Another teacher considers some understanding of Descartes' struggle to 
initiate modern algebra as a necessary presupposition. 
Here there may 
be differences of a philosophical and/or a pedagogic nature. The teachers 
agree that there are presuppositions involved in the given objective being 
attained, but accept no more than an overlap about what they are. 
The atmosphere that this chapter has tried to generate, is one in 
which teachers would think twice before always stopping at the axioms 
and definitions. It is by stopping there that they give the impression 
that, 'mathematicians start with an empty mind, set up their axioms and 
definitions at their pleasure, in the course of a playful free creativity... 
deduce theorems from these axioms and definitions' 
(Proofs and Refutations, 
p. 143, footnote 1). The argument of the science perspective is that this 
gives pupils a false impression of mathematical progress, if not of mathe- 
matics itself. 
Thus, a provisional answer to question 3) is that a common syllabus 
cannot be guaranteed by simply agreeing on mathematical objectives. These 
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objectives do not fully determine what precedes them in mathematical 
content, without regard to perspectives and philosophical movements. 
A more detailed response can be attempted once the fourth perspective 
has been presented. 
CONCLUSION 
At various points, this chapter has indicated the limitations that 
occur if one does not hold one hundred percent to the view that mathe- 
matics involves logically the method of science. This will be considered 
also in the concluding remarks that follow. 
1. The result of ignoring 'mathematical discovery' in schools is 
that pupils come to believe falsely that they are the only ones 
who do mathematics 'untidily'. Even if one holds that 'mathematics' 
is 'tidy', one ought not to mislead pupils into believing that 
its development is equally formalised. 
2. What pupils do, does not have to be called 'mathematical discovery', 
if the teacher believes that it falls short of 'mathematics'. 
Equally unsatisfactory is for the teacher to call it 'discovery', 
when the pupil would happily accept it as 'replication'. However, 
the teacher ought to keep an open-mind to the possibility of 
discoveries, for otherwise they will be 'barred'. 
3. The two methods of science presented may be used as models where 
they are incompatible with a philosophical movement. Thus the 
Newtonian View may be employed as a pedagogic model even by 
Hypothesisors. 
4. There is one important difference between someone who employs the 
methods of science in mathematics teaching only for pedagogic reasons 
and someone who uses it, at least in a part of mathematics, on 
logical convictions. The latter person has a logical obligation 
to show that an appreciation of 'formal proofs' is an inadequate 
demonstration of being mathematically educated, if it omits an 
appreciation of 'mathematical discovery' methods. 
CHAPTER10 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING - TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the points raised in the previous chapter have a bearing 
on the material presented in this one. To orientate mathematics teaching 
towards 'technology' is to presume some reference to 'science', or more 
particularly, to 'scientific methods'. 'Technology' is generally taken 
to imply the application of sciences to problems of everyday life. 
These sciences may be either 'natural' or 'social'. Business Studies 
is as much a technology as Engineering. In both subjects one finds 
mathematics joining with science to resolve problems related to everyday 
life. Thus, the 'technology perspective' focuses on the function that 
mathematics has, rather than on the nature or quality of the growth of 
the subject, mathematics. As with the 'everyday' notion of technology, 
it is assumed here that any product of a technology will have a use. 
The extent to which 'the technological perspective' demands that mathe- 
matics should consist totally of 'useful parts', is a central point of 
discussion in this chapter. The term 'useful' will be allowed a breadth 
of meaning to include 'being useful in mathematics', as well as 'being 
useful to some area outside mathematics'. Hence, those following a 
technological perspective are forced to ask questions about the purpose 
of mathematics, rather than presuming that it is a permanent member of 
the sacred timetable of any school. The most radical position is one 
which would claim that all mathematics has a useful purpose, and this 
should ground its place in education. 
Such radicalism may be halted immediately by the suggestion that 
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the technology perspective necessarily leads to a loss of rigour in 
mathematics education. Applicability is achieved at the expense of 
knowledge of formal proofs. Not one, but three problems arise: 
Problem 1 involves the tension between 'rigour' and 'applicability'. 
Adversaries of the technological perspective suggest that a more flexible 
attitude to the demand for applicability would reduce this tension, but 
only at great cost to the technological perspective, as it will be out- 
lined in this chapter. In considering various solutions to the problem, 
one central theme of this thesis will be highlighted, for each solution 
must be tempered, in relation to the mathematics educators' views of 
'rigour' and 'applicability'. It will be seen that these views are 
embedded in the philosophies of mathematics discussed in part 1 of this 
thesis. If a teacher's notions of 'rigour' and 'applicability' are 
embedded in different philosophies, then he should not be surprised if 
there is some resulting tension. This leads one to identify the more 
general problem that has been present throughout this part of the thesis: 
Problem 2 involves the influence, that the compatibility or incompatibility 
of the philosophies of mathematics identified in part 1 has, on the kinds 
of teaching perspectives that one can, with logical consistency, support. 
The point of concern brought out in this chapter is that teachers have the 
feeling that such a problem exists, but because they cannot identify it 
clearly, their solutions are pragmatic. This leads to difficulty in 
carrying through one's intended policy for mathematics education, for 
the teacher has an inadequate understanding of his teaching situation: 
Problem 3 involves teachers presenting the mechanical application of 
certain techniques to pseudo-real-life situations, 
' 
as a substitute for 
1. By 'pseudo-real-life situations' one means situations described in 
terms of real life objects, like houses, cars, bills, et al., but 
they are not related to each other realistically, or the pupil is 
not asked a realistic question about them. When will one need to 
know 'the planes of symmetry of a matchbox' or the amount that a 
[Contd. overleaf 
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genuine applications. This devalues the notion of application, and fails 
to provide pupils with anything more useful than additional examination 
passes. 
1 
Even where the applicative area has genuine technological, or 
at least vocational, value, as is found in Commercial Arithmetic or in 
Mathematical Methods and Computer Studies, too often 'education' is 
sacrificed for 'training', in order that sufficient routines are learned. 
2 
Once the standpoints of the differing philosophical movements are 
given with regard to these three problems, and the technology perspective 
in general has been clearly presented, it will be possible to turn again 
to the three questions raised in part 2 Chapter 6.3 Throughout this dis- 
cussion it will be of critical importance to distinguish philosophical, 
from purely pedagogic support for the technology perspective. It is very 
easy to interpret a perspective totally reliant on pedagogic support, as 
having stimulated concern on the basis of transient values only. 
4 
No 
matter the stimulus for implementing this perspective, the concluding 
argument of the chapter is that concentration on mathematics as 'servile', 
is not pejorative. Pupils who constantly look out for uses of what they 
know, rather than 'digest, regurgitate for examinations, and forget', are 
Fn. 1. D. 181, contd. 
girl actually paid for a bicycle, if she resold it for £9 and lost 
l9"o in doing so. These examples were taken at random from 
Mathematics through Experience, Book 3. 
1. 'Examination passes' have a use, but those in Applied Mathematics 
seem to have a particularly short-lived one. 
2. 'Sufficient' would be determined by the vocational bodies to which 
the teacher looked, or sometimes by an examination syllabus. 
3. The questions were: 1) What distinguishes perspective X from all 
the others? 2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one 
perspective before, as a pupil, one can appreciate some other 
perspective? 3) Does one find a common logical sequence to what 
is taught, no matter through which approach it is taught? 
4. Rather as one considers a neighbour to be always 'keeping up with 
the Jones', there may have been a tendency in times of greater 
affluence for Heads of Department to compete for the most 'with-it' 
mathematics equipment or project, for expediencies that may alter 
with each change of Governors, say. 
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closer to most people's conception of a mathematically educated person, 
than at first sight might be expected. 
APPLICABILITY is not a synonym of technology. It has already been men- 
tioned that technology is taken to refer to 'science', while 'applica- 
bility' is a broader term, equally at home in the arts or the sciences. 
1 
Furthermore, the technological perspective, as discussed here, includes 
applications of mathematics within mathematics, as well as outside 
mathematics. This is not excluded by the concept of 'applicability', but 
is not usually considered. One may use a spanner to open another spanner, 
but one would not take this to be its central use. While most of the 
debate is about 'external applicability', and by 'applicability' one 
will generally be referring to 'external applicability', it ought to be 
remembered that this internal reference is acceptable, and will be men- 
tioned explicitly at times. 'Internal applicability' takes a back seat, 
because far less heat is generated by the suggestion that mathematics 
must be taught through its 'internal' uses, than when one suggests it 
must be taught through its 'external' uses too. Clearly, at least two 
forms of the technology perspective are possible. These positions are: 
a) a Strong Technology Perspective insists that mathematics is to be 
seen as necessarily applicative. Every element of mathematics awaits 
service elsewhere. All mathematics has the potential for application, 
from the moment of its invention. 
In the last chapter Sawyer was quoted as saying that a necessary 
part of establishing a mathematical theorem was that, 'fruitful applica- 
tions of it have to be found' (see p. 166 above. This is a stronger 
position even, than that found in part 1 Chapter 4. There, mathematics 
was identified as 'the science of possibilities', not the science of 
1. A very broad sense of 'science' was mentioned on p. 157 above, which 
roughly equated 'science' with 'knowledge' and thereby could cover 
'the arts' as well as 'science'. 
'fulfilled possibilities'. Nevertheless the logical point is held by 
both: that mathematics consists totally of elements necessarily capable 
of 'fruitful applications'. 
1 
As Morgan notes of an examiner for the 
International Baccalaureate in Mathematics, he 'is required to assess 
the student's... ability to represent situations in mathematical terms 
(mathematical models), to examine their implications and possibilities, 
and to arrive at definite conclusions by the application of mathematics 
as a tool' ('The International Baccalaureate' in Developments in 
Mathematical Education, p. 259). This is certainly on lines similar to 
Sawyer, and it is found within the confines of an examination structure. 
To put this notion of the Technology Perspective more concisely, 
'Mathematics or some part of it is to be seen as consisting of elements 
all of which necessarily have the potential to be employed in the 
resolution of problems in other areas, either inside or outside 
mathematics. ' 
In this strong conception of mathematics as technological, the 
phrase 'inside or outside' is of critical importance and deserves 
elucidation. To the Hypothesisor, mathematics stops being definable as 
mathematics if it lacks interpretation. Furthermore, interpretation must 
logically occur outside mathematics, for mathematics to take on the 
character of a discrete discipline. An economist may be given the 
qualifying characterisation 'mathematical economist', precisely because 
he has a significant knowledge of another discrete area; i. e. mathematics 
as well as economics. From the basic problem of simple interest, to 
complex models of the economy described within computer packages, the 
economist is aware that arithmetic formulae are open to useful 
1. Sawyer's stronger position amounts to barring theorems from full 
status until they are fruitful, while the Hypothesisors argue that 
all theorems are potentially fruitful, and the more explicitly 
fruitful parts are the parts that the present community remembers. 
185 
interpretations. In arithmetic, I=Pxtx 100 just indicates an 
acceptable way of manipulating real numbers, while it is interpreted by 
the economist as an indication of the nature of simple interest. Its 
status as a well-formed formula of arithmetic is presumed by the economist. 
He does not check that this is so, but assumes that members of the related 
area, in this case, mathematics, have confirmed its validity. However, 
the economist is confirming the existence of the discrete area, known 
as mathematics, by taking I=Pxtx 100 as validated elsewhere. 
If 
there were no members of other areas who were willing to make such 
public confirmations of trust, then mathematics would be quickly reduced 
to the status of a game. It is the fact that mathematics is interpreted 
'outside' mathematics, that is crucial to its being regarded publicly as 
a discrete area of knowledge. 
b) a Weak Technology Perspective insists that mathematics has the 
potential of being helpful sometimes, to other areas, either inside or 
outside mathematics, through its application. The argument is that 
knowledge and understanding of certain parts of mathematics are found 
to illuminate empirical situations, if one has the relevant knowledge 
of both the empirical situation and mathematics. Someone holding this 
weak perspective may claim that the arithmetic formula mentioned earlier 
in the economics example, does find an interpretation in economics as 
the Simple Interest Formula, but it is an exaggeration to claim that 
any well-formed arithmetic formula necessarily has the potential for 
such fruitful application. 
External Applicability. Whatever one's notion of the technological 
perspective, one is using the term 'external applicability', at least 
implicitly. In order to understand the possible diversity in this 
phrase, the approaches to answering these three questions will be 
considered: 
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1) 'Where should you build the greenhouse? ' 
2) 'How could you have made sure that that joint fitted better? ' 
3) 'Cut that bun in four and have a piece. What part of the 
bun have you eaten? ' 
1) This question, involves the many variables that there is no space 
to identify and discuss, but somehow a decisive criterion has to be 
identified by which to judge the best place to put the greenhouse. 
Such a criterion could be, 'sunshine hours1 on a maximum area of the 
greenhouse'. Here practical experimentation is not practical, for one 
cannot easily go around erecting and re-erecting a greenhouse until the 
optimum site is found. The question cries out for a model to illuminate 
the situation. Aided by trigonometry and calculus, a mathematical model 
will be derived. It will not solve the problem on its own, but then as 
Professor Lighthill says, 'no one can expect to solve the whole of any 
problem mathematically' ('Presidential Address' in Developments in 
Mathematical Education, p. 98). Here is a problem and someone with a 
kit of mathetical models is likely to find one that provides 'a good fit', 
perhaps with one or two on-the-spot adjustments, in line with a physical 
model, no doubt. 
2) This question involves a previously constructed object, for example 
a cot, and the amateur carpenter is not satisfied fully with his achieve- 
ment. He did it all by 'eye', a straight edge and a pencil, rather than 
according to a previously designed plan. He now sees that as a matter 
of fact he would have done better to have used some simple geometry, 
before he had plunged into estimations. 
3) This question arises when an exasperated teacher combines a number 
of motivational techniques to overcome a particular child's inability 
to handle simple fractions. The question is not just concrete, but 
1. This is to include both a measure of intensity and time. 
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involves both an experiment and an unsolicited reward. The teacher is 
not interested in what the pupil learns about currant buns, but only 
what he learns about fractions. 
Looking at the three questions, one might suggest that the three 
questions are essentially the same, for they all employ empirical 
situations and some mathematics. However, the argument of this chapter 
is that each identifies a distinctive use of the term, 'external 
applicability'. These will be called, Rational Applicability, Concrete 
Applicability, and Pseudo-Applicability. 
1 
1) Rational Applicability is to be employed when there is no reasonable 
alternative for dealing with the problem, except through some abstract 
characterisation of the problem. It is not realistic to imagine green- 
houses being built and dismantled all over ten acres of land, for a 
number of years, until the problem is resolved. One can conceive of 
this happening, but one would consider it irrational to turn the 
conception into actual practice. 
2) Concrete Applicability is worth separating from rational applica- 
bility, because a teacher who is given examples of the kind expounded 
under 'the amateur carpenter problem' only, may believe wrongly that 
mathematical applicability is motivating, but not rationally compelling. 
Thus the phrase 'concrete applicability' is to be employed to refer to 
problems where it would be reasonable to choose either to use a 
theoretical framework to resolve the problem, or to rely largely upon 
practice. One alternative is not overridingly the more reasonable, as 
would seem to be the case with the greenhouses and the models of national 
economies. The carpenter could reasonably choose to construct alternative 
joints, rather than calculate which shape will fit most tightly, but 
1. 'Pseudo-applicability' will be treated separately in this chapter, 
for it is only meaningful in the restricted domain of mathematics 
education, and not in ordinary usage. 
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this too would be a reasonable approach. 
Both these forms of applicability focus on realistic problems, 
whose solution is of interest in both the area applied and the recipient 
area. 
CRITIQUE OF PSEUDO-APPLICABILITY 
Pseudo-applicability only occurs in educational situations. It involves 
contrived empirical events, being employed to help eliminate ignorance 
in a given area of mathematics, like fractions. For motivational reasons, 
all or some part of mathematics is presented to a pupil through empirical 
situations. Thus Thwaites argues that underpinning S. N. P. is the 
'philosophy of drawing mathematics out of real situations which are 
easily recognizable, readily comprehensible and genuinely interesting 
to the pupils' (S. M. P.. the first ten years, p. 176). Using this 
approach initially does not necessarily prevent graduation in a given 
area of mathematics to one of the other forms of applicability. A 
concept acquired by abstraction from empirical situations may be employed 
on another occasion to resolve problems in new empirical situations. 
Tommy may learn what a quarter is, through currant buns, but tomorrow 
he may be sharing out chocolate with three of his friends. This seems 
to indicate Thwaites' intention, when he goes on in the same report, 
'The familiar "Oh Sir, what's the point of this? " should now be as 
obsolete as totting should have been a generation ago. Thus every 
chapter, especially in the first few books, starts with a practical task 
which is aimed at stimulating the pupil's imagination and sharpening his 
curiosity. ' However, the practical tasks begin chapters rather than end 
them, and even in books like Book F where much is made of the four 
applications of matrices, all are internal to the same parental structure, 
algebra. 
The point is that one may indicate by mathematics in application, 
illumination primarily of mathematics itself, rather than the empirical 
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area to which it is supposedly applied. Consider the following problems 
from S. M. P. in this light, 'Make a list of at least 10 triangular objects 
or frameworks that you have seen' (Book A, p. 44). This seems to reinforce 
triangularity rather than improve one's understanding of the world. 
OR 'A gun weighing 3 tons fires a 25 lb. shell with a muzzle velocity 
of 2000 ft. per sec. What other information would you require to 
calculate the recoil velocity of the gun? ' ('A' level S. M. P. question 
for 1964). This stimulates thoughts of standard dynamics models rather 
than illuminating ballistics. 
In pseudo-applicability, it does not matter what clothes are put 
on the mathematics, for only mathematics is identified in the educational 
objective. 
Applicability of mathematics as the obiective of training. Even though 
the status of mathematical knowledge has been questioned, there remain 
features of mathematics that make it attractive to other areas of study. 
These are the features that are commonly agreed as necessary conditions 
of mathematical proof. The possibility of sufficiency may be removed 
but there is still agreement across the philosophical movements that 
objective, public formulation for example, is a necessary condition of 
mathematical proof. Another feature is the ease with which mathematical 
procedures may be repeated. 
1 
The attractiveness of mathematics to the 
social sciences, in particular, may be tainted, but is not lost. 
The effect of this in schools is a practical concern for pupils to 
have 'enough mathematics' to meet the requirements that are to be found 
in the sciences. Various kinds of 'applied mathematics' have arisen; 
sometimes under this title, and sometimes under titles suitably adapted 
to the market for which it was intended: for example, 'commercial 
1. This reiterates the point made on p. 169 above that mathematics is 
distinct, for it is never concerned with particulars but rather with 
'classes', 'sets' or 'types'. 
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arithmetic' for future secretaries, and 'mathematical methods and 
computer studies' for future computer engineers. Consider the example 
of third years in a secondary school, learning how to use a table of 
squares; e. g. 132 = 169.... In one class they learn to practise this 
skill through the problem of carpeting a six bedroom mansion, all of 
whose rooms are square. In another class, the previous lessons have 
included discussions on the value of learning one's 'Times Tables', and 
how prewritten tables may reduce labour, and also on patterns to be 
found in the sequence of square numbers. The pupils in this class 
therefore, now 'find' it useful to employ 'Square Tables' to facilitate 
obtaining the objective of their present work: the gaining of an approxi- 
mate value for gravity through experiments using Newton's trolley. 
This is a crudely presented contrast of styles but it does pick 
out a genuine distinction. Only in the second class have the children 
freedom1 to suggest firstly that 'Square Tables' would be of use, and 
later, that 'Square Root Tables' would be useful also, to reduce their 
labours. In the first class the children can competently employ an 
algorithm, but only in the second class are they given the opportunity 
to demonstrate that they recognise differing situations in which a 
particular algorithm can be appropriately employed. No one wishes to 
reject the value of combining applicative and vocational approaches with 
'general education', provided the result is education and not training. 
Sometimes the vocational requirement is the sole objective, and the 
result is the machine-like application of standard methods and models, 
to standard problems, rather than understanding the criteria of 
1. 'Freedom' is not unlimited and a phrase like 'guided rediscovery' 
may be appropriate given the discussion in the previous chapter on 
this point. Ennever uses the clause, 'unconscious of any restrictions 
they have accepted in making their own selection' 
(See, 'Science in 
the Middle Years' in Schools Council Working Paper, No. 22, pp. 60-1). 
The teacher may attract pupils to a given decision, but does not force 
it upon them. 
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application. Few people today expect to see 'teachers from Training 
Colleges teaching Religious Instruction and Physical Training' but rather, 
they expect 'teachers from Colleges of Higher Education teaching Religious 
Education and Physical Education'. 
Unfortunately the inclusion of the name of an accepted discipline 
in the title of a course may leave it uninspected for educational content. 
Children may be left, therefore, passively to apply standard algorithms, 
and mechanically resolve artificial problems, or even real ones, that 
could be more efficiently resolved by some other means. Thus, one does 
not need to use a computer to sum the first 100 integers, when one can 
use a formula. Realistic use of mathematics is essential if pupils are 
not quickly to become disillusioned. 
' 
If there are such 'training 
courses', then they can become 'educational', only if the pupils are 
encouraged to acquire knowledge and understanding of both mathematics 
and the areas in which it is to be used. Even on motivational grounds, 
one would expect this to lead to greater concern by pupils for what they 
learn, if they appreciate the purpose of their applicative work. Fourth 
years would then learn how engineers really use mechanics, in reducing 
frictional resistances of aircraft wings, rather than how to deal with 
the problem of a friction-limited projectile. If one has no understanding 
of either the mechanics, or the physical properties of aircraft movement 
then one cannot develop one's 'applicability education', and there is 
certainly room for the argument that this rules out the possibility of 
mathematics education for all. 
APPLICABILITY AND MATHEMATICAL RIGOUR 
There is a fear among some mathematics teachers that the price of 
'external applicability' is 'rigour'. Underlying this is the belief 
1. This point was noted earlier, p. 163, footnote 1, with reference to 
'discovery' in science teaching. 
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that mathematics consists of a priori knowledge, while science consists 
of a posteriori knowledge. Thus if one concentrates on technology, then 
one is working solely in the a posteriori area. This sound logic focuses 
hard down on the following: 
1) How do non-mathematical areas employ mathematics? Lighthill asserts 
that 'effective application is possible only if one sets out to learn the 
language of the field of application and master those characteristics 
special to it' (loc. cit., p. 96). Lighthill suggests a constant inter- 
play between mathematics and the field of application. It is logically 
possible for mathematics to be employed in science, without the mathe- 
matician who works for the scientist understanding the scientific problem. 
He is simply asked to resolve a given partial differential equation, but 
knows no more of the situation than that. The scientist must, in 
Lighthill's terms, be capable of 'building a bridge between the abstract 
ideas and inferences of mathematics and the concrete problems arising in 
some field of application' (p. 95). If the mathematician relies totally 
on the scientist, then the assumption must be that the mathematics is 
separable, isolatable from the empirical. There is a backing for this 
separation in the identifying of scientific a posteriori knowledge and 
the identifying of mathematical a priori knowledge. This position is 
presented, for example by Koerner in Fundamental Questions in Philosophy 
(p. 85), and earlier but more fully in his Experience and Theory 
(Chapter XII). 
1 
This activity by a scientist with a problem, can be 
encapsulated in the term 'idealisation'. An idealisation is the process 
by which a model is produced of some empirical situation. The process 
1. This is also the position held by the applied mathematician, Hall, 
who says of applied mathematicians and scientists: 'there is no 
necessity for each to do the work of the other' (See 'Applied 
Mathematics' in Mathematical Education, p. 32). This is the call 
of 'co-operation' and may be contrasted with Lighthill's desire 
for 'bi-lingual' applied mathematicians. 
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is necessarily selective, in the sense that not all features of the 
empirical situation are represented in the model. That is, 'no two 
empirical propositions-can be identical with their respective 
theoretical idealizations' (Fundamental Questions in Philosophy, p. 84). 
The idealisation possesses all relevant features with regard to the 
problem at hand, and meeting this requirement is no easy task. 
As Lighthill points out, for the representation to be sufficiently 
true of the empirical situation the 'applier of mathematics must learn... 
to use simultaneously the weapons of mathematical reasoning and the 
inferential methods typical of the field of application' (loc. cit., 
p. 96). This process of constant interaction is another form of 
'application'. It is distinguishable from 'idealisation' because 
'interaction' is that process in which 'applicans' and 'applicandum'1 
modify each other, while in idealisation the process has only one 
direction. 
Thus two methods of applicability have been identified. These are 
'idealisation' and 'inter-action'. Philosophically idealisation is 
compelling for logicists. This method indicates a separation of 
'applicans' and 'applicandum', and furthermore, the a priori knowledge 
can modify the a posteriori, but not vice versa. This fits the logicist 
system, while inter-action would require the possibility of change in 
the opposite direction, which is not logically acceptable. Intuitionists 
retain a modified choice between the alternatives, for it is important to 
remember that public interpretations of mathematics in Intuitionistic 
logic are synthetic a posteriori, and so could conceivably be open to 
modification from outside mathematics. However mathematics in itself 
1. 'Applicans' is the instrument of clarification: the mathematical 
modelling, and the 'applicandum', the empirical or other situation, 
which is identified as problematic. 'Interactive application' will 
be used to indicate that 'applicans' and 'applicandum' are mutually 
modified through modelling, on occasions. 
would not be modified. Even without the logical constraint the Hilbertian 
Formalists1 would argue that as a matter of stipulation mathematics consists 
of formal systems, empirically founded but deductively expounded. Thus 
inter-action is stipulatively excluded, if one means that mathematics 
itself is open to modification, and not just limited to the appropriate- 
ness of the model. There is an ambiguity in the line, 'We then manipulate 
the model in such a way as to mimic certain features of the proposed 
development we are investigating'(Teaching Mathematics Applicable - 
Introductory Guide, p. 12). This hypothetical model is formed in 
mathematics, taking constant cognisance of both mathematics and the area 
of application. The hypothesisors can allow logically the possibility 
that inter-action will lead to fundamental changes in mathematics itself, 
2 
but more usually one is changing one previously known mathematical kit 
for another, under the influence of the 'applicandum', the empirical 
situation. 
2) Idealisation and Mathematical Rigour. The argument of 'id. ealisation' 
is that applying mathematics involves the permanent retention of the 
control of mathematics by mathematicians. In being asked to provide 
a model for a given physical situation, the door to the mathematics room 
remains shut to the scientist and his influence. The scientist is to 
present his problem in such terms that the empirical features fall away 
like the skin of a ripe peach, leaving the exact concepts of mathematics 
naked, behind. 
Thus, in the simplest of examples, the problem of the addition of 
apples, Koerner's point would be that the solution to any such problem 
1. Strict Formalists sidestep this debate, as for them, mathematicians 
have no responsibility for the interpretation of formal systems, 
e. g. in applicability. 
2. Wilder discusses this point in Evolution of Mathematical Concepts, 
pp. 11-16 and concludes, 'mathematics... evolves under the influence 
of forces. . . both within itself and without'. 
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must be a posteriori knowledge. 
' 
This assumes that, 1) any proposition 
that describes the world is part of a posteriori knowledge and 2) any 
proposition of mathematics, if it has a subject matter, is logically 
different from that of empirical propositions. Thus '1 +1= 2' does 
not describe the world, but is a formal model of occurrences of empirical 
descriptions, like '1 apple and 1 apple make 2 apples'. The former 
proposition does not exactly identify a translation of the latter proposi- 
tion into mathematics, but is only an idealisation of such. 
Given this strict separation of mathematics from the empirical 
contexts, any lessening of mathematical rigour cannot be logically tied 
to applicability, if it occurs. Mathematical propositions do not occur2 
in empirical discourse itself. Thus the mathematical propositions may 
be underpinned by any one of the philosophical movements identified in 
part 1 of the thesis, with equal facility. 
3) Inter-action and Mathematical Rigour. The argument in support of 
'inter-action' is that applying mathematics involves the continual modifi- 
cation of both mathematical models and scientific theories, according to 
empirical evidence in the former case, and to computations and proofs in 
the latter. A model that 'sends' a space rocket into the sea requires 
modification, no matter how beautiful the proof is. The repercussions 
may not be so visible in reality, and so the mathematician merely receives 
a report of the experiment say, that was carried out at the end of a 
chain, of which his mathematical model is an integral part. Only the 
'bi-lingual' will appreciate to what degree the empirical difficulties 
are the result of an inadequate mathematical model. This is particularly 
1. See Experience and Theory, pp. 167-72 and 'On the Foundations of 
Mathematics in Experience' in L'Age de la Science, Vol. III, No. 3. 
2. What occur in empirical discourse are names of mathematical proposi- 
tions. Thus '2 +2= 4' may occur but not, 2+2=4, or more likely 
one finds the 'cross-breed' 2( )+ 2( )= 4( ) in which the exact 
mathematics and inexact scientific statements are conflated. 
the case, if the model has been fed into the scientific theory at several 
points, rather as statistics may be found in economic forecasting. 
This position only makes sense, if empirical features can be said 
logically to modify mathematical elements and vice versa. In order for 
this to occur in a logical sense, simultaneously, both the empirical and 
the mathematical knowledge inputs must be either a priori or a posteriori, 
and not one of each. Given the Newtonian view outlined in the previous 
chapter (see p. 159 above), it may be possible to make all theoretical 
components a _priori, 
but it is more likely that they will be considered 
a posteriori. In this case the logicist would feel logically excluded, 
just as hypothesisors would feel excluded if the a priori position were 
taken throughout. As the mathematical components might be those of 
intuitionistic logic, no other movement besides the logicist would feel 
excluded necessarily by a posteriori knowledge throughout. Thus the 
logicist would say that this 'Evolutionary1 inter-action' has less rigour 
than mathematics itself, and must be employing an empirical substitute 
for mathematics. The logicist may yet accept this same inter-action 
method for applications within2 mathematics, while rejecting it for 
external use. 
The most obvious examples of this 'Evolutionary inter-action' would 
be at the rather advanced level of Hilbert spaces applied to quantum 
mechanics. Yet it is possible to involve interaction at the secondary 
school level, if the problems have sufficient realism. This is just one 
of the principles of 'projective modelling' that is the key to the design 
of the Schools Council Sixth Form Mathematics Project. Students are con- 
stantly involved in two activities, 'thinking realistically' and 'thinking 
mathematically', 'translating' and 'simulating'. 
3 
The interaction can be 
1. Using the terminology introduced above, part 2 Chapter 9, p. 160. 
2. Like algebra applied to Euclidean geometry, or matrices to algebra. 
3. See Teaching Mathematics Applicable Introductory Guide, particularly 
pp. 20-4. 
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found also in first year books, like Modern World Mathematics, where 
both mathematical and physical models are required and the differences 
discussed. 
' 
In this way the models are open to mutual modifications, 
and the pupils are encouraged to develop understanding in a genuinely 
inter-disciplinary fashion. 
The inter-action is the criterion by which one decides that rigour 
is vital, and if there is no inter-active concern2 at a given point, then 
the force for rigour is reduced. As Ormell puts it, 'One cannot expect 
students to appreciate excessive formal rigour on the new course.... The 
essence of rigour is taking care over inferences of various kinds .... The 
purpose of rigour is also more evident: a mistake in inference in modelling 
might entail something going disastrously wrong in the real world. ' 
(Teaching Mathematics Applicable Introductory Guide, p. 23). 'Rigour' 
is tied to 'caring' rather than exclusively to an obedience of axiomatic 
sequences. Nevertheless, in Ormell's philosophical stance, there is 
only support of the underlying logic upon which 'formal rigour' rests, 
rather than a constant requirement of its detailed scrutiny. Ormell 
follows Douglas Quadling in the belief that, 'to be mathematics at all, 
there must be the possibility of deriving it by processes of logical 
argument from a recognised axiomatic basis' Issues at Secondary Level', 
p. 178 in Mathematical Education). 
There is no challenge here to classical logic, but clearly 
Intuitionists do explicitly make such a challenge, 
3 
and also among the 
1. See for example, p. 73, question 6 of Book 1 which involves a mathe- 
matical description of the movement of a curtain ring, and also the 
construction of a physical model of such movement. It draws out the 
point that the model produced for a taut material must be made more 
general - modified - if one learns experimentally that the material 
holding the curtain is elastic. This is Inter-action at work. 
2. Indelicately, one might say that extra scrutiny occurs when one 
treads on another's toes. 
3. See above p. 48, Heyting argues 'logic is a part of mathematics, and 
can by no means serve as a foundation for it' (Intuitionism, p. 6). 
Hypothesisors the unique position of Classical logic is at least 
questioned. 
' 
'Rigour' is a much less clear notion, once it is allowed 
that the ground rules may alter. In this way, 'rigour' becomes an 
ambiguous concept, if the 'formal rules' are not made explicit, but are 
mistakenly taken as read. As the discussions of part 1 of the thesis 
have shown, one cannot take 'mathematical knowledge' as unquestionably 
absolute, any more than one would take a scientific theory as believed 
by all and for all time. Once one accepts that mathematics has no 
absolute status derived from an eternal logic, for a considerable number 
of people concerned with mathematics - say, for scientists or philosophers 
as well as mathematicians - then it is less of a surprise 
that its justi- 
fication as an essential feature of what any man must know, should be 
held by many to be its 'usefulness', rather than its 'peculiar logical 
form'. In this light, attention is drawn again to the conclusions reached 
on p. 89 above, that 'derivability' is a sufficient condition of 'proof' 
for Logicists and Formalists, and for the public form of Intuitionistic 
proof, but not for the Hypothesisors. They require in addition, the 
'public scrutiny of proof-analysis' and that the proof has 'applicative 
value2either within or without mathematics'. 
Thus three points need underlining with regard to the nature of 
rigour: 
1) 'Rigour' is related to 'derivability'. By 'derivability' one 
means, 'derivability within a given logic', usually either Classical or 
Intuitionistic. This in itself indicates a plurality of rigour. 
1. See the argument in part 1 Chapter 4 which concludes on p. 68, 
footnote l, by noting that Lakatos' editors fear any suggestion 
that there are no infallible methods of proof. 
2. Compare p. 166 above, W. W. Sawyer's comment on the final stage in 
the discovery of a mathematical theorem, 'Fruitful applications of 
it have to be found'. The point implicit in Sawyer and explicit in 
Wilder is that mathematical knowledge is 'public', and a mathematical 
theorem is not what one man produces in private, but what a community 
publicly recognises as having a 'relation to the world of reality'. 
See p. 164 above. 
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2) There is no complete agreement on the importance of rigour in 
mathematics. The Hypothesisors stress the co-existence of 'rigour' and 
'inter-action'. 
3) For the Hypothesisors any adequate analysis of 'rigour' must include 
its purpose, in addition to criteria of use, like 'setting out the formal 
rules and checking that a given derivation follows these rules' 
(G. Kreisel, 
'Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs' in The Philosophy of Mathematics, 
p. 78). Point 3) is a logically stronger form of point 2). 
Given the validity of point 1), a teacher ought to be aware that 
'rigour' must be ultimately linked to a given logic. The teacher may 
then take either the position that there is only one true logic, the 
position of 'absolute rigour', or that there is a plurality of 'rigour', 
in the sense that rigour is identified relative to a given logic. 
Further, points 2) and 3), if either is accepted by a teacher, imply 
that 'checking... a given derivation' is more important on some occasions 
than on others. In other words, rigour is to increase in strict 
co-relation to inter-action. This may be a valid attitude to instil in 
pupils, but it is easy to see the dangers of taking it as freedom to be 
lax, on most occasions. 
One central facet of the argument has been omitted, and will remain 
so until the beginning of part 3. That is, the conception of mathematics 
education and more generally, of 'education' itself, that is held in this 
thesis. This will be remedied then, and the aims of mathematics education 
will be identified at the same time. In what follows, it will be assumed 
that the technological approach does aim to get pupils to understand both 
what they are doing and why they are doing it. This eliminates most 
common uses of 'training'. 
1 It is not inconsistent with the notion of 
1. The concern for 'understanding' rules out the possibility of the pupils 
'being just trained' (R. S. Peters, 'Aims of Education', pp. 19 and 54 
in The Philosophy of Education). Gribble emphasises the place of 
'explanation' in education and its omission from training 
(Introduction 
to Philosophy of Education, pp. 22-4). 
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'rigour' identified by Logicists, Formalists and Intuitionists for people 
to be trained to be rigorous, for one may learn to take great care in 
following a logical sequence, without any appreciation of why one is 
taking so much care. Mathematicians tend towards rigour when there is 
greater likelihood of error, but pupils may be trained to be rigorous 
without being given any explanation, except for the teacher saying that 
it is an important requirement for examination success. 
THREE QUESTIONS 
Having clarified the nature of the technology perspective, it is 
possible to raise the questions first identified in Chapter 6; and 
proposed on p. 182 in this chapter. 
1) What distinguishes the Technology Perspective from all the others? 
According to the strong position, all mathematics taught by this approach 
is taught as potentially useful. 
1 
This usefulness may be satisfied in 
two ways. Either the mathematics is useful within2 mathematics or to 
some other area. According to the weak position, the usefulness may 
only be contingent. Thus, a teacher has two distinctive approaches from 
which to choose: 
a) A Strong Technology Perspective in which mathematics 
necessarily contains both internal and external applicability. 
b) A Weak Technology Perspective in which mathematics is 
contingently externally applicable. 
1. A point hidden in the present argument is that while mathematics may 
be defined as a set of potential models, not every application of an 
element of mathematics is modelling. All modelling is applicative 
but within mathematics, not all applying is modelling. One may have 
proved 'the angles on the same segment theorem' and then one uses it, 
to show its fruitfulness, to identify the nature of cyclic quadri- 
laterals. There is applicability without modelling here. Yet if 
one uses algebra to demonstrate a property of arithmetic then algebra 
models arithmetic to achieve this. For example, to demonstrate 
commutivity of integers under addition. 
2. In which case, one could treat mathematics as if it were a technology, 
rather than as a technology. See p. 196 above for a logicist justi- 
fication of such a position. 
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This is not the end of the matter, for one may argue that mathematics is 
internally, nothing but a set of potential models, and also argue that the 
use of these models externally, is a contingent possibility. This may be 
identified as 'A Strong Internal Applicability Perspective'. It contains 
logical reasons for presenting some of mathematics as internally applicable. 
This perspective may be viewed as no more than a modified form of b) for it 
does not deny b). However, it is useful to give the perspective a separate 
identity, because it has obvious affinity with those schools of thought 
that are most attracted to the formalisation of mathematics; including 
Logicists, Formalists and Bourbaki. 
However, the Loaicist philosopher presents a view of internal 
applicability that has not been inferred at all, thus far. The logicist 
identifies a special relationship between propositional logic1 and mathe- 
matics, in which logic models all mathematics. That is, any element of 
mathematics may be redescribed in principle, in terms of propositional 
logic. The logicist is concerned solely with the applicability of logic 
to substantiate the rigorous nature of mathematics. In the sense of model 
that was identified earlier, 
2 
it is inappropriate to suggest logic models 
mathematics for there is no possibility of inaccuracy in the explanatory 
role, as the logicist identifies it. However, applicability has been 
differentiated from modelling, and so 'internal applicability' is a 
meaningful interpretation of the logicist position, as there is necessarily 
the interrelationship of all elements of mathematics, through their 
reduction to logic (or set theory, in Bourbaki and Quine). Thus it is 
within a logically rigorous framework that S. M. P. Book F introduces 
matrices, in order to solve simultaneous equations, and Modern World 
1. More realistically one might refer to the Bourbaki redescriptions 
of mathematics in terms of set theory. 
2. See p. 159, footnote 1, where a model is identified as a useful but 
not a true description of something. 
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Mathematics Book 1 introduces linear equations to understand translations 
and co-ordinate sets. The logicist puts 'logical strength' above the 
fruitfulness that is so important to the Hypothesisors, in particular. 
As far as the logicists are concerned, applicability has no intrinsic 
value but occurs only for the sake of improved rigour. In this sense, 
the logicist is interested in internal applicability for the logical 
support it gives mathematics, but this cannot be the case with external 
applicability. As the logicist views logic and mathematics as a discrete 
area of knowledge, consisting of analytic a priori propositions, then 
this area can only be contingently connected with any area consisting 
of a posteriori propositions, which includes all science. 
The Formalist may either consider the strong technology perspective 
as meaningless, or will have a view of internal applicability much along 
the lines of the logicists or Bourbaki, that there is necessarily the 
possibility of interrelationships, given the nature of the rules of 
manipulation. He would therefore accept the Intermediate Perspective, 
and certainly this would seem highly compatible with Formalism as 
described in this thesis. On the other hand, external applicability 
does not follow necessarily as a consequence of any definition of formalism 
that has been presented, nor is it incompatible with any. As was the case 
with logicism, formalism excludes the Strong Perspective, for formalism 
identifies mathematics as essentially interpretationless. If mathematics 
was necessarily externally applicable then this would feature in the 
meaning of mathematics, and would prevent its being an essentially 
interpretationless formal system. It has been strongly suggested in the 
discussion of the Games perspective on pp. 150-54 above, that external 
applicability can only be contingently linked to the Formalist conception 
of mathematics. External applicability was recognised in that discussion 
as a facilitator of mathematical understanding at pre-formal conceptual 
levels, and so it is those formalists who are most concerned to preserve 
the view that mathematics is really uninterpreted, that must entertain 
the technology perspective for pedagogic reasons alone. While formalists 
may be particularly suited to the Intermediate Perspective, it is also 
compatible with Intuitionism and the Hypothesisors. 
The Hvpothesisor who defines mathematics as the science of possi- 
bilities, is implicitly identifying mathematics with 'the science of 
applicability'. Mathematics is identified as a system of potential 
models and modelling is a 'strong'form of applicability. There is thus 
a logical connection between applicability and this philosophical move- 
ment. Furthermore, in the works of Ormell, Sawyer, and Wilder one 
finds a logical commitment to both external and internal applicability. 
This philosophical movement does not require a logical distinction to 
be drawn between 'internal' and 'external' applicability, and so the 
connection between mathematics and applicability is between all elements 
of mathematics being either internally or externally applicable, or both. 
Thus the commitment is to the Strong Technology Perspective. 
No matter what philosophy underpins one's commitment to the techno- 
logical perspective, 'applicability' characterises its distinctiveness 
from the previously identified perspectives. 
2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one perspective as a 
pupil. before one can appreciate some other perspective? 
Given three forms to this perspective, it is clear that the We 
Technoloav Perspective makes no necessary claims on the logical priority 
of approaches, beyond those that will be identified in discussing the 
other forms, for it amounts to saying that a teacher has a free hand 
to motivate pupils however he wishes. The Intermediate Technoloa_r 
Perspective introduces the important question of the logical status 
of internal applicability as being separable from that of external 
applicability, but the 'science of internal applicability' is only a 
technology in an extenuated sense. 
1 
However, the focus of the previous 
chapter has been methods of scientific investigation rather than the 
identifying of mathematics as a science. Strictly speaking, an understand- 
ing of such a form of investigation is presumed when a teacher wishes his 
class to see that 'algebra' is in the role of a technology, when it is 
used to illuminate 'Euclidean geometry'. The teacher ought to be claim- 
ing that algebra provides the tools for scientifically investigating 
geometry, in just that sense of 'scientific' identified for 'the Newtonian 
view' on pp. 159-60 of the previous chapter. 
2 
In this sense, to appreciate 
that geometry can be 'algebratised' is to understand a scientific method, 
and hence that one area of mathematics can be applied to another. This 
is not to claim that the teacher must separate the presentation of the 
scientific and technological perspectives in time, but only that under- 
standing of the latter includes understanding of the former. 
It was suggested in reply to the first question that indifference 
to philosophical standpoints does not carry over to the Strong Perspective. 
The implications of logical force there, identifies certain necessary 
characteristics of mathematics, in particular, that it is a science that 
involves hypothesising - answering 'what happens if' questions. 
Hence, 
the mathematically educated child must be able at least, to follow a 
method of science and hypothesise, even if he is not required to under- 
stand the method. In the previous chapter two methods of science were 
picked out and one of these centred on 'hypothesising' and was seen 
readily to fit one of the philosophical movements, the Hypothesisors. 
There was not however, a uniqueness claim made. Thus pupils will be 
1. Just as it was noted at the beginning of Chapter 9 that 'science' has 
an extenuated sense that covers all search for knowledge, hence one 
could see 'technology' as covering all instances of 'applicability'. 
It would be however only technology in this sense, and not according 
to common usage. 
2. There is the inductive generalisation that geometry can be fitted 
into an algebraic framework, and that resulting roofs match original 
Euclidean ones for power (see p. 105, footnote 15. 
required to show that they can follow g method but the preferred method 
is open to modification by 'the community of mathematicians'. 
One peculiarity of the method identified by the Hypothesisors is 
that no distinction is drawn between the method of mathematics and that 
of mathematical development. Mathematical proof and mathematical dis- 
covery are inseparable for the Hypothesisors. Development is not to be 
hidden (see the earlier discussion pp. 62-71 above). It may be as a 
result of this desire to identify mathematics with what is clearly and 
cleanly demonstrable that 'idealisation' arose. This fits much more 
readily with 'what happened when' questions than 'what happens if'. 
To face uncertainty would be a radical departure for many mathematicians 
and mathematics teachers but that is what the Hypothesisors and the 
'inter-action' method require. Teachers who believe that motivation 
is engendered in otherwise bored pupils by this approach, may turn to 
a series like Daily Life Mathematics in whose preface one reads, 
It is a common experience of teachers that pupils put forth 
their greatest efforts when engaged on work which they 
realise is worthwhile, and further that the practical 
approach and visual methods of teaching are the most 
effective means of arousing their interest... the pupils 
should have an opportunity of learning something of their 
place in the universe... topics may be grouped under two 
main headings, those concerned with financial transactions 
and those concerned with space and time. 
An important criterion employed in syllabus selection in this book is 
to ask 'in what circumstances, in daily life, does one ever need to... ' 
(Preface, p. vii). 
In this series the 'daily life' approach is not chosen for 
motivational reasons alone, for there is likely to be far more mathematics 
that could be taught through this approach than is actually included. 
Criteria for selection of what is to be taught must go alongside how 
it is to be taught. A teacher who is just concerned with motivating 
his pupils, might use a pin to select material. However an orientation 
towards 'education' and not simply, 'the learning of mathematics', is 
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likely to involve additional criteria. One finds in the above extract 
from Daily Life Mathematics a possible conception of education, in terms 
of 'learning something of their place in the universe... '. This would 
certainly narrow the selection of material for it is to look both to the 
pupil and his future citizenship, for 'relevance'. This can be carried 
out free of any other perspective. The teaching involves indicating how 
the mathematics chosen will be worthwhile in the life of the pupil, but 
there is no obvious attempt to present or exclude any one philosophical 
standpoint. 
It would be possible for pupils to learn to hypothesise within 
mathematics, dealing with its internal hypothetical nature, without being 
given the challenge of applying hypothesising externally. This could be 
done even in line with Sawyer's criterion of 'fruitfulness'. Thus, if 
one does not hold the life-mathematics condition within the Hypothetical 
philosophy then one may argue that the science perspective identified in 
the previous chapter, provides all that the technological perspective 
requires with logical force. What is left disputable is the notion of 
'science' itself and whether it is as the formalists employ it, possibly 
interpretationless, or as indicated on p. 158 above, as what helps 'man 
to deal with his environment'. If the latter definition is accepted then 
the science perspective is an empty vessel, an instrument awaiting direction. 
To return to the question, the conclusion is that the technological pers- 
pective does presume an appreciation of the science perspective, and so 
a pupil must have come to appreciate that perspective in order that he 
can appreciate the technology one. 
3) Does one find a Common Logical Se Quence to what is taught, 
no matter through which approach it is taught? 
Largely one may reiterate the answer given in the previous chapter 
on pp. 177-9. That is, mathematical objectives concerned with the content 
of what is to be taught will necessarily identify certain prerequisites, 
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but not all. Agreement that all thirteen year-olds should have knowledge 
and understanding of a rigorous proof of Pythagoras' theorem will entail 
necessarily prior knowledge of right-angled triangles and so on, but 
differing teachers will present one or more differing proofs, and only a 
teacher concerned with 'fruitfulness' is likely to mention unsuccessful 
proofs. He will do so if their method has borne fruit on other occasions. 
' 
The teacher may see other values in presenting error. Firstly, to show 
how one may learn from error, and secondly perhaps, to introduce the 
validity of the Hypothesisor's conception of mathematics being fallible. 
Throughout this chapter there have been clear indications that this 
perspective combines a way of teaching, with criteria for selecting 
syllabus content. On the one hand pupils are to be encouraged to look for 
2 
applications, and on the other hand material is chosen for the ease with 
which realistic examples can be drawn, provided that they link logically 
to the prerequisites determined by the 
these ways it is hoped that pupils wil 
achievement in area where applications 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this chapter, 
overall syllabus objectives. 
3 
In 
1 feel the reinforcement of personal 
are reall fruitful. 
three problems were identified 
as likely to cause difficulties. The first was the concern mathematicians 
have that rigour ought not to be relaxed for the sake of applicability. 
The argument presented on pp. 195-200 above, was that rigour is a pluralistic 
concept which only has sense with regard to a given logic, and so the 
1. An impression of this is given by Dieudonn4 in 'Abstraction in 
Mathematics and the Evolution of Algebra' in Learning and the 
Nature of Mathematics, pp. 100-13. 
2. This reiterates the problem noted in the previous chapter on the 
genuineness of discovery. Ormell is not so concerned that the 
applications are not new, but that they are still hypothetical and 
have not already been adequately resolved. For example, fog is 
still a problem of motorway driving (Specimen Paper, 1974). 
3. It would be unrealistic to deny that the most influential criterion 
of secondary syllabi remains, not moving too far from the most 
popular '0' level and 'A' level syllabi at the time. 
question of laxity may reduce to the more intractable one about the choice 
of logic, much to the surprise of mathematicians generally. 
Secondly, hypothesisors like Ormell are denouncing as artificial the 
separation of Applied Mathematics from Pure Mathematics. They argue that 
there is no logical reason for such a separation if one denies the a Priori 
status of mathematics, and that 'applicability' is equally meaningful 
internally as well as externally. This is the view of just one philosophy 
of mathematics and it has been shown in this chapter that if the concept 
of 'applicability' as well as 'rigour' is clarified then the limits of 
conflict and compatibility among the philosophical movements are clarified. 
Two moderate views of the technological perspective are thereby identified, 
rather than the extremes of 'all application' or 'all purity' that might 
otherwise be the basis of meaningless slogans. 
Thirdly, concern can be shown for 'real' rather than 'pseudo' 
applicability even if one does not support the Strong Technology Perspective 
that hypothesisors hold to. Furthermore, there are still mathematics 
teachers who do identify a distinction of some kind between Pure and 
Applied Mathematics, and the argument of this chapter is of particular 
relevance to them. The argument has been that they should be at least 
concerned that their 'applied mathematics' involves 'rational applicability' 
as well as less logically compelling forms of applicative mathematics. 
In this way, the vital technological importance of mathematics as a 
modelling activity is open to all teachers to follow, and pupils can 
receive mathematical education rather than a training in particular routines. 
Finally, the overall argument is that the technology perspective 
provides1 the added dimension of 'fruitfulness', as compared with the 
other perspectives previously discussed. 
1. Naturally, the compatibility of this perspective with others will 
differ, depending on the philosophy of mathematics the individual 
teacher holds. 
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CHAPTER11 
MATHEMATICS TEACHING - INTER-DISCIPLINARY POSSIBILITIES 
In part 1 of the thesis four different views of mathematics were 
identified. So far, in this second part of the thesis, four different 
teaching perspectives have been discussed. It has been assumed that 
mathematics will be taught at any one time, clearly identified in terms 
of one of the movements presented in part 1 and according to one of the 
perspectives outlined in the previous four chapters. In this chapter, 
two alternatives to this view will be identified, and the first of these 
will provide the main focus of this chapter. These alternatives are: 
1) Mathematics need not be taught as a separately identifiable subject, 
although particular skills traditionally linked to 'mathematics' will 
still be imparted. This will be called the 'Integrated Studies Possibility'. 
2) Mathematics does not appear at all explicitly or implicitly in formal 
education. This is a logical possibility but as it will be argued in 
justifying mathematics education in part 3, not a realistic or desirable 
alternative. 
A weaker form of the first alternative will also be considered: 
3) Mathematics takes its place among other subjects to support a given 
theme or topic. Pupils are made aware of the distinct 'disciplines' and 
may be taught in groups labelled 'mathematics lesson' at some points in 
the week. This will be called the 'Inter-disciplinary Enquiry Possibility'. 
1 
1. In a project like the Schools Council Humanities Project, each unit 
calls upon an understanding of several areas, usually identified with 
separate content in the traditional curriculum, e. g. Drama and 
Geography in a Poverty Unit. 
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Before attempting a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
1) and 3), it is important to clarify what may be suggested by the phrases, 
'integrated' and 'inter-disciplinary'. In his article, 'Curriculum 
Integration' (The Philosophy of Education, pp. 123-49), Pring identifies 
four uses of the term 'integration'. One of these four senses has wide- 
spread currency in education literature and White encapsulates this as the 
notion of the educated man's successful 'integration of what 
(he) learns 
into a total pattern of life' (Towards a Comnulsorv Curriculum, p. 82). 
In this sense, integration entails nothing about the curriculum beyond 
the ruling out of narrow specialism, and the requiring of the educated 
man's knowledge to be 'coherently organised' within his 'total pattern 
of life'. By 'integration' in this sense, one is simply supporting the 
generally accepted view that 'education is of the whole man'. This sense 
of 'integration' is neither particularly illuminating nor contentious, 
but the three other senses to which Pring refers, are more directly 
related to the curriculum, and epistemological questions in general. 
In 1) above, the term 'integrated' could, according to Pring have 
two interpretations. On the one hand, it could mean that separating 
knowledge into disciplines is artificial, and a unified presentation is 
therefore preferable; taking this argument to its extreme, it is that 
knowledge is a 'seamless whole' and so any development at any one point, 
will necessarily influence knowledge at other points in the unified body. 
Pring calls this 'the "atrona" thesis' (p. 128) and contrasts it with 
'the "weak" thesis', introduced on the same page, that limits the 
'seamless whole' to some sub-section of 'knowledge', like 'humanities' 
or 'the sciences' or 'the arts'. Clearly the phrase 'Integrated Studies' 
found in 1) above, could be taken in either sense. 
In 3) above, the phrase, 'Inter-disciplinary Enquiry' replaces 
'Integrated Studies', and Pring also makes a similar conceptual distinction. 
Pring sees 'Inter-disciplinary Enquiry' as part of 'a claim for a closer 
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examination of the logical interdependence of different disciplines while 
at the same time recognizing their distinctiveness' (p. 128). Pring con- 
cludes on p. 148 that this 'interdependence' could be highlighted in the 
curriculum as a whole, without anyone pursuing Inter-disciplinary Enquiry 
as a teaching method. In other words, the phrase 'Inter-disciplinary 
Enquiry' may indicate an approach to education in general, or a focusing 
in on a particular topic, problem or theme, by several disciplines. The 
latter is most commonly taken to be the novel idea of Inter-disciplinary 
Enquiry. 
1 
Thus four senses of 'integration' have been identified, and the last 
three will be referred to in the remainder of this chapter. The four 
senses may be characterised as: 
1) The 'education of the whole man' thesis, 
2) The 'strong integration' thesis, 
3) The 'weak integration' thesis, and 
4) The 'inter-disciplinary enquiry' thesis. 
The fourth position has been shown to be itself ambiguous. Pring seems 
to identify three senses of 'inter-disciplinary enquiry': 
a) in which logical inter-dependence of different disciplines is 
accepted, but their distinctiveness is also recognised. Both 
points influence an overall education policy of Inter-disciplinary 
Enquiry. 
b) in which a given topic, problem or theme is presented in a lesson 
or series of lessons by a teacher or teachers who are concerned to 
interrelate otherwise separated disciplines. 
1. Logic may require both the policy and the implementation through the 
particular novel teaching approach, but this would still not guarantee 
that teachers were aware of both policy and teaching method. 
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c) in which all inter-dependence of disciplines is seen as contingent, 
1 
and any policy of Inter-disciplinary Enquiry is supported only 
if it 
has 'success'; for example, in terms of improved examination results 
or employment prospects. 
While a) and c) are, or are parts of, education policies, 
b) is a teaching 
method, and as they stand, a), b) and c) are not necessarily 
interconnected. 
a) and c) require teachers to show links among disciplines, 
but only b) 
requires the teacher or teachers to be actively involved in the 
imparting 
of knowledge from differing disciplines in their own lessons. 
In this chapter, discussion will begin with the outlining of the 
arguments in favour of the discreteness of mathematics and how these 
arguments reflect upon views for and against the retaining of mathematics' 
position as formally discrete within most usual notions of education. 
This will lead to further analyses of the 'integration theses' just out- 
lined, and finally the compatibility of these theses with the teaching 
perspectives discussed in the earlier chapters of this part of this 
thesis, will be considered. This will leave certain points about mathe- 
matics teachers in general, to be brought together in the Conclusion to 
this part of the thesis, and certain points about the training of mathe- 
matics educators to be resolved in the final part of the thesis. 
THE FORMAL DISCRETENESS OF MATHEMATICS 
In one sense the formal arguments were presented in part 1 of the 
thesis and so do not require repetition. What may be useful is to bring 
together the features of those arguments that seem most pertinent to the 
school situation. A contemporary model for such a pertinent argument 
would be the criteria to which Hirst has referred in his works. Drawing 
1. Pring seems to be unsure if Hirst would hold position c), but some 
clarification may be found in Hirst's recent letter to the Journal of 
Further and Higher Education, 4 (1), Spring 1980, pp. 122-3, in which 
he states 'forms have so many complex inter-relations', 'differences 
within any one form', but between forms one is making 'a categorial 
shift'. This does seem to leave c) alone as a possibility. 
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on the most famous of his articles and also one of his latest, 
1 
three 
criteria push through to the front. In identifying a form of knowledge 
one must isolate 1) A Test for Truth; 2) Uniqueness of Meaning - 'a kind 
of knowledge which, of its nature, cannot be expressed in any other 
symbolic system' (Article B, p. 107); 3) Logical Structure by which the 
form of knowledge develops. This model fits well the likely response 
from Logicists. 
For the Lo¢icist, 'Logic and Mathematics' form an isolatable area 
of formal derivability from self-evident axioms or formal abstractions. 
Thus Logic and Mathematics clearly consist of a distinctive logical 
structure which can only develop by further deductions from what has 
been previously proved. The deducibility within the system that structures 
the development of the form of knowledge also provides the criteria for 
truth. At each stopping point what is derived from self-evident axioms 
is a valid theorem. That it is also true is known by its necessary 
correspondence to some part of an absolute reality 
(Frege's 'realistic 
logicism') or to some nominal reality of abstractions 
(Russell's 
'nominalistic logicism')2 which provide 'meaning' through reference, for 
the elements of mathematics. Thus, not surprisingly, the Logicist has a 
view of logic and mathematics in which the three Hirstian criteria are 
identifiable but logically interconnected. 1) Truth rests on deducibility 
from axioms; 2) There is a Referential Theory of Meaning where the refer- 
ence is to an unique body of concepts; 3) The test for truth is simul- 
taneously the means by which the form of knowledge develops. These 
conditions are sufficient to make mathematics discrete, for any new system 
meeting all three would be a part of logic and mathematics. 
1. Article A: 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge' in 
Philosophical Analysis and Education, pp. 113-38. 
Article B: 'Human Movement, Knowledge and Education' in Journ. 
of Phils of Ed., Vol. 13, pp. 101-8. 
2. The distinction was more fully discussed above, part 1, Chapter 2. 
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All Formalists1 argue that mathematics is separable from logic because 
the latter only is based upon self-evident axioms. While mathematics 
develops according to rules rather as logic does, it does so from posited 
foundations and the objects of manipulation are not logical but empirical. 
To the Formalist a mathematical proposition consists of a series of 
strokes and has no further reference. To the Hilbertian formalists the 
criteria for the discreteness of mathematics would be coincident with 
those of the Bourbaki, except that the latter make no claims either way 
on the a Priori /a Posteriori nature of mathematical knowledge. To the 
Strict Formalists, one of Hirst's criteria is considered inapplicable 
for mathematics. Mathematics is 'a kind of knowledge which, of its 
nature, cannot be expressed in any other symbolic system' but there is 
no conception of 'meaningfulness' in this system. Its discreteness is 
identifiable in its having neither meaning nor self-evidence. The 
presence of the former would make it an empirical science, and of the 
latter, logic. 
Nov in part 1 of the thesis a movement was identified that neither 
tied mathematics to logic, nor reduced the distinction between mathematics 
and other sciences to the incorrigibility of the former's calculations. 
This movement was Intuitionism but there are others who would argue for 
1. Formalisers, like the Bourbaki, also support the view that mathematics 
is separable from logic. They see the axioms of mathematics as human 
constructs that are derived from the set theoretical framework which 
will be assumed internally consistent until proved otherwise. Logic 
alone is considered as consisting of self-evident axioms, and as such 
is separable from systems based on set theory. By formal derivability, 
various systems are produced from set theory and according to how one 
uses a given system it receives a name and 'meaning'. A system enter- 
ing mathematics as 'algebra' might go into some secret service as an 
encoding/decoding system. Thus mathematics is viewed by the Formalisers 
as set theory which has been given a particular use, and that is what 
is meant by calling it an 'interpreted' or 'meaningful' system. 
Mathematics is a form of knowledge for its test for truth and method 
of development are both based upon 'formal derivability' from set 
theory and its distinctive use is its peculiar 'meaning'. Bourbaki 
was introduced on p. 53, footnote 1 above, and some of these points 
were made then. 
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the discreteness of mathematics from logic and the natural sciences, in 
its being both 'a priori' and 'synthetic'. Kant, two hundred years ago, 
and Koerner today, have held this position but would not call themselves 
Intuitionists. Kant held that mathematics provides the categorial 
skeleton into which concepts of communication are fitted (the 'stuffing' 
of the world - the objects, as against the stage of space and 
time). 
Koerner holds a different argument for the discreteness of mathematics. 
He specifically goes out to show how it differs on the one hand from 
logic and on the other, from the natural sciences. Firstly, the proposi- 
tions of logic are unique particulars, while those of mathematics are 
generalisations. Thus in logic one could not consistently assert both 
'p implies q' and 'p implies not-q'. These propositions are incompatible 
in the sense that both could not be part of 'logic'. Koerner argues that 
the mathematician can frame incompatible sequences of words without 
committing a logical contradiction. He can claim that both 'there exists 
an object such that it is the square root of -1' and 'there does not exist 
an object such that it is the square root of -1' hold in mathematics for 
they are rules1 that tell one how to proceed in the game and not assertions. 
It is comparable to the fact that both the rules 'Eat fish on Friday' and 
'Don't eat fish on Friday' may be present in the same language-game with- 
out any contradiction resulting. The contradiction arises only if one 
attempts to obey both rules simultaneously. Koerner is stressing that 
existential propositions in mathematics are logically different from 
those in the natural sciences, for mathematical objects are human constructs. 
The objects of mathematics exist or cease to exist according to the rules 
of the game. In this sense, they are logically different from empirical 
objects. Furthermore, Koerner argues that in mathematics there logically 
1. Wittgenstein took a similar position in Lectures on the Foundations 
of Mathematics, pp. 248-52. 
cannot be the problem of ambiguities that occurs with empirical objects. 
Empirical objects can be such that it is disputable whether it is 
'bluey-green' or 'greeny-blue' but it cannot logically be disputable whether 
2347953 is a prime number or not. 'Inexactness' has no place in mathematics. 
The Intuitionists have their own arguments for the discrete position 
of mathematics. Koerner has not provided his own explanation of the formal 
nature of mathematics but is only independent of the Formalists in his 
conception of the foundations. They are not self-evident or abstractions 
but 'rules', 'rule-incorporated objects'. Mathematics still stands out 
as a system of formal derivability as it does for the Formalists. The 
Intuitionist on the other hand provides distinct criteria for truth, 
meaning and mathematical development. 
1) Truth rests on 'constructibility' and not formal derivability. 
2) The study of mathematics may be seen as describing human thought 
processes. The objects of mathematics for the Intuitionists are mental 
and cannot logically be seen as empirical objects precisely because in 
any such form, 'we can never be mathematically sure that the formal 
system expresses correctly our mathematical thoughts' 
(Heyting, op. cit., 
p. 4). The Intuitionists argue that there is a subject, mathematics 
which constructs its own framework, an evolving system, and its construc- 
tions are mental rather than empirical. Such a subject cannot be identi- 
fied with any other because of its evolving nature and yet its demand upon 
the mind may give it a potential use in describing thought processes or 
more likely, encouraging thought processes. In other words, mathematics 
may be justified educationally because it is in this area that 'thinking' 
is a precondition of 'knowledge'. If 'mathematics' is logically identified 
with 'thinking' then in terms of problem 2, p. 181 and comment on p. 208, 
1. Clarification is presented as logically impossible by the Intuitionist 
argument that the descriptions in Intuitionistic logic(s) are no 
better than a model of actual thinking. While studying mathematics, 
brings an appreciation of thinking, thinking is only one group of 
functions of the human mind. 
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'if children ought to be made to think, then studying mathematics to 
acquire knowledge of mathematics will necessarily involve children thinking'. 
3) The logical framework develops as the subject develops and so this 
structure cannot logically be identified as the structure of any other 
subject. Not even mathematicians know for certain what the logic of 
mathematics is, but only what is a suitable logic to describe what has 
already been constructed. As Wittgenstein concisely but disparagingly 
put it, 'Intuitionism comes to saying that you can make a new rule at 
each point. It requires that we have an intuition at each step in 
calculation, at each application of a rule; ... We might as well say that 
we need, not an intuition at each step, but a decision. ' (or. cit., p. 237). 
Educationally, one must get pupils 'inside mathematics' for them to under- 
stand it. There is no substitute for 'doing'. One cannot pick-up mathe- 
matical knowledge second-hand. 
The H_yiothesisors retain the view that mathematics is empirical but 
formalisable. 1 However 'formal derivability' is not a sufficient definition 
of its test for truth. It must also demonstrate 'fruitful applicability' 
which simultaneously identifies the source of its own development when 
the applicability is 'internal'. The other distinctive feature comes 
through in the meaningfulness of mathematics. Mathematics is not 
meaningful in the sense that other sciences are normally thought to be; 
for it does not describe some reality but 'previews' it. It enables 'us 
to understand the possibilities of the real world' and not just to describe 
what has already happened or could easily be constructed (See Ormell's 
'Towards a naturalistic mathematics in the sixth form' in Physics 
Education, July 1975). Mathematics, claims Ormell, is the product of 
1. The nature of this formalisability was identified in part 1 Chapter 4 
where it was made clear that Lakatos may have held a fundamentally 
more relativist position than Ormell does. Ormell holds unflinch- 
ingly to 'bivalence'. 
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'disciplined imagination', and of 'thought-experiments' in Lakatos' terms: 
it is not simply the manipulation of empirical marks on paper as the 
strict Formalist would suggest. Both Hilbertian and Curry-type Formalist 
views of mathematics are rejected by the Hypothesisors who identify 
mathematics as always open to interpretation, always the potential model. 
From each philosophical movement comes an organised justification 
of the discreteness of mathematics, and any one set of criteria can be 
employed to identify a subject to be placed on the time-table. One could 
go on then and find sociological, psychological and historical reasons 
that would give added strength to mathematics' claim for an independent 
place on the time-table. This is not a part of this thesis however. 
Yet one set of discreteness criteria, not strictly philosophical will 
be discussed, for in them seem to lie the root of a justification of 
mathematics' employment in Inter-disciplinary Enquiry, in a sense stronger 
than sense c), described on p. 212 above. In the work of Wilder one finds 
an explanation of the appropriateness of mathematics not being seen as 
some independent fortress. 
'Mathematics is something that man himself creates and the type of 
mathematics he works out is just as much a function of the cultural 
demands of the time as any of his other adaptive mechanisms. ' (Wilder, 
Evolution of Mathematical Concepts, p. 3). This is not just a picture 
of mathematics as a set of tools that change according to evolutionary 
requirements like any applied science, for mathematics is special, it 
is also the source of extensive aesthetic experiences. It has a peculiar 
duality of 'science' and 'art, 'inventor' and 'creator'. Here lies the 
discreteness of mathematics. Wilder who takes an anthropological 
approach, does seem to rest his arguments on the greater importance of 
mathematics as applicative either 'in all physical theory' or 'within 
mathematics'. 'Even the purest of mathematics may suddenly find 
application' (o cit., p. 186). Wilder's criteria are not purely 
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contingent for ten pages later, he says the 'major difference between 
mathematics and the other sciences, natural and social, is that whereas 
the latter are directly restricted in their purview by environmental 
phenomena of a physical or social nature, mathematics is subject only 
indirectly to such limitations'. However on the following page, he 
brings one back again from the edge of a logically necessary criterion 
when he goes on, 'Yet perfect rigour and absolute freedom from contra- 
diction in mathematics are no more to be expected than are final and 
exact explanations of natural and social phenomena' by other sciences. 
All 'continue to evolve more abstract, scientifically effective, and 
marvellous concepts'. Wilder is thus going on to stress what all 
developing areas of scientific study share, 'abstraction'. 
1 Wilder 
turns this notion which would commonly be used as a criterion of discrete- 
ness for mathematics into a criterion of possibilities of integration. 
All knowledge may be seen as developing towards this 'abstract ideal 
state'. In evolution, every theory becomes a 'model'2 and mathematics 
is seen as the science that initiates models which come to find applica- 
tions in theories and are then preserved as models in the area to which 
they were applied, once the theories in which they became embodied 
become modified. Wilder seems to identify an evolutionary cycle of 
'Mathematical Model - Scientific Theory - Scientific Model'. 
Wilder takes the view that evolutionary forces drive men of science 
across boundaries. Wilder is free from the fetters of any philosophical 
movement, and perhaps even of logical consistency, but he does provide 
1. With Lakatos in mind 'abstraction' seems to be the social scientist's 
term for what philosophers call 'formalisability'. The key to 
relativism for both Wilder and Lakatos lies here. Ormell uses 
'abstraction' to identify mathematics' power to explain science. ('Mathematical Models and Understanding in Science', an address 
to the A. S. E. Conference. Reading, January 1979). 
2. 'Theory' and 'model' are used in the sense noted on p. 159 above, 
where the former is thought to be a true description and the latter 
is known not to be. 
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an interesting argument for a realistic appraisal of inter-disciplinary 
enquiry involving mathematics. Even though the logical discreteness 
arguments become blurred in Wilder's hands, he has still presented mathe- 
matics as 'distinctive'; bridging 'arts' and 'sciences', for example. 
This exemplifies well the sense a) upon which Pring focuses ('Curriculum 
Integration', p. 148, and above p. 211), when he talks of a concern for 
'interrelations'. Given that all the positions discussed here, including 
Wilder's, support some notion of mathematical discreteness, it would seem 
to be appropriate now to try to identify in what sense one can still talk 
of, 'inter-disciplinary mathematics teaching'. 
INTER-DISCIPLINARY MATHEMATICS TEACHING 
Through the 1960s and 1970s two forms of Inter-disciplinary maths- 
matice teaching have developed. On the one hand, there is the servicing 
of other areas by mathematics. This is well exemplified in the increasing 
weight of statistics in geography syllabuses. On the other hand, there 
is the inclusion of real life situations in mathematics syllabuses, as 
occurs when football league tables, fashion and food budgeting are included. 
In each case, the pupil may be encouraged to bring together knowledge from 
other compartments of his mind than that which he usually calls upon when 
entering the given time-tabled lesson. 
The State of Inter-discivlinary Mathematics Teaching. Although there 
have been these developments it is very difficult in practice to find in 
most secondary schools anything more adventurous than examples like those 
just given. 
1. These areas may facilitate pupils' success in taking C. S. E. in 
Physical Education, or any Home Economics' public examination with 
a consumer affairs element. In AsDe is of Secondary Education in 
England, p. 150, one reads, 'some girls were learning, as part of 
their mathematics, to enlarge skirt and dress patterns. . . and 
they 
were later to make them in the needlework department'. 
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Mathematics may appear however in an Inter-disciplinary teaching 
context without its being taught there. Mathematics may be taught in 
mathematics lessons and used in physics lessons. The science teacher 
mentioned on p. 141 above, teaches those parts of mathematics which he 
requires for his physics, like density, and not because he has chosen 
the road to Inter-disciplinary Enquiry. Thus mathematics may appear out 
of context for three different reasons: 
1) a subject teacher finds the pupils ignorant of a mathematical 
tool which he requires and so the subject teacher provides the tool. 
2) the pupils' knowledge of certain mathematical tools is required 
to develop a particular Inter-disciplinary theme and so mathematics is 
used there. 
3) mathematics features in the objectives of the planning of the 
Inter-disciplinary theme and the pupils are taught some mathematics 
in that light. 
In 2) the teacher intends to identify new uses of these mathematical tools 
but does not intend to introduce new mathematical tools. This approach is 
particularly compatible with the 'idealisation' view of applicability 
picked out in the previous chapter. Mathematical tools meet requirements 
set by some problem from either another subject or group of subjects and 
in solving the problem it is not mathematics itself which develops but 
this other subject or group of subjects. This may be contrasted with 
the 'inter-action'1 approach which claims that the use of mathematics 
must involve some modifications to both the tools and to what they are 
applied. The implication for education is that in the former case there 
is learning about mathematics only, while in the latter case, there is 
1. See p. 193 above, where 'idealisation' and 'inter-action' were 
introduced. 
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the possibility of learning in mathematics also. 
1 
This contrast is still essentially centred in a discussion of teaching 
perspectives rather than necessarily involving different philosophies of 
mathematics. However the 'idealisation'/'inter-action' distinction does 
signpost certain philosophical conditions for Inter-disciplinary Enquiry 
and Integration. If these thematic approaches involve the sweeping away 
of 'knowledge boundaries' then certain stumbling blocks will arise. The 
most obvious block is that between 'a priori' and 'a Dosteriori' knowledge. 
If mathematics is taken to belong to the former category then necessarily 
any 'problem-solving' can only go in one direction - no a posteriori tools 
can be used in mathematics. Mathematics is seen to 'idealise' reality 
but not to 'inter-act' with it. The approaches identified in this chapter 
can only initiate knowledge and understanding of mathematics in any full 
sense if an 'inter-active' approach is accepted. Only the logicists must 
of necessity reject this choice, for even the intuitionists can choose at 
the level of Intuitionistic logic(s). At the other extreme to the Logicists 
would be those committed to a Pragmatic Theory of Truth who would argue 
that the essential position of 'inter-action' in the concept of truth, 
2 
leads naturally, if not of logical necessity, to Inter-disciplinary Enquiry. 
1. Given the distinction Pring draws between 'integration' on the weak 
thesis and 'interrelationships among disciplines' then the distinction 
here between 'inter-action' and 'idealisation' can be seen to parallel 
it. Pring argues that "'integration" raises certain questions in 
epistemology to which "interdisciplinary" remains indifferent' ('Curriculum Integration', p. 135, loc. cit. 
). Similarly 'inter- 
action' makes epistemological demands that only certain philosophical 
movements can logically accept, while 'idealisation' makes no such 
demands. 'Inter-action' goes some way towards Pringle notion of 
'integration' but stops short of being for the Hypothesisors at least, 
a feature of 'supra-subjects' as Pring seen 'integration' identifying. 
Pring does have another notion of 'integration' which has strong 
similarities with the views of the Hypothesisors. The link is not 
surprising for Pringle 'Problem-solving Method' is tied to Dewey, 
and the Hyppothesisors have strong ties with Pragmatism generally (see 'Curriculum Inte ation', pp. 143-6, and I. D. E., sense a) 
given on p. 211 above 
2. Pring makes precisely this point, that it 'imports a notion of truth 
quite foreign to our normal language', i. e. one form of such Enquiry 
is most naturally rooted in Pragmatism. 
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The limiting constraint is whether or not a mathematical proposition can 
satisfactorily demonstrate its warranted assertibility by applications 
within mathematics or must it prove itself in the outside reality. 
Whatever one's position on this point, only the Hypothesisors of all the 
philosophical movements discussed in part 1 of the thesis would seem to 
give support with some logical, rather than evaluative force, to Inter- 
disciplinary Enquiry, in this sense. 
The ResDonsibility of a Teacher for His Subject. If the teaching 
situation involves inter-disciplinary enquiry then other teachers than 
specialists in a particular subject will be concerned about that subject. 
In the example on p. 220 above, the geography teacher is concerned about 
statistics and the teaching of statistics. In a genuinely 'inter-active' 
situation, it would seem reasonable for the mathematics teacher to care too. 
In his article, 'Teachers and the Curriculum', Wain does point in 
this direction but concludes with the less revolutionary hope that 
'teachers will increasingly take on much more responsibility for the 
development of their own subject and other related subjects in schools' 
(Mathematical Education, p. 155). In 1979 terms, one ponders the problem 
that mathematics is often taught by those teachers of 'other related 
subjects', for there is no one else to do so, and one concludes that it 
is the responsibility of those mathematics educators that there are, to 
be responsible for how their subject is taught. Wain concisely describes 
what has happened but does not grasp this focal nettle. 
The implied assumption that mathematics should be a compulsory 
subject with a large allocation of time should be looked at 
closely... The reform of the mathematics syllabus has gone 
ahead in an isolated way... there has been an increased tendency 
for mathematics in particular to be shut into its own water- 
tight compartment-mathematics seems to have raised even 
higher the wall that traditionally has separated it from other 
parts of the curriculum. This has happened at a time when the 
applications of the subject have widened remarkably into areas 
formerly thought of as non-mathematical. It is often also the 
case that, in schools where integration of subjects and moves 
to mixed ability teaching have occurred, the mathematics 
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teachers often plead a special case for their subject as not 
being capable of fitting in to such new structures. This is 
not to say that such developments are to be applauded but 
rather to indicate that mathematics is usually one of the 
subjects least able to accommodate itself. (ibid., p. 152). 
Thus 'inter-disciplinary mathematics teaching' can mean more than 
mathematics having a part to play in a topic with other disciplines, and 
more than the mathematics teacher making mention of other subjects in his 
lessons: it could also mean the mathematics teacher feeling a responsi- 
bility for any kind of mathematics educating going on in the institution 
in which he works, at least. 
ARGUMENTS FOR PRESERVING 'MATHEMATICS' AS 
A SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED SUBJECT. 
The most simplistic, if not the weakest of arguments is that head- 
masters continue to put such a label on the time-table. However, head- 
masters themselves have made a selection and one must focus on the reason 
for their choice. They may say, 
1) Mathematics traditionally appears on school time-tables, give me 
a reason for change. 
2) All interested parties like employers, parents and governors expect it. 
3) Pupils who leave school, apply to bodies which often expect or require 
the successful prior study of mathematics. The label makes it clear 
to both pupils and these other bodies that the school is explicitly 
concerned to meet the requirement. 
4) Pupils learn beat at lessons with 'expected' labels, in the long 
term. Novelty is not obviously compatible with education. Further- 
more, the secondary label, 'mathematics' has probably been presented 
in the Junior school already. 
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5ý Schools have a duty to ensure knowledge is imparted and one area 
of knowledge ist mathematics, 
AND a) this organisation of knowledge is shown most simply by direct 
labelling; 
OR b) the areas of knowledge cannot logically be imparted except in 
isolation, so what sense could be made of alternative or no 
labelling. 
These are just the kinds of reasons that one may collect from headmasters 
but given that in Great Britain there is no legal compulsion to have 
mathematics as a label and nothing about content follows from the concept 
of a time-table, there cannot be a logically compelling argument for the 
label's appearance in schools. 
Such arguments are not of central importance to this thesis. What 
is of importance is that such arguments lead to a retention of the label 
'mathematics' on the time-table but those who present the arguments may 
have radically differing conceptions of mathematics from one another and 
from the philosophers of part 1 of this thesis. Much of the discussion 
that has occurred in this part of the thesis has led to the conclusion 
that what is defined by philosophers and professional mathematicians as 
1. A critical point hangs on whether the 'is' is logical or contingent. 
Clearly to Hirst it is logical while to anti-realists like Dewey the 
link is contingent, depending on its practical success (see part 1 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, pp. 85-90)" A more extreme relativism is to 
be found in the writings of M. F. D. Young. This epistemological 
ambivalence has been central to the earlier discussions of the 
Hypothesisors and well-characterised in the work of Lakatos. He 
presents a picture of mathematics separated necessarily from other 
areas of knowledge by logical conditions like the employment of 
'thought-experiments'. This is not a sufficient justification and 
Lakatos provides this through the empirical assertion that mathe- 
matics is more thoroughly formalisable than other sciences. More 
extreme relativism is not discussed in this thesis because there is 
only minimal documentation of such a perspective influencing 
mathematics teaching. As a matter of fact, mathematics remains 
strongly independent, only open to attack from the 'inter-action' 
of applicability discussed in the previous chapter. That it has 
no more to fear at this moment is highlighted by the complete 
absence of the language of 'integration' in such documents as the 
Schools Council report, Mixed-ability teaching in mathematics, 1977. 
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mathematics cannot be achieved by most pupils in schools, before the 
compulsory schooling has ended. 
1 
The formal demands and the pedagogic 
reality conflict. It is probably the case that many of those seeking 
the permanent position of mathematics on the time-table have a notion 
of mathematics that would not be found in part 1 of this thesis, at all. 
There are still those who equate mathematics with 'arithmetic and correct 
calculations' but this is no longer the case with the industrially and 
commercially linked public examinations of City and Guilds and the 
Mathematics in Education and Industry Project. On p. 78 of Mathematics 
through School Geoffrey Matthews draws together many of the attitudes 
inherent in what one might call 'progressive mathematics teaching'. 
Focusing in on the concern 'to relate the mathematics with real life', 
he says, 
School mathematics must keep one eye on the outside world... 
start looking across the boundaries... But in our enthusiasm 
we must not submerge mathematics totally within the general 
curriculum. There are still topics which are straight 
mathematics and there are still times when honest practice 
is necessary ... if,... it grows naturally from the environ- 
ment the children will also grow to enjoy the subject and 
to thrive at it. 
Matthews identifies three parts to mathematics: 
a) That it is able to look across boundaries - i. e. it has applicability. 
b) That there are self-contained elements of 'straight mathematics'. 
c) That certain parts of mathematics are such that familiarity is 
most readily achieved through 'honest practice'. 
When different people discuss the essential place of mathematics 
on the school time-table there is probably agreement on the fundamental 
importance of at least one of these parts. The headmaster may stress b) 
and c) while the employer/governor may wish to stress a) and c), and so 
1. See the discussion of 'creative work' in mathematics on pp. 127-31 above 
and of the formal demands of 'the game of set theory' on pp. 150-54 
above. 
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on. However, many of the philosophers and professional mathematicians 
with whose views much of part 1 of the thesis was concerned, may not go 
beyond recognising the relevance of b). They identify mathematics with 
a level of conceptual development rarely attained before thirteen, 'a 
system of formal operations'. Thus the mathematics of the early years 
of the secondary school which pupils may appreciate because it stays 
close to a) and c), is not recognisable as mathematics to these 
philosophers and professional mathematicians. 
These people would argue that the word 'mathematics' isolates a 
concept whose technical usage logically excludes reference to an amalgam. 
If mathematics occurs in an inter-disciplinary curriculum then its 
characteristic features must still be identifiable. Each philosophical 
movement discussed in part 1 of this thesis, asserts the discreteness 
of mathematics, according to logically compelling criteria. 
1 In 1969 
Matthews wrote that mathematics teaching ought 'to help the children 
develop gradually - and not overnight - from discovery with things to 
eventual abstraction with pencil and paper' ('Mathematics in the Middle 
Years' in Schools Council Working PaDer No. 22, p. 64). The important 
point is that inter-disciplinary enquiry is not ruled out, but the teacher 
must have a full-blooded appreciation of mathematics as a discrete 
discipline, in order to produce materials that still incorporate the 
critical features of mathematics. The label 'mathematics' on a time- 
table may be no more than a signpost for most pupils, in that they do 
not possess knowledge and understanding of what delineates mathematics, 
but this is not an acceptable state for all teachers using mathematics 
to be in. Pupils can feel that they are following a trail that will lead 
1. In Chapters 2 to 4 of part 1 of the thesis, each philosophical move- 
ment gave a response to the question, 'Is "mathematics" logically 
distinct from the "empirical sciences"? ' and in so doing particular 
criteria were identified as characterising mathematics for that 
movement. 
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eventually to an understanding of mathematics, if taken for long enough, 
but for those who associate mathematics with 'a system of formal operations' 
it is logically unacceptable for teachers of mathematics still to be on 
the trail. 
Even mathematics educators like Wilder, who have a 'cultural view' 
of mathematics identify the subject as at least distinguishable by its 
independence from direct empirical influences. There may have been a 
move away, in the last ten years, from 'mathematics taught as intrinsically 
valuable' to 'mathematics taught for its usefulness', but there has been 
no sign of a move from 'mathematics taught only for intrinsic value' to 
'mathematics taught only for instrumental reasons'. Furthermore, the 
hypothesisors may ease the criteria by which a pupil can be said to have 
a real understanding of mathematics, but they are at one with the other 
philosophical movements in requiring anyone who imparts mathematics, 
like a teacher, to be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding 
of the subject. 
1 
All the views that arise from the philosophical movements of part 1 
of this thesis agree that integration of mathematics in either the strong 
or weak senses given on pp. 210-11 above are logically impossible, with 
the exception of the logicist accepting a weak form of integration in 
the unifying of mathematics with logic. Although the strict formalists 
talk of mathematics as 'uninterpreted science' and hypothesisors like 
Ormell call mathematics 'the science of possibility', they refrain from 
claiming that mathematics has been reduced to some other discipline. 
The criteria of discreteness are seen to hold mathematics solidly apart 
from other science areas. 
2 This is not a rejection of the possibility of 
1. This point is taken up in the general discussion of what is required 
in educating mathematics teachers, part 3 below. 
2. Put explicitly 'integrated studies including mathematics' is seen as 
self-contradictory for there cannot be a mathematical method apart 
from mathematics itself, as there can be 'scientific method' apart 
from any particular science. This was shown in part 2, Chapter 9. 
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Inter-disciplinary Enquiry, in any of the senses outlined on p. 211 above, 
but the technology perspective of the previous chapter does seem to stand 
a shorter step from the policy described in sense a)1 on p. 211, than any 
of the other orientations discussed in this part of the thesis. However 
no perspective rules out this kind of approach. 
CONCLUSION 
Two fundamental conclusions would seem to be derivable from the 
discussion in this chapter. The first refers to integration, and the 
second to inter-disciplinary enquiry. 
1) There would seem to be a unified rejection of integration if it is 
taken to imply the presentation of knowledge as a 'seamless whole'. 
White summarises the argument most precisely when he writes that there 
'may or may not be a case for teaching the different sciences - physics, 
chemistry, biology - under the one rubric of 
'general science': if 
'integration' only goes as far as this, it is at least binding together 
disciplines which have important structural features in common. But 
in so far as it goes beyond this to pulp everything together, it is 
unintelligible. ' (White, op. cit., p. 89). In the last thirty-five 
years arithmetic, geometry and algebra have come together under one 
secondary school examination syllabus, but to talk of the integration 
of mathematics with other areas of knowledge would seem to be the call 
of a lone voice in the wilderness. 
2) Three senses of 'inter-disciplinary' were introduced on p. 211. 
Sense c) presented no obstacles to any philosophical movement or teaching 
1. In sense a) there is 'logical interdependence of different disciplines' 
as a feature of an Inter-disciplinary Enquiry education policy, and if 
'interdependence' is interpreted as 'interaction' was in the previous 
chapter then there would seem to be close ties with the technology 
perspective. Furthermore, such an interpretation would restrict the 
acceptability of such a policy to other philosophical movements, 
particularly the logicists for whom 'interaction' is limited to other 
areas of a priori knowledge only. Naturally if 'interdependence' is 
taken in some weaker sense, as that suggested by 'idealisation' in 
the previous chapter, this constraint would not arise. 
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perspective for it simply suggests that if the reference to other disciplines 
while teaching a given area, perhaps mathematics, leads to 'better results' 
(according to one's own particular measure), then this would seem to be 
reason for considering such an approach. Sense b) which requires teaching 
a given topic, problem or theme by interrelating disciplines, would seem 
also to be acceptable to any philosophical movement or teaching perspective. 
Furthermore, the discussions in the previous chapters might themselves 
provide teachers with stimuli for Inter-disciplinary themes; like 
'Mathematics and the Arts'. In the story of Chapter 6 of this part of 
the thesis the young teacher used an 'Art perspective' in the sixth form 
(see p. 100 above) and a 'Games perspective' with first formers 
(see p. 101), 
and so on. The range is freely available to the teacher, and philosophy 
alone cannot either make, or stop the teacher making, certain choices. 
Clearly, if a teacher holds that all or any branches of mathematics ought 
only to be taught through a single given perspective, then the range of 
Inter-disciplinary contexts will be thereby limited. The theme of 'war' 
ought not to be presented from a games perspective. The perspectives of 
the previous four chapters cannot be more restrictive than this. 
Sense c) is the only form of Inter-disciplinary Enquiry that does seem 
to entail constraints on its acceptability to differing philosophical 
movements. Although it does not involve the reduction of one or more 
areas of knowledge to some kind of 'seamless whole', it does seem to 
challenge the isolationism of philosophies that see mathematics as either 
logically untouchable by empirical influences, like Logiciem, or those 
that see mathematics as uninterpreted, like Formalism. 
'Integration' may be rejected as an education policy and teaching 
method for mathematics, but within given constraints 'Inter-disciplinary 
Enquiry' has been seen to provide a valid addition to the teaching 
perspectives discussed in the previous chapters. 
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CONCLUSION TO PART 2 
INTRODUCTION 
This part of the thesis has taken mathematics into the school and 
considered the ways in which the subject might be presented. Four 
perspectives have been outlined: 'mathematics as an art-form', 'mathematics 
as a game', 'mathematics as a science' and 'mathematics as a technology'. 
The first perspective has been seen to differ according to one's concep- 
tion of aesthetic criticism. Three such conceptions have been given and 
these were found to have similarities with differing philosophical move- 
ments discussed in part 1 of this thesis. While the discussion of the 
other perspectives has not shown the same breadth of interpretation, 
differing philosophies of mathematics from part 1 of the thesis have 
shown themselves more readily aligned to one perspective rather than 
another. Although a teacher's view of the nature of mathematics may 
lead him to teach mathematics from one perspective rather than another, 
it has been mentioned on several occasions in this part of the thesis, 
that a teacher may have no such philosophical thoughts in view, but be 
influenced by psychological findings or just by his instinctive belief 
that one approach has been found by him to be more successful than 
another. One important factor in the third part of this thesis is a 
consideration of the dangers and limitations of such 'instinctive' 
decision-making. 
Part 2 of the thesis has been introduced through the use of an 
imaginary young mathematics teacher who attempts to prepare himself for 
the coming year in which he will teach a range of ages and abilities. 
Through this teacher the four perspectives are introduced in a secondary 
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school setting. In the main body of this second part of the thesis, 
each perspective is taken separately and considered in the light of 
three questions: 
1) What distinguishes one perspective from all the others? 
2) Must one logically have come to appreciate one perspective 
as a pupil, before one can appreciate some other perspective? 
3) Does one find a common logical sequence to what is taught, 
no matter through which approach it is taught? 
Finally the possibility of teaching mathematics through a policy of 
inter-disciplinary enquiry was considered and favourably noted, provided 
one has made very clear what is taken as the meaning of 'inter-disciplinary' 
and that certainly it should not imply the taking of knowledge as a 
'seamless whole'. 
THREE QUESTIONS 
The first question was successfully answered in the sense that each 
perspective is differentiated without one perspective collapsing 
irretrievably into any other. However, a particularly close connection 
was found between the science perspective and the technology perspective, 
for 'technology' is normally taken to mean 'applied science', or at least, 
'applying a scientific method', and as such the technology perspective is 
an extension of the science perspective. This leads naturally to the 
second question as to whether or not a pupil can appreciate the one 
perspective apart from the other. The technology perspective does 
logically require appreciation of the science perspective, but this need 
have no temporal implications. In gaining an awareness of the technology 
perspective a pupil could simultaneously gain an understanding of a 
scientific method. No such close relationship was found between any 
other pair of perspectives, but conversely it was found that if one 
considered mathematics is a game then one could not logically be also 
considering that mathematics is a science. The former perspective rejects 
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the notion of 'seriousness' while that of the science and technology 
perspectives requires it. Naturally, if one is only presenting mathe- 
matics as metaphorically a game or even slightly more tightly, if one 
is arguing that mathematics might be viewed as a game, then no such 
logical problem arises. Similarly, teachers following the technology 
perspective were seen to be at odds with any perspective that showed an 
overriding concern for the aesthetic qualities of mathematics, at the 
expense of questions of internal or external usefulness. 
The attempts to answer the third question have made it clear that 
any more than generalised responses are impossible until the aims and 
objectives of a teacher's or a department's or a school's mathematics 
education are known. Once these aims and more specifically the objectives 
are known, then one could say that this objective can only be achieved if 
that objective is also achieved. Only on this basis could one go on to 
give any logical sequence to what is taught. It is not the intention 
of this thesis to do that, but in part 3 of the thesis, the focus is 
put on the notion of 'mathematics education', and its aims. This leads 
to consideration of the implications for the education of mathematics 
educators, and their attempts in future years consistently to produce 
objectives for mathematics education and a logic to what will be taught. 
Clearly, part 3 can only be accomplished if parts 1 and 2 of this thesis 
have successfully clarified the range of interpretations found in both 
the philosophy of mathematics and of mathematics teaching. 
CONCLUSION 
In this final section of part 2 of this thesis, opportunity has 
been taken to look back beyond this part of the thesis and on to the 
final part of the thesis, but it would seem worth identifying finally 
the two critical pointers for the planning of mathematics education 
that have come to the fore in this part. 
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Firstly, it has been shown that there are at least four realistic 
perspectives through which mathematics may be taught. These may be used 
to highlight differing features of mathematics, provided that the pupil 
is not given the view that mathematics is and could only be a game, or 
1 
a science, say. 
Secondly, it has been shown that the philosophical movements introduced 
in part 1 of the thesis are compatible with mathematics being taught 
from a variety of perspectives, and even compatible with mathematics 
taught within an inter-disciplinary approach. 
1. The argument of this thesis is that any teacher who did present 
mathematics as exclusively a game would be cutting off choices from 
his pupils that would require a level of justification that this 
author has not found warranted. This point is considered in more 
detail in the following part of the thesis. 
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PART 3: MATHEMATICS EDUCATION, 
ITS AIMS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
In this final part of the thesis, two contrasting views of the 
nature of aims in education are outlined. This same contrast is then 
identified in mathematics education. The distinction is drawn between 
fundamental aims founded on intrinsic values as against aims founded 
on extrinsic values. The clarification of this distinction will be 
the first objective of this part of the thesis. 
Once the distinction has been drawn clearly for education in general, 
the focus will turn to mathematics education as the particular example 
chosen for examination in this thesis. It is hoped that the distinctions 
drawn at this point will be shown to reflect other distinctions already 
identified about the nature of mathematics, on the one hand, and the 
methodological theories of mathematics teaching, on the other. 
In the conclusion, responsibilities will be laid out for any mathe- 
matics teacher to follow. It is hoped that the argument of the thesis 
will convince readers that these responsibilities are essential for 
anyone who has accepted that he wishes to introduce pupils, as part 
of their compulsory secondary education, to an understanding of mathe- 
matics. While it would be inappropriate for a philosophical thesis to 
identify syllabus detail or even prescribe the syllabus balance, it is 
believed here to be the philosopher's duty to identify the constituent 
approaches to mathematics education, if there is conflation and ignorance 
present. It would be to stand against a century of learning theory for 
a philosopher to claim that he can prescribe what content a mathematics 
0 
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syllabus must have, and for what age, in order that knowledge and under- 
standing be achieved. However, some of what the adult mathematics 
teacher should know, to be able to formulate aims and objectives in 
mathematics education, will be prescribed: that is, he should be aware 
of the material identified in the first two parts of this thesis, which 
shows the breadth of usage of the term 'mathematics', and the differing 
perspectives from which mathematics may be taught. In other words, a 
framework for training mathematics educators is arrived at. 
THE AIMS OF MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 
In this section, there will be a brief explanation of the limited 
space given to consideration of the notion of 'education' itself, 
followed by a clarification of the terms 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' 
as used in discussions of the aims of education. This will lead to a 
discussion of the differing emphases given to intrinsic or extrinsic 
values by differing mathematics educators and how their positions are 
linked to their views of mathematics, mathematical understanding and 
approaches to mathematics teaching. 
Education. Whatever sense one gives to this term, there would seem to 
be general approval of the necessary linking of education with an under- 
standing of the main branches of knowledge. 
1 
Beyond this point, agree- 
ment seems to shatter into as many views as there are writers on education. 
Thus, any attempt to provide one further justified view of education would 
provide the writer with a task that would quickly outgrow the specific 
focus of the main body of this particular thesis. Rather than allow this 
to happen, this author will mention points about his implicit view of 
1. R. S. Peters, 'Aims of Education' in Philosoohv of Education at one 
end of the spectrum of views on the concept of 'knowledge' to 
G. Esland, 'Teaching and Learning as the Organization of Knowledge' 
in Knowledge and Control, at the other. Whatever their differences 
over objectivity, they both accept that knowledge can be made avail- 
able and can be used. This would seem to fit a base notion of 
'knowledge and understanding' in an educational context. 
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education that may have influenced the emphasis of his present writings. 
Firstly, it has been assumed that among the main branches of know- 
ledge is some area that can be denoted as 'mathematics' without excessive 
ambiguity, beyond that clarified earlier in the thesis. It is taken for 
granted here that being educated should include among its achievements 
an understanding of mathematics. 
Secondly, the author views 'education' rather as R. S. Peters views 
'liberty', and 'equality'. 
1 
'It constitutes a presumption. Reasons 
have to be given for interfering with people just as they have to be 
given for treating people differently. ' (ibid., p. 180). Thus 'education' 
is to be seen as involving a presumption of 'optimism'. In an easily 
assimilated slogan this might be, 'every child can learn every thing'. 
The presumption is that, without good reasons for believing otherwise, 
'educators must try to transmit knowledge with understanding, chosen by 
some further criteria, to all who lack the knowledge'. It is assumed 
that as a matter of fact, there is no adequate instrument by which one 
picks out those children who will be most enriched by, and will most 
enrich, any given area of knowledge. All learners are treated as capable 
of intellectual progress in all areas, unless conclusive evidence is 
shown of incapacity2 being present. The practical consequence is that 
it is not thought right that a teacher in the state system should have 
the right to select whom, of those he normally claims to be able to 
teach, he is willing to teach. Admittedly, there are educational systems 
which reject these assumptions. They group learners according to the 
1. In chapters IV and VII of Ethics and Education, Peters places the 
responsibility for limiting equality and liberty on those wishing 
to introduce the constraints. It is this point about responsibility 
that is taken up here. Thus if a teacher wishes to exclude a child 
from his modern language class then he must be the one who has good 
reasons for so doing. 
2. By 'incapacity' would be meant, the permanent inability to acquire 
knowledge in given areas, according to the evidence of scientific 
knowledge at that time. 
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belief that reliable statements can be made about educational outcomes, 
and that satisfying individual outcomes is overriding. 
Thirdly, it is assumed that education is not just the transmission 
of a content to a group selected for good reasons but that the nature of 
the 'interference' at any one time can be justified. In other words, 
the author assumes that education involves 'interference' with children 
or parents or some other identifiable holders of rights on behalf of 
those to whom the branches of knowledge are to be transmitted. The most 
obvious way that the educator could justify this interference at the 
specific level of 'why is he teaching this to them now? 'is by giving 
his aims and objectives. Thus the presumption made is that the educator 
could share his aims and objectives with pupils, parents or others con- 
cerned, as far as it is comprehensibly possible. The limitations should 
be recognised by the teacher through an on-going concern for psychology, 
sociology and philosophy, or more practically, the results of work in 
these areas as they touch the branch(es) he teaches. 
1 
Thus the author sees education as the transmission of understanding 
of branches of knowledge, including mathematics, where the educator 
should assume that every child can gain that understanding, unless he 
can give reasons for this not being so; and also the educator should 
generally be able to identify publicly the aims and objectives underpinning 
what he transmits. In what follows, the discussion does not refer to 
'education' exclusively in this particular form to which the author 
leans, but by giving the preferences now it is hoped that the orientation 
of this discussion may be the more readily appreciated. 
1. It might be taken as a natural consequence of this requirement that 
the teacher would think more carefully about which parts of syllabuses 
cannot be identified in terms of aims and objectives that are compre- 
hensible to non-specialists, and why they are taught. 
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Aims in Education. While one teacher seeks to develop in his pupils a 
love of history, another seeks to develop skills so that his pupils are 
prepared for employment interviews. These two1 teachers may be seen as 
emphasising different kinds of aims. The one stresses an aim intrinsic 
to education, and the other stresses an extrinsic aim. To the first 
teacher, 'a developed love of history' is part of what he means by 
'being educated'. The aim is intrinsic to his conception of education. 
To the second teacher, 'possessing skills sufficient for an employment 
interview' is only an extrinsic aim of education. It is not a logical 
consequence of an appreciation of this teacher's conception of education, 
but the teacher may feel that such extrinsic aims are just as important 
for the future well-being of his pupils as members of society as intrinsic 
educational aims are. The first teacher may stress the worthwhile nature 
of the constituents of what he teaches, independently of consideration 
of them as means to ends external to education. He teaches history for 
its educational worthwhileness, while the other teacher may choose at 
the final analysis, the period 1900 to 1945, in preference to the period 
1600 to 1685, if he thinks that an appreciation of the later period will 
be of more critical importance at an interview than an appreciation of 
the earlier period. This teacher considers extrinsic value to have the 
final say in his syllabus choice. 
While this has provided an approximate notion of the distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic aims, there are finer divisions within 
each category that ought to be identified to prevent ambiguity in the 
consequent discussion. This clarification can be achieved most simply 
1. Although the passage talks of 'two teachers' it could be without 
contradiction, one teacher who holds both kinds of aims with con- 
siderable concern. The separation highlights the difference of 
meaning which is the important point here, between 'intrinsic' 
and 'extrinsic'. 'Extrinsic' is often replaced by the word 
'instrumental' and there is no attempt to dispute such a substi- 
tution here. 
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by taking the notions 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' separately. 
Intrinsic aim. The example of an intrinsic aim that was given above, 
'a developed love of history', identifies a teacher's concern that his 
pupils will come to pursue history for its own sake, and that this will 
demonstrate in part that they are 'becoming educated'. In contrast, 
another teacher may be satisfied that his intrinsic aim has been achieved 
if his pupils acquire an adequate understanding of history. While the 
former teacher sees the pursuit of history as of overall importance, 
within a general notion of education in which the pursuit of truth is 
crucial, another teacher may be satisfied with the possession of 
historical facts. This teacher may see pursuit as just a means to an 
end, and the motivation which leads to the acquisition as inconsequential. 
Thus 'becoming educated' would have more to do with 'possessing the truth' 
than 'pursuing' it. Another teacher may see both these aims as adequate 
for he sees 'being creative' as the key aim. He wants his pupils to feel 
responsible for the development of this branch of knowledge, and thereby 
keen to try their hand at developing it, in case they are gifted in that 
way. Hence, the health of the branch of knowledge will be maintained, 
and more generally 'creativity' may be seen as the cornerstone of 
'education'. 
Thus, there is not just one sense of 'intrinsic aim' but a great 
many senses, only a few of which are hinted at here. Furthermore, a 
teacher may hold to several of the senses indicated here. He may want 
his pupils both to pursue and possess an understanding of history, and 
value both, in being thought of as 'educated'. This complexity and 
disparity of usage will be borne in mind, when the focus turns to 
considering the aims of mathematics education. 
Extrinsic aim. In the same way that an intrinsic aim can have 
differing senses, so can an extrinsic aim. A vocational reason has 
already been mentioned. Another line would be a more general social 
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one that pupils should study history in order to appreciate their cultural 
heritage and be attuned to its preservation. 
Thus extrinsic aims may refer to long term effects on the individual, 
like his employment prospects or his independence, or they may refer to 
wider concerns like the society's heritage or preservation and/or love 
of the fatherland, and so on. There is a great diversity here too, and 
specific examples will be referred to in the discussion of the aims of 
mathematics education. 
Before focusing down on mathematics, one note of caution may be 
worth giving. The line between identifying an aim as extrinsic rather 
than intrinsic may be less clear-cut than the examples so far given might 
seem to suggest. Particularly in the areas of language and mathematics 
difficulties can arise over their roles as 'handmaidens'. If a history 
teacher encourages his pupils to read Orwell and Hemingway to gain a 
better insight into the Spanish Civil War, is his objective extrinsic 
or intrinsic to his aim that they should pursue the study of history to 
become educated? Similarly with the physics teacher who encourages his 
pupils to take trigonometry seriously for work in optics, has he identi- 
fied an extrinsic or an intrinsic aim? Certainly the study of literature 
in the one case, and the knowledge of trigonometry in the other case, 
will be used to develop the pupil's intrinsic valuing of history and 
physics respectively, but 'extrinsic' does not seem to be used here in 
the sense previously isolated. The physics example may be seen as even 
more difficult to untangle than the history example, for the pupil could 
not achieve a meaningful understanding of optics without knowledge of 
some mathematical theory of space. The mathematics is a logically 
necessary condition for achieving the aim of the physics teacher, that 
his pupils appreciate optics. There is a clear ambiguity here and its 
resolution would seem to be a matter of choice. What is important here 
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is that awareness of the difficulty has been shown. 
1 
Directing Mathematics Education. A professor of pure mathematics might 
say, 'Some members of each generation ought to have the opportunity to 
love symbols and their logical development'. A primary school teacher 
might reply, 'Mathematics education is a necessary part of learning how 
to run a home, and to make choices in one's life, independently of the 
advice of others'. While some will justify mathematics education on 
intrinsic grounds and others on extrinsic grounds, one cannot assume 
that educators will hold to a rigid consistency in their teaching 
programmes according to such emphases of value. The university professor 
may stress the intrinsic value of mathematics, but still proudly refer 
to the applicative value of matric algebra in traffic communication. 
2 
He may do this for motivational reasons, but, more likely, he is not 
completely blind, nor wishes his students to be, to the extrinsic value 
of some of mathematics. Similarly, a secondary school teacher, taking 
eleven year-olds, may generally talk of the value for life that mathe- 
matics has, but he takes care that pupils fully appreciate the elegance 
in the proof that a figure with n odd nodes, takes at least --n strokes 
to be drawn. 3 Clearly a commitment to one kind of justification of 
mathematics' place in education, is not a blank cheque for its use as 
the sole criterion of curriculum selection. Many other factors, many 
of them contingent, come in at this point. Obviously the teacher's job 
specifications, the lesson 'label' and the nature of mathematics itself, 
all constrain what is taught at any given time. 
1. This seems to be the basis of Heyting's justification of the value of 
mathematics as noted on p. 49 above. He suggests that mathematics 
helps one to think in certain ways. Generally one relates mathematics 
to 'thinking abstractly'. At this point it would be appropriate to 
stop and consider the matter psychologically, but at another time 
and place. 
2. Telephone networks rely on metric algebra for drawing up plans of 
new systems. 
3. Explanation of this element of traversable networks is described, 
for example, in S. M. P. Book B, Teacher's Guide, p. 295. 
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If one is given to understand that mathematics education is on-going, 
then this entails the presence of certain procedures, like derivability, 
which individuate mathematics. The complete set of such entailments 
will differ according to the teacher's view of the nature of mathematics 
itself. Furthermore, certain views will be seen to support, as a matter 
of fact, one form of justification of mathematics in education, rather 
than another. The Formalist view of mathematics, described in part 1 
Chapter 2, falls readily into line with the intrinsic justification. 
Although Formalists argue about foundations, they agree that the central 
criterion of validity of new formally developed systems, is internal 
consistency, and nothing to do with extrinsic interpretation. In this 
sense, Formalists see themselves as Pure scientists, and one may identify 
support for intrinsic justification in the concept, 'pure'. This 
philosophy may be readily contrasted with that of the Hypothesisors, 
who see any conception of 'truth' including a central criterion of 
external applicative value. Thus, mathematics is identified as necessarily 
an applied science, as all must be. This leads naturally, if not neces- 
sarily, to justifying the place of mathematics in education extrinsically. 
l 
It is to be hoped that this last page has encapsulated the emphases 
indicated by the discussion of the nature of mathematics in part 1 of 
the thesis, and has set these beside typical, contingent perspectives 
about mathematics teaching, that had been considered in detail in part 2 
of the thesis. The resulting synthesis is the recognition that arguments 
can exist, with support partially rooted in the nature of mathematics, 
for a justification of mathematics education, as intrinsically valuable, 
on the one side, and as instrumentally-orientated, on the other. Consider- 
ing the extent to which these seemingly opposed positions are compatible 
1. Or, to see 'education' by definition, as involving the achievement of 
'a better society' or other ideal state. 
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will be a key factor in the conclusion of this thesis. 
Within any education system certain aims may be unrealistic. 
Between a system in which mathematics was compulsory from five to sixteen 
and one in which, only arithmetic was allowed before the age of fourteen, 
one will expect to find strikingly different objectives of mathematics 
education at some points. In identifying aims and objectives, a mathe- 
matics teacher would be most unrealistic if he did not recognise political, 
social and other constraints, particularly if they were of the kind just 
identified. In addition, he will have his sights adjusted differently, 
if he leans to the ultimate aim of children coming to value mathematics 
for its own sake, rather than towards their always being concerned to 
know the immediate 'pay-off' of what they are learning. 
It is no part of a philosophical analysis to present a sample of 
aims and objectives. It is the job of a philosophical analysis to pin- 
point inconsistencies that will arise in selection, if certain principles 
are not recognised, 
2 
and also to indicate that what look like inconsis- 
tencies are not logically so. Consider a teacher who aims to develop 
manipulative skills in real numbers, but has no specific objectives 
like dealing with accounts, calculating electricity bills, etc. From 
the views presented in this thesis, it should be clear to see that this 
'anti-common sense' position can have a consistent foundation. The 
teacher may not simply be pig-headed, but is presenting a strictly 
formalist view of mathematics, through the games perspective. He could 
fear that pupils will be content with the applicative value of mathe- 
matics if that alternative is presented, while he believes the true 
value of mathematics lies in its intrinsic value. Hopefully, this is 
1. This has become even more evident with the recently increasing 
emphasis upon accountability. No attempt has been made here to 
argue that the teacher must be autonomous in the formulation of 
his aims. 
2. Such principles are discussed below, pp. 264-67. 
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the reason. The fear is that the teacher is aware that his pure mathe- 
matics professor at university had this attitude, and held it on rational 
grounds, but that the teacher himself holds this view only because of 
emotions kindled in him by the professor. The professor is knowingly 
in whole-hearted support of the view that mathematics is to be loved 
for its own sake, but his protege in the secondary school may appreciate 
and implement the attitude, yet lack the philosophical understanding 
that gives it rational foundations. It is equally tragic if a college- 
trained mathematics teacher talks continually of 'discovery' and attempts 
to implement a Nuffield-style approach, but the teacher lacks any 
adequate knowledge and understanding of this as a scientific perspective. 
It is to be hoped that some of these complexities, underpinning the 
various movements of mathematics education have been clarified, or at 
least, identified. If the complexities are there, then it is not so 
surprising that the average mathematics teacher is defensive when he 
is asked to justify his on standpoint, or to inspire pupils to follow 
the 'cause' he seems to represent, as his professor had inspired him. 
The 'causes'are many, and the nuances so technical, that an appreciation 
of distinctions thought critical by the followers is completely out of 
the reach of secondary, let alone, primary pupils. An additional cause 
for concern is that teachers too, are unaware of the complexities. 
Consider the complex nature of the position held by a teacher who views 
the nature of mathematics as the totally abstract 'Science of Formal 
Systems', while being fully aware that his present class are at a concrete 
level of cognitive development. As a good teacher he may well stress 
the'care' to be taken in the connecting argument of a set of concrete 
operations, (e. g. when one considers what numbers of points it could 
require Chelsea, Newcastle United and West Ham United to gain promotion 
from the Second Division). This teacher highlights rigour at his pupils' 
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conceptual level. Unfortunately, many teachers are less rigorous when 
they think about their teaching than when they think about their subject. 
The result is an attempt to provide illumination of mathematics through 
formal manipulations before pupils are intellectually ready. 
1 
Thus the aims of various mathematics teachers have been considered, 
and the result has been a great diversity of models of mathematics 
educators. These models have been predominately orientated towards the 
view that the nature of mathematics rests in some form of 'formalisation'. 
They have also for the most part emphasised the intrinsic value of 
mathematics in education. 
The diversity of types of intrinsic aims have been considered 
earlier, p. 240. While the professor imagined on p. 242 above stresses 
'pursuit of truth', the teacher on p. 245 seems more concerned with the 
'possession of knowledge', as he 'aims to develop manipulative skills in 
real numbers'. The critical point is that this diversity exists at 
several levels2 and a mathematics educator can consistently choose'his 
own mixture', if he has the kind of knowledge expected of a philosopher, 
that will prevent his falling into logical pits. Thus the teacher cannot 
claim to emphasise the extrinsic values of mathematics, if the only view 
of mathematics his pupils receive is linked to 'loving mathematics for 
its own sake'. 
Contrasting views of mathematics educators have been given in these 
fictional models both in the previous few pages and earlier in the thesis. 
It is crucial to the argument of this thesis that alternative standpoints 
are internally consistent and should be taken into account. This is not 
just interesting theoretically, for the main situation in which aims 
1. A recent discussion of this point is found in the Introduction to 
Notes on mathematics for children, C. U. P., 1977, pp. ix to Zvi. 
2. There is diversity about the nature of mathematics identified in 
part 1 of this thesis, and similarly about teaching perspectives 
part 2), and also about aims and objectives as identified in 
the present discussion. 
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and objectives of mathematics education will be discussed is in the 
department meeting of a secondary school mathematics team, and such 
meetings would be either totally 'pragmatic' or lacking in communication, 
if some members of the team held that there was only one correct concep- 
tion of the pupil becoming mathematically educated, and any other was 
necessarily invalid. While there may be common features and there may 
also be some logically impossible combinations, the fundamental view 
presented here is that there are possible alternatives. 
One of the features that has been presumed to be common to all the 
various kinds of aims of mathematics teaching has been that 'understand- 
ing' is involved. As yet, there has been no attempt to clarify what is 
meant by 'understanding', 
1 
particularly in the specialist area of mathe- 
matics. It would seem appropriate to consider in the light of the 
present discussion, 'Is"mathematical understanding" ambiguous? ' 
It would be hoped that this will lead to a reinforcement of the central 
commitment to alternatives. 
Mathematical Understandin?. In part 2, Chapter 10, two conceptions of 
mathematics were identified in relation to the Technology Perspective. 
(1) A weak form, in which mathematics could be said to satisfy the 
perspective if, as a matter of fact, it could be shown to have connections 
with other areas, and to have an internal interconnecting structure - as 
matrices generalise principles identified in the solution of simultaneous 
equations. (2) A strong form, in which mathematics is held necessarily 
to have both internal and external connections. These conceptions 
parallel differing views of mathematical understanding which will be 
presented now. 
In the weak form, mathematical understanding consists of understanding 
1. On pp. 150-153 above, there was an attempt to indicate some qualities 
a pupil would show if he 'understood' what he had been taught. 
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connections within mathematics related to the particular proposition 
that one claims to understand. Thus, one may rightly claim to under- 
stand that the angle at the centre of a circle is twice the angle at 
the circumference, 
1 
if one can derive it from axioms and can go on from 
the proof to demonstrate that any cyclic right-angled triangle has a 
diameter as its hypotenuse. This view is readily compatible with 
Wittgenstein's linking of 'understanding' to 'use', as discussed on p 
of this thesis. No claims or conditions are made for 'use' outside the 
formal system. 
In the strong form, mathematical understanding involves at every 
point consideration of the possibility of knowledge about the given 
proposition including its use in other areas. Thus an adequate under- 
standing of the theorem mentioned for the 'weak form', would necessarily 
involve some knowledge of its external use, for example, in the position- 
ing of cameras at an athletics meeting to maximise coverage. 
2 
This is 
Ormell's position. He feels that one is not being sufficiently demand- 
ing if one simply requires an understanding of the applicability of 
mathematics as a whole, rather than making applicability to 'reality' 
a key feature of the understanding of any mathematical proposition. 
1. a) 2(2a) ffi 2b b) If (2a) = 90 degrees, 
then 2b = 180 degrees. 
2. The cameraman at B needs only half the camera angle of the cameraman 
at A, and so positioning cameramen at the circum- 
ference maximises use over those at the centre. 
(Example suggested by C. P. Ormell) 
x Competitors in a race. 
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The arguments presented in part 1 Chapter 4, and part 2 Chapter 10 have 
been that the Hypothesisors see the use of a mathematical proposition 
not as a bonus, but as an essential part of its meaning. Thus, an 
essential part of the strong form of mathematical understanding is 
demonstrating that one knows the kinds of place where external applica- 
bility of a potential model may be realised. 
While not wishing to require the strong form, one may wish to go 
beyond the weak form in requiring the person with understanding to have 
some appreciation of how mathematics, 'taken as a whole relates to things 
that are different from it'. This is the standpoint found in the work of 
Stephen Brown who encapsulates his view as 'to understand X internally is 
to see connections within X itself: to understand X externally is to see 
how X taken as a whole relates to things that are different from it'. 
(Mathematics Teaching, No. 69, December, 1974). A pupil may have 'weak 
understanding' of matrices but no idea of what separates that area of 
study from that on circuits in another area designated 'physical. 
It could be useful to consider how questions about mathematical 
understanding may enter the discussion going on in the department meeting 
mentioned above. Differing teachers may stress different features that 
they consider critical to a pupil's development of mathematical understand- 
ing. The head of department may wish to stress the objective that students 
are able to derive and appreciate formal proofs. Another member of the 
team insists that a stronger notion of mathematical understanding is 
required in contemporary society. The pupils must be able to see external 
applications for as much of their mathematics as possible. A third member 
of the team fears that following the views of the other two will be at the 
expense of the healthy growth of mathematics itself. This teacher wishes 
to make the highest priority the encouraging of pupils to take risks, use 
their'intuition', so that future creative mathematicians should not be 
lost. Each of these positions will be considered in turn: 
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1) Formalisation. The head of department is satisfied with the weak 
sense of understanding, and follows in the direction of the past fifteen 
years, in which the stress has been upon formalisation. He may even 
accept that this has been at some cost to the level of arithmetic 
competence of his pupils, but has led to improved understanding. 
However, there do seem to be some other weaknesses in this position. 
As Poincare said, about three-quarters of a century ago, 'in becoming 
rigorous, mathematical science takes a character so artificial as to 
strike everyone; it forgets its historical origins; we see how questions 
can be answered, we no longer see how and why they are put' 
(The Value of 
Science, p. 217). 
1 
It is algebra that is insisted upon in 'modern 
mathematics', and it is algebra which is most formalisable, having the 
richest syntax. The result is that children are required to study most 
what has no direct empirical representation. '2 +2= 4' can be 
represented by apples, and the triangle by a piece of paper, but how can 
one concretely represent 'a ob=bo a', that commutivity holds for some 
algebras and not others? Algebras stand one further step away from the 
everyday, and one explains the commutivity, by comparing '3 +1=1+ 3' 
with '3 -1ý1- 3', or 'the cat is beside the dog' means the same as 
'the dog is beside the cat' but 'the cat is under the dog' does not 
mean the same as 'the dog is under the cat'. In other words, if one 
considers arithmetic, geometry and algebra as languages, then algebra 
is least like ordinary language which has semantic clarity and syntactic 
exceptions. There is a natural hierarchy from the everyday to the 
algebraic, and one ought not to be surprised to find sense in mathematics 
education delaying the algebraic. This is not a new argument, but is 
1. Meserve quotes Poincare in his article, 'Geometry as a Gateway to 
Mathematical, in Developments in Mathematical Education, p. 251. 
Like Thom, Meserve indicates that geometry combines an intuitive 
clarity with applicability which makes it a strong contender for 
the role of 'gateway to mathematics'. 
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found in much the same form in Rene Thom's article, 'Modern Mathematics: 
Does it Exist? ' (loc. cit., pp. 194ff). The stress on formalisation and 
algebras led education to forget that for most people for most of their 
lives mathematics means numbers and their manipulations. To start with 
set theory in the secondary school, or even earlier, is to confuse the 
pupils unnecessarily. Thus the brave words of S. M. P's Director, Brian 
Thwaites, in his 1967-68 Annual Report, (The First Ten Years, p. 176) that 
'The familiar "Oh Sir, what's the point of this? " should now be as 
obsolete as totting should have been a generation ago' have a strange 
ring, when considered alongside S. M. P's own Supplementary booklets in 
the nineteen seventies, concentrating on the very manipulative skills 
that were rejected in S. M. P. Book A. There one reads that the purpose 
of the section on fractions 'is to remind the pupils of the meaning of 
fractions; it is not concerned with complicated techniques for combining 
them'. 
Seeing the public meaning of mathematics, as can so readily occur 
in geometry, and having confidence that one has got things right, as 
occurs in arithmetic, are both essential for a child to become a 'fluent 
speaker of mathematics'. These contingent factors were missed by those 
who were keen on formalisation at any price. The argument is not for 
all arithmetic and geometry, and no algebras, but that formal deriva- 
bility has only a limited role in mathematics education. 
2) External applications. For the teacher with belief in the strong 
form of mathematical understanding, there is a great intellectual drive 
to insist that pupils, provided they can manage it, tackle syllabuses 
that either take cognisance of external applications or are adaptable 
to such an approach. Clearly, this adds weight to what is required of 
pupils. The demands are even greater if one takes cognisance also of 
the arguments in part 2 Chapters 9 and 10 above, that 'applicability' 
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is an 'interactive' process and so one must have understanding of the 
area to which one applies the mathematics, as well as the mathematics 
itself. The implication would seem to be that if the syllabus content 
is unchanged when one adds this extra dimension then there will be 
increased strain on the pupils. This strain can be partly ameliorated 
if one accepts the point made in part 2 Chapter 10, p. 197, that "'Rigour" 
is tied to "caring" rather than exclusively to an obedience of axiomatic 
sequences. ' The teacher may be satisfied with a child at a particular 
conceptual level having visual evidence that the angles of a triangle 
add up to a straight line, 
1 for he wishes to concentrate on its usefulness 
as quickly as possible, and there is nothing contentious about the rigour 
of the existent formal proofs. One reduces the demand on the pupil by 
not requiring him to be able formally to derive every proposition he 
applies, but only those which may require modification to facilitate 
successful application. 
3) Intuition. This last point well exemplifies the worry of another 
teacher who wants to encourage the pupils to have confidence to be 
'creative' in their study of mathematics. Like the teacher who is keen 
on external applications, he may have to predetermine which are the 
important formal proofs to prevent his pupils being overloaded. Thus 
the pupils are directed to what is to be 'challenging'. 
Similarly, formalisation may be stressed to the extent that pupils 
come to believe that, given logical reasoning, everything in mathematics 
can be worked out, but in practice the routes are rarely so clearly 
1. He simply requires the pupil to tear off the corners of a triangle 
and rearranges them to form a straight edge. 
A BAC 
The empirical exercise provides adequate assurance in this case. 
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demarcated by logic alone. Even if mathematics is nothing but the science 
of formal systems, the point made in part 2 Chapter 9, p. 167 is worth 
repeating here, that children are given a false understanding of mathe- 
matics, if they are only allowed to see it as 'a tidy system'. Develop- 
ments by real mathematicians are untidy, but the pupil is given the 
impression that formal derivability is all that one needs to know in order 
to do mathematics. As Hadamard is quoted as saying, 'the object of 
mathematical rigour is to sanction and legitimate the conquests of 
intuition, and there never was any other object for it' (Polya, 'As I 
read them' in Developments in Mathematical Education, p. 78). The danger 
of some formalisation approaches has been that children have neither been 
given signs that there is a place for intuition, nor sufficient confidence 
in the probability of repeated success to use their own intuition; 
1 if, 
indeed, they are told of its existence. 
It can be argued further, that stressing the ability to derive and 
appreciate proofs, as the central objective of mathematics teaching, 
overshadows a key feature of mathematics, the clarity of failure. A 
pupil's confidence can be built up if he recognises that mathematics 
may develop through picking up the interesting features of the mistakes 
one makes: then one will be less reluctant to rely at times on one's 
intuition, and not feel frustrated if results do not 'drop out' tidily. 
This feature of encouraging pupils to help develop mathematics may be 
called: 
1. 'The development of self-confidence and courage in the student would 
certainly appear to encourage intuitive thinking. This requires a 
willingness to make mistakes and one who is insecure or who rather 
is afraid to enter the realm of insecurity may be unwilling to make 
such mistakes. ' (J. W. Oliver, 'The Role of Intuition' in L. R. 
Chapman (Ed. ), The Process of Learning Mathematics, 1972, p. 65) 
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Learning from Failure and Untidiness. Early in their schooling, children 
are taught to check their answers to sums. Given a subtraction sum, they 
are expected to check the correctness of their answer by addition. This 
increases the pupil's independence and confidence, and also reinforces the 
message that addition and subtraction are inverse operations. Students of 
mathematics are bred on this clarity of failure. To their advantage, 
pupils are taught methods by which they can identify their mistakes for 
themselves, butt this approach also leads pupils to expect that every 
answer given in mathematics can be given a clear tick, or cross. Hope- 
fully, teachers are increasingly stressing the positive side of this 
peculiarity and playing down the negative side. If pupils are made to 
realise that they can learn through their mistakes, and that mathematicians 
in general learn through their self-corrections, then this is one way in 
which pupils will come to appreciate that mathematics can be 'untidy'. 
This untidiness has been viewed as part of the successful development 
of mathematics. It is not the only subject in which people benefit from 
their mistakes but is the only one2 in which the mistakes can be identi- 
fied by the person who makes them, through the correct displaying of 
related procedures, like inverse operations. 
A further peculiar feature of mathematics learning, that is only 
open to a minority of other areas, 
3 
is that stressed by Wittgenstein. 
He pointed out that someone who learned a new proof in mathematics was 
simultaneously doing some new mathematics. Learning and doing are one. 
1. A question of value is indicated here and a preference is shown. It 
is assumed that most children view the clarity of failure in the way 
described. Furthermore, it is prescribed that teachers ought to try 
to minimise the number of pupils who associate mathematics with failure. 
2. This is true only if the subject identified is the science of All 
formal systems, for clearly a propositional calculus has this property 
of self-correction. 
3. As far as the author knows, there are only claims that ordinary 
languages have this feature of simultaneous 'learning and doing' but 
they are not self-correcting. 
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This peculiarity highlights the inappropriateness of seeing mathematics 
as a game, as was presented in part 2 Chapter S. To learn a new opening 
in chess, is not to play chess. The learning is logically separable from 
the playing of the game, but this is not so in mathematics. This 
peculiarity does not have implications for teaching approaches only, for 
differing philosophies of mathematics will interpret this feature in 
different ways. The Formalist will see the simultaneity of learning and 
doing, as relevant only to the learning of fact-free symbols within a 
given system, while the Hypothesisor will see any extension of mathematics 
as potentially referring outside of the science of formal systems itself, 
as a further 'potential model'. The Hypothesisor puts the added responsi- 
bility upon the mathematician to find out what external implications follow 
from any changes he makes to the formal system internally. 
Whatever one's philosophical standpoint a mathematics teacher ought 
to recognise the peculiar place that correctness plays in the learning of 
mathematics. The child who is able to correct his own work is also able 
to correct anybody else's work. In this sense, being able to understand 
one's own mistakes entails being able to understand what one has done 
wrong. This leads to a further point about 'mathematical understanding': 
someone who can rectify as well as recognise his errors in a given area 
has the more developed understanding, at least in that respect. 
Thus an appreciation of how to correct mathematics is itself an 
indication of the level of mathematical understanding achieved. Two points 
can now be made in response to the question given on p. 247 above 'Is 
"mathematical understanding" ambiguous? ' 
1. It is ambiguous. Different teachers do mean different things by it. BUT 
2. There would seem to be certain commonly agreed features if one wishes 
to achieve particular intrinsic aims for the mathematical education of 
one's pupils. Thus any teacher concerned about the health of that branch 
of knowledge called 'mathematics' needs to encourage his pupils' intuition 
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and that is facilitated by highlighting the positive value of appreciating 
error and untidiness as sources of mathematical development. Similarly 
there is agreement that to achieve the aim of possessing knowledge of 
mathematics with understanding will involve to a greater or lesser extent 
the appreciation of the formalised nature of mathematics. However, 
'external applicability', which is seen by this author as a critical 
feature of mathematical understanding, is not considered important by 
every secondary school mathematics department; nor is it claimed here 
that every department must make external applicability a key aim. 
However, the following discussion will highlight the danger of being 
satisfied with the weak form of mathematical understanding. 
Teaching mathematics: its unity and isolationism. While it has just been 
admitted that teachers cannot be forced to take the view to which this 
author leans, it would be a sign of weakness if the full weight of argu- 
ment is not presented for greater concern for external applicability. 
The opportunity will be taken here to spell out what is seen as one 
further critical danger for all education that results from the mathematics 
teacher's overriding concern for the 'internal health' of his subject. 
The argument given here does not denounce the validity of such concern 
but questions whether it is the most appropriate central aim in the 
educating of secondary age pupils, and whether other, less specialist 
aims, are more appropriate for the main body of pupils who study mathe- 
matics during their compulsory schooling. 
Given any group of mathematics teachers, there will be division 
among their chosen objectives, but there will be unity also. Over the 
last five years, teachers have taken to heart remarks made about the 
radical changes made to mathematics education in the previous decade. 
In Mathematics Teaching, No. 73, December 1975, Dunning-Davies brought 
the charge, that there was 'a pre-occupation with jargon and abstract 
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mathematical structure at the expense of much needed manipulative skill'. 
This may be seen as a counter to the kinds of exhortations to mathematics 
teachers that had been preached by projects like S. M. P., in whose first 
report, one reads that, 'Almost any required index of manipulative skill, 
within reason, could be achieved at sufficient cost to the rest of the 
pupil's mathematical education'. By these quotations one can readily 
identify the opposing pressures put on mathematics teachers for the last 
fifteen years, at least. They were first encouraged to drop arithmetic 
for structure, and then to reduce structure for manipulative skill. 
A philosophical thesis is not the place to draw conclusions about 
the psychological validity of one view or another, in terms of its proven 
efficiency in educating pupils mathematically. However the philosopher 
can make it clearer what can be meant by 'manipulative skills', 'structures', 
and so forth. He can also indicate where ultimate goals are inconsistent 
with initial presuppositions. The phrase 'manipulative skill' may be used 
to imply any competence, from one that is solely the result of 'rote- 
learning' or any other non-manipulative response control, 
1 
to some other 
skill which cannot be achieved competently unless the learner recognises 
the rules he is to follow. Given the request for an answer to 'three 
treble tops' at darts, three different people may have differing levels 
of understanding, hidden in their correct responses. 
1) Johnny automatically answers '180'. He has some understanding of 
subtraction and can work out '501 - 180', but all his multiplications 
are automatic. He knows by heart all the dart-board combinations 
from double one to three treble tops. Taken away from the dartboard 
and Johnny would be at a loss with '3 x 3', let alone '3 x3x 20'. 
He has no formal skills of multiplication. 
1. A child learns to respond 'three' to the shape '3', but this may 
indicate nothing of his knowledge of arithmetic, but only of his 
powers of imitation. 
258 
2) Joe can respond '180' to both 'three treble tops' and to '3 x3x 20'. 
Joe can work out '4 x2x 12' even though it does not appear on the 
dart-board. He has some recognition of 'written arithmetic' which 
is lacking in Johnny. Joe has a rote-learned knowledge of all 
number bonds from 1x1 to 12 x 20. He has 'arithmetic fluency' 
in the sense that as a milk boy he can work out in a book, for 
the milkman, what each household has spent that day, week, etc. 
The milkman does not require Joe to have heard of associativity 
or commutivity but he does work according to such rules. In this 
sense and in the sense that he applies his arithmetic, Joe could 
be said to have some understanding of arithmetic. 
3) Jill has an internal understanding of arithmetic in the finite 
domain up to '12 x 20', for she knows that '3 x 
(3 x 20) = 
(3 x 3) x 20' and that '3 x (3 x 20) = (3 x 20) + (3 x 20) + (3 x 20). 
She appreciates the rules of associativity and commutivity for this 
domain, and that multiplication is a recursive form of multiplication. 
She is certainly on the first rung of the ladder of mathematical 
understanding, the abstract activity. 
When there is a discussion of weaknesses found in young people's 
manipulative skills, it is essential that all parties know what is being 
identified. No one ought to be satisfied with Johnny's highly restricted 
state, 
1 
but the accusations of Dunning-Davies and others seem to be 
directed at the Jills of this world, who may lack 'arithmetic fluency' 
although they can explain the nature of the activities they are asked to 
carry out. To claim confidently that Jill has mathematical understanding 
in the modified sense? identified on p. 249 above, at least, the teacher 
1. The automatic response is acceptable if it 'is seen as a quick way of 
summarising a process of thinking rather than the acceptance of an 
authoritarian statement' (M. Brearley, Number in the Primary School, 
Froebel, 1960). 
2. In that sense of mathematical understanding, Jill is required to show 
some appreciation of connections internal to the area of study, and 
also appreciation of how that area of study relates to other areas, 
external to it. 
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must be able to show that Jill is aware of the applicative value of 
arithmetic as well as the nature of such interconnections as those between 
addition and multiplication. In other words, the desire is that the divide 
between Joe and Jill should be removed and that a minimum level of 
'manipulative skill' should also indicate the moderate form of mathematical 
understanding, at least. It would be just as unacceptable for teachers to 
strike out for 'Joes' at the expense of 'Jills' just because the man-in- 
the-street is more concerned with applications than understanding rules, 
as it has been to ignore 'Joe' for 'Jill' in recent decades. It is to 
be hoped that people will come to accept the broader notion that combines 
both sets of skills, and not be swayed in one direction by public opinion, 
and in the other, by editorial comments that announce that 
'... mathematicians are among the last people to need arithmetic' 
(Mathematics Teaching, No. 73). 
What seems to bedevil this rational compromise is the belief that 
Jill's understanding is in any sense inadequate, unless she appreciates 
that arithmetic is embedded in set theory. She may understand that multi- 
plication is connected logically to addition, but not that the integers 
can be derived formally from set theory. John Williams has said, 'unless 
the ELEMENTARY structures have been grasped, those that incorporate them 
will not be intelligible' ('Some Peculiarities of Calculative Thinking' 
in Learning and the Nature of Mathematics, p. 180). A house of cards 
models this standpoint and a child who has missed a foundation card 
will soon find his house topples down. This is the view that mathematics 
is so rigorously formalisable that one must start with the ground rules. 
Given the games perspective discussed in part 2 Chapter 8, one should not 
be surprised that there is such a view. One would not be surprised to be 
told that it is stupid to try and play draughts, if one has no knowledge 
of how many squares each piece may move, nor upon what colours on the 
board. While it is consistent, if one holds that mathematics is one big 
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game, to require the child to start with the ground rules, the agonies 
that result are surely good reasons for most of us shying away from this, 
as a pedagogic approach at least. 
A warning note is being signalled. Over-emphasis on the coherence 
of mathematics leads as a matter of fact to impossible demands being 
placed on the child. Although no question is raised for the philosopher 
of mathematics, a logical point is identified for the philosopher of 
mathematics education. Anyone who presents as realistic a programme of 
mathematics education which is totally inconsistent with all agreed know- 
ledge in educational psychology, is committed to as much a logical 
absurdity, as someone who claims that the square root of 2 is rational. 
It is more than strange for someone to admit that there is a lot of sense 
in the work of Piaget, Dienes, Bruner et al., but still to go on wanting 
children to begin with the most abstract mathematical structures. 
Unfortunately, this does seem to have occurred and helps to explain the 
placing of infinite cardinals in the work for eleven year-olds in series 
like Learning Mathematics and the Manchester Mathematics Group. Coherence 
must be tempered by a concern for applicability and realism, if the task 
of getting pupils on the inside of mathematics is to be a generally 
reasonable one. The objective of mathematics education being supported 
here is that, in this area, 'the achievement of manipulative skills, with 
understanding, must include that conception of understanding, identified 
in its strong form, 
1 
on p. 248 above'. 
Some educators may argue that this objective can only be satisfied 
if one takes some form of the inter-disciplinary approach outlined in 
part 2 Chapter 11. Built in to this objective is the imparting of know- 
ledge in other areas besides mathematics and this would be achieved most 
1. The strong form of the concept of mathematical understanding, outlined 
on p. 248 above, involves a mathematical proposition being understood 
only if the person knows how to use and derive it in mathematics, and 
has some awareness of its potential for external applicability. 
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efficiently if there was 'interaction' among teachers as well as between 
the disciplines they teach. 
Until recently, the weight of mathematics education has been 
'isolationist'. Mathematics teachers have been reluctant to participate 
in the growth industry of inter-disciplinary projects and group C. S. E's. 
Peculiarities of the subject have been seen as justifying the separation 
of mathematics and its study from everything else. Part of the argument 
has been the claim that the systematic nature of mathematics will not 
come across to pupils so clearly if it is tainted by external applicability. 
If children are to see mathematics as systematic, and if there is no 
adequate model of mathematics, then the argument seems to be that children 
in secondary schools ought to be able to look back on their mathematics 
career and perceive the visible system, with the peculiarities that have 
been identified. 
1 
The argument is essentially value-laden even though 
it carries the support of almost all great pure mathematicians this 
century. Hardy stressed the importance of extrinsic uselessness of his 
work. His pleasure lay totally in the doing and the aesthetic experience 
that often resulted. Communication to others was inessential, the doing 
was all. Thus, one has a picture of the isolated mathematician, active 
in mind and suspended in time. This is comparable to someone doing 
The Times crossword on an endless journey to their office. Hardy was 
willing to discuss his work with like-minded people but he refused to 
accept any responsibility for the applications that his work might have. 
While a genius may be allowed to hold to such isolationism, it would 
be senseless for generations of ordinary children to be told that 
isolationism is an essential part of the wonder of mathematics and that 
it is not to be studied in the light of society and its problems. Added 
1. The argument of part 2 Chapter 11 was that this does not logically 
preclude its Inter-disciplinary Study (See particularly the Conclusion, 
pp. 233-4). 
to all the mathematics teachers who genuinely believe in this isolationism 
must be added those who have gone with it for 'a quiet life'. Such a 
teacher is concerned with achieving the maximum measurable set of 
behaviourable objectives with the minimum level of disciplinary disturb- 
ances, and never takes seriously the choice of a more open standpoint. 
The isolationism identified in this part of the thesis does not 
rest explicitly upon views of the nature of mathematics, for this line 
of argument was the key to the discussion in part 2 Chapter 11.1 Rather, 
the argument of the isolationist mathematics teacher is that learning 
mathematics involves peculiar features like 'self-correction' that are 
not found, as a matter of fact, in other areas. The hidden consequences 
of this have included reliance upon a paradigmatic form of problem-solving. 
At all levels up to 'A' level, ramified forms of this method have taken 
people through their examinations. 
2 This habit learning' is not exclusive 
to mathematics but the 'isolationism' has reduced the probability of others 
being aware that the kind of 'knowledge and understanding' identified in 
this part of the thesis is not being achieved or even considered as an 
essential objective. Teachers slip into believing that 'getting them 
right is synonymous with understanding'. Furthermore, there would seem 
to be a worryingly short set of steps, to 'following algorithms blindly', 
from the formalist, met in part 1 Chapter 2, who stressed the rule-governed 
nature of mathematics. The formalist mathematics teacher, believing that 
struggling blindly is part of learning to love mathematics in the end, 
may well argue that giving pupils extrinsic reasons for learning some 
1. The argument presented on p. 218 above is that each philosophy of 
mathematics identifies criteria by which mathematics is shown to be 
'discrete' and is in that sense, isolatable area of knowledge. 
2. A child is taught to treat any problem of the form, 'I have some..., 
and then get --- 
more..., and I have all together. How 
many did I have at first? ' By using a given flow chart, verbalised 
as, 'Take the last mentioned number, subtract the penultimate one 
and write down the remainder as your answer', the child is given 
a method, but not understanding. 
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element of mathematics now will only lessen their commitment to mathematics 
for its own sake. 
1 Certainly this teacher is not an educator, in the sense 
identified in this thesis, and can have no educational defence for his 
approach, if he claims to be educating his pupils by 'blind obedience'. 
2 
The alternative discussed in part 2 Chapter 8 was the teacher who puts 
off mathematics education until after the pupils can grasp the conceptual 
demands made by the abstract study of 'the science of formal systems'. 
While valid, it is not easy to imagine many teachers admitting that 
their subject is 'pseudo-mathematics'. For a teacher with a genuine 
commitment to Formalism, this would provide the benefit that 'isolationism' 
would be unnecessary, and could be delayed. It is to be hoped that the 
emphasis of this section has been seen to be the breaking down of walls 
and the building of bridges among teachers of different subjects, as well 
as in the minds of pupils, as they employ the techniques of one subject 
and then another. 
**** 
EDUCATING MATHEMATICS TEACHERS 
This whole thesis has been aiming at revealing a part of the 
essential equipment of a mathematics teacher. The previous section has 
discussed teachers' aims, expectations and even models of their mathe- 
matically educated pupils, but no attempt has been made to direct the 
analysis inwards at the teacher himself. Now, therefore, the question 
is asked directly: 'What essential equipment for a mathematics teacher 
can this analysis identify? ' In order to answer this question one would 
need some idea of the context of this discussion, and a context of some 
1. This is analogous to the piano teacher who demands nothing but 
exercises from his pupils, never allowing them to play complete 
pieces, at their level. 
2. He could claim to be laying the preconditions for their becoming 
mathematically educated. This problem was discussed previously 
in part 2 Chapter 8, pp. 150-154 , in particular. 
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kind has been identified in the points made about 'education' itself on 
pp. 236-38 above. The conclusion drawn was that education is to be seen 
at least as, 'the transmission of understanding of branches of knowledge, 
including mathematics'. If teachers are to transmit an understanding of 
mathematics then it seems to follow that they need types of 'equipment'. 
These could be put crudely as, 'equipment on the subject to be taught', 
'equipment on teaching the subject', and finally, 'equipment on aims of 
teaching the subject'. Obviously, a practising teacher will not see 
these as discrete areas, and throughout this thesis points of interaction 
and overlap have been highlighted. This does not deny the possibility 
that treating each area separately here will not benefit the clarity of 
the overall argument of the thesis. Thus the three types of 'equipment' 
will be taken in the order suggested: 
1) Knowledge and understanding of. as well as comDetence in. mathematics 
In the first part of this thesis it was shown that 'mathematics' itself 
has a complex nature. It was argued that there are at least four internally 
consistent ways of interpreting the structure of mathematics. These were 
identified as the Logicist, Formalist, Intuitionist and Hypothesisor 
philosophies of mathematics. In order to claim a fuller appreciation of 
the nature of the subject that they will teach, it would seem reasonable 
to require future mathematics teachers to have some background experience 
of these viewpoints, in addition, where necessary, to the knowledge of the 
1 
subject acquired in their non-professional training. 
2) Knowledge and understanding of differing teaching apuroaches 
to mathematics 
In the light of all that has been written in the second part of this 
thesis, this may seem like a very broad requirement, but nevertheless it 
is surely a reasonable consequence of the basic notion of 'education' 
1. If their previous or concurrent study of mathematics lacks study of 
the nature of mathematics this should be compensated for in training. 
considered above. This included a reference to 'transmission' and so 
it is reasonable to assume that a future mathematics teacher would wish 
to be equipped with knowledge of differing approaches to mathematics 
teaching. At least some of these approaches were identified in part 2 
of this thesis, and the future teacher would be in a stronger position 
to claim an understanding of these approaches if he was also aware of 
the kinds of links that have been mentioned in the thesis between certain 
approaches and certain views of the nature of mathematics itself. Thus 
in part 2 Chapter 8, the harmony of the games approach with Formalist 
views of mathematics was picked out, and in Chapter 10 similar harmony 
was found between the technology approach and the philosophical standpoint 
of Hypothesisors. Four discrete approaches have been identified, as well 
as a fifth derivative one. These are 1) the Art approach, 2) the Game 
approach, 3) the Science approach, and 4) the Technology approach, and 
teaching mathematics through Inter-disciplinary Enquiry. 
3) Knowledge and understanding of aims of mathematics education 
While this area may require a key position in the training sequence 
of future mathematics teachers, it has been placed last here and in the 
thesis as a whole, because it is the most controversial area to tackle. 
Underlying it are questions of the following kind: 
'Why teach mathematics to them? ', and the slightly less contentious, 
'Why teach that part of mathematics to them? '. 
An educator of mathematics teachers can equip his students to understand 
the notions of educational planning, and even to appreciate the different 
programmes1 of mathematics education, that have, do and could exist, but 
ultimately the teacher must decide for himself how to answer these kinds 
of question. The philosopher can help him to pick out likely logical 
1. Programmes devised under a great variety of constraints, including 
greater and lesser degrees of teacher autonomy and accountability. 
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pitfalls, but cannot make the choice of values for him. Thus this thesis 
could end here, but on p. 237 above, the author admitted that he hoped 
that others so interested, would include in their understanding of the 
notion of 'education', more than the transmission of understanding of 
the main branches of knowledge, but also 
a) a presumption of 'optimism', and 
b) a presumption that teachers can share their aims with 
pupils, parents or others concerned. 
It would be clearer to consider each of these additional factors in turn: 
a) A presumption of 'optimism'. If the educator of mathematics teachers 
wishes his students to be aware of the consequences of this presumption 
then he would expect them to understand these consequences to be that: 
i) Everyone can enlarge their knowledge of mathematics. 
2) Everyone should have the opportunity to appreciate that 
mathematics has this characteristic of enlargement 
(e. g. 
1+1=2; 2+1=3; 3+1=4; 4+... ). 
3) Everyone should have the opportunity to achieve some 
understanding1 of mathematics. 
A generalised consequence is that, 
4) Every teacher ought to assume that his aims of mathematics 
education refer to every one of his pupils unless he can 
give good reasons why they should not. 
This leads to the second presumption which requires mathematics 
teachers to give, as far as possible, an account of why they teach what 
and how they teach it. 
b) APresumttion of 'sharing of aims'. If a teacher constantly rejects 
the right of pupils, parents and others concerned to be given reasons, 
besides that of saying 'this is necessary for you to become educated', 
1. Obviously this would involve differing demands according to the 
sense of 'understanding' taken. 
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then he would not be satisfying the notion of educator that is presumed 
here. The teacher need not be required to justify his every move, but 
he must be required sometimes to be prepared to tell his pupils or others 
the purpose of what is to be learned, and why it is being taught in a 
particular way rather than in another. 
1 
In this sense, a teacher has 
a responsibility to have the knowledge and understanding required, so 
that he is able to indicate to the pupils the relevance of what he teaches 
to them individually, or to society as a whole. 
Thus, three aims have been identified for any educator of future 
mathematics teachers: The student will acquire 
1) knowledge and understanding of, as well as competence in, 
mathematics; 
2) knowledge and understanding of the differing teaching 
approaches to mathematics; 
3) knowledge and understanding of aims of mathematics education. 
Admittedly the three aims given briefly here are not very informative by 
themselves, but it is hoped that, supported by the thesis as a whole, 
they would provide an essential part of a framework for training. 
CONCLUSION 
In the first part of the thesis, four philosophies of mathematics 
were presented. While some preference has been shown for one movement, 
that of the Hypothesisors, rather than the others, the critical conclusion 
drawn is that there are several such movements, each one of which is 
internally consistent. The ideas that they present have influenced 
mathematics education since 1944. Although the formalising pressures 
of logicism and formalism are to the fore in most modern mathematics 
series like Learnin, Mathematics, S. M. P., and others, intuitionism has 
reminded some mathematics educators of the limitations of the written 
1. This is setting aside motivational support for such a presumption, 
which is probably very strong. 
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form. This comes across particularly clearly in A. T. M's Notes on mathe- 
matics for children (C. U. P. 1977, pp. 224-30). The following introduction 
to the section entitled 'Creative Ignorance' should highlight this approach, 
as it questions formalisation pursued at any cost: 
A man sees, grasps, or understands something no one else 
has seen...; ... if he wishes to share his discovery with 
other people.... Some other people must see, grasp, or 
understand what he has.... Some other people must accept 
that he has truly discovered a pattern.... A proof is 
constructed to get other people to accept the thing proved... 
The hypothesisors have also influenced movements in mathematics education. 
Ormell's work as director of the Schools Council Sixth Form Mathematics 
Project reflects this philosophical stance most strongly. In the decade 
of the project's existence, related movements have arisen, such as the 
Mathematical Modelling Journal and Mathematics Applicable Group, with 
similar philosophic sympathies. There can be no doubt that the disputes 
about the nature of mathematics, that came to the fore, a hundred years 
ago, with the work of Frege, have and still do breathe life into differ- 
ing movements in mathematics education. Given the clashes at all levels 
of one influence or another, particularly in published school mathematics 
materials, it is reasonable to expect teachers of mathematics to have 
knowledge and understanding of these philosophies that have helped to 
seed divisions. 
In the second part of the thesis, it has been argued that four 
perspectives to mathematics teaching are identifiable. These perspectives 
are the Aesthetic, Game, Science and Technological orientations. Many 
great mathematicians have stressed the aesthetic-orientation. Zeeman 
and Hardy are just two that have been mentioned in this thesis. Many 
of the mathematics series of the nineteen-sixties stressed the games- 
orientation of mathematics teaching. S. M. P. has become both the most 
famous and the most popular. Contrasted with this orientation has been 
the unified methodology of Nuffield courses, that have emphasised the 
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discovery method. This has been identified as paradigmatic of the Natural 
Sciences, but found in mathematics as well as physics, chemistry and other 
'more strictly' science courses. Through the Schools Council mathematics 
courses has come the plea for the concrete and the practical. In many 
ways, these courses can be seen as turning back to the strongly instru- 
mental views of courses that arose with the foundation of Secondary 
Modern education, as education for non-examination pupils. Daily Life 
Mathematics is just one such series that believed, 'the practical approach 
and visual methods of teaching are the most effective means of arousing' 
children's interests (Preface, p. vii). 
These perspectives may not be mapped one to one mathematics series 
or mathematics teaching department, but there can be little doubt that 
the differing perspectives exist, and have voluble support. At least 
in part, the perspectives have been seen to develop from the philosophical 
frameworks identified in the first part of the thesis. Certainly, the 
increasing strength of the view of the nature of mathematics as, the 
science of formal systems helped to provide stimulus to the commitment 
in the nineteen-sixties and early seventies for a 'narrow proof-like 
approach' in the presentation of mathematics in secondary schools. It 
was heralded as a closed and structured game, rather than the haphazard 
bag of recipes that had seemed to come across through the effect of the 
preceding influence, i. e. passing pure mathematics examinations. Much 
of the strength of the new approach seemed to lie in its endless expansion, 
rather as Descartes saw it when he wrote, 'making each truth that I dis- 
covered a rule for helping me to find others' 
(Discourse on the Method, 
P" 93, Haldane and Rosa, 1967). The emphasis of formalisation was also 
an emphasis upon 'internal applicability', and contrasts with the balance 
of emphasis to be found here. In the technological orientation, outlined 
in part 2 Chapter 10, it was made clear that equal, and logically prior, 
importance is to be given to 'external applicability'. Yet, given that 
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there are other views that have significant influence, it would seem 
foolish not to suggest that mathematics teachers should have knowledge 
and understanding of these perspectives too. 
In the second part of the thesis, it has been made clear, as each 
perspective was introduced, how philosophical presuppositions about the 
nature of mathematics may limit the range of consistent stances that the 
mathematics teacher can take in regard to that perspective. Thus, any 
philosophical standpoint that relates to the nature of mathematics to 
'proof in public use', puts clear limitations on the extent to which the 
games perspective can be developed. 
1 
The general point is that teachers 
ought to be expected to appreciate the interconnections among perspectives 
and philosophical movements. This is to reinforce the argument that both 
perspectives and philosophical movements ought to be known to mathematics 
teachers if they wish to claim an understanding of the full potential of 
mathematics in education. 
It is not only methods of mathematics teaching and questions about 
the nature of mathematics that have been scrutinised in this thesis, but 
as has been discussed earlier in this part of the thesis, the aims of 
mathematics education, too. They may owe their selection, at least in 
part, to the influence of preferred philosophical standpoints as to the 
nature of mathematics, say. It would be unexpected, to say the least, 
to find that those who love mathematics for its lack of interpretations 
place external applicability as the central aim of mathematics education. 
It would be just as peculiar to find Ormell acclaiming that the greatest 
justification of mathematics in education lay in the creative forces that 
mathematics can help to unleash. 
The expectation is that, given proper understanding of the method- 
ologies and of the various views of the nature of mathematics, each 
1. The Hypothesisors come across as claiming that mathematics ends as 
well as begins in the real world, and this contradicts the essential 
notion of a game as non-serious and self-contained. 
271 
mathematics teacher can draw together through his own aims a coherent 
view of mathematics in his pupils' education. 
1 
Not all pupils can know 
what the teacher is required to know in order to make his pedagogic 
decisions, but the teacher ought to be prepared for 'whys' about how 
he teaches, and what he teaches. 
Although the general tenor of this thesis has been to seek compromise, 
a preference has been indicated for education that is shown to be at 
least partly extrinsically valuable. The belief underlying this view 
of education is that education ought to provide the route to a more 
interactive2 society, as well as being valued for its intrinsic worth- 
whileness. This approach has a logical consequence for all subjects, 
including mathematics. A subject can strengthen its place on the curri- 
culum if it can be shown to be of both extrinsic and intrinsic value. 
Of all the perspectives found in part 2 of this thesis, it is the 
Technological orientation which most readily meets this possibility. 
In this one perspective, both forms of justification are necessarily 
present. The teacher is required to seek both internal and external 
applicability, in order to focus on the achievement of mathematical 
understanding in the strong sense. 
3 Furthermore, this perspective nestles 
most kindly into one philosophical movement, that of the Hypothesisors, 
1. As Claude Birtwistle put it, nearly twenty years ago, 'Successful 
teaching of any subject depends on the methods of teaching employed, 
the background of the teacher and the content of the course. ' (Mathematics Teaching, No. 17,1961, p. 69). 
2. 'Interactive' is used here to indicate the same sense as 'interactive 
application' has in the discussion on pp. 193-97 above, that people 
try to understand for themselves the point of view of others with 
whom they 'interact'; just as in mathematics it has been suggested 
that the mathematician should try to understand the area of knowledge 
to which the mathematics is applied and to be willing to modify both 
the mathematics and the subject to which it is applied. 
3. On p. 247 above, the strong form of mathematical understanding was 
identified as involving at every point, the consideration of the 
external use of the given proposition, in addition to understanding 
connections within mathematics that relate to claims made about this 
proposition and its derivability. 
272 
without being totally incompatible with the others. Thus, a coherent 
mathematics education, founded on these pillars of Technological-orientation 
and mathematics as the science of possibilities, has much to commend it, 
but there is no question that in teacher training the duty lies in the 
provision of knowledge and understanding of all philosophies and perspec- 
tives as they relate to mathematics and education. 
The conclusion reached is that the teacher is thereby able to use 
all approaches, and to explain to pupils that there are various views of 
the nature of mathematics. However, the limits of achievement for any 
one pupil at any one time must be left as a constraint on the teaching, 
that ultimately can only be resolved by the teacher himself, with support 
finally from 'learning theory' rather than 'philosophy'. The value of 
the programme in this thesis, it is hoped, is that its implementation 
would prevent future generations of pupils taking mathematics in 
secondary schools and coming out believing that there is only one view 
of the subject and one way for it to be presented. Under this programme, 
'formal derivability' is seen as just one feature of mathematics, and 
presentation as a game as just one method of presentation, among many. 
As Douglas Quadling put it, 'despite the effort expended on curri- 
culum development over the past two decades, teachers of mathematics at 
secondary level still find themselves with fundamental unresolved questions 
of aim, of method and of balance. So far the experimentation which has 
gone on has fed on rich experience, but its achievement has been more to 
identify the questions than to provide the answers. ' (Issues at Secondary 
Level' in Mathematical Education, p. 180). It is to be hoped that this 
thesis has presented some answers and has not been satisfied with just 
presenting further questions. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix attempts to identify those theories of truth that have 
a clear influence on the philosophical movements discussed in part 1 of 
the thesis. It provides both background and an indication of how this 
author interprets these diverse theories, particularly as they arise in 
part 1, Chapter 5. 
Theories of Truth. Aristotle's theory of truth is generally recognised 
as both the first theory and the forerunner of the Correspondence Theory. 
This theory has usually1 been supported by realists, 
2 
while the other 
major theory of the first half of this century, the Coherence Theory3 
has had the support of anti-realists. Since the 1930s a new theory has 
taken the centre of the stage, Tarski's Semantic theory of truth. Even 
so, two further theories are described in this section because of their 
influence on the Philosophy of Mathematics. These are the Pragmatic 
theory which may be seen as somewhat of a compromise between the Corres- 
pondence and Coherence theories, having been initiated by the realist, 
Peirce, and modified by his anti-realist followers, James and Dewey, and 
the Redundancy Theory. The latter theory attempts to eliminate 'truth', 
and was founded by a philosopher of mathematics, Ramsey and at one point 
found favour with Wittgenstein. 
1. It is thus somewhat of a paradox that Austin provided a modified form 
of the theory. 
2. Dummett provides a conception of 'realism' free from ontological 
commitment to mathematical objects in 'Realism' in Dummett, p. 146. 
3. The Coherence Theory is a holistic theory that requires coherence among 
a complete set of beliefs. Taken in isolation it has found difficulty 
in collecting supporters but seen as a feature of a Pragmatic theory 
it is far more tenable. As no mathematical theory is to be discussed 
that holds to such an holistic theory of truth, any discussion of it 
will arise through the Pragmatic Theory 
(For a recent explication 
see, N. Rescher's The Coherence Theory of Truth, 1973 O. U. P. 
). 
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1) The Correspondence Theory of Truth 
In its most cogent form, this theory argues that if a proposition 
is true, then there is a direct relationship between the meaning of the 
proposition and the facts being picked out by the proposition. Similarly, 
if the proposition is false then such a relationship will exist between 
the negative proposition and the facts. Thus, if 'the cat is on the mat' 
is true, then the cat is on the mat, and if 'the cat is on the mat' is 
false, then wherever the cat is, it is not on the mat. The traditional 
criticism of the theory as presented by Russell1 and Wittgenstein2 has 
been that the nature of the correspondence is unclear. If there is a 
claim for direct isomorphism between components of the proposition and 
components in the world then the theory would be rapidly refuted, for 
there may well be another language3 in which the same proposition is 
expressed in far fewer or more words. Given this possibility there will 
be redundant components on some occasions and shortages on others, accord- 
ing to the language used. The theory only retains force if it is linked 
to linguistic conventions. In this form, to assert that 'the cat is on 
the mat' is to claim that this is a conventionally acceptable way of 
identifying a given set of facts4 in the world. Hence, one can identify 
two forms of the Correspondence Theory. Cooper calls these, 'the 
1. 'On Propositions' in Logic and Knowledge, pp. 314-20, and 'On the 
Nature of Truth' in Philosophical Essays, pp. 149-59. 
2. Tractatus, 4.01-4.1212. The criticism that follows, based on Cooper's 
argument Philosophy and the Nature of Language, does not apply to 
Wittgenstein, as Cooper admits, p. 96. 
3. Cooper provides the fictional word 'Catamat' as a translation of 'the 
cat is on the mat' to highlight the problem for these earlier theories 
on 'components'. See Philosophy and the Nature of Language, p. 182. 
4. In Austin's version of the Correspondence Theory, 'the facts' become 
synonymous with statements made in accordance with descriptive con- 
ventions. It would seem that this does not rule out the alternative 
use of 'facts' as referring to the world, rather than as statements 
about the world. Moreover Austin seemed to modify his position closer 
to the one suggested here, after an attack from Strawson. Compare his 
article 'Truth' pp. 121-4 with 'Unfair to facts', pp. 154-62, both in 
Philosophical Papers. 
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old-style theory'1 and 'the new-style theory'. 
The old-style theory claims a correspondence between a true sentence and 
facts in the world, according to a given ordering identifiable through 
the sentence. Thus 'the cat is on the mat' is distinguishable from 'the 
mat is on the cat', because of an ordering present in the sentence being 
identifiable, in some way in the facts. 
The new-style theory presents 'correspondence' as dependent upon conven- 
tions that indicate how the meaning of the sentence, asserted as true, 
relates to things in the world. Cooper encapsulates the position as 
follows, 
"The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if the demonstrative2 
conventions governing the use of the referring expressions 
(e. g. 
'the mat"), and the descriptive conventions governing the use 
of the predicate (e. g. the cat must be the mat), are both 
obeyed. To say that a sentence is true is to say just this - 
that the conventions in question are being obeyed. This is 
the sense in which "is true" serves to assert a correspond- 
ence of a conventional sort between sentences and the world. 
(Cooper, OP. cit., p. 183. Footnote is not in the text). 
Cooper admits that this is roughly the theory that Austin held. It 
provides criteria for some true propositions, though not a definition of 
truth, but it does at least show one how to be sure that a given assertion 
is true. It does not provide the meaning of 'p is true'. Furthermore, 
such a set of criteria would seem irrelevant in the case of analytic 
propositions, for in such cases nothing in the world needs to be demon- 
strated or described. Thus, this form of the correspondence theory may 
be an improvement on the earlier style, but it does not resolve all the 
problems about truth, and no doubt one would be extremely sceptical of 
any theory that claimed to do so. 
1. Cooper, or. cit., pp. 181-6. 
2. Both 'the demonstrative conventions', by which correlation is achieved 
with general situations in the world (e. g. 'eat ... mat'), and 
'the 
descriptive conventions', by which correlation is achieved with 
particular connections among things as they occur in the world 
(e. g. 'the cat sat on the mat'), hook the theory on to the world. 
2) The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 
While Pragmatism is traditionally identified with Peirce, James and 
Dewey, the concentration here will be particularly on Peirce, as it is 
in the body of the thesis. However, the main features of Dewey's theory 
will be explained, because there would seem to be echoes of the theory 
in the views of contemporary philosophers of mathematics like Dummett, 
l 
who are dissatisfied with traditional 'realist' standpoints. 
Peirce, James and Dewey agree on the strong link between the meaning 
of a concept, and the use to which it is put within the language. Truth 
is somewhat incidental to their overall theories, but they all focus on 
its connection with successful inquiry. As Peirce says, 'The opinion 
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is 
what we mean by truth... '2 (Essays, p. 54). It is important to understand 
that Peirce is not saying that what is true is determined by what people 
generally accept at a particular time, nor that truth is just a matter 
of belief. While what one believes one believes to be true, belief is 
not a sufficient criterion of truth. In fact Peirce believed that any 
belief is fallible, except for those of logic and mathematics. 
However, within ordinary language it makes sense to equate 'truth' 
with 'a state of belief unassailable by doubt' (C_P. 5.416) for truth 
itself can never be identified for certain (See p. 60 of the thesis for 
further discussion of this point). Now this state of belief is to be 
reached by 'a method... by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing 
human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our 
thinking has no effect... the method must be such that the ultimate 
1. Dummett attempts to provide a philosophy of mathematics that values 
Intuitionistic logic without excluding necessarily a realist stand- 
point. See, 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic' in 
Dummett, pp. 215ff. 
2. In Peirce one finds 'inquiry' linked to the worthwhileness of a 
search for truth and in James and Dewey, it is explicitly of moral 
value. Definitely the Pragmatists indicate views now common in 
Philosophy of Education. 
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conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science. ' 
(Essays, 
pp. 24-5). This indicates the realism that James and Dewey were 
to reject while holding to the concern with inquiry. In Peirce's realism 
one finds similarities to a Correspondence Theory, for here too, there is 
a matching with 'Real things'. However, anyone's personal matching of a 
proposition to reality is not what makes the asserted proposition 
'unassailable by doubt', but rather its being tested by others using the 
same method. In this way the proposition is either approved or adjusted. 
Thus, truth is dependent firstly upon deriving propositions by the 
scientific method. These propositions indicate 'how things really and 
truly are' (Essays, p. 25), and secondly they are identified as true 
because as a matter of fact they achieve the support of an 'overwhelming 
consensus of opinion' (C_P. 6.610). The result is a rather thinly sup- 
ported but nevertheless consistent theory of truth. This may be justi- 
fied because Peirce was more concerned to lay down principles by which 
one could work, than to have a water-tight definition. While the 
Correspondence Theory may provide a better definition, it does not provide 
a working hypothesis and such passivity was an irritation to Peirce. As 
Ayer says of their position, Peirce and James conduct their enquiry'into 
the nature of truth from the standpoint of the individual thinker who is 
actually concerned with forming his beliefs. For someone in this position 
the cash-value of the question "What is truth? " is "How can I decide what 
propositions to accept? "' (The Origins of Pragmatism, p. 199). Tinged 
with Ayer's positivism, this does not indicate sufficiently the concern 
for achievement among the pragmatists. This is made even clearer in 
Dewey's position. 
Dewey accepts Peirce's approach but can see no reason for calling 
beliefs 'true', if their status cannot be established conclusively. He 
prefers to talk of 'warranted assertibility'. The 'warranted assertion' 
is achieved at the end of an inquiry which involves the turning of an 
0 
'indeterminate situation', disequilibrium, 
1 
into a stable state, the 
solving of a problem. This is a procedure comparable to, but not 
identical with, Peirce's 'method of science'. This Dewey-type inquiry 
involves identifying the problem, establishing an hypothesis, theorising 
about and testing the hypothesis until the resolution of the problem is 
achieved. The proposition that states the conclusion to the inquiry is 
a 'warranted assertion', and the method of inquiry is the criterion by 
which the assertion is established. Thus the assertion, 'the cat sat 
on the mat' taken in isolation is meaningful2 in only a weak sense. 
Unless one asserts that as the result of a problem like that faced by 
a distressed cat-owner in search of his cat, the proposition could not 
possibly be a warranted assertion. Links may be seen between Peirce's 
views and the Correspondence Theory on one aide, and Dewey's views and 
anti-realist positions on the other. 
Taking this last point further, one can try to identify more clearly 
the realist/anti-realist distinction that characterises Peirce's diverg- 
ence from James and Dewey. In the Postscript 
(1972) to his article on 
Truth (1959), Dummett provides this clear identification of the distinc- 
tion. He says, 
The fundamental difference between the anti-realist and the 
realist lies in this: that.... the anti-realist interprets 
"capable of being known" to mean "capable of being known by 
us it, whereas the realist interprets it to mean "capable of 
being known by some hypothetical being whose intellectual 
capacities and powers of observation may exceed our own. " 
... 
The anti-realist holds... that the only meaning we can 
confer on our sentences must relate to those means of deter- 
mining their truth-values which we actually possess. Hence, 
unless we have a means which would in principle decide the 
truth-value of a given statement, we do not have for it a 
notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say 
that it must be either true or false. (Dummett, p. 24). 
1. This is indicative of Dewey's general use of biological and Darwinian 
analogies throughout his works. 
2. In Pragmatist theories of meaning including Dewey's, a word gains 
meaning in use and so an isolated sentence is in a Pragmatic sense, 
'meaningless'. 
27d 
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This quotation indicates clearly the realist/anti-realist gap and it will 
recur as the forms of mathematical truth become clearer. As the distinc- 
tion becomes clearer, so will the problems of 'compromise' as attempted 
by Wittgenstein and Lakatos. 
Dummett's own position in 1959 is clearly anti-realist, with clear 
echoes of Dewey when Dummett uses the term 'warranted'. He says that one 
is warranted in making an assertion only if one has the method by which 
'we could in a finite time bring ourselves into a position in which we 
were justified either in asserting or in denying' the particular proposi- 
tion (ibid., p. 16). Thus one has a pragmatic notion of truth linked to 
successful inquiry, but with two distinct underlying twists. Going one 
way, the realist way, one believes there are 'eternal answers', and going 
the other way, the anti-realist route, there are no answers except our 
answers. 
3) The Redundancy Theory of Truth 
This theory is usually attributed to F. P. Ramsey although both 
Dummett (ibid., p. 4) and Haack 
(PhilosoDhy of Logics, p. 127) suggest 
it is derived from Frege but not supported by him. Ramsey argues that 
'It is true that the cat is on the mat' has the same sense as 'the cat 
is on the mat', and so whenever a proposition is asserted no more is 
being said than the proposition alone. The conclusion drawn is that 
the phrase 'is true' can be eliminated. A similar elimination would 
occur for 'It is false that the cat is on the mat' by asserting 'the cat 
is not on the mat'. Ramsey rejects1 any idea that 'true' or 'false' 
(as 
against 'negation') can be predicated of a proposition, so their use in 
language can only be for stylistic reasons or emphasis. Certainly the 
employment of these words has led to paradoxes that would otherwise be 
eliminated, and one wonders whether, like Tarski, Ramsey was concerned 
1. 'Facts and Propositions' in The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 142-4. 
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to remove the Liar paradox, one version of which is 
'The sentence on line 2 page 280 of this Appendix' is false. Ramsey was 
certainly interested in the paradoxes and categorises them into semantical 
ones, like the Liar one and purely 'logical' or mathematical ones, like 
Russell's paradox, concerning 'The sets of all sets that are not members 
of themselves'. (If S is a member of S then there is a set in which S 
is a member of itself and which is not a member of the set of all sets 
that are not members of themselves). It may be that Ramsey thought that 
the way in which semantical paradoxes were due 'to faulty ideas concerning 
thought and language' (ibid., p. 21) was because it had not been appreciated 
that 'true'and 'false' could be eliminated. 
' 
The main difficulty of Ramsey's theory is that one does find 'true' 
and 'false' contributing to the meaning, and not just the emphasis of 
propositions. As was noted on p. 23 above, there is a difference between 
the semantic principle of bivalence, 'every statement is either true or 
false' and the logical law 'p v -p'. This distinction evaporates for 
Ramsey, as the semantic principle can have no other interpretation than 
'p v -p'. In other words, if 'true' and 'false' add nothing to the mean- 
ing of sentences, then they are either 'p' or '-p' according to their 
form and that is that. Yet there are propositions like, 'Truth is stranger 
than fiction'2 and 'Everything he says is true'. It is much harder to 
make 'truth' or 'is true' redundant in these examples than in 'it is true 
that the cat is on the mat'. 'True' does not here occur predicated of a 
proposition, so that it is not clear how according to the redundancy 
theory, it is to be eliminated. The theory is still valuable because it 
causes one to ask the questions, 'Do we need "true" and "false" in 
1. Naturally, not all paradoxes involve 'true' and 'false'. 
2. This example is used by Platts, Wave of Meaning, p. 11 to indicate 
one of the other uses of 'truth' not covered by Ramsey's theory, 
but here it exemplifies two points. 'Truth' in use and the problems 
of verifying certain propositions, are indicated. 
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ordinary language, and do we need "true" and "false" in formal languages? ' 
The argument so far has been that the answer to the first question is 
indubitably positive, and the work of Tarski and implicitly Goedel's, 
has been to facilitate answers to questions about its necessity or 
otherwise in formal languages. 
4) The Semantic Theory of Truth 
In his work on truth1 Tarski saw himself reiterating Aristotle's 
original definition and consolidating it, rather than firing a revolution. 
2 
Tarski provides criteria which must be satisfied for any definition of 
truth to be adequate, and he also exemplifies this by a definition of 
truth for a particular formal language. It is important to remember that 
he provides criteria for a definition and not criteria for truth. 
The first criterion of material adequacy is that for every sentence 
S of the language L (for which a theory of truth is to be constructed), 
there is a provable theorem in the theory which takes the form: 
(T) S is true iff p (iff is 'if and only if') 
(where 'S' is a structural descriptive name of the sentence p). 
Davidson3 gave this form to Tarski's 'Convention T, 
4 
and the example 
made famous by Taraki, 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white. 
The second criterion is that there is a finite set of logical principles 
to be employed to deduce instances of T, and deduced from a finite set of 
basic axioms. The possibility of producing such theories of truth is 
1. His theory is found in two articles: 'The concept of truth in 
formalised languages' in Logic. Semantics and Metamathematics and 
'The semantic conception of truth' in Readings in Philosophical 
Analysis (ed. Feigl H. and Sellars W. 
) 
2. Tarski refers explicitly to Aristotle's definition as a source, 
'Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages', p. 155, footnote 2. 
In the work of Davidson the result has been like a revolution in 
the seventies, comparable to that sparked off by the works of 
Wittgenstein in the sixties. 
3. See for example, Davidson's reference to it as 'Tarski's convention T' 
in a footnote in 'On Saying That' in Words and Objections, p. 173. 
4. In 'Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages', pp. 187-8, Tarski 
introduces the phrase, 'Convention T'. 
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severely limited by the requirement that every sentence is to have its 
proven (T) sentence, for it is quite clear that most languages, including 
formal ones, have an infinite number of sentences. This production of 
potentially infinite sentences is dealt with in formal languages, by 
building up chains under a recursive principle. That is to see new 
sentences as conjunctions of already given sentences, which correspond 
to conjunctions of (T) sentences. Thus 
'If S is true iff p and T is true iff q then S and T is true iff p and q' 
or, 'If "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white and "Grass is green" 
iff grass is green then "Snow is white and grass is green" iff 
snow is white and grass is green'. 
This explains only the barest bones of Tarski's theory, but to do more 
would require technical elaborations that are inessential to the argument 
of the thesis as a whole. However three further points do seem worth 
making: 
a) Tarski believes that no theory of truth for an ordinary language 
can be formed to meet his criteria, because ordinary languages 
will always contain self-referential paradoxes like that on p. 280 
above. These can be avoided in a formalised language, which has 
distinct Object-language and Meta-language. 
1 
b) Dummett criticises Tarski's theory for only giving sense to truth 
in the form, 'ihr true', and not in any other sense, i. e. tense or 
mood. This is not just a shortcoming for ordinary language, but 
also for formal languages like modal logics. As Dummett says, 
'its role in our language does not reveal why such inflections of 
tense or even mood should be forbidden'. (Dummett, p. 233). 
1. Taking a simple reflexive proposition like 'this is a lie', 'this is 
a lie' is true iff this is a lie. If the Right-Hand-side and the 
Left-Hand-side belong to different languages, then there cannot be 
a paradox, for the reflexiveness is retained within each side. 
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cý Popper and Platts1 both argue convincingly that Tarski's theory is 
a reformulation of the Correspondence Theory, for links are made in 
the Tarski theory between what carries the truth: a sentence, and 
what tells one that the sentence is true: entities in 'the world'. 
Some Further Comments. In this thesis, topics have been considered that 
cover volumes of words in philosophy, and no less can be said of 'truth', 
than has been said of 'realism', 'science', 'aims', and so on. It is 
hoped that this appendix has given finger-nail sketches of theories of 
truth whose features are recognisable in the main body of the thesis. 
It should not be thought that the absence of significant discussions of 
the views of Davidson, Kripke, Wiggins, et al. indicates either a lack 
of interest or ignorance of their views. It does indicate however, the 
belief that the main argument of this thesis has been clearly presented 
without the need for additional considerations of 'truth' and 'meaning' 
as these writers view them. The author is confident that whatever else 
these recent views have identified, they have not provided unanimity on 
these matters. It is sufficient for the argument of this thesis, that 
the reader accepts that there are generally consistent but different2 
ways of considering such key concepts, and that in an elementary form, 
these differences have been indicated here. 
1. See Popper, Unended Quest, pp. 141-4 and Platts, Ways of Meaning, 
pp. 34-7. Haack in Philosophy of Logics, pp. 112-14 employs a 
similar line to Platts, but concludes more cautiously, 'Taraki's 
definition of satisfaction, if not of truth, bears some analogy to 
correspondence theories'. 
2. Theories presented separately here may have been brought under one 
roof by philosophers in the last fifteen years or so. Certainly, 
Strawson has indicated that the Correspondence Theory (new-style) 
and Ramsey's Redundancy Theory may have sufficient overlap that they 
can be regarded as variants of one school. Strawson presents such a 
possibility in 'A Problem about Truth' and 'Truth: A Reconsideration 
of Austin's views' (Loaico-Linguistic Papers, pp. 214-33, and pp. 234-49). 
Brought together one can view this theory as one alternative to 
Davidson's view that 'truth' in ordinary language is undefinable, 
except in conforming to Tarski's Convention T, from which criteria 
for the use of 'truth' are identified. The developments in Davidson's 
position are identifiable in such articles as, 'Truth as Meaning' 
[Contd. overleaf 
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(S nthese, xvii, 1967, pp. 304-23), when compared with 'Thought and 
Talk' (Mind and Language, ed. S. D. Guttenplan, Clarendon Press, 
1975, pp. 7-23) or 'Reply to Foster' (Truth and Meaning, ed. G. Evans 
and J. McDowell, O. U. P., 1976, pp. 33-41 . Davidson has come to be 
seen as representing the view that theories of meaning can only be 
devised from the successful construction of a theory of truth, and 
not vice versa. Other alternatives to this position include, 
a) Dummett's view which has been shown in this thesis to be closely 
tied to an Intuitionist standpoint, in which a theory of meaning 
presumes the identification of a theory, not of truth, but of 
'constructibility', or 'verification' or 'falsification'. 
b) Quine also provides an alternative that has significant sympathy 
with a position taken centrally in the thesis, that of the Pragmatists, 
particularly those like Peirce who have realist inclinations. Quine 
also fails to find a guarantee of unambiguous communication in truth 
conditions. He accepts the 'indeterminacy of translation' as sup- 
port for his belief that any security for communication is to be 
found in the possibility of empirically equivalent experiences that 
people have, rather than in what they say. In the discussion of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in Chapter 5 of this thesis, this 
point is implicit in the position identified for Quine. As with 
Dummett's position, the successful use of 'truth' is found in what 
people do, and this form of realism was discussed on pp. 276-79 above. 
While Dummett stands alone in allowing the possibility of anti- 
realism, he indicates a sympathy with those influenced by Austin, 
Strawson and more strongly recently, b Grice, who believe that 
Davidson's (and incidentally Quine too) position may provide an 
adequate, if restricted, theory of truth, but in using such a theory 
to frame a theory of meaning, the position stands against that of 
ordinary usage. The elimination of intensional presuppositions, as 
occur if one claims that it makes sense to talk of 'the meaning of 
"Eric Blaire is alive"', as if one would talk of abstract entities, 
is considered by Grice and others as tantamount to the elimination 
of meaning itself. Certainly, Davidson only has room for 'meaning 
in L', rather than 'meaning' per so. Apart from the truth conditions 
by which one can test the truth of 'Eric Blaire is alive', one is 
left, according to this rebuttal of Davidson, with only the alternative 
of 'this is what I/she/he/etc. means by... ', and not, 'this is what 
is meant by... '. There is the soft echo of Plato and Frege, as they 
have been met in the main body of the thesis, in this alternative to 
Davidson. 
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Mathematics, Science of Possibility*-A Critical Review 
E. BLAIREt 
Holland Park School, London, England 
Summary 
This paper supports the view that search for the applicative standpoint in mathematical 
education has yet to be sufficiently exploited. Mathematical propositions are considered to 
have both an `internal' and `external' role and thus a system of `potential models' is evolved. 
Despite the stress on the applicative nature of the subject it is argued in conclusion that the 
position in the body of the paper is compatible with the synthetic apriority of mathematics. 
What is Mathematics About? 
`Mathematics, Science of Possibility" is the phrase Ormell uses to entitle his answer to 
the question, `what mathematics is about? ' 1 support Ormell's answer but feel that some 
of his arguments may gain from expansion and critical appraisal. His is a genuine attempt 
to show on philosophical grounds that the recent approach to mathematics, the isola- 
tionist policy, is not being true to what mathematics is about. Mathematics is not just an 
aesthetically pleasing manipulation of symbols but a purposeful activity. To the mathe- 
matical educationist, particularly to those interested in the less able, the recent dragging 
of mathematics higher into the clouds is most frustrating. The less able child is at a totally 
concrete level of thought, and for him, learning mathematics can be validated only as a 
purposeful activity. Ormell's own interests are towards the A level child and so if both 
extremes of mathematics cry out for purposeful mathematics, then there are good grounds 
for looking for a justification of mathematics as such. If it could be shown that mathe- 
matics is mainly valuable as an artistic game, then surely many of the views of education 
inherent in our society would be turned on their heads. Mathematics has status today 
not for intrinsic value as an activity but because of the purposeful and applicative 
nature of the activities within it. 
Unfortunately just because one feels that it would be good for education if such-and- 
such were the case, it does not make it the case. This article is intended to be as impartial 
as possible, and to fault as well as support Ormell's arguments and conclusions. 
lt may be that one does not have to make a choice between mathematics as the 
production and manipulation of axiomatic systems and mathematics as `the study of 
what is true of hypothetical states of things'. 2 Tucker3 suggests that mathematical 
propositions have both an internal and an external role. As the former, they are rules, 
proofs, identities, etc. of a fact-free but meaningful nature, and as the latter, they have 
the potentiality for being models of possible pictures of reality. Tucker rejects the formalist 
* C. P. Ormell, 'Mathematics, science of possibility', Int. J. Mahr. Educ. Sci. Technol. 3,329-341 
(1972). 
f Assistant Master in Mathematics. 
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position where he says that mathematics consists of meaningless axiomatic systems, but 
supports for his internal role, formalizers where the axiomatic systems are meaningful. 
Whether or not such rigid formalists ever existed is not to be debated here, but I take 
mathematical meaningfulness to infer the following: 
a+b =c has a meaning given in terms of the relations and the relating of variables by 
the relations. It is not necessary for the proposition to have substitution incidents in 
order that it should become meaningful in a formalist sense, that is true or false. 
What is to be considered here is whether Ormell has provided a notion of mathematics 
which puts these roles in a truer perspective. In one form or another the vast majority 
of people would accept that mathematical propositions do have this 'internal role'. 
However, a purely internal debate cannot give a justification for mathematics in a wider 
context. The 'internal role' is no answer to the question 'what are mathematical pro- 
positions used for? ' as asked by the outsider. He wants to know the purpose of mathe- 
matics and he expects quite rightly an ordinary language justification. As science is 
generally justified by the value of its application, so may be mathematics, but the 
arguments cannot be identical. Mathematics, the 'hand-maiden' of science is one more 
step away from reality-what is constructed. 
Any but those concepts taken as fundamental are open to operational definition in 
science. The concepts of mathematics are at most open to a purposive definition for 
`externally' they do not 'do' anything. The 'objects' of the mathematical world are them- 
selves passive in function. The 'objects' of the scientific world have themselves an active 
function. Pi has a purpose, but electrons do things. As soon as one tries to externally 
justify mathematics, one turns to science for comparison. People like Peirce, Popper and 
Lakatos have tried to use one theory to explain both disciplines. Both Peircean Fallibilism 
and Popperian Falsificationism stress the importance of counter-example. Tucker has 
noted that not all mathematics as an activity is on the level of constructive proofs, but 
much is on the level of constructive arguments. It is on this less rigorous level that the 
work of Lakatos4 (following Popper) seems to hold water. While the mathematical world 
searches for proof, counter-examples are valuable. Peirce saw that this process cannot 
be taken as identical to that in science, for mathematics consists of fact-free hypotheses. 
Mathematics refers only to 'possible states of affairs'. One might argue that mathematics 
at its lowest level is like science at its highest, for generally science is validated by 
observation and by correct prediction of a specific nature. 
Model 
It would seem at this point that one might take up Ormell's position. To him, mathe- 
matics is about problem-solving and it does this by a simulating activity. The hypo- 
theses of Peirce become the models of Ormell. Ormell uses the word 'model' not in its 
usual mathematical sense but in its scientific sense. His 'model' is not an 'internal-role' 
player but an 'external-role' player. It is not the kind of model that shows the consistency 
and independence of the axioms of a deductive system, but the kind of model used by 
Wittgensteinb in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics where 2+2=4 is a 
model of a possible situation. (The in-between model are strokes made on paper or 
fingers counted to discover how many dolls a girl has. ) This model helps to solve a 
problem in 'the external world'. It is not just a sterile paradigm. The line between 
mathematics and science may seem to disappear with this approach but what may remain 
is the distinction between a hypothetical and an experimental study. A little girl is 
experimenting to find out how many dolls she has, laying them out in front of her and 
MATHEMATICS, SCIENCE OF POSSIBILITY 415 
counting them by one method or another. Her answer is an empirical statement that 
may be false. This is not doing mathematics because mathematics is not an activity of 
manipulating objects as they are given. Anyone who recognizes any type of distinction 
between mathematics and science accepts this. A formalist might say that the mathe- 
matician deals with problems of the `outside world' by idealization. What seems 
important for Ormell's thesis is to make clear the distinction between a simulating 
activity and an idealizing activity. The general position seems to have been to see the 
application of pure mathematics to experience as an activity to be regulated from within 
pure mathematics. 
Let us take a hideously simple example: 
`How many apples are there when I add an apple to a box of apples with one apple 
already in it? ' 
The logicist knows the statement `1 +1= 2' is an identity statement or an analytically 
true proposition. The problem must be reduced to a statement that is able to be sub- 
stituted by a logical symbolic phrase deducible from the axioms (plus those necessary 
additional ones) of the system. Suppose we get `I apple add 1 apple =2 apples'. This 
may now be said to characterize units and couples thus having the same logical status 
as the original arithmetic proposition. The formalist takes this a stage further and ends 
up with a totally symbolic statement like 
((xoE1) & (YoE1))=((xouyo)E2) 
which has the same logical status as 
(x) (Y) 
l(XE 
1) & (YE l )) 
= 
((x uy) E2) 
These approaches and the intuitionist are all inward looking and in no way explain the 
application of mathematics to experience, to the lay-man. They are not explanations at 
all but further layers of `private language'. Körners and others have tried to break out of 
this network by saying that the mathematical statement is an idealization of the problem. 
Every property of the apples is ignored except for that of being of `unit' value. The `adding' 
relationship between the apples is retained, but no questions are asked of how or why 
the adding comes about. Thus we come to a mathematical solution `I +I= 2' which 
when de-idealized gives me an answer to my problem, `two apples'. Körner represents 
this as 
ein (ei = b) --> (bi -* b2) -> (b2 = e2) A ea 
What we have are empirical situations put through an idealizing machine to shrink them 
down to their `exact concepts' and a reverse process at the end of the operation. To 
Körner7 the statement `1 apple and 1 apple makes 2 apples' treated in this way is a 
problem of applied mathematics which is itself inexact and not distinguishable from 
theoretical physics say. What is important is that the process of idealization from inexact 
to exact concepts is thought to be necessarily the way applied mathematics functions and 
also it should be noted that logicists and formalists think their descriptions are similarly 
unique. 
At least Körner has tried to get outside to deal with the problem, but he has not 
recognized the hypothetical status in practice of applied mathematics problems. If the 
question is `how many apples does 1 apple and 1 apple make? ' it may be mathematical 
but if it is, `here is 1 apple and here is I apple, how many apples are there? ' then the 
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question is not for the mathematician but for the man in the street or the scientist. The 
mathematician deals with the hypothetical, not the actual. Only the actual needs to be 
idealized, not the hypothetical. Thus it is that Ormell's simulating activity of mathematics 
in application to experience is far more digestible than an idealizing theory. If one deals 
with possible situations then one is taking the elements of reality as they stand without a 
need to pass them through idealization processes for they are to he modelled in the 
mathematics not `processed' into it. One looks for applicable mathematical models for 
the problem situation and sees which provides the best practical solution. What one is 
not claiming is that there is a discipline of applied mathematics which is governed by 
necessary rules so as to process all problems of reality with mathematical content. It is 
seeing applicable mathematics in this light that leads to the rigid traditional views of 
applied mathematics. There is nothing there but the pure mathematics, the real life 
problem and a way of looking at it and tackling it. What does not exist in any case is 
applied mathematics. One has pure mathematics which is the source of models for 
simulating real-life problems if interpreted in the right way. This method of interpretation 
is not an extension of pure mathematics, governed by rules and a logico-symbolic system 
but rather, an extension of imagination-another external rather than internal source of 
the aesthetic in mathematics. 
Interpreted Mathematics 
Let us try again to clarify how mathematics is to be described. It is not to be taken 
as uninterpreted symbolism for if this is all that it is then educationally, unless one is to 
be a formalist, it has almost no value in the external world. However, if it is to be 
'interpreted mathematics' then one must enquire for what purpose is it interpreted. The 
answer here is to say that the formalist has produced an infinite number of 'kits' of 
uninterpreted symbolism from which mathematical models of situations may be made 
up. These are all'potential models' each of which may have an infinite number of possible 
situations in which it may be interpreted. To see this as the connection between mathe- 
matics and reality seems fine, but Ormell seems to have a hint of the idea that within 
mathematics itself this `modelling' is on-going. That is to say that mathematics is a 
layered cake where the uninterpreted symbolism ('uninterpreted' for the formalist and 
`interpreted' for the formalizer) may in one sense be a model of the uninterpreted 
symbolism at a higher level of generality. When one talks in this way one may be 
twisting from the concept of a 'scientific model' to that of a 'mathematical model' without 
showing either that the two concepts are essentially one or admitting the change. 
I shall take it that what Ormell means is that any level of mathematics may be used as 
a model for a solution of a problem depending on the level of generality of the problem. 
Thus any part of mathematics may be interpreted and so it is mathematics in toto which 
is the 'science of possibility'. Ormell discusses the language of possibility and it seems to 
me that this language is most applicable to 'action' rather than 'objects'. The 'what' of 
possibility may just be an emphasis of English where the only available general pronoun 
is not as neutral as those of other languages. The language and the reality of imagination 
on the other hand necessarily have an objective primacy. To imagine building a wall 
depends, if we are to do it in mental pictures, upon starting with objects that then do 
things. It seems to me that it is the possibility of building a wall which is analogous to the 
possibility of mathematics and not the possibility of a wall. Ormell is trying to see 
mathematics as a next level of abstraction from disciplined imagination but this may have 
no more than a twisted validity. By disciplined imagination I may go through the complete 
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process of building a wall but the plans of the architect, quantity surveyor or builder 
may be more abstract. What distinguishes the imagined processes from others including 
mathematics is the lack of possibility of verification or falsification. This is not an attack 
on Ormell for he does discuss how mathematics differs from scale drawings, etc. It may 
be noted that Ormell says that what makes mathematics fundamental here is that `there 
is nothing in addition to the record' and Wittgenstein makes a similar remark, in the 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: `In mathematics process and result are 
equivalent'. Wittgenstein goes on to make another relevant point in distinguishing what 
mathematics allows us to do and science does not. 
'I can calculate in the medium of imagination, but not experiment. ' Lakatos talks of 
`thought experiments' and sees them only differing from their scientific counterparts in 
their levels of abstraction, while Wittgenstein thought there was a logical gap. I side with 
Wittgenstein in what follows and believes that he would have had great sympathy for 
Ormell's views. Wittgenstein equates mathematical solutions and models at one point 
and talks of mathematical propositions as frameworks of possible descriptions. 
'Mathematics forms a network of norms. ' 
It seems to me that Wittgenstein believed mathematics is important anthropologically 
because it has application and if it had no application it would have far less status. 
'The mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer. ' 
Only the unknown or ill-considered artist acclaims that art has its true value in the 
creating and not in its communication. This is the failing that Ormell is clearly high- 
lighting. Even earlier in Peirce8'9 we find similar lines of thought and perhaps Aristotle's 
always so practical spirit lies back in the depth of this program. 
To return to the surface I feel that Ormell'o''t might have validly laid greater stress on 
`interpreted mathematics' as a purposeful activity. That is to say the manipulation, the 
simulating, the connecting is to be stressed rather than the things related. It seems to me 
that much of the sterility lies in the ghost of logicism which is a set theory/class program 
as against a `program of relations'. Ormell talks of `reification' which has a thing- 
orientated connotation. This may be better seen as `the possibility of states of affairs'. 
Let us see mathematics as a theory of possible relations. In a problem about a wall and 
a ladder, set so that I can get over the wall, if I am in prison the wall, the ladder and the 
setting are not themselves just possibilities. What is found in 'disciplined imagination' 
are the possible ways these things may be related and similarly my mathematical model 
provides me with ways of relating things. The mathematics is not so much 'a study of 
what is true of hypothetical states of things' as Peirce put it, but rather 'the hypothetical 
relationships among things'. Thus, one may be able to make a direct attack on `idealizing 
theories' of applied mathematics by stressing the place of relations. Ormell rightly states 
that in mathematics the record and the manipulation are one, but too often it has been 
forgotten that the power of mathematics lies in the possible manipulations rather than 
in the expressions so produced. The manipulations cannot be idealizations of activities 
in the real world but are simulating activities comparable to a computer program 
simulating population growth. Reproduction cannot occur in a computer. Mathematics 
is itself the investigation of possible relationships between fact-free symbols. 
Thus, one has two notions of mathematics as the science of possibility. In its non- 
applied state it is providing, as Ormell said, 'kits' and then related to a particular 
problem one has a set of possibilities some of which may satisfactorily simulate the 
needed relationships of the problem. It is in the latter interpretation that the life- 
mathematics dichotomy is solved, or at least given a public hearing. 
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Interpretations 
Before drawing conclusions I should like to discuss this interpretation of mathematics 
with regard firstly to education and secondly to science. Ormell notes the distinction 
between statements of applicable mathematics and those of a mixed number/verbal 
nature. A statement of the first kind would be open to genuine simulation by mathe- 
matics while the second type is not `intended' for such. This is partly to go back over 
what has been previously stressed, that in the past philosophers have used statements of 
the second type to exemplify applied mathematics. They have taken it that these were 
just simplified versions of `the meaty problems of reality'. These may not however be 
mathematical statements in the first sense at all. Take a statement such as: 
`six defenders and five attackers make up a football team'. 
This may be simulated as 
6a+5b=c or 6p+5p= lip 
but my sporting comment only becomes a question of mathematics if the context is 
appropriate. That is to repudiate someone who agrees that there are eleven players but 
thinks there are seven defenders and five attackers. The point is that Ormell says that 
numbers may be just symbols independent of any mathematical framework and I want 
to take this further and say that one may make a statement which for you is not an 
attempt to make any correct numerical comment. I may not be able to add up to eleven 
and yet still know: 
`six defenders and five attackers make up a football team'. 
Relating to this are several educational points that are often ignored. Firstly a child 
is counting correctly when he says: `one, two, three, ... ', not because 
he is making valid 
manipulations but merely because he repeats a socially accepted verbal procedure. 
Similarly, a child may learn to count up to a hundred and that ninety-nine is followed 
by one hundred but not that 2,135 follows 2,134 or that 2,136 means two thousand, one 
hundred and thirty-six. It is not just a matter of set theory for the child but also things 
like recursive definitions, a theory of relations and the learning of a public means of 
precise communication. 
Perhaps more important than these examples is how the purity of mathematics as 
stressed by logicists and formalists, etc. can lead to practically speaking dangerous or 
at least deplorable attitudes for adult life. The war-cry of method and not correct calcu- 
lation is not necessarily right. One may be able to rely on a computer for calculations 
but one should recognize that errors of one part in a million may spell doom. In the 
classroom one may tell pupils at A level that the constants of indefinite integrals are not 
to be calculated, but in problems of aircraft friction it is the `C's that matter and not 
those easily obtained beautiful pieces of integration. 
Thus mathematics may be aesthetically pleasing but the educationalist must not 
ignore its applicative value. We have seen that mathematics and science may often go 
hand-in-hand. However, Ormell suggests that a possible distinction lies in the fact that 
what one might call mathematical experience and the results derived from it are therefore 
`«-repeatable', while that of science would only he `ß-repeatable'. Körner talks of pure 
mathematics having `infinite-repeatability' in a similar way. Ormell does not want to 
draw such a dramatic line between mathematics and science. It may be just that they 
considered themselves scientists that the symbolic models of Maxwell, Sommerfeld, 
Bohr and Einstein were seen as parts of theoretical physics. No one can deny that it was 
interpretation within physics that gave experimental value to the models. Bohr's circles 
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and Sommerfeld's Keplerian ellipses are closer to the imagination and thus mathematics 
than experience. Hermann Weyl said that physics attempts to convert natural laws into 
a priori constructed mathematical functions. Perhaps it is more correct to see functions 
provided which are capable of interpretation within physics. 
Mathematics is still not verified by experience and as such remains logically distinct 
from science. However, the same mathematics as an interpreted model may be shown 
to be a correct model by experimentation. That is to say that the correctness of our choice 
of model from all the possible ones is validated by experimentation, but not the model. 
Whatever roles mathematics may have, there remains only one discipline of knowledge, 
but there may be several fields of interpretation. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion I want to lay emphasis on two features of Ormell's `Mathematics, 
Science of Possibility', the one seems of particular educational importance and the other 
of particular philosophical importance. 
Firstly, if one accepts that mathematics is a simulating activity for problem-solving in 
life-mathematics contexts, then this is the most practically relevant way a child can see 
what mathematics is about. If Peters is right and education is initiation into worthwhile 
activities, then there seems to have been a danger recently of seeing mathematics as 
`initiation into an applicationless metaphysics or mind-trainer' which not even the 
Pythagorians would have seen as adequate justification for giving mathematics a central 
place in the scheme of things. It is one thing to value art for its own sake but another to 
deny society the value of mathematics as a `science'. 
Secondly, Ormell seems to feel that the underlying support given to the philosophical 
thesis that mathematics is synthetic a priori is no longer of importance, whether right or 
wrong. That one knows 3+5 =8 only by experience and that the proving and the 
recording are one, does not seem to me to show that mathematical knowledge is not 
logically different in status from scientific. Ormell may well have shown that the Kantian 
position is most unsatisfactory, but surely mathematics as `fact-free manipulation' at a 
level of abstraction above `disciplined imagination' is still distinct by more than just 
degree from the discipline of science. The choosing of `kits' may be empirical but surely 
not the kits themselves. What may be being brought to light is the strange status of much 
of the work of theoretical sciences. These too may be `kits' whose construction is also 
comparable to `disciplined imagination' but they are not constructed with the intention 
that they should hold a truth independent of experience. To someone who relies on the 
notion of applied mathematics as an idealization of science, a distinct structure from 
pure mathematics, then the theoretical sciences may be interpreted similarly. However, 
by Ormell's conception of mathematics, one is not forced into that position and there 
are no propositions of applied mathematics with a status lying between the a priori and 
the a posteriori, for all mathematical propositions can keep their a priori status. Only the 
interpretations may be open to empirical validation. Similarly, there are no inexact 
concepts of applied mathematics to worry about and a similar saving may be found for 
the concepts of theoretical sciences. As possible models they can be treated as possessing 
concepts no less exact than those of mathematics, but they are distinct from those of 
mathematics because no one intends them to have both an internal and an external role. 
There is no purely symbolic uninterpreted physical science but only the interpreted kind. 
A proposition of mathematics can only be validated necessarily internally while a 
proposition of physics can at most be internally falsified-its validation is necessarily 
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external and as such' empirical. In this sense mathematics retains its logical priority and 
independence of the theoretical sciences. 
What Ormell may have left for others to show is that while mathematics is a `science 
of possibility', branches at least of other sciences may also be given this title, although 
I would add, not the same logical status. It is not the intention of this paper to decry the 
value of traditional philosophies of mathematics for their internal analyses of mathe- 
matics, but only to doubt their value as external explanations and thereby their value 
for justifying mathematics as one among other worthwhile activities within education. 
Ormell himself seems to go one step further and to say that the Peircean-based philosophy 
of mathematics is a philosophy of mathematics while the approaches of logicists, 
formalists and intuitionists are not, because they are nothing but internal analyses, 
metamathematics and not philosophy. 
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Creativity and Mathematical Thinking E. Blaire 
In this article Eric Blaire discusses Prof. Zeeman's view 
that mathematics is at once 'inhuman' and 'creative art'. 
Prof. Zeeman's article in Mathematics in Schools was, how- 
ever, reprinted from the Psychiatric Quarterly, 1966; it 
may not fully represent Prof. Zeeman's current views. 
This paper may be best seen as a reply by a school-teacher to 
an article by Zeeman. 1 In that article mathematics is claimed 
to be unique among the sciences, as it alone is both creative 
and independent of humanity and the universe. It is neither 
my wish nor belief to deny that mathematics is open to 
aesthetic appreciation, but I fear that Zeeman's expression 
of his position is open to dangerous misinterpretations at 
levels below that of the University. 
Zeeman is probably right to draw distinctions between Mathe- 
matics and the Arts, but perhaps the intended lines should 
have been drawn more clearly. He says, "It is as if every 
art student of today could copy and improve upon the canvasses 
of the great masters". But why stick to such a narrow con- 
ception of the Arts? Logically literary masterpieces could be 
repeated, and some abstract paintings are open to identical 
reproduction. The analogy seems particularly troublesome if 
we consider prints or moulds which the student can reproduce 
and perhaps undeniably improve upon in, say, clarity by means 
of technical advances. Certainly Zeeman wishes to make a 
logical, rather than an empirical, point. Perhaps the point is 
that necessarily mathematical 'masterpieces' have a duality. 
That is to say, they are not what they are only for themselves, 
but also because they are new tools for the continuation of 
the game. As such they may be used and improved by anyone 
working, i. n the sam field. New uses may be found for them 
within the subject. It is this 'instrumentalism' which draws 
a clear line between Mathematics and the Arts. 
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Elliott's distinction between the traditional and new con- 
cepts of creativity2 may provide us with a similar line. 
If mathematicians are not 'makers' but 'discoverers' then 
on Elliott's view one would not apply the traditional con- 
cept of 'creative' to what they do. However the new concept 
finds its paradigms in practical activities where exceptional 
imaginativeness or ingenuity is denoted as 'creative' in this 
new sense. It may be that the Arts mainly use one concept 
and the Sciences the other, and Mathematics which at various 
times has been thought to belong to either, neither or both 
camps, may have had both concepts applied to it. Zeeman 
certainly seems to intend to use the traditional concept 
while putting mathematics into the sciences where the tradit- 
ional concept is inapplicable. Thus if we see mathematical 
creativity only in the new sense this kind of analogy problem 
will not arise. 
Thus far mathematics and the sciences have not necessarily 
been differentiated. Zeeman uses the concept of 'simplific- 
ation' to do this. Unfortunately Zeeman does not prove that 
it is logically impossible for this process to go on in the 
sciences except through mathematics. It may be logically 
possible for some sciences to simplify themselves without any 
substantial use of mathematics. It may, of course, have been 
Zeeman's intention to define 'simplification' as a mathematical 
activity, but he does not explicitly say so. It seems to rie 
that many scientific theories may have had more complex forms 
in the past than they have now. Examples of this are found in 
the theory of evolution, changes in zoological and botanical 
taxonomies and in geology. There one can find simplification 
without any primary requirement of involvement of mathematics. 
The power to simplify and explain, when applied to the natural 
and social sciences, is not necessarily the main basis for 
Society's support of mathematics. It may be argued that mathe- 
matics is more readily appreciated for its power to penetrate 
obscure ranges of possibilities, e. g. in the sciences. Zeeman 
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can only turn to his own cultural ; rou. p to confirm his 
commitment to the belief that the -,., iair justification for 
doing mathematics ought to be its ''creativity and elegance". 
This does not prove that applicability is only a secondary 
justification. 
Zeeman is demanding ultimately an emotional tie to mathe- 
matics. We have seen above that it is not possible con- 
vincingly to argue that mathematics is "the most original 
and most creative of all the sciences", but another point 
arises here: Zeeman has not shown that mathematics does 
not fall within 'the technologies', rather than the 
sciences. 
If the applicative standpoint is central to mathematics 
then perhaps the basis for itq*gro, ": th may lie in its 
strength as a technology, rather than as a science. (This 
is not an argument, but a thought for consideration. ) 
This could be another way of highlighting the problem of 
the use of the word 'creative'; for in some sense 'pottery' 
may advance through being a 'technology' connected to 
metallurgy, a 'science'. Similarly mathematics may be open 
to such division; and in one area, the technological one, 
the traditional concept of 'creative' is appropriate, 
whereas in the scientific area only the new concept is 
appropriate. Perhaps one can go further and say that the 
activity of "creative thinking" as found in mathematics 
(which we may not agree can logically he divided into two 
parts) is distinguishable in its denotation from that 
found in any other area. That is, at least as a matter of 
fact, it is the only area where thinking is concerned with 
models of possible 'worlds' rather than actual. If this 
were shuw, wO to be the case, then Zeeinan's use ol 'ra, ost' 
would be, to say the least, inappropriate. 
Most people, of course, are not mathematicians, but there 
is an undeniable need for more people to have sonic 
the grm: th of mathematics 
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competence in, and understanding of, mathematics. If 
emphasis on the aesthetic value of mathematics is intended 
to bring this about by means of the educational process, 
then Zeeman is making some deep demands on Society. On 
Zeeman's position initiation into mathematics is understand- 
ing (if not 'acquiring') mathematical 'taste'; but this is 
at a level of mathematical competence that only a few attain. 
If others are to be so initiated then these few would seem 
to have ahead of them an inhuman task. 
Certain questions now arise about the possible relationship 
between 'the aesthetic' and mathematics. The qualities of 
"elegance, intrinsic beauty, profundity, generality, 
simplicity, depth, subtlety and economy" which make up mathe- 
matical 'taste' in Zeeman's opinion may be found in aesthetic 
appreciation generally. However Zeeman does not say whether 
or not these qualities are to possess particular features 
which may characterise them as applicable to mathematics alone. 
All these qualities may equally apply to music, say. Would 
Zeeman be happy to see music replace mathematics on the School 
time-table, if it were shown that at an earlier age a student 
may acquire greater appreciation of these qualities in music 
than in mathematics? If 'the aesthetic' is to be a justific- 
ation for doing mathematics, then either it cannot be a major 
one, or the aesthetic qualities named above must in some 
respects be either unique or peculiarly highlighted in mathe- 
matics. The last point may, of course, be a statement of 
Zeeman's position, but he does not say so explicitly. Perhaps 
'the aesthetic' is not to be mainly taken as a justification 
for teaching mathematics, but as an aim. That is to say, that 
at least the understanding of these qualities as exemplified 
in mathematics is one of the important ways a student can be 
shown to he initiated into mathematics. 
If we were discussing music this might seem to be a fair 
position; for no one doubts its place among the Arts; but 
with regard to mathematics there seem to be various problems. 
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Firstly, we have agreed that mathematics is not an Art. 
Secondly, Dienes for example, may accept the importance of 
these qualities in teaching mathematics as 'aims'. However, 
he may think that such qualities can be understood and 
exemplified by a child at a considerably lower level of 
mathematical development than that characterised by Zeeman. 
There may be a resulting confusion of different concepts by 
the primary and secondary teacher. Thirdly, at the second- 
ary level in particular, one may question whether or not 
'the aesthetic'can be taken as a major aim (or aim at all) 
in teaching mathematics. Surely, if we were to stress what 
may be highly subjective features of mathematical education, 
then the result could be a chaotic variation of material 
covered. The main aims of a secondary teacher must surely 
be to equip his students for their further needs in the area 
of mathematics, and also for those areas to which they may 
apply their developing mathematical knowledge. Certainly 
'The Aesthetic' may be an extrinsic aim of the teacher, but 
the proper consideration of it as an intrinsic aim would 
require greater clarification of the qualities laid down by 
Zeeman. 
Zeeman is not unaware of the applicative value of mathematics, 
and talks of valuable models to be produced in relation 
to brain cells. What is worrying is the tendency of modern 
text books to stress 'imagination, ingenuity and originality', 
which are at least some of the features of 'creative thinking' 
in mathematics (using Elliott's new concept), without 
sufficient regard to applicability, which is, at least, 
equally important. If one has only the notion of 'ingenuity', 
say, as found in 'the great mathematicians' then one is aiming 
at a level totally inappropriate to the average secondary 
school child. In the child's eyes this is likely to 'come 
across' as a logical, hard-headed approach to the subject 
which will alienate the vast majority of eleven-year-olds, 
possibly for life. On the other hand, an approach which has a 
considerable amount of applicativeness may provide the found- 
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ation necessary for producing students interested in 
mathematics. 
A teacher must recognise that his students are (-apah]e ei a 
level of thinking distinct in complexity, and probably in 
quality, from that of say, Zeeman. To use an analogy, it 
is not only the material that changes as the student 
advances, but also his tools. In this case the tools are, 
to a great extent, 'ways of thinking and approaching prob- 
lems'. The teacher may use 'material' which does not fall 
within the compass of pure mathematics. With guidance the 
child may develop 'his tools' through the manipulation of 
blocks whose physical properties are essential for the 
solution of the problem. Mathematics can be done before a 
child reaches a level of 'abstract thinking'. There is a 
danger that if one concentrates on seeing mathematics in its 
'abstract, inhuman' form one may blind oneself to the need 
for its initiation in a concrete form at various levels of 
conceptual development. 
As the title of this paper implies, I am not attacking 
Zeeman's views as such, but I am urging caution: because 
some of them may be taken as dogmas into the classroom, 
where they have, and I would say, must, lead to trouble. 
One finds attempts to teach eleven-year-olds to understand 
infinite cardinals, because the teacher wants to take his 
students along a logical sequence 'to the end'! It is 
forgotten that the child has yet to gain the equipment for 
such a level of conceptualisation. If all he possesses are 
concrete conceptions of mathematics, then he will be totally 
incapable of grasping Zeeman's abstract aesthetic qualities 
which the conceptually developed person may be capable of. 
What may be independent of 'levels' is the kind of approach 
demanded by mathematics. That is to say, given a problem, 
one 'kicks it around' mentally and then one relies on trial 
. and error (plus experience) to discover possible solutions. 
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when one finds an answer one cleans it up and if it still 
does hold, one has one more model to call upon in the 
future. (And if not, one tries again. ) Zeeman is highlight- 
ing what one finds in a 'real mathematician', and these 
qualities may be taken possibly by teachers as an ultimate 
goal which can be met only if, at the lower levels, the 
ground is prepared and the seeds sown. The danger then may 
be to treat the goal as a set of objectives capable of 
achievement in some way or other, at every level. 
Unfortunately 'thinking' is a difficult concept to define, 
and in schools 'thinking mathematically' requires at least 
two different interpretations. In each there is some open- 
ing for 'creativity', but it is to be found most readily 
where the 'isolationist mathematician' will not look. There 
is, firstly, what Dienes calls, "constructive thinking". 
But this is not half as important as 'analytic thinking'. 
Under this heading can fall the whole field of 'tackling 
problems'. A teacher has taken his students a considerable 
way when they can recognise which problems are suitable for 
mathematical treatment - perhaps this is what needs to be 
stressed most with regard to mathematical initiation. This 
might not be called a part of mathematics teaching at all 
from the point of view of a 'Zeeman-type philosophy' for it 
is an indubitably 'human' activity. 
Given a problem as mathematical, then the student must be 
able to pick out those factors which are relevant (and 
sufficient) for formulating an adequate model (which may not 
solve the problem, even then). As Miss Edith Biggs has 
always made clear, most of the 'creativity' goes on prior to 
computation and/or manipulation of symbols. (This is most 
probably the view of professional mathematicians like 
Zeeman, also. ) While some 'structural learning' (following 
a strictly logical sequence) may be necessary in order to 
operate in this area, there is no evidence, of either a 
logical or a psychological nature, to suggest that mathematics 
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as a whole, demands such an approach. It is just an 
impression given by people putting mathematics once formul- 
ated, on a level with propositional calculus. The truths 
there set down may be "independent of individual preferences" 
but this alone is not evidence that as an activity it. possess- 
es a unique objectivity, particularly for the student whose 
evaluation of mathematics may differ both from that of a 
teacher and/or a mathematician. 
Mathematics has been considered by too many people as an almost 
mystical activity where the uninitiated can tread only with 
the most calamitous results. Zeeman is putting mathematics 
on just such another pedestal; and any pedestal gives many 
teachers and students the impression that it is out of their 
reach. "These views lead to self-fulfillment! " Only the 
'genius' attempts to study on these terms at any depth because 
everyone believes that it is the subject for 'geniuses' alone. 
Zeeman links the poetic with orderliness, reliability, and 
predictability, but the link is ultimately subjective. It 
may be important to initiate children into mathematics - 
as Sawyer thinks - so that one cannot say of an answer: 
"If they had thought what it meant, they would have seen that 
it was ridiculous". The stress here is for understanding, 
and must not be taken as a cry for creative appreciation. 
The latter is only possible logically once there is sufficient 
understanding. 'Creativity' as a concept certainly possesses 
aesthetic overtones, but to recognise the importance of 
"simplification" is one thing and to make beauty a criterion 
of mathematical truth or validity is another. Zeeman as a 
mathematician may be able to afford to dull the distinctions 
of ordinary language, but the teacher needs to be clear about 
the difference between the traditional and the new concepts 
of 'creativity'. 
Let us make one final expression of belief in the humanity 
of mathematics. The history of mathematics is full of 
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instances of human influences. They may be logically only 
indirect but they yet remain essential. What guarantee is 
there that it would develop in the same way in inhuman or 
machine minds? The dominance of the denary system is a daily 
reminder of physiological pressure. That the Greeks 
developed geometry and not another branch of mathematics 
seems almost certainly to have been the result of an in- 
efficient numerical recording system. Gattegno argues: 
"Mathematics thus reflects, like any other human activity, 
the personal, the individual qualities which make its future 
as completely open as it must have been in the past". 
Mathematics reflects the societies of its origin. Recent 
developments in foundation theory all seem to indicate just 
how human rather than inhuman this subject is. People now 
ask, just how much of the rigour is an illusion: they com- 
plain that systems have been "forced" into logical frameworks 
by human inventiveness. The limits of mathematics lie there - 
these are now the fundamental questions of today. 
In concluding this article I return to 1944, the point from 
which rapid changes in School Mathematics were to come. In 
the report of that year on the teaching of mathematics one 
finds the desire that mathematics should provide "vivid and 
practical parts of the pupil's experience" and also that 
"every stage in the working of every problem should be set 
out in the form of a logical and grammatical statement; 
and taken together, these should fit consecutively into a 
coherent, meaningful and grammatical whole", This is again 
an attempt to link creativity and objectivity. Here the 
'logical' seems to be synonymous with 'common sense' or 
perhaps worse, 'what is right'. Certainly these are worry- 
ing beginnings which still seem to be echoed. No matter 
what one means by 'logical' it is dangerous to take as 
synonymous for mathematics phrases like 'creative thinking' 
and 'logical coherence'. I believe such mistakes are made 
by teachers partly because of the lack of clarity on the 
part of people like Zeeman, who fail to emphasise that the 
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'juggling, groping, hitting and missing' that precede dis- 
covery are not even necessarily logical activities (at all) 
and thus cannot be identical with the cold symbols that 
ultimately make up the new proof. The proof is not a 
written record of creativity; it is just a sign that 
creative thinking has gone on. It does not tell one what 
creative thinking is like. 
Zeeman has described his experience; the danger is to try 
to bring about the same level of experience independent of 
a student's conceptual. development; to initiate creative 
thinking as if it were logical thinking, and vice versa. 
No one should confuse the need for stimulating ingenuity, 
as capable of leading to mathematical accomplishment, with 
the teaching of logical rigour. Zeeman clearly expects the 
one to follow the other. I have tried to clarify the causes 
of this confusion and to urge the need for care when we are 
introducing mathematics at school level. E. B. 
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